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THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

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CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS

1925

PRINTED BY BHUPENDRALAL BANERJI AT THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS,
SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA

O. U. Press—Reg. No. 77 B.—3-12-25—600.

PREFACE

The present work embodies the results of several years of close study of Hindu Philosophy and particularly of that part of Hindu Philosophy which deals with Hindu ethical and spiritual life and its underlying principles. The work was undertaken in 1915 at the suggestion of Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal, then George V Professor of Philosophy of Calcutta University. It was also under Dr. Seal's close personal supervision and guidance that the research was carried on. Two chapters of the work were submitted for the Premchand Roychand studentship of Calcutta University as a first instalment. The award of the studentship for 1916 necessitated the continuation of the work on the lines originally proposed till 1920. The author has since altered his previous presentation, rewriting and elaborating some of the chapters and adding two new ones. He has also departed from the original plan rearranging the chapters in three parts in accordance with the main divisions of Hindu spiritual life. For the same reason he has added the chapter on "Moksha and Mokshasadhana" as constituting the culmination of Objective and Subjective Hindu Ethics and forming an integral part of the Hindu ethico-spiritual scheme.

As will appear from the presentation, the author has had to rely almost wholly on the original sources. Though many works on Indian and Hindu Philosophy have appeared since the author's particular undertaking, yet he has not been able to utilise any for his own *special* purpose. The author has tried to give a *philosophical* exposition of Hindu ethical ideas, while most

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Works on Indian Philosophy are disquisitions on chronology rather than philosophy.

As the author's method has been the occasion for some comments, the following explanations may be of some help to the reader. What he has attempted in this work is an *analytical* exposition of Hindu Ethics as distinguished from the historical. The History of Indian Philosophy, in the author's opinion, is as much an interpretation of significance as an enquiry into sequence. It therefore supposes two different kinds of enquiry—(1) a chronological enquiry into time-order, and (2) an analytical enquiry into meaning and value. The author's aim throughout has been to concentrate on the analytical and philosophical question proper. He has avoided chronology as a rule not only because he does not feel competent to tackle the chronological issues but also because he does not believe chronology to be of much use in a philosophical valuation of ideas. The necessity of accurate chronology for the History of Indian Philosophy need not be denied, but it is possible also to exaggerate its value and to glorify mere chronology into the History of Indian Philosophy. This seems at least to be a tendency of recent times, it being almost a fashion now-a-days with certain Indologists to make everything of the question of dates and to condemn even philosophy because it is not chronological. Dates have no doubt their use and value, but a mere assortment of dates of philosophical works, philosophers and schools of philosophy is no more the History of Indian Philosophy than a similar arrangement of names and dates the History of European Philosophy. An interpretation of the content is as much necessary for the genetic study of thought as it is for the genetic study of plant or animal life. To study the development of thought one has to depend on the analytical knowledge of thought-types

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quite as much as to study the evolution of plant and animal life one has need of accurate special knowledge of plant and animal types. It need not be denied that genetic studies have considerably modified our old ideas of forms as fixed types and of the species as eternal and immutable. It may even be conceded that they will succeed at last in reducing nature's variety to complete unity and in deriving its manifold forms from the variation and modification of a few elementary types. But this is hardly a good argument against the validity and the value of analytical studies. To prove the continuity of divergent forms is not to eliminate differences, but merely to show how types, apparently unlike, may yet have a common origin. Continuity is not identity, nor does the mere fact of sameness of origin annul essential specific differences. Analytical studies have thus their use and value despite all that genetic studies may hereafter establish or evolutionists claim for themselves. And even if science succeed at last in resolving being into pure becoming and land us on a fluid, mobile world of pure flux (as Bergson hopes), it will not have dispensed with the need of analysis for all our *practical* purposes.

Exception has also been taken to the author's method on the ground that he has indulged in comparisons with European and Modern Thought while explaining concepts and ideas which are peculiar to the Hindus. The author's reply is that these comparisons are an essential part of the enquiry he has undertaken and could not be avoided without prejudice to his work of analysis and interpretation. To explain the Hindu view-points to modern man he must needs use the language of modern man without which he cannot possibly make himself intelligible. The author cannot conceive of any really useful enquiry into meaning and

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significance except their resolution into the familiar and easily recognised, modern equivalents: by interpretation he means simply this bringing out of agreements and differences with the ideas that obtain to-day. To assume at the outset that the Hindu is so far removed from the European that it is impossible to interpret him to the European mind is to prejudge the very question at issue. If the author had ever been of this persuasion he would never have undertaken to write his book in English.

The author has not been able to consider either Bauddha or Jaina Ethics in the present work except only incidentally in some places more by way of contrast than as an elaboration of the Hindu view-points. One reason for this is the heterodox standpoint of these two Indian schools, repudiating as they do not only the authority of the Vedas but also the particular injunctions and prohibitions which the Vedas prescribe. This has necessarily altered the character of Jaina and Bauddha Ethics which start from the ethical as distinguished from the ceremonial conception of duty which is the orthodox Hindu view. There is also an essential difference of ideal and aim, a difference which characterises the Bauddhas and Jainas as radically distinct schools of thought with an altogether new outlook on life and its ultimate aim. It is true that the reasons which apply in these respects to Bauddha and Jaina Ethics also hold good in respect of Vaishnavika Ethics and the Bhakti School generally. Here also there is a fundamental departure from the Hindu standpoint which would seem to require a separate and independent treatment. But the Vaishnavas do not repudiate Hinduism nor place themselves in a position of conscious antagonism and opposition as the Jainas and Bauddhas do. They no doubt assimilate in their systems much that is foreign and

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even opposed to the spirit of Hinduism, but they do all this as synthetic philosophers seeking to liberalise Hinduism by enlarging its boundaries rather than as rivals emulating with it and contesting its right to the pedestal of Truth. They push Hinduism beyond the traditional limits, but they do it to meet its critics and save it from the assailants. They are Hindus who go beyond Hinduism, not anti-Hindus who renounce or disclaim it.

Before concluding the preface, the author begs to apologise to the reader for the unsatisfactory transliterations and misprints in this edition. Owing to the numerous demands on the small University Press, the printing, even in this form, has taken nearly two years. As a better get-up would have postponed the publication almost indefinitely, the author was obliged to be reconciled to a less satisfactory, earlier appearance. The author hopes however to make up for these deficiencies in the next edition. The author begs here to acknowledge his obligation to Babu Kshitish Chandra Chatterjee, M.A., Lecturer, Calcutta University, for the list of errata and corrigenda.

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The Ethics of the Hindus

INTRODUCTION

The 'Ethics of the Hindus' is based on a three-fold scheme of the spiritual life comprising the stages of sociality, subjective morality and the life absolute and transcendental. Hindu Ethics is thus social ethics and psychological ethics and culminates in the philosophy of the Absolute which is the consummation of the Spiritual life.

The social Ethics of the Hindus is represented in a scheme of Varnáshramadharma, *i.e.*, duties relative to one's Varṇa or social class and one's Áshrama or specific stage in spiritual discipline. The duties of Varna and Áshrama together constitute the code of relative duties, the duties of station in life, the duties obligatory on the individual in consequence of social status, temperament, specific powers and capacities. They are to be distinguished from the sádharmaadharma, the *common* duties of man, the duties that are obligatory on all men equally, irrespective of individual capacity, social status, nationality, or creed.

The Varnáshramadharma thus represent a code of relative duties and constitute the relativistic ethics of the Hindus. It comprises the ethics of sociality as well as the ethics of individual capacity and is thus fuller and more comprehensive than the Platonic scheme which is the ethics of sociality only. The basis of the classification according to Áshrama, it will be seen, is the genetic view of the moral life, and the importance, psychological as well as ethical, of such a view cannot be too much emphasised.

The Varnáshramadharma, as will be seen, constitute the sphere of the hypothetical imperative, but this does not imply that they are conditional on a subjective choice of the individual. On the contrary, they are all obligatory without condition in their respective spheres. Thus the duties of the Bráhmīn are obligatory without condition on whoever is a Bráhmīn, and the duties of the married life on whoever has married and has a family. Only the duties of one class or of one stage of life has no authority over another class or over another stage. Some however think that there is room here for individual freedom specially in regard to the order of the several Áshramas. Thus it is urged that though the order from Brahmacharyya through Gárhastya to the later stages is true for the majority yet there may be exceptional cases, men with special powers and capacities, who may attain to the later stages without going through the earlier.

These relative duties however do not constitute the entire field of the moral life. Besides these there is also a code of common duties or Sádharmaadharma which every man must observe whatever his social position or individual capacity. The Sádharmaadharma are thus the duties of universal scope and validity and are to be distinguished from the merely relative duties. The idea underlying this classification is that two kinds of service are obligatory on every individual for the protection and help spiritual as well as material accorded to him by his fellow beings. In the first place it is necessary that he should pay off his debt to his particular community in a specific way according to his capacity for the special advantages and opportunities of life it provides for. But this is not all. Besides his community he is also indebted to mankind in general by whose culture and experience through the trials of life he hourly profits in his career

through the world. It is therefore necessary that he should pay off this larger debt, in however small an amount, by assisting the cause of humanity in general and seeking the common good as distinguished from the good of his own community. This is the inner significance of the scheme of Sādhāranadharma which is thus a check to communal egoism seeking as it does an equitable adjustment of the relative claims of communities in a larger ethics of humanity.

From what has been already stated it is clear that the Sādhāranadharma constitute the foundation of the Varnāshramadharma, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For example the Brahmin in performing his religious sacrifice must not appropriate another's property for the purpose, non-appropriation being one of the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own community as well as, though in a negative way, the cause of humanity as a whole. It should be noted however that the Varnāshramadharma are not directed merely to the good of the community—they also, though in an indirect way, subserve the purpose of the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a specific community who observes the duties of his class does not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same process, all other communities according to their deserts and needs and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen, is also the view of Plato whose virtue of justice is the common good which is to be realised by each class through its specific duties, but this is to be distinguished from the common good which constitutes the object of the Sādhāranadharma of the Hindu classification. The end in these common and universal duties is not the common well-being which is being concretely realised in specific communities, but the common good as the pre-condition

and foundation of the latter ; it is not the good which is common-in-the-individual but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individuäl. Hence the Sádharana duties are obligatory *equally* on all individuals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity.

The Sádharanadharma and the Varnáshramadharma together constitute the objective morality of the Hindus, *i.e.*, morality as represented in a code of external acts and requiring outward conformity. But objective morality is not sufficient by itself and it is necessary that the individual after a period of discipline in objective co-operation and self-restraint, should look inwards into himself and aim at subjective purity and inner excellence of the will. This constitutes subjective morality and gives us the psychological ethics of the Hindus. It is assumed that Chittasuddhi or purification of the mind is an indispensable condition for the higher stages of the moral life. Objective morality represents the stage of the moral tutelage of the individual after which however he must be left to his own freedom. But even then it is necessary that he should not be led away by the mere intensity of the impulse of the moment. A certain equanimity of the mind, a sort of mental equilibrium and impartiality is the pre-condition of the proper and righteous use of one's freedom. It is only in this impartial and undisturbed frame of mind that the rival claims of competing impulses and moral values can be rightly appreciated and adjudged. To this end it is however necessary that the natural man should be purified and spiritualised and should learn through a proper understanding of his inner nature, to subordinate the lower to the higher impulses and to maintain the balance and tranquillity of the soul which are the pre-conditions of proper ethical valuation. This constitutes the problem of the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus which thus includes not merely the analysis of the will

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and its inner springs and their psychological as well as their ethical classification, but also a part of their practical ethics as embodied in the various practical schemes of Chittasuddhi through external and internal aids.

Even subjective morality however is not the highest stage of the spiritual life. It is itself a means like sociality which together with the latter must lead to the ultimate end or goal which is the life absolute and transcendental. Here sociality as well as subjective morality must be merged in the end thereby either to be annulled and transcended or to re-appear in a new light and charged with absolute significance. This is the underlying intent of Patanjali's Scheme of Yoga, Shankara's view of Moksha, Rámánuja's doctrine of Bhakti and the Buddhist theory of Nirvána. All these agree in recognising the transcendental as the limit of the empirical life, the timeless as the truth of all that is in time. This timeless, transcendental life is therefore the culminating stage of the spirit, the sphere of its consummation and fruition. It is in a certain sense a supermoral plane of being, a level of Spiritual life in which the individual as consciously participating in the eternal reality of the Absolute, is free from the sense of mere striving as well as from that of mere duty or obligation. It is the stage of the spirit, in short, in which the good is not presented as something *to be accomplished* but as an accomplished fact from eternity which the individual therefore does not realise but merely reveals in his own life as participating in the life of the Absolute.

This absolute life however has itself been variously conceived by the Hindus, being in some systems regarded as the negation of all that is empirical (Nyaya), in some as a kind of intuition (Shankara), in some again as intuition culminating in devotion, worship and love and enriching and enlivening the empirical life of activity and

thereby filling it with absolute significance and worth (Rámánuja). This intuition again is conceived either as the intuition of the Self, or as the intuition of Purusha as well as Prakriti, or again as pure intuition or knowledge without either locus (Jnátá) or object (Jreya) which is the philosophy of pure experience.

One special point of interest in this connection is the difference between Shankara and Rámánuja in the significance they respectively attach to the empirical life of Duty after the emergence of the intuition of the Absolute. According to Shankara the moral life is at an end at this stage and there is Karma-Sanyása or freedom from the bond of Karma or duty in consequence of the lapse of the individual into the eternal reality of the Absolute. The moral bond here falls off as do other bonds and a state of absolute freedom is reached which is the Freedom of Reality itself. According to Ramanuja however the moral life is not annulled in this mediating process of absolute intuition, but only transfigured, shorn of its character of mere subjectivity, and filled with absolute significance and value. The sense of duty therefore persists even after the intuition of the Absolute and the obligations of the empirical life continue to be binding in all stages of the spirit; only at this plane they cease to appear as merely empirical or subjective and are recognised instead as the self-revelation of the transcendental reality, the temporal manifestation of what is itself timeless and eternally real. The moral life therefore receives now an entirely new meaning: it is no longer the service of man merely, but also of God as revealing Himself in suffering humanity, the Eternal Absolute as accomplishing itself in time through the temptations, the struggles, the successes and failures of men, that is, through the history of the world.

PART I

THE OBJECTIVE AND SOCIAL ETHICS OF THE HINDUS : THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DUTIES.

The objective morality of the duties is the ground-work of Hindu Ethics. As constituting their concrete moral life it furnishes the positive basis of Hindu ethical concepts and norms. It also is preparatory to the higher morality of self-purification which necessarily presupposes the mediation of an objective code of right and wrong actions. We shall therefore first consider the Objective Ethics of the Hindus, *i.e.*, their enumeration and classification of the Dharma in the objective sense of 'duties.'

N.B.—The term 'Dharma' is also used in the subjective sense of *virtue* as well as in the sense of *religious merit*. Here however we are concerned only with its objective meaning of 'duty.'

Manu's Classification of the Duties.

Manu's classification of the Duties is one of the earliest attempts at a systematic treatment of this subject. Manu distinguishes between relative duties (Varnáshramadharma), *i.e.*, duties relative to one's station in life, and common duties (Sádháranadharma), *i.e.*, duties of universal scope and validity. The relative duties are the specific duties relating to one's station in life, *i.e.*, one's station as determined by one's varna or caste and one's áshrama or particular stage of life. The universal duties are the duties irrespective of one's age, caste or creed, *i.e.*, duties obligatory on man as man and

not as a member of a particular community or social class or as being at a particular stage or period of life.

Under the class of the *Sádháranadharmas* or common duties Manu enumerates the following ten :—

Steadfastness (*Dhairya*).

Forgiveness (*Kshamá*).

Application (*Dama*).

Non-appropriation, *i.e.*, Avoidance of theft (*Chouryábháva*).

Cleanliness (*Shoucha*).

Repression of the Sensibilities and Sensuous appetites (*Indria-nigraha*).

Wisdom (*Dhi*).

Learning (*Vidyá*).

Veracity (*Satya*).

Restraint of Anger (*Akrodha*).

A glance at the above list shows that nearly all the duties have reference to the attainment of the individual's own perfection. There is practically no recognition of the social duties proper, *i.e.*, of the duties of social service in a positive sense as distinguished from negative toleration (*Kshamá*) and non-appropriation (*Chouryábháva*). Even veracity does not necessarily imply positive social service in this sense : it aims at negative non-interference rather than positive service and it may be practised purely as a dianoetic virtue of self-culture, *i.e.*, as absolute self-dedication to Truth. In any case there is no necessary implication of any positive social service in veracity any more than there is in the other enumerations under the common duties. It follows therefore that Hindu morality primarily aimed at the autonomy of the individual, *i.e.*, at making him self-sufficient and self-dependent and free from all external bonds, physical and social. This is the underlying purport of the ascetic

virtues of steadfastness, application, repression and self-restraint. The dianoetic virtues of wisdom, learning and veracity have also this end of self-culture in view, and the omission of the virtues of positive social service from the lists is also significant when viewed in the light of this ideal of a non-social self-autonomy and self-sufficiency. In fact, it is this ideal which dominates the Hindu Doctrine of the Law of Karma—the Law which apportions to each individual what he has himself earned by his own deeds or karma. According to the Hindu idea there can be not only no vicarious sin and punishment but also no vicarious redemption. No man can help another in the attainment of his end: just as he cannot reap what another has sown so also he cannot help another to his fruition. A free spirit is a law unto himself and is arbiter not only of his own natural lot but also of his higher end or destiny as spirit. There are thus no duties which are not strictly speaking duties to self, and duty in the sense of positive moral aid to others is self-contradictory in its very conception. One's natural lot is itself a result of one's karma or freedom, and one can no more conduce to the betterment of another's natural life than one can conduce to his moral life.

Prasastapáda's Classification of the Duties.

Prasastapáda also classifies the duties, like Manu, into common, generic or Sámányadharma and relative, specific or Visheshadharma. Thus the Duties (Dharma), according to him, are :—

- (i) either generic, sámánya, i.e., common to all áshramas or stages of life and all varnas or social classes and communities;
- (ii) or specific, vishesha, i.e., relative to one's particular station in life as constituted by one's

particular varna or social class and one's áshramā or particular stage of life.

I. The Generic or Samanya Duties are :—

Moral Earnestness, Regard for the Spiritual (Dharmé Shraddhá, Dharma Manahprasádah).

Refraining from injury to living beings (Ahimsá).

Seeking the good of creatures (Bhutahitatva).

Speaking the truth (Satyavachana).

Refraining from theft (Asteya).

Sexual continence (Bráhmacharyya).

Sincerity, Purity of Motive (Anupadhá).

Renouncing or restraining anger (Krodha varjana).

Ablution, Personal cleanliness (Abhisechana, Snána).

The eating of linseeds and other specified substances on special occasions for the object of shuchi or purification of the body (Shuchi-dravyasevana).

Devotion to the Deities recognised by the Vedas (Vishishta-Devatá-bhakti).

Fasting on specified occasions (Upabása).

Moral watchfulness (Apramáda), *i.e.*, the unfailing performance of the unconditional duties (nitya-naimittikánám karmánám avashyambhávena karanam).

It is pointed out that in every case the agent's positive resolve (samkalpa) must be an antecedent condition of the accomplishment of the duty as in mere external cessation or forbearance (nibṛtti) there is only avoidance of sin (adharma), but no positive virtue (Nibṛtteh adharmo na bhavati, na tu dharmo jáyate.—The "Nyaya-Kandali"

on Prasastapada's Bhashya on Vajsheshikadarshana).
Hence

Refraining from injury (Ahimsa) is a duty not simply in the negative sense of mere cessation from harm or injury (himsábháva) but also in the positive sense of a definite *resolve* not to hurt a living being (bhutánám anabhidrohasamkalpah).

Similarly, refraining from theft (asteya) as a duty is not the mere cessation from appropriating what belongs to another but implies, besides the outward cessation, an internal samkalpa, resolve or attitude of the will, *viz.*, the resolve to disapprove and disdain all acts of misappropriation as unrighteous (Ashástrapurvakam parasvagrahanam maya na kartavyam iti samkalpah, na tu parasvádánani-bṛttimátram).

Thirdly, Brahmacharyya as a duty is not the mere refraining from the outward act of sexual indulgence, but also implies the internal resolve of the will not to long for such indulgence even in thought (Brahmacharyya striseváparivarjanam tadapi samkalparupam).

Again sincerity (Anupadhá) in the sense of bháva-shuddhi or purification means purification of the motive, *i.e.*, the resolve to be free from all impure feelings of pride, self-esteem, etc., in the discharge of one's duties in the consciousness that duties done only with a pure motive are conducive to morality (vishuddhena abhipráyena kṛtánám karmanám dharmasáadhanatvát)

This holds good also in the case of restraint of anger (krodhavarjana) which is to be observed not merely outwardly but also as regards the inner will (Sa api samkalparupah).

II. The Vishesha or Specific Duties are :—

- (1) The Duties relative to the different castes or social classes (Varna), and

(2) The Duties relative to the different stages of life (Áshrama).

(1) The Duties of the castes are divisible into :—

(a) The Duties common to the three castes of Brahmin, Kshatra and Vaishya. These are :—
Sacrificial ceremonies (Ijyá, yágádi). Acquisition of knowledge by study (Adhyayana). Charity (Dána).

(b) The Duties obligatory on the Brahmin only. These are :—

Acceptance of gifts (Pratigraha).

Teaching. (Adhyápana).

Performance of ceremonial sacrifice (Yájana).

The way or mode of life prescribed for a Brahmin (Svavarnavihita-samskára).

(c) The Duties obligatory on the Kshatra only. These are :—

Protecting people from external aggressions and internal disturbances, as well as governing them with a view to peace and prosperity (prajápalana).

Chastising the wicked (ásádhunigraha).

Not retreating from battle (Yuddheshu anivartana).

The way or mode of life prescribed for a Kshatra (Svakiyasamskára).

(d) The Duties obligatory on the Vaishya only. These are :—

Buying (kṛaya), *i.e.*, procuring commodities from others after paying their proper price (mulyam dattvá parasmát dravyagrahanam).

Selling (vikraya), *i.e.*, bartering away commodities to others after realising from them their legitimate price (mulyam ádáya parasya svadravya dánam).

Agriculture (kṛshi).

Breeding and rearing of cattle (Pashupālana)

The way or mode of life prescribed for a Vaishya (svakiyāsamskāra).

(e) The Duties obligatory on the Shudra only.

These are :—

Being subservient or in subjection to the other three castes (Purva-varṇa-páratantṛa).

Observing such rites as do not require the utterance of the sacred mantras or incantations (Āmantrika Kriyá).

The above are the five divisions of the Duties of Varna or Social class. These Varna or caste duties constitute only one of the two main classes of the specific Duties. The Duties of Āshrama or different stages of life constitute the other class of these specific duties.

(2) These Duties of Āshrama or different stages of life are likewise divisible into several sub-classes. These are :

(a) The Duties of the unmarried student (Brahmachárin) practising sexual abstinence. These are :—

Serving, and attending to the comforts of, the preceptor (Guru-shushrushá).

Collecting fuel (Indhana-áharana).

Offering incense to the sacrificial fire (agnou homah).

Collecting alms (Bhaikshya).

(b) The Duties of the married person living with his family (kṛtadára grhastha). These are :—

Performing the five sacrificial ceremonies or Yajnas (bhuta-manushya-deva-pitr-brahma-yajna) every morning and evening by means of

one's own earnings. (Upárjitairarthairbhuta-manushyadeva-pitrbrahmákhyanám panchánám yajnanám sáyampráharanysthánam). Bhuta-yajna is the offering of sacrifice to the bhutas or elements (bhutebhyañ valipradánam bhutayajnah). Manushyayajna is the serving and entertaining of guests (atithipujanam manushyayajnah). Devayajna is the offering of incense to the sacred fire (homáñ devayajnah). Pitryajna is paying respect to the dead by observing the funeral rites and other allied ceremonies (Shráddham pitryajnah). Brahmayajna is the reading of the sacred texts, *i.e.*, the Vedas (Vedapáthah Brahmayajnah).

These are the five yajnas (panchayajna) prescribed for the married person and their observance is binding on him only if he has the necessary strength or capacity (shakti) to undergo the hardships involved.

Over and above these sacrificial ceremonies it is also the married man's duty to beget children by co-habitation with his wife, but it should be in proper season, *i.e.*, there must be periods of abstinence after cohabitation and procreation of a child (Rtvantareshu brahmacharyyam apatyotpádanam).

(a) The Duties of the Recluse (Vánaprastha) and of the Brahmacharigrhastha, *i.e.*, of the householder who after having completed the duties of his married life, is living a life of conjugal abstinence or celibacy at home. These are :—

Wearing the bark of trees (Valkaládhárana)

Letting the hair, etc., grow (Keshádhárana)

Living on the roots and the fruits of the jungle (Vanasya phalamulasya bhojanam).

Dining on the surplus of the meal after entertainment of all the guests (atithishesha-bhojanam).

(d) The duties of the Yati. A Brahmachari-grhastha or Vánaprastha becomes a Yati or mendicant-seer on the attainment of Sraddhá or chittaprasáda, *i.e.*, mental serenity and equanimity. Such a man is known not only by his self-possession and serenity of mind but also by his gentleness and harmlessness to all sentient creatures, by the destruction of his Karmas and their potencies, by the absence of any lapse through carelessness in the performance of the acts of self-discipline as laid down in the Yamas and Niyamas, and the Yogik trances which he produces in himself by meditation on his knowledge of the six categories of the Vaisheshikas. Shraddháván (shraddha-chitta-prasáda), sarvabhutebhyo nityam abhayaṁ dattva sváni karmáni samnyasya yamaniyameshva-pramattasya shatpadartha-prasamkhyánádyogaprasáddhanam (yogaprasáddhanam=samádhivisheshasya utpáddhanam).

The Yamas are :

Harmlessness (Ahimsá).

Veracity (Satya).

Refraining from theft (Asteya).

Sexual abstinence (Brahmacharyya).

The Niyamas are :—

Cleanliness (Shoucha).

Contentment (Santosh).

Arduous application and devotion (Tapas).

Reciting Vedic texts (Svádhyáya).

Meditation on the glories and the perfections of the Lord (Isvarapranidhána).

The Yamas are thus duties of self-restraint, even veracity implying restraint in this sense, *i.e.*, restraint of the self's tendency to exaggeration and misrepresentation in the interest of momentary self-advantage. The

Niyamas on the contrary are rules of self-realisation, *i.e.*, the realisation of the self's true essence as Spirit. Thus while the Yamas are negative and restrictive, the Niyamas are positive and objective rules of self-expansion and development.

Comparing now Prasastapáda's list of the Generic or Sámánya duties with Manu's enumeration of the sádhárana dharmas we notice that Prasastapada adds Moral earnestness (dharmé shráddhá), Refraining from Injury (Ahimsá), Goodwill to creatures (Bhuta-hitatva) and Moral Watchfulness (Apramáda) to Manu's list, while he omits Steadiness (Dhairya), Forgiveness (Kshamá), Endurance of Physical pain (Dama), Wisdom (Dhi) and Learning (Vidyá). As regards Prasastapáda's additions it will be seen that Ahimsa and Bhutahitvatva are not the equivalents of Manu's Kshamá (Forgiveness). Forgiveness as a duty is not incompatible with the ethics of self-autonomy which aims at individual self-sufficiency and independence as the highest ideal of the moral life. Ahimsá (Harmlessness) and Bhutahitvatva (seeking the good of creatures) however represent the negative and positive aspects of a more inclusive and humanitarian ideal of life in which the individual can achieve his moral end only by going beyond himself instead of remaining confined within the stone walls of independent neutrality. This is a relieving feature in Prasastapáda's view of the moral life which appears also in his treatment of the Springs of Action. Similarly the addition of Moral Earnestness and Moral Watchfulness and the omission of Learning (Vidyá) and of Wisdom (Dhi) are significant as emphasising the ethical in place of the dianoetic virtues and thus teaching a non-intellectualistic view of morality as distinguished from the intellectualism of Sankhya and Shankara-Vedanta. Thus Moral Watchfulness and Moral Earnestness represent respectively the

negative and positive aspects of the ethical training of the will, the first of which consists in the cultivation of that alertness of moral consciousness which will prevent a moral lapse through mere carelessness or inadvertence and the second in that earnestness of moral feeling and impulse which is inconsistent with levity or frivolousness, of any sort.

Secondly, as regards Prasastapáda's classification of the duties into generic and specific, it is to be observed that while it provides a basis for the distinction between conditional and unconditional obligations, on the other hand it brings out the close connection between the moral life and its positive basis as constituted by social status and individual psychological capacity of the moral agent. In this respect the Hindu classification is fuller and more complete than the Platonic classification of the virtues according to the different social classes only. In the latter we miss not only a list of *sádhárana* or common duties but also the distinctive Hindu classification according to *Áshrama* or moral capacity relative to one's particular stage of life. There is indeed a common duty even according to Plato, *viz.*, the virtue of Justice which is to be realised by the soldier, the artisan as well as the legislator, but it is not an independent duty which is to be realised in itself but is only a function of the proper discharge of its specific duties by each particular social class. Thus the soldier realises justice by protecting the State while the legislator realises it by wise legislation and administration, *i.e.*, each realises it in specific form through the discharge of his specific duties. Hence justice is a common duty only in the sense of being common-in-the-specific. But the *sádhárana* or common duties of the Hindus are common in a different sense. They are common as being independent duties of all the social classes alike. Thus *achourya* or non-appropriation

is an independent duty to be discharged by every man, be he a Brahmin, Kshatra, Vaishya or Sudra, it being obligatory on him as man and not as a member of a community. It is laid down that the common duties cannot be transgressed in the discharge of the specific duties, the idea being that there are certain general relations between man and man which cannot be discarded in the interests of particular communities. The common duties are thus the preconditions of the specific duties, *i.e.*, they are not the common-in-the-specific such as Plato's Justice, but the common-as-the-prior-of-the-specific. In this sense the *sādhārana* dharmas of the Hindus are a safeguard against communal egoism and intolerance. They provide, through a code of universal duties, a basis for a much more humanitarian treatment of the Shudra than the Platonic scheme would permit in respect of the barbarian and the helot who lack civic status. For Plato the barbarian is without any moral standing: there are not only no duties to be fulfilled by him but also no duties to be fulfilled *in respect* of him. The Hindu however, in spite of the social degradation of the Shudra, does not exclude him altogether from moral protection, but shelters him from persecution through a code of universal duties which are obligatory on man as man. These duties are to be observed by all alike, being the duties obligatory on everybody in his dealings with everybody else. They are thus to be observed not merely by the Shudras but also by members of the higher castes. The Hindu classification is also fuller as we have said in another respect, *viz.*, in respect of the classification according to Ashrama or spiritual capacity of the different stages of life. It implies a genetic view of the moral life and anticipates a genetic ethics with an ascending scale of moral codes corresponding to the progressive unfolding of spiritual powers. The far-reaching import of this

classification when considered in this light of a progressive morality of ascending stages cannot be too much emphasised.

The Mimámsāka classification of the duties.

The Mimámsakas also classify the duties, but not into generic and specific as Prasastapada does, but on an entirely new principle. According to the Mimámsakas the duties (karmas) are divisible in the first instance into secular (laukika) and scriptural or transcendental (Shástrika, Páramásthika). The secular duties are the dr̥stárthaka duties, *i.e.*, duties of sensuous or empirical import while the scriptural duties are the adr̥stárthaka duties, *i.e.*, duties of non-sensuous or non-empirical import. The sanction in the secular duties is merely human, while the sanction in the scriptural duties is religious or divine. The secular duties therefore have not the evidential value or validity of the scriptural duties. The latter are the duties of unquestionable moral authority while the former have only a derived authority depending on human experience.

The scriptural duties again fall into the two classes of (1) kámyakarmas or duties conditional on subjective desire and (2) Nityanaimittikakarmas or duties of unconditional validity. The kámya or conditional duties are scriptural injunctions that are authoritative only when there is desire for a particular end. Hence they are scriptural duties presupposing a subjective prius of a pathological motive. The unconditional duties on the contrary are obligatory in themselves independently of any pathological motive. These again fall into two classes, *viz.*, (1) the nityakarmas or duties which are unconditionally obligatory for all time and (2) the naimittikakarmas or duties which are unconditionally obligatory only when their nimittas or special occasions arise. Thus

the daily prayer (*sandhyā*) is an unconditional, *nitya* duty: it must be done every morning and evening without fail. Bathing in the Ganges in a solar or lunar eclipse, however, is an unconditional, *naimittika* duty: it is unconditionally binding only on the occasion of the eclipse. In either case, however the duties are unconditionally binding, *i.e.*, obligatory independently of any pathological motive of the agent.

The scriptural duties are also either negative or positive in significance, *i.e.*, are either *Vidhis*, positive injunctions, or *Nishedhas*, mere prohibitions. The injunctions which are conditional suppose a *prius* of subjective desire in the agent. The object of such injunctions is to define the agent's duty or proper course for the realisation of his desire. The negative prohibitions also imply a subjective *prius*, *viz.*, a forbidden impulse in the agent, but the object in this case is to indicate the means of checking or subduing it.

This therefore is a classification of the duties on an entirely new principle, being based in the first instance on the presence or non-presence of a scriptural sanction. The significance of the classification consists in its insistence on a non-natural sanction of the duties and the consequent separation of the moral life proper from the merely natural life. The secular duties are only inductions from experience as to what is beneficial or injurious and as such inductions are not infallible, only a problematic and relative authority attaches to these *laukika* or human institutions and conventions. The scriptural duties however are of unquestionable and absolute authority. They thus constitute a morality which is specifically distinct from the problematic and relative morality of human creation. It is assumed that morality truly so-called must be of indubitable authority and must therefore have a non-empirical source or origin.

Hence there must be a radical difference between the indubitable morality of the scriptural duties and the doubtful morality of the customs of men.

• Within scriptural morality itself a further division is recognised in accordance with the presence or non-presence of a non-scriptural motive as a conditioning factor. Thus the *kāmya* or conditional duties are the duties that arise in consequence of the agent's choice of particular ends. They are duties conditional on his desiring particular ends, though the desiring itself is not a duty, but a result of free choice. It is assumed that there are ends which are not in themselves morally authoritative, but they are to be accomplished in the proper way so that whosoever chooses these ends is also under specific obligations to seek them in the proper manner. As distinguished from these we have the unconditional obligations of the *nitya-naimittika* duties: these are authoritative in themselves irrespectively of the subjective desires of the moral agent. The idea is that there are some obligations that arise from the very nature of man as man and these do not admit of exceptions or limitations. There are other obligations however which arise only in relation to a contingent situation, and these are relative to the subjective freedom or choice of the agent. In the latter case the duty is not to seek the end which is freely chosen, but to see to the proper seeking of it, *i.e.*, to seeking it by the right means. (It is to be observed that this category of non-morally conditioned moral duties raises an important ethical question, *viz.*, the question of the possibility of moral motivation in spite of a non-moral or pathological impulse. A rigorist like Kant cannot admit such non-moral motivation and therefore cannot recognise any conditional duties. The *Prābhākara* School of the *Mimāṃsakas* also comes to a similar conclusion from the

standpoint of ethical disinterestedness, but the Bhāṭṭa School finds a place for them in the moral life by the distinction of contingent and truly moral ends as explained above.)

The Ramanujist classification of the duties.

There is also another classification of the Duties in Hindu Ethics which deserves notice here, the classification or rather deduction of the duties obtaining amongst the school of the Ramanujists. The Duties according to this classification or deduction are to be regarded as representing certain perfections which must be ascribed to God as the Moral Ideal. From the nature of these perfections in God man's duties are to be derived or deduced; i.e., the latter are to be defined as being ontologically implied in these ideal perfections of the Divine Personality.

Now the conception of God as the Moral Ideal includes the ascription of certain auspicious qualities (Kalyāna-guna) to the Lord. God as Bhagavāna or Lord is conceived as akhila-heya-pratyanika, i.e., as actively cancelling or removing all evil and imperfection of finite beings even as light cancels darkness. In this consists the life of God which is a personal life in incessant and inseparable relation to other persons. Thus knowledge conceived as absolute knowledge in God means the active enlightening of his creatures who are ignorant of their own good and evil (Jñānam ajñānam cheshtanānam hitāhitanirupanopayogigunatvāt—Lokāchāryya's "Tattvatraya"). Similarly might in the Almighty consists in enabling creatures in their weakness to eschew evil and attain the good. (Shakti Ashaktānam hitāhita-prāptiparihāropayogigunatvāt.) Forgiveness in the Lord is again for the sáparādha or person guilty of lapse who has since repented and seen the error of his ways. Compassion

in the Lord is likewise for suffering creatures, just as straightforwardness (árjavam) is for the crooked, gentleness (márdavam) is for the shy and the timid, etc. (Jnánam ajnánám, shakti ashaktánám, kshamá sáparádhánám, kṛpá dukhinám, vátsalyam sadoshánám, shilam mandánám, árjavam kutilánám, souhárđyam dushtahrđayánám, márdavam vishleshabhirunám.) These are the ideal or absolute perfections in the Divine Person. The human virtues are to be conceived after the pattern of their absolute archetypes. It is these latter that represent the natural human powers in their ontological nature and the right use of these powers in man must therefore consist in exercising them according to their ontological essence, *i.e.*, as they are exercised by God. For example absolute knowledge consisting in enlightenment of ignorance, all human knowledge can have no other end or goal than the enlightenment of ignorant fellow-creatures. Similarly, power in the Absolute Person being only an enablement and furtherance of the weak, human power can have no other meaning or justification than putting the weak in the way of achieving their own good. Clemency (kshamá) similarly is the proper attitude towards the morally guilty (sáparádhā), tenderness (vátsalya) towards the imperfect and deficient (sadosha), straightforwardness (árjavam) towards the crooked (kutila), etc. The exercise of these powers, it is to be noted, implies certain moral conditions in the persons towards whom they are directed; *e.g.*, repentance in the moral delinquent is a necessary condition for the exercise of forgiveness, humility in the uncivil (manda) for the exercise of civility (shila), etc. It may be further added that in the Ramanujist view, the success of finite creatures conduces to the success of God's purpose and of God himself.

This therefore is an ethico-theological classification or deduction of the duties as ontologically implied in the

perfections of the Divine Personality. It is distinct alike from the socio-ethical classification of Manu and Prasastapáda and the ethico-psychological classification of the Mimámsakas. Man in this view is the image of the Divine Person and his highest destiny is to realise his true being as an image of God and as an essential factor in God's personal life. The duties of man are thus the realization of the divine perfections in him, *i.e.*, the accomplishment of himself in God and of God in himself.

Considering now these various classifications of the Duties we find that a special feature of the Hindu treatment is the recognition of a list of common or transcommunal duties as distinguished from the communal duties or the duties of self-culture in the various stages of life. Here we have therefore the foundation of a universal ethics of humanity as the prius of an ethics of communal good and mere self-culture. The idea of a common human life as being the basis of communal as well as individual life, of every community being itself a differentiation of Universal Humanity, is the reason which underlies this conception of the common or universal obligations as distinguished from the obligations to one's community. The latter arise from *Pitṛna* or *Kulaṇa*, *i.e.*, from our indebtedness to the socio-plasm from which we have emerged into being. The former arise from *ṛṣiṇa*, *i.e.*, from our debt to humanity, *i.e.*, to the larger experience of the race whereby we profit in the struggle for life. This is a much larger and therefore more important debt which must not be ignored in the fulfilment of the narrower obligations to oneself or to one's community. This is however not itself everything : it constitutes only the general framework which must be concretely filled in by the communal and individual duties. Through the education of the *Ashrama* duties the individual becomes a useful member

of his society or community and as there is a progressive unfolding of the powers of the individual, the code of self-education also varies in the different stages. This therefore is not only an abstract ethical scheme of merely general duties which apply nowhere because they seem to apply to every case, but also a plan of the concrete moral life of specific duties within a framework of common or universal obligations to humanity. This tridimensional classification of the Duties thus represents the attempt at a synthetic scheme of the moral life which combines in itself the individual-genetic, the communal and the universal aspects of morality in organic unity. The distinction between scriptural and secular duties and between conditional and unconditional ones is also characteristic of this synthetic spirit of reconciliation of different aspects. While it represents the attempt at a reconciliation of the ethical life proper with the standpoint of ceremonial morality and formalism, it also seeks to combine ethical consequentialism with ethical disinterestedness in a complete scheme of conditional as well as unconditional morality. Recognising the value of ethical purism on the one side in its code of unconditional duties, it also seeks to provide through the conditional duties a moral significance for those interested actions which lead to fruition without entailing any evil. It thus embodies in one synthetic scheme the admissibility of non-moral motivation alongside of the need of disinterestedness. (It must be remembered however that Hindu morality primarily aimed at self-autonomy. Even the communal duties have in fact this end of self-autonomy in view: they are debts to the community by the discharge of which the individual gradually qualifies for freedom and self-sufficiency.)

PART II. . . .

THE SUBJECTIVE OR PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS OF THE HINDUS.

The Objective Ethics of the mediation of external duties constitutes the foundation or groundwork on which is raised the Subjective, Psychological Hindu Ethics of chittasuddhi or purification of the mind. The latter is a necessary supplement to Objective Ethics as being the treatment of the moral life from the internal standpoint of the spirit as a free moral agent. A free spirit is moralised only through his freedom and not by compulsion or external conformity. The inwardisation or subjective realisation of the external moral content is thus a necessary sequel to the objective morality of the duties. We shall therefore consider now the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus as the explication of the conditions and principles of self-purification. Our exposition will comprise:

- I. The Analysis of Volition.
- II. The Analysis of Conscience.
- III. The Analysis and Classification of the Springs of Action.
- IV. The Classification of the Virtues.

We shall consider each of these topics in a separate chapter and we shall consider the general trend of Psychological Hindu Ethics on the basis of their treatment of these topics in a chapter of concluding remarks.

CHAPTER I.

THE ANALYSIS OF VOLITION IN HINDU ETHICS.

The analysis of *prabṛtti* or volition constitutes the psychological basis of Hindu Ethics. Of particular ethical significance in the analysis is the interpretation of the psychological motive with reference to considerations or absence of considerations of utility or advantage. The distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary actions is also ethically significant: it raises the vexed question about the moral significance of unintentional and accidental actions. Lastly, the analysis of the consciousness of freedom in willing furnishes the psychological basis of the ethical treatment of responsibility and obligation.

The psychological analysis of the will, is a special feature of the Nyaya-vaisheshika systems of Hindu philosophy. The subject is treated not only by Prasastapāda in his commentary on the Vaisheshika Philosophy, but also by Vishvanātha and the Neo-Naiyāyikas. Prasastapāda's treatment is confined merely to a presentation of the essential differences between voluntary and non-voluntary action. The Neo-Naiyāyika treatment however goes far beyond Prasastapāda in its analysis. It not only distinguishes between volition proper and actions which are automatic and reflex but also enters into the most acute analysis of the motive from the utilitarian and non-utilitarian standpoints. In the following exposition we shall first consider the distinction between Voluntary and Non-voluntary Action from the standpoint of Prasastapāda and of the Neo-Naiyāyikas. We shall next consider Vishvanātha's analysis of volition in the *Siddhāntamuktāvali* along with the notes, the explanations and comments of the "Dinakari" thereon.

I. *Voluntary and other forms of Activity.*

The essential difference between volition or ethical action proper and non-moral or automatic action was noticed by the Hindus as early as the time of Prasastapáda.

Prasastapáda's distinction between Volition proper and the Automatic Activities of the organism.

Thus, in the Gunagrantha of his commentary on the Vaisheshika Sutras Prasastapáda classifies prayatna or conation into—

- (1) Jivanapurvaka, *i.e.*, having the life of the organism as its cause or antecedent condition, and
- (2) Ichchhádveshapurvaka, *i.e.*, having ichchhá desire and dvesha, aversion as the cause.

Hence Jivanapurvakaprayatna designates the organic activities proper, *i.e.*, the reflex and automatic activities of the organism, while Ichchhádveshapurvakaprayatna represents voluntary action or action with conscious foresight and choice. It is pointed out that each of these kinds of activity has its proper effects. Thus the organic activities serve certain specific ends (kám arthakriyám karoti), *i.e.*, the ends of the organism. Similarly voluntary action serves a definite purpose, *viz.*, selection of the good (hiṭapráti) and rejection of the evil (ahitaparihára) besides shariravidhárana or maintenance of the erect posture of the body.

It is to be seen that in the above analysis of conation organic activities are not only attributed to the life of the organism as their antecedent condition or cause but are also regarded as subserving the ends of the organic life. This teleological conception of activity is extended also to voluntary action where the purpose or end is regarded as being consciously aimed at and chosen. The ascription of shariravidhárana to voluntary effort becomes significant when viewed in the light of this essential

character of volition as conscious aiming and choice, for the physical straining of innervation represents this self-conscious direction of the will in its psychophysical aspect as alertness of the body and the mind as the necessary pre-requisites of conscious action. This will be clear when we remember that with the lowering of consciousness (as in reverie or sleep) there is a corresponding relaxation of attention as well as the bodily posture.

The "Dinakari" on the Distinction between Voluntary and Automatic Action.

The "Dinakari" (commentary on Vishvanátha's "Siddhāntamuktāvali" by Mahākeva and his son Dinakara Bhatta) also distinguishes between volition or voluntary action and automatic and reflex actions of the organism.

Thus Kṛti which in the wider sense is identified with prayatna or conation in general, includes, according to the "Dinakari,"

(1) Prabṛtti, *i.e.*, volition in the positive sense as conscious selection of the good,

(2) Nibṛtti, *i.e.*, volition in the negative sense as rejection of the evil, and

(3) Jivanayoniprayatna, *i.e.*, activities arising from the life of the organism, in other words the automatic and reflex activities proper. But kṛti in the narrower sense stands for prabṛtti, volition or voluntary action including willing in its positive and negative aspects, *i.e.*, including nibṛtti. This excludes Jivanayoniprayatna, the organic activities, from volition-proper: there is no volition in these organic activities (prānasanchāra) because they are not svecchhādhinamatkṛtisādhya, *i.e.*, cannot be brought to pass by my *free* will.

It is to be seen that by insisting on Svecchhādinatva or freedom as a necessary condition of volition the

Dinakari excludes from volition proper not only the automatic and reflex activities of organic life but also all actions under blind impulse. It also follows from Dinakara's analysis that to constitute volition it is not sufficient that the action should be determined by conscious choice, in volition proper there being not merely conscious choice but also the consciousness that the choice has been free (*Svechchhádina*), *i.e.*, undetermined by anything except my own will.

II. *Analysis of Volition.*

In the foregoing we have considered the distinction between voluntary action and non-voluntary and automatic actions. In this section we shall consider the Hindu analysis of volition itself as set forth in the *Siddhántamuktávali*, the *Dinakari* and other works.

Analysis of Volition in the Siddhántamuktávali of Vishvanátha :

The *Siddhántamuktávali* of Vishvanátha is of particular interest in this respect. Its analysis of volition and its conditions from the *Prábhákara* and the *Nyáya* stand-points is remarkable at once for subtlety and acuteness.

(a) *The view of Prabhákara.*

The *Prábhákara* view of the will otherwise known as the *Gurumata* is set forth in the *Siddhántamuktávali* as follows :

The consciousness of something to be done (*káryatá-jnána*) together with the desire for it (*chikirshá*) as the auxiliary condition (*sahakári*) causes volition (*prabṛtti*, *kṛti*). The volition produces the organic reaction (*chestá*) which produces *kriyá* or the act regarded objectively. Hence the steps are :—

(1) *Káryatá-jnána*, the consciousness of something to be done,

(2) Chikirsha, the desire to do it which implies *kṛtisadhyatājñāna* or the consciousness that it *can* be done,

(3) Prabhṛtti, *kṛti*, the act of volition,

(4) Chestá, the motor impulse in the organism,

(5) Kriyá, the act regarded objectively.

As regards the nature of *kāryatājñāna*, it is pointed out that it is not the bare consciousness that something is to be done but the consciousness of something to be done as produced by the representation (*pratisandhāna*) of the thing as *svavishesnana*, i.e., as specifying the self. This it will be seen implies a distinction between appropriated and unappropriated ideas it being assumed that the idea of an act does not of itself stimulate the will except in so far as the self has ideally appropriated or identified itself with the as-yet-unrealised objective content represented by the act. Hence we may have what may be called the bare idea of something to be done and this is incapable of inciting to active decision, but we may have also the consciousness of the thing to be done as produced by the representation of its being appropriated by the self and in this case there is desire and choice.

This distinction between the bare idea of an act and the idea of it as specifying the self and thus inciting to will is very clearly brought out by Gágá Bhatta in the “*Bhāttāchintāmani*.” Gágá Bhatta distinguishes two kinds of *kāryatājñāna*. Thus I may have *kāryatājñāna*, the idea of a thing to be done simply in the form of the consciousness that it lies in my power to accomplish it if I choose. But I may also have *kāryatājñāna* in the more peremptory form of the consciousness that I must do it. The first of these according to Gágá Bhatta has reference merely to the inherent practicableness of the act in question

(padarthanishtháyogyatá) and is thus not the determinant of volition, but the second being itself the effect of the anticipation which is strengthened by the consciousness of the good being unassociated with any serious evil consequences is the cause of volition through the desire (which it arouses), and it is this specific form of consciousness—the form which takes this peremptory character of *must*—which is signified by svavishenavattapratibandhanajanyakáryatājñāna, *i.e.*, by the cognition of duty as produced by the representation of the act as qualifying the self. (Káryatājñānam dvividham. Māyā idam kartum shakyté ityevam rupam ekam. Mama idam avashyam kartavyam, ityevam rupam dvitīyam. Tatra ādyaṃ padarthanishtha-yogyatāgamyam iti naprabhittim prati hetu. Dvītiyam tu sveshtasādhana-
natvalavadanishtānanuvandhitvajñānānyam iti chikirsha dvārā prabhittim prati hetuh. Idameva svavisheshanavattāpratisandhānānyatvam.)

It is to be seen that káryatājñāna in the first form as explained by Gágá Bhatta in the foregoing analysis is only the consciousness that the thing can be done and is therefore identical with the kṛtísādhya-tājñāna which in the Prābhākara analysis is regarded as implied in desire or chikirshā. Hence according to the Prābhākaras káryatājñāna is always to be taken in the second sense, *i.e.*, in the sense of the consciousness that something *must be done*, while káryatājñāna in the first sense as the bare consciousness that the thing can be done is nothing but the kṛtísādhya-tājñāna which is an implicate of chikirsha or desire for the thing. It is to be seen also that while Gágá Bhatta will not recognise the bare consciousness of the act as capable of being accomplished as a determinant of volition (na prabhittim pratihetu), the Prābhākaras by making it an implicate of desire include it among the conditions of willing.

Some however explain káryatájnána as the bare cognition of an act, and they interpret kṛtisádhyatájnána as signifying not only the consciousness of bare subjective capacity but also the cognition that it is to be done. According to them, káryatájnána as well as kṛtisádhyatájnána in both senses are involved in desire.

The significance for psychology of the distinctions set forth in the foregoing analyses cannot be too much emphasized. In the first place the cognition which constitutes the conscious antecedent of a volitional process is distinguished from the simple cognition of a fact. It is the cognition of an act and not of a *given* matter of fact, the consciousness of something *to be done* and not of something which simply *is*. Again within this active consciousness of an act the distinction is recognised between the bare consciousness of its practicableness and the more active consciousness of self-determination with reference to it, *i.e.*, the consciousness that it is to be accomplished by me. The validity of these distinctions is obvious enough though they may appear overnice and scholastic to superficial critics.

(2) *The meaning of chikirshá.*

Káryatájnána, the cognition of duty leads to prabr̥tti, will, through chikirshá, desire which is defined by the siddhántamuktávali as kṛtisádhyaprakárikákṛtisádhyákriyáviśhayinichehḥá, *i.e.*, as the desire which has the form (prakára) of something *to be* accomplished by the will or kṛti—the something to be accomplished being an act (kriyá) which is *capable* of being accomplished by the will. Hence chikirshá is the desire to accomplish an act which is cognised as capable of being accomplished by the will.

It will be seen that among the *conditions* of chikirshá the Prábhákaras recognise kṛtisádhyatájnána, *i.e.*, the

consciousness that the act is to be, implying also that it can be accomplished by the will, but not ishtasádhana-tájnána, *i.e.*, the consciousness that it is conducive to my good. It is in this respect that the Nyáya analysis differs from that of the Prábhákaras, the Naiyávikas insisting on ishtasádhana-tájnána as being an indispensable condition of all desire. It is to be noted also that chikirshá is the ichchhá, *i.e.*, the wish to do what I recognise as kṛtisádhya, *i.e.*, as I am to, and therefore as what is in my power to, do or accomplish. Hence it is something more than mere kṛtisádhya-tájnána, *i.e.*, something more than the cognition that something is to be or can be done. The latter is a necessary condition of chikirshá but is not itself chikirshá which is conative and not merely cognitive in nature.

(3) *Prabṛtti or kṛti.*

Hence in kṛti or volition we have according to the Prábhákaras—

(a) Svavisheshanavattápratisandhána, the representation of something as svavisheshana, specifying the self.

(b) Káryatájnána or the cognition of it as something to be done implying kṛti-sádhya-tájnána or the cognition that what is to be done, *can* be done.

(c) Chikirshá or the *desire* that it be done.

It will be seen that the Prábhákara analysis does not recognise it to be necessary for volition that the action should be represented as ishtasádhana, *i.e.*, as conducive to the good of the agent. In place of ishtasádhana-tá, conduciveness to pleasure, happiness or satisfaction, the Prábhákaras will merely have svavisheshanavattápratisandhána, *i.e.*, the representation of the act as purushavisheshana, specifying the self or appropriated by it. This implies that the real motive to volition is not anything external, but the self itself as specified by or identified

with something to be done. According to the Prábhákaras this holds good not only in the case of the *nitya-karmas*, i.e., acts which are always binding (such as ablution, the daily prayer, etc.) and the *naimittika-karmas*, i.e., acts which are obligatory only when their *nimittas* or specific occasions arise (such as river-bath on the occasion of an eclipse or expiation for one who has sinned), but also in the case of the *kámyakarmas* or acts from sensuous inclination or material motives of gain. It is to be seen that the distinction between *nitya-naimittika karmas* and *kámyakarmas* lies in that the former are non-dependent on the agent's subjective desire for pleasure, happiness or felicity while the latter imply such subjective motive as their necessary condition. Hence the *nitya-naimittika-karmas* may be described as the unconditional duties or acts non-conditioned by subjective or empirical motives while the *kámyakarmas* may be designated hypothetical duties or acts constituting the content of the empirical will. According to the Prábhákaras however even in the sphere of the *kámyakarmas* the real motive is not the sensuous inclination or desire for the external pleasure, but the self itself as qualified by or identified with this desire or inclination. In other words though in empirical willing we have *ishtasáadhanatá* or the material motive of gain as a necessary condition for the desire or *kámaná*, this desire is an incentive only as *svavisheshana*, i.e., as specifying the self and appropriated by it. In the case of the *nitya-naimittika* or unconditional duties on the other hand, the acts (ablution, prayer, etc.) as enjoined by the imperative imply no material prompting or *ishta-sáadhanatájnána* and are motives to will as purely determining the self without reference to anything extrinsic to themselves.

It is to be noted that the *kámyakarmas* or conditional duties may be either *Vaidika*, i.e., of scriptural origin,

or Laukika, *i.e.*, of social origin. The scriptural duties are *adṛśtārthaka*, *i.e.*, of non-sensuous or non-empirical consequence, while the Laukika duties are *drśtārthaka*, *i.e.*, of sensuous or empirical import. Thus there are religious sacrifices and the like (*yágádī*) enjoined in scripture on persons desiring non-natural objects such as happiness in heaven, etc. These constitute the *kāmya* duties of non-sensuous import. Similarly cooking and the like (*pákádī*) are recognised as being required to ensure specific empirical results. These constitute the *kāmya* duties of sensuous import. In either case there is *kāmaná* or desire for a consequence, *i.e.*, for a consequence other than the act itself, but this desire moves the will only as *svavisheshana*, *i.e.*, as specifying the self. There is thus *ishtasáadhanatájnána*, *i.e.*, an extraneous purpose in all empirical volition whether enjoined by scripture or recommended by society, but this extraneous purpose moves the will by being identified with the self and appropriated by it for the time being.

The material motive implied in *kāmyakarma* has a negative as well as a positive side. Positively it is the consciousness of the act as being conducive to a specific good of the agent, but this positive consciousness of a prospective good is incapable of inciting to will except in so far as it is unaccompanied by the apprehension of any serious undesirable consequences spoiling the value of the anticipated good in question. It is the absence of these deterrents such as the anticipation of any serious loss or injury (*valavadanishṭānanuvandhitva*) that constitutes the negative side to the positive consciousness of *ishtasáadhanatá* or material advantage, in the motive in empirical willing.

If we compare the *Prábhākara* with the *Nyáya* view we shall find that the essential difference arises from the *Prábhākara* insistence on the element of self-reference

in all motive which the Naiyáyika does not consider to be necessary. Thus for the Naiyáyika what is essential in the volitional process is ishtasáadhanatájnána or consciousness of the object desired as being conducive to my good, and there need not be any representation of this as specifying or enriching the self. With the Prábhákaras however it is this self-reference that constitutes the essential part of the motive while the consciousness of good may or may not be present. As a matter of fact such consciousness exists only in empirical willing which implies kámaná or desire for pleasure. Even here however the consciousness of good is a motive only as purushavisheshana, *i.e.*, as being referred to and appropriated by the self. In nityakarma however there is no material motive involved and the act moves the will as *purely* determining the self, *i.e.*, in so far as the self identifies itself with it. The Prábhákaras contend that what is anugata, present in all cases of volition, is káryatájnána, the consciousness of a thing to be done—the consciousness which is produced by the representation of the act as specifying the self. Hence this consciousness being present in all cases, while ishtasáadhanatájnána or consciousness of good being sometimes present and sometimes not, the hypothesis of the former being the true cause of volition has the merit of simplicity (lágghava):—evam cheshtasáadhanatva-valvad-anishtánanuvandhitva-shuchitakálajivitva-jnánajanyánám káryatájnánánám káryatájnánatvena anugatánám prabñttau hetutvam iti lágghavam (“ Bháttachintamani ”).

It will be seen that the Prábhákara analysis of the will constitutes a very important and substantial contribution to the ethics of rigorism. While the Kantian rationalism does not provide us with an adequate psychological basis of rigorism, the merit of the Prábhákaras lies in removing this serious defect by

founding moral theory on the positive basis of our inherent psychological constitution. Kant no doubt admits at least one feeling which is not pathological, *viz.*, love of duty or reverence for the Moral Law, but he does this at the sacrifice of pure ethical rationalism. But the Prābhākaras point out that the element of self-reference is the only essential part of an act of will, and the desire for an extraneous end (as in *kāmyakarma* or empirical willing) appeals only as identified with the self and appropriated by it for the time being. The psychological basis of rigorism has been developed in this line by Green who holds that the motive is not the strongest desire but the desire which the self has identified with itself. While with Green however the motive as determining the self and determined by it is always presented as a good, with Prabhākara and his followers the act is presented as *ishtasādhana*, good or advantageous to the self only in the case of empirical willing or *kāmyakarma*. In the case of the *nityakarmas* or unconditional duties, the agent is impelled by no such consciousness of anticipated good, but is prompted to action merely from the sense of *preranā*, duty or obligation. Thus while Kant inconsistently admits a non-rational factor, *viz.*, reverence for the Moral Law which makes the realisation of the Law psychologically possible, the Prābhākaras avoid such inconsistency by their psychological theory of volition which they explain independently of feeling and of the consciousness of good.

The Prābhākaras go beyond Kant also in another important point. With Kant it is the nature of the Moral Law that procures certainty for the idea of freedom. The "Ought," the imperative character or obligatoriness of the Law establishes the power, the freedom in the agent to obey it. Hence the idea of

freedom is implicated in the idea of the Moral Law, and the reality of freedom follows from the validity of the latter. With the Prábhákaras however *kṛtisádhyatájnána* or the consciousness of power is a *psychological* implicate in *every* act of will and therefore also in the desire for duty. The Prábhákaras generalise into a necessary psychological condition of *every* desire what Kant would confine to the mere desire for duty, *viz.*, *kṛtisádhyatájnána* or the consciousness of freedom. Hence with the Prábhákaras the proof of freedom lies in the psychological conditions of volition—it is psychological. With Kant freedom is an ethical implicate of our consciousness of the Moral Law: hence its reality stands or falls with the ultimate validity of the consciousness in which it is implied. The proof of freedom with Kant is therefore *ethico-metaphysical* and not psychological. It may be remarked however that the Prábhákaras also give what may be called the *moral proof* of freedom as arising from the obligation implied in the imperative character of the Moral Law, but they develop this proof in connection with the code of Vedic injunctions and prohibitions which they regard as constituting the Moral Law. The Vedic prescriptions they argue are of an impelling character and this establishes the power, the freedom in the moral agent to accomplish them:

Prabartanárupo hi vidhih arthát samihitasáadhanashaktim vodhayati (Párthasárathi Mishra's "Shástradipiká.")

B. *The Nyáya View.*

In the foregoing exposition we have confined ourselves to the Prábhákara analysis of the will as set forth in the *Siddhántamuktávali*. We shall now deal with the Nyaya view as presented in the same work—the view which we may note is also accepted by the Bháttas

and the Shankara-Vedántists as regards the psychology of volition.

A special merit of the Nyáya analysis lies in the fact that it analyses will not merely in its positive aspect as *chikirshá*, desire or attraction for the good but also in its negative form as *dvesha*, aversion and avoidance of the evil. While with the Prábhákaras with their doctrine of the pure will and self-reference the consciousness of good or evil is of no consequence and therefore the distinction between the two kinds of will is immaterial, with the Naiyayikas with their hedonistic theory of the motive this is a very essential distinction which cannot be psychologically insignificant as the Prábhákaras hold.

(a) *The conditions of Chikirshá, Ichchhá or Desire according to Nyáya :*

The conditions of *chikirshá*, *ichchhá* or desire according to the Nyáya are :—

Kṛtisádhyatájnána or the cognition that something *can* be done and *Valavadanishtánanuvandhishtasádhana-tájnána*, or the cognition that this thing is not only conducive to my good but is also incapable of causing any serious loss or harm outweighing the good to which it leads.

Hence *chikirshá* implies

(1) *Kṛtisádhyatájnána* or the consciousness of a thing as capable of being done by me.

(2) *Ishtasáadhanatájnána*, or the cognition that this thing is my *ishtasádhana* or conducive to my good.

(3) *Valavadanishta - ananuvandhitva - jnána* or the consciousness of this good being unaccompanied by a stronger evil.

About the exact nature of the third of the above conditions there has been divergence of views,

(1) According to Vishvanátha it is not the consciousness of the absence of evil but the absence of the consciousness of evil. Thus according to Vishvanátha's interpretation Valavadanishta-ananuvandhitva-jñána is something negative and means anishtajanakatva-jñánábháva, *i.e.*, the absence of the knowledge of its being anishtajanaka or productive of evil.

(2) Others hold however that Valavadanishta-ananuvandhitva as a condition of volition cannot be something negative. To say that it is the mere *absence* of the consciousness of evil is to make it psychologically unintelligible as a condition of willing. The absence of the deterrent can be psychologically operant only as the positive consciousness of absence. Hence it is Valavadanishta-ajanakatva-jñána, *i.e.*, the positive cognition of its being unproductive of a valavat or deterrent evil.

Vishvanátha however rejects this latter interpretation. His objection to this view is that if desire (chikirshá) follows immediately without vilamva or interval where there is consciousness of good (ishtasáadhanatájñána) together with the absence of the deterring consciousness of evil (valavadanishta-ajanakatva-jñánábháva), then an intervening consciousness of the absence (anishta-ajanaktva-jñána) is not necessary.

The question raised here is: What is the precise significance of the absence of deterring motives which is said to be presupposed in every act of volition? Some hold that as a psychological determinant of volition it must be of the nature of a positive consciousness of the absence of a stronger evil. This however raises the difficult question about the nature of this consciousness of absence as distinguished from the simple absence of the consciousness of evil. Moreover Vishvanátha's appeal is to the actual experience of men which certainly supports his contention that in a great many cases at

least there is nothing of this *positive* consciousness of absence though there is volition. 'Vishvanátha's contention seems therefore to be that an absence of the consciousness of deterrents, or, if this is unintelligible as a *psychological* condition, an indefinite subconscious sense of the absence, suffices for volition, though also in special cases it may become a positive consciousness of the absence.

In this connection there is also an interesting discussion as to the nature of the pratibandhaka or deterrent. The question is raised whether the deterrent is to be conceived as the *cognition* that a certain thing is injurious or productive of undesirable consequences (*dvishtasáadhanatájñána*), or whether it is to be conceived as the *feeling* of aversion or *dvesha* which arises from this cognition of injury or harm. Some hold that mere cognition is sufficient while others contend the cognition must produce the feeling of aversion before it can act as a deterrent. It will be seen that the dispute is about the significance which is to be attached to our emotional and instinctive life in the causation of volitional process. Those who consider the bare cognition to be sufficient are accused of underrating the affective and emotional life while over-estimating the importance of thought. As against these it is contended by others that the idea itself cannot move the will except as influencing feeling. The far-reaching import of this psychological controversy will be obvious if we remember that it is on similar issues with regard to the emotional life that the philosophy of life has opposed itself at the present day to the abstract intellectualism of Hegelians.

(b) *The conditions of Dvesha, Aversion.*

Just as in the case of Chikirshá or Desire there is not only a positive but also a negative side consisting

respectively of the consciousness of a good and the absence of the consciousness of a stronger evil, so also in the case of Aversion or Dvesha there are the corresponding positive and negative factors. Thus Aversion implies as a positive condition the consciousness of evil or harm and as a negative condition the absence of the consciousness of a greater good. Thus *dvishatasāadhanatājñāna* or the cognition of a thing being conducive to injury or harm together with *valavadishtasāadhanatājñānābhāva* or the absence of the consciousness of a compensating good produces *dvesha* or aversion to an object. It is significant that in this case there is no mention of *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the consciousness of power as a condition.

With reference to the precise nature of the negative—

(1) While Vishvanatha holds that it is merely the absence of the consciousness of a compensating good (*valavadishtasāadhanatājñānābhāva*).

(2) Others contend that a mere absence is psychologically unintelligible and that there is here a positive consciousness of the absence of good and not merely the absence of the consciousness of good.

The question of the *pratibandhaka* or deterrent to aversion is also discussed in this connection. It is pointed out that the absence (*abhāva*) of the consciousness of a compensating good being the negative condition of aversion, a positive cognition of such good will act as a deterrent. Others however hold that such cognition by itself is not sufficient; the cognition of good must lead to desire (*ichchhā*) in order to counteract the aversion, it being assumed that a feeling is overcome only by the opposite feeling and not by mere idea.

- (c) *The conditions of Volition (Prabṛtti, kṛti)*
according to Viśvanātha.

After discussing the conditions of Desire (and Aversion) Viśvanātha next considers the conditions of volition (Prabṛtti). Prabṛtti, or volition in the positive sense implies, according to Viśvanātha,

(1) Chikirśhā, desire to do something.

(2) Kṛtisādhyatājñāna, the cognition that it can be done.

(3) Ishtasāadhanatājñāna, the cognition that it is conducive to my good with valavadanishta-anuvandhitva-jñanābhāva or the absence of the cognition of a stronger evil.

(4) Upādānapratyakṣha, the perception of the upādāna, matter or stuff out of which the thing is to be produced.

It is pointed out that since every one of these is a condition of volition, therefore any one being absent, volition will not follow. Hence

(1) Where kṛtisādhyatājñāna or the confidence in one's power is lacking, there is no volition. This is why there is no willing of impossible things such as producing rain (vṛṣhtikarana) or bringing the moon down to make it serve the purpose of a lamp (chandra-mandalānayana). There is no volition for such things for they are recognised to be beyond the agent's power. While however the consciousness of power is thus a necessary condition of willing, this consciousness must exist *at the time of the willing* or there will be no volition. Thus the kṛtisādhyatājñāna, or consciousness of power, must be tadānimkṛtisādhyatājñāna, must exist at the occasion of the willing: there will be no volition if this consciousness is lacking at the time of willing though it may exist before or after it. This is why the sexually immature boy does not care for the future pleasures of youth: bhāvi yauvarājye bālasya na

prabṛtti. The boy is lacking in the capacity of indulging in these pleasures though he may acquire it in a maturer age. Hence it is that as a boy he does not care for what as a young man he will desire afterwards. This it will be seen implies that our powers and capacities unfold themselves in a certain order, which appear not *all* at once but *each* in its proper time and circumstances, and as our freedom is itself dependent on the exercise of these powers and capacities it is also a thing that grows with ourselves and expands and deepens with the broadening and deepening of our lives.

(2) Similarly where ishtasādhana-tājñāna or the consciousness of good is lacking, there is no volition. How, then, are we to account for acts of self-injury such as suicide? What is the motive to suicide? What can be the consciousness of good in these acts of self-destruction? The answer is, even in these there is ishtasādhana-tājñāna or consciousness of good, for what happens in such circumstances is this. On account of abnormal mental conditions there is lapse of judgment for the time being and the individual resolves on taking poison under the erroneous consciousness that suicide is not a great evil: roga-dushitachittah vishādi-bhakshané pravartaté tadānim-valavadanishtānanuvandhitvājñānāt. According to another view the abnormal conditions induce the act of suicide not through any *positive* consciousness of the act being not an evil but only through the absence of the consciousness of its being an evil, *i.e.*, by suppressing the consciousness of evil which would be present in normal conditions—rogadushita-chittah vishādibhakshane pravarté tadānim-valavadanishtānanuvandhitvājñānāt.

The difference between the two interpretations centres round the way in which the deterring motives are to be conceived as being suspended. While some recognise

a mere negative operation in the nature of a temporary suspension of the 'counteracting considerations as being sufficient, others think that there is a *positive* judgment that such considerations are unavailing. It will be seen that in the actual conditions of life the negative as well as the positive forms operate. Thus in the case of ordinary suicides it is the negative form that generally suffices, there being in these cases nothing but a temporary suppression of the deterring motives. But in the case of martyrs and suicides who act from deliberation or morbid self-consciousness it is the positive form that holds good.

(3) While there is thus consciousness of good (including the absence of the deterring motives) in all volition it is also necessary that the anticipated good (ishtasáadhanatá) must be tadanim-ishta-sáadhanatá, *i.e.*, must be relative to the time and circumstances. Thus what is good in one condition of life may not be a good in another condition and thus may cease to be desired in the altered conditions. This is why the meal which is greedily desired by the hungry man only disgusts him after appeasement: tripto bhojanó na pravartaté. The reason is that the condition of the desire, *viz.*, hunger having ceased in the changed circumstances, the meal (bhojana) is no longer felt as a good.

N.B.—It follows from the above that good and evil as depending on subjective conditions like attraction (rága) and aversion (dvesha) in the individual, must always be relative and conditional. But this contradicts the Nyáya doctrine of an absolute and unconditioned good as being the highest end. The Naiyáyika solves the difficulty by conceiving the highest good not as positive happiness but as the absolute cessation of suffering. According to him the highest good conceived negatively as absolute freedom from suffering does

not imply either *rāga*, attraction, or *dvesha*, aversion, in the agent, for this negative state being not positively favourable (*anukūla*) but merely not unfavourable (*apratikūla*) cannot inspire any pathological feeling such as *raga*, attraction in the agent in order to be desired.

(4) If there is thus consciousness of good in all cases, the question rises, how is moral evil possible? The essence of moral evil lies in the conscious choice of the evil course in preference to the good. How then is such deliberate choice of the evil possible which constitutes sin? As a matter of fact we find that crimes are perpetrated by believers (*āstikas*) who believe in hell as well as by persons who know the penalty they have to pay. Thus men often yield to temptation such as forbidden sexual indulgence (*agamyāgamana*), the destruction of the enemy (*shatrubadha*) even though they are fully alive to the penalty attached. How is all this possible if consciousness of good is a necessary condition of volition in all cases?

The answer is: under the influence of strong passion there is a temporary suspension of the consciousness of the penalty. Thus the seductions of the pleasure sometimes succeed in driving out the consciousness of punishment in hell and volition takes place as a consequence in spite of the presence of the counteracting motives *as a rule*. (*Utkatarāgādīnā narakasāadhanatādhitirodhānāt.*)

(d) *The View of the Nabyās.*

Amongst the *Nabyās* or New *Naiyāyikas* there are followers of *Prabhākara* as well as of orthodox *Nyāya*. The New *Naiyāyikas* who hold the *Prabhākara* view demur to the old *Naiyāyikas* as regards their views as to the conditions of *prabhṛtti* or volition. According to the

orthodox Nyāya view the conditions which are required for volition are *valvadanishtānanubandhishtasāadhanatve satikṛtisādhyatājñāna*, *i.e.*, *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or confidence in one's power or capacity and *ishtasāadhanatājñāna* or the consciousness of the agent's good together with *valavadanishtānanubandhitvājñāna* or the absence of the deterring motives of evil. The Nabyās however point out that the confidence in one's power is not always a condition of volition. As there cannot be an original consciousness of competency in regard to future acts which have never been willed before, the individual would never will them if the sense of competency were a necessary condition of all volition. The truth is that these acts are in the first instance an imitation of what has been observed to be done by other persons. Hence it is only in the later and more developed stage of self-conscious willing that the consciousness of power can enter as a determining factor of the volitional process. The old Naiyāyikas however argue : there can be no question of imitation in such acts. As a matter of fact there is imitation neither in new constructions (prompted by constructive imagination) nor in the spontaneous unfolding of the life of instinct such as sex-gratification.

N.B.—It is to be seen however that the real point at issue is whether the sense of competency is to be included among the conditions of volition. The instances of instinctive, spontaneous or impulsive actions which the old school cites against the new views may disprove the theory of imitation but do not establish the traditional view as regards consciousness of competency being required as a necessary condition. As a matter of fact there is some confusion here which obscures the real issue as neither imitative, nor spontaneous and instinctive acts come strictly within the class of volitional actions which they are supposed to illustrate.

(e) *Comments of the "Dinākari."*

The "Dinākari" makes some very interesting comments on the Nyāya view as expounded in the Siddhāntamuktāvali. Thus :

(1) With regard to the condition of desire (ichchhá) it points out that this may exist svarupatah, i.e., on its own account, without being known or consciously referred to the self. This means that volition need not be self-conscious though of course a conscious desire for some good must be present. It is the presence of such a desire that distinguishes volition proper (prabṛtti, prayatna) from automatic, reflex or instinctive acts (jivanayoniprayatna) in which there is no conscious desire. But this merely means that the desire involves the consciousness of the future good towards which it strives and not that there is also a consciousness of the desire itself or of the self as so desiring. Ishta-sāadhanatājñānē ichchhá-svarupatath visheshanam, tena ichchhājñānashunyaakāleapi chikirshā nirvāhah.

N.B.—It follows from the above that according to the Nyāya view conation includes

(a) Automatic, reflex and instinctive activities which are characterised by the absence of conscious desire, and

(b) Volition proper involving conscious desire for a future good.

The latter again is—

(1) Either simple volition as implying nothing more than the effort to realise a future good aimed at,

(ii) Or self-conscious willing implying not merely the conscious desire for a future good but also a consciousness of this desire or of the self as so desiring.

The distinction between volition and self-conscious volition is possible only in the Nyāya view according to which self-reference is not a necessary condition of the

volitional process. For the Prábhákaras however as all desire must specify the self in order to move the will, volition is necessarily self-conscious in all cases.

(2) Again as regards Aversion (Dvesha) the "Dinakari" points out that this may be either direct or transferred. It is direct in regard to pain (duhkha) while in regard to all that is a cause of pain (duhkhasádhana) the aversion is indirect, derived or transferred. Even the natural fear of a snake (sarpa) is in this sense transferred or derived.

(3) As the presence of a strong aversion (valavad-dvesha) stands in the way of volition, the question rises: how is the absence of the deterrent to be conceived in order to be regarded as a condition of volition? The view of Vishvanátha is: the consciousness of a preponderating evil (valavaddvishtasáadhanatájñána) being the deterrent, the absence of such consciousness is a condition (hetu) of volition. But this raises the question as to what constitutes the counteracting or deterring force of the deterrent and several other questions. (i) Thus we have first to ascertain what *constitutes the deterring strength (valvattva) of the aversion*. According to Nyáya this is not a question of the sheer intensity of the pain involved. As a matter of fact the agent is not deterred or moved to act by mere consideration of the greatness or smallness of the pain involved. Considerations of vahutara or alpataraduhkha, i.e., of quantitative differences in the pain, do not decide the question here, even an intense pain sometimes proving unavailing while even a comparatively feeble one being observed to be effectual. This shows that the deterrent force of the pain is a peculiar quality which is not easy to describe. Kvachit vahutarasya duhkhasya avalavattvát, kvachit alpasya duhkhasya valavattvát, anugatasya vallavattvasya avalavattvasya durvachattvát. According

to Nyaya this deterrent force of the aversion (dvesha) is a specific quality independent of quantity, aversion (dvesha) in certain forms and certain occasions being deterrent, *i.e.*, falling within the class (jāti) of feelings characterised by the mark of being deterrents—dveshē-valavattvam jātivisheshah.

The ordinary Nyaya view of a valavadanishta or deterrent evil is as follows:—A deterrent evil (apishta) is that anishta or evil which is other than whatever is entailed as a necessary accompaniment or consequence of the act in the interval before fruition; valavadanishtā-nanubandhitvam chaishtotpattināntariyakaduhkhādhikāduhkha-ajanakatvam. Ishtopattināntariyakaduhkhādhikāduhkha-ajanakatvasya, valavadanishtānanuvandhitvasya vidhyamshasyākshateh (Vijnanabhikshu's "Sankhyapra-vachanabhāshya"). If therefore there be any pain arising from the act even after the realisation of the end, such pain will act as a deterrent. It may be noted that the pain which is entailed by the act *before* fruition, either as an accompaniment or as a consequence of it, may or may not deter. The pain however which comes *after* fruition is always a deterrent, the idea being that the presence of pain at this stage is the negation of the fruition which is the real incentive to the act. Some point out however that the absence of pain which is other than what is involved as a necessary accompaniment or consequence of the process leading to fruition cannot be a condition of volition as this will imply that there is always nāntariyakaduhkha or intervening pain accompanying the process of realisation of the end. As a matter of fact there are also sukhamātrajanakakarmas or acts which produce pleasure only without causing pain and such acts do not imply the absence of pain other than that involved in the intervening process as a condition, there being no intervening pain at all

in such acts. The Nyáya meets this objection however by showing that pain cannot be altogether got rid of in any case as it will always be present at least in the form of the effort or exertion (shrama) which must be put forth by the agent in realising his end.

The above is the ordinary Nyáya view of the deterrent as being the pain which is apprehended as likely to come after fruition. Váchaspatimishra however interprets the deterrent to mean narakaduhkha, the fear of punishment in hell or theological penalty. He thus imports psycho-ethical considerations to explain the psychological process of arrested will in the presence of the object of desire. In this respect the ordinary Nyáya view as being a purely psychological explanation is not only deeper in its analysis but also profoundly original there being nothing corresponding to it even in modern Western psychology. The Chárvákas no doubt offer also an explanation on a purely psychological basis, but they emphasize only the quantitative differences of pleasures and pains as the determining factors in selection and rejection. Thus according to them there is selection when there is a balance of pleasure over pain as contrarywise there is rejection when the amount of pain exceeds that of pleasure. The Naiyáyika however points out that quantitative differences are not always effectual in determining the result, but there is one factor which is always potent as a deterrent to volition, viz., the existence of pain *after* fruition. Hence the pleasure which is to be potent as a motive must always come *at the end* of the process, just as the pain which comes after the pleasure of fruition must always act as a deterrent. There is, in other words, a certain *order in time* in which the pains and pleasures must follow one another in order to move the agent to act, an order which may be said to be a specific quality in pleasures

and pains like Mill's quality which decides the question of their strength as motives and deterrents. It will be seen that this is an entirely new element or factor which is not included in the Benthamite calculus according to which distance and proximity in time affect only through variations of the intensity or *quantity* of pleasures and pains and not through their order in time in the process leading to fruition.

(ii) Secondly the question rises : what is it that acts as a deterrent? Is it the subjective aversion of the agent, or the object which, inspires the subjective feeling? The Dīnakāri observes : it is not the object of aversion (*dviṣta* or *anīṣṭavīṣṭa*) but the feeling of aversion in the subject that acts as the deterrent in volition. Here is therefore a question of subjective value, the deterring strength of the feeling being relative to the person, the time and other circumstances. *Tattakālinatapurushichechhām prati prabṛttim prati cha tattakālinatapurushiyavalvaddviṣṭa-jñakatva-jñānasya pratibandhakatvam kalpyate*. Thus *nāraka*, suffering in hell, is a deterrent evil (*valavaddviṣṭa*) to *Chaitra* and he abstains from sinful self-indulgence as a consequence, but as such suffering has no influence as a deterrent on *Maitra* he does not abstain from such self-indulgence.

(iii) The force of the deterrent may also be overcome in another way. Thus one and the same act may be capable of producing intense pleasure (*utkatasukhajanaka*) and intense pain (*utkataduhkhajanaka*) at the same time. Here neither desire (*ichchhā*) nor aversion (*dveṣha*) will be produced. But there may also be competition between the two states of desire (*ichchhā*) and aversion (*dveṣha*) resulting in an oscillation between the two antagonistic conative attitudes which may culminate at last in volition when the aversion (*dveṣha*) has been overcome or has subsided.

Volition may therefore be suspended in two ways : (1) when the desire has arisen but does not culminate in actual willing, being counteracted by a deterrent aversion, (2) when the desire as well as the aversion are unproduced as a consequence of the act being cognised to result in intense pleasure and intense pain at the same time. In the latter case the pleasure being exactly balanced by the pain, the corresponding impulses do not arise being neutralised at the very beginning. But under certain circumstances there may be a state of oscillation instead of complete suspension or abeyance which may be said to constitute the non-intellectual basis of the intellectual process of deliberation. This state will cease when the indecision at last terminates into actual willing by the aversion being overcome or subdued or when it has otherwise subsided of itself.

As there are two forms of arrested volition, there are also two ways in which the force of the deterrent may be counteracted. Thus the deterrent may be simply unproduced being completely neutralised by an equally strong impulse to act generated by the consciousness of intense pleasure, as in states of complete suspension of conation. But the deterrent may also be overcome by the consciousness of pleasure after a state of oscillation between desire and aversion as in the case of final resolution of indecision and wavering into actual willing.

(iv) It should also be noted that consciousness of impending evil is a deterrent only in the sense that the agent is practically certain about the consequences of the action he contemplates. In cases however where the consequences are uncertain and problematic and the apprehension of evil is merely speculative, desire and volition are not necessarily counteracted. Thus men are not prevented from risking the dangers of costly and

wasteful ways merely by the speculative apprehension of possible evil consequences to themselves. Yuddhādāu valāvanishṭaśāḍhanatva-sandeheapi ichchhāprabrttyoh udayāt.

Note.—Hence with regard to the deterrent it is to be observed that it is always a *feeling* of aversion arising from the conscious apprehension of evil and not the simple cognition of an object of aversion. Secondly, the evil apprehended is some painful experience which is cognised as marring the fruition aimed at by the act of volition either through theological penalty believed to be associated with the action or by entailing suffering on the agent after fruition and thus negating the fruition. Thirdly the force of the deterrent is relative to the person, the time and the circumstances, so that what is sufficient to deter one person, or under one kind of circumstances may not deter another, or in a different set of conditions. Fourthly, the deterrent implies some degree of certainty about the evil consequences on the agent. For example, where the possibility of evil is a matter of mere speculation the deterrent is not necessarily effectual. Fifthly, the deterrent may also fail either by being simply unproduced as when the feeling of aversion is neutralised by an equally strong feeling of attraction the result being the complete suppression of conation, or by the attraction of pleasure at last overcoming the aversion and resolving itself into action after a temporary state of oscillation.

(4) It is to be seen from the above that volition includes positive as well as negative conditions which again imply intellectual as well as conative and affective factors. The question thus arises : how are these intellectual and non-intellectual factors to be conceived in relation to the positive and negative conditions of volition ? The Dinakari discusses five different alternatives in this connection.

(i) Thus it may be supposed that the conditions which suffice to induce volition are cognition of the absence of any deterring evil consequences (valavadanish-tānanuvandhitvajnána) *plus* cognition of the action being conducive to the agent's good (ishtasādhana'tājnána) *plus* resulting desire, etc. It will be seen the emphasis here is on a *positive* cognition of the absence of the deterrent, *i.e.*, the negative condition of the absence of deterrent motives is conceived as a positive consciousness of security.

(ii) It may be supposed that the deterrent is itself a cognition, being the consciousness of the act as entailing serious evil consequences on the agent. Therefore the absence of such cognition, being the absence of the deterrent or pratibandhaka, is the real ground (hetu) of the volition. The negative condition is therefore conceived here negatively as valavadanish-tānanuvandhitvajnána-bhāva, *i.e.*, absence of the cognition of serious evil consequences, in response to the logical demand for parsimony of hypothesis and the inadmissibility of unnecessary and superfluous assumptions. It is assumed that volition being psychologically possible even without a positive cognition of the absence of the consciousness of a deterrent in many cases, a positive cognition is not a real determining factor even where it may be felt to be present.

(iii) In the above the deterrent is conceived as a simple cognition of possible evil consequences on the agent. It may be supposed however that the deterrent, pratibandhaka, is not mere valavadanish-tajanakatvajnána, *i.e.*, not the simple cognition of the act as entailing serious evil consequences, but dveshavishishtasya valavadanish-tajanakatvajnána, *i.e.*, the cognition of the act as a source of evil by an agent who entertains a feeling of aversion for it. In other words, the deterrent, pratibandhaka, is

not a simple cognition but a compound made up of the two components of the feeling of aversion (*dvesha*) and the cognition of evil (*anishtajñāna*). Hence mere aversion is ineffectual just as mere cognition of the evil. (a) Thus suppose there is aversion (*dvesha*) without any *jñāna*, cognition of the evil. Such aversion is powerless as a *pratibandhaka* or deterrent, *i.e.*, there may be volition inspite of such groundless aversion. (b) Similarly suppose there is cognition of evil but no aversion, *i.e.*, suppose the cognition (*jñāna*) exists without the feeling of aversion (*dvesha*) which it should ordinarily produce. Such cognition is also ineffectual as a deterrent, *i.e.*, there may be volition inspite of such cognition of the evils associated with it. (c) Again, suppose there is not only the cognition but also the feeling of aversion. Here we have everything that is necessary to constitute the deterrent or *pratibandhaka*, and the presence of the deterrent renders volition impossible. (d) Lastly, suppose both the cognition and the feeling are absent. Here the factors of the deterrent being all absent, the negative conditions are fulfilled. Hence where the positive conditions are also absent, volition follows without fail. Thus while in the case of (a) and (b) volition may or may not take place, in the case of (c) it is impossible as in that of (a) it is inevitable.

Note—It will be seen that (a) and (b) illustrate the conflict between the intellectual and non-intellectual factors of the mind from two opposite points of view. This conflict is writ large on modern life where intellect and instinct are struggling simultaneously for victory. (a) illustrates the impotence of mere feeling which inspite of heredity and transmission has often to give way to the light of knowledge. This is how race-prejudice and race-habit yield gradually to enlightenment and higher moral outlook. (b) illustrates the tragedy of the

overdeveloped intellect "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," of the intellect which 'grows at the expense of the other factors and thus cannot translate itself into the life of feeling and willing.

(iv) In (iii) above we have discussed the alternative which conceives the deterrent as a compound in which the feeling of aversion as well as the cognition of evil enter as essential components. There is a fourth alternative which remains to be considered, *viz.*, that which conceives the deterrent as consisting essentially in a feeling of aversion, a feeling however which is itself induced by the cognition of the evil consequences on the agent that may be entailed by the action contemplated. In this view it will be seen a causal relation is assumed between the cognition and the feeling, the latter being regarded as an effect of the former. It is not clearly shown however whether the cognitive element continues in the effect, or ceases with the appearance of the feeling. If the first of these is meant we have only, it will be seen, another variety of (iii), the deterrent being conceived as a compound of components which are causally related to each other. It will also be noted that in this view in either of its two forms we have an analysis of volition from the intellectualist standpoint which ascribes primacy to the cognitive factors and does not admit irrational feeling to have any influence over conscious choice and will. It however follows from this view that cognition is also ineffectual without feeling, though it may have primacy as the causally determining factor and therefore priority over the other factors of the mind. Thus according to it there may be cognition of evil (*dviṣṭa-sādhana-tājñāna*) but it will not of itself prevent willing till there is feeling of aversion produced by such cognition. This is illustrated in the case of suicides. Thus when a suicide resolves on

self-destruction by means of poisoning (vishabhakshana) it cannot be supposed that he has no idea of the evil consequences on himself of the act of taking poison which he resolves upon. What therefore happens is that the cognition of the evil consequences fails to produce the feeling of aversion which it will in ordinary circumstances. As a result of this his cognition has no influence on his decision and fails to act as a deterrent to the action.

Note—we have thus three different explanations of suicide, etc.,

(1) We may explain such acts as being due to the cognition of their evil consequences being overpowered for the time being.

(2) We may suppose also that the agent under the influence of strong feeling and abnormal mental conditions has a *positive* consciousness or conviction that the acts will not entail serious evil consequences on himself as ordinarily believed.

(3) Lastly we may suppose that the agent has cognition of the evil consequences but the cognition fails to produce the feeling of aversion (dvesha) which alone can act as a deterrent.

(4) Dinakara however does not accept any of the four alternatives discussed above. According to him the deterrent is neither the mere cognition of evil nor the simple feeling of aversion, but is either of these according to special circumstances. Hence in some cases the cognition is sufficient and, in some again the feeling of aversion is required. But as primacy belongs to cognition as the causally determining factor, the absence of the deterrent as the negative condition of volition does not mean the mere absence of the affective factor of aversion but also the absence of the cause of the aversion, *viz.*, the cognition of evil. Hence the negative

condition of volition is always the cognition of the absence of evil consequences (ananuvandhitvajñāna) and not the mere absence of the Dvesha or aversion. It follows therefore that the absence of aversion (dveshābhāva) without cognition of the absence of evil consequences will not suffice to cause volition even when the other conditions remain.

The five alternatives explained above represent the various ways in which volition can be regarded from the positive and negative standpoints. The implied hypotheses in the five alternatives are all tested by application to certain specific cases and the appeal is to the solemn testimony of a person who is asked to report what passes in his mind, *i.e.*, other people's introspection is used as objective material. It will be seen that the entire analysis is based primarily on the Nyāya conception of volition. The Nyāya recognises in all volition consciousness of some good to be attained which in its negative aspect means the absence of serious evil consequences marring the worth or value of the good aimed at. The Prābhākaras however do not recognise any consciousness of good as being necessarily implicated in volition. Therefore the analysis of volition from the Prābhākara standpoint must differ essentially from that of the Nyāya which conceives willing as a pursuit of some good desired or aimed at. The Dinakari therefore next analyses the Prābhākara conception of volition discussing its bearings and implications particularly with reference to the question of freedom of will.

(5) In all volition according to Prābhākaras the psychological process is as follows :

(i) In the first place, there is Svavisheshanavattāpratisandhāna, *i.e.*, the representation of a certain visheshana or specific determination of the acting agent or pravartamāna puruṣa.

(ii) Secondly, there is *káryatájñána* or cognition of something to be done.

(iii) Thirdly, there is *chikirshá* or desire which is a desire for things capable of being realised by the will—a desire which is itself characterised by the *consciousness* of power or competency with reference to the object to be realised or achieved by the will (*kṛtisádhyatvaparakárikákṛtisádhya-kriyá-vishayinichchhá*). Hence the desire is not merely about *objects* that are capable of realisation by the will but also implies subjective consciousness of such capacity or competency on the part of the acting agent.

(iv) Lastly, there is volition, *prabṛtti* following on the desire—volition which completes the process.

It will be seen the above analysis agrees with the *Nyáya* only in the last two steps. The first two however show an essential departure from the *Nyáya* view according to which the steps are:—

(1) Cognition of *káryatá* or duty with reference to something which is recognised as conducive to good without entailing serious evil consequences—*valavadanishtánanuvandhishtasáadhanatávishayakakáryatájñána*.

(2) *Chikirshá*, desire.

(3) *Prabṛtti*, will.

Hence according to *Nyáya*, the consciousness of good with its negative implicate is necessarily involved in all volition, but according to the *Prábhákaras*, this is not a necessary condition of volition which requires only the representation of something as a specific determinant of the self but not necessarily the consciousness of good. Thus the consciousness of good is present only in some actions, *i.e.*, in *kámyakarma* or empirical actions from material motives of personal profit or gain. It is not present however in the performance of the unconditional duties (the *nityanaimittikakarmas*).

This shows that volition is possible without the consciousness of good, *i.e.*, that the latter, where present, is only an inessential accompaniment rather than a necessary determining condition of the process of willing. In fact the so-called consciousness of good in empirical prudential actions is not itself the real determinant of the process of willing—it determines will only as being a mode or modalisation of the representation of the act as *svavisheshana*, *i.e.*, as specifying the self. It is thus the representation of the act as appropriated by the self which is the real cause of volition, and in empirical action it further presents itself as conducive to the well-being of the agent.

But this is not the only point in respect of which the *Prābhākaras* differ from the *Naiyāyikas*. They also differ materially from the latter in their conception of the relation between the first and the second step in the process. Thus according to the *Prābhākaras* the relation between the first and the second step is that of establisher and established, *i.e.*, the representation of the act as a *visheshana* or specific determinant of the self is the cause which produces or generates the *kāryatājñāna*, *i.e.*, the consciousness that it is to be done. The *Naiyāyika* however does not recognise any causal relation between the consciousness of good and the cognition that it is to be done, the relation according to the *Naiyāyika* being a bare relation of the sameness of object, the *vishaya*, *i.e.*, the object of the consciousness of good, being also the *vishaya*, the object of the consciousness of duty with reference to it. In other words, according to the *Naiyāyika* there are not here two psychoses one conditioning the other but only one psychic compound with the two aspects of consciousness of good and the cognition of duty with reference to it.

N.B.—It is to be noted however that with the Naiyáyika also nothing is *ishta*, desirable or good except in relation to a subject. It is the subject of volition that determines his own values and therefore there is no question of mere mechanical determination as may appear at first view. In fact, the Naiyáyika differs far less in this respect from the Prábhákaras than do the Chárvákas who believe only in mechanical attraction and repulsion of pleasure-pain. The Chárváka view in this respect may be described as mechanical hedonism as distinguished from the self-deterministic hedonism of Nyáya which ascribes valuation to subjective freedom. The only important difference between the Prábhákaras and the Naiyáyikas in this respect relates to the fact that while the latter conceive this subjective determination as a *consciousness of good* in all volition, the Prábhákaras do not admit that this is always the case, volition being possible according to them without the act of self-determination taking the form of a specific consciousness of good. What is essential, according to the Prábhákaras, is subjective self-determination with reference to the act which appeals as *good* only in *kámyakarmas* or empirical actions from material motives but which appears as Duty pure and simple in regard to the *Nityānaimittika karmas* *i.e.*, the non-empirical and unconditional obligations of the individual.

Hence the essential difference between the Nyáya and the Prábhákara views consists first in the importance which Nyáya attaches to the consciousness of *good* and secondly with reference to the relation between the self-reference of the act and the consciousness of duty with reference to it. For the Prábhákaras the latter relation, as we have seen, is a *niyámaka* relation, *i.e.*, of establisher and established, the *svavisheshanajnána*, the cognition of the act as a specific determinant of the

self being the ground or cause of the káryatájnána, the cognition that it is to be done. In fact, according to the Prábhákaras, the cognition of duty follows from the representation of self-reference as consequence from ground or hetu, as conclusion from premise (Tasya svavisheshanapratisandhánasya káryatájnánahetutá linga-jnánavidhayá). Hence for the Prábhákaras we have here two distinct psychoses, one leading on to the other. For the Naiyáyikas however, the two cognitions, *viz.*, the cognition of good (ishtasáadhanatájnána) and the cognition of duty (káryatájnána) are held together in a complex, the object (vishaya) of the two cognitions being the same. In other words, according to Nyáya, that which is cognised as ishtasádhana or good is also cognised as kárya, the thing to be done, so that the link between the two steps, *viz.*, the purely cognitive (the consciousness of ishta or good) and the cognitive-conative (the cognition of duty with reference to it) is the simple one of community of vishaya or object, that which is the object of the value or ishtasáadhanatá-cognition being also the object of the duty or káryatá-cognition. Hence for the Nyáya, though analysis reveals a distinction of aspects, yet there is only one psychosis with a dual nature—a cognitive and a conative one. For the Prábhákaras however there are here not two aspects of a single psychosis, but two psychoses, the link between them being that of establisher and established. As we have already noted, the Prábhákaras regard this relation as that of ground (hetu) and grounded, or premise and conclusion and they actually elaborate this into the form of an inference (anumāna) both in regard to kámyakarmas or ordinary prudential and empirical actions as well as nityanaimittikakarmas or unconditional and non-empirical duties.

1. Let us first consider the case of ordinary empirical actions from material motives. Let us consider, for example, the act of cooking one's meal (Pákah) which is an empirical action (kámyakarma) implying desire (kámaná) for some good to be attained. For the Prábhákaras such an act involves inference amongst the psychological antecedents or conditions which determine it. The inference involved is this:

The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my will or kṛti—pakah matkṛtisádhyah (Conclusion).

Inasmuch as

While the act is conducive to my good (madishta-sádhana), it is at the same time incapable of being accomplished except through my volition: matkṛtimviná asattv sati madishtasáadhanatvát (Ground).

The ground of the inference, it will be seen, is a specific determination of the self, i.e., the determination of it by the act of cooking, which, in this case, takes the form of conduciveness to the agent's well-being, cooking being an ordinary kámya or empirical action. It is this subjective appropriation of the act which presents itself as conducive to the agent's good that acts as the ground or reason of the subjective cognition that it is to be done or accomplished by my will. It is this latter cognition which is thus determined or produced by the subjective appropriation of the act that leads to chikirshá or desire and finally to kṛti or will. It is to be seen that the act is self-appropriated not merely as being conducive to the agent's good but also as one which is incapable of being realised except through the agent's will. This latter qualification is added to exclude performances beyond the agent's power such as vṛshti or production of a rainfall and also similar results compassed by the volition of other persons such

as parakṛtapāka or cooking done by others. In neither of these cases, is there subjective self-appropriation though there is the consciousness of good, in the case of rain-fall because of the consciousness of impotency or helplessness and in the case of cooking by other persons because of the absence of the necessity of exerting oneself for the result which is being realised without the agent requiring to will it. It is also to be noted that the qualification of madishtasāadhanatva or conduciveness to one's own good is negatively significant as excluding shrama, *i.e.*, the fatigue of the muscles, etc.; involved in the act of cooking. These are not subjectively appropriated as objects of volition or things to be accomplished by one's kṛti or will even though they are incapable of being accomplished except through one's own volition. The reason is that they lack the quality of being conducive to the agent's good—a quality which distinguishes the act of cooking and thereby makes it to be subjectively appropriated.

Some point out that there is here neither inference as the Prābhākaras suppose nor any compounded consciousness of duty and good as the Naiyāyikas hold. Thus there is no compounding of the consciousness of duty (kāryatā) and conduciveness to good (ishtasāadhanatā) into a unitary complex experience through the unity of the vishaya or object as the Naiyāyikas suppose nor are there two psychoses, one establishing the other, as the Prābhākaras think. The Pravartaka or motive here is a simple psychosis which involves neither any inference nor any duality of nature, there being nothing more in it than the simple cognition that something is to be accomplished by my will. It is this Kṛtisādhyatājñāna or cognition of something to be accomplished as svechchhādhina, *i.e.*, as dependent on my pleasure or freedom which is the essential condition of volition. The motive

is thus the consciousness of something to be accomplished by the agent's free will and is neither an effect of subjective self-appropriation as the Prābhākaras contend nor a component in a psychological compound as the Naiyāyikas urge. It is dependent on the agent's *svechchhá* or undetermined will and is thus neither an effect of self-determination through self-appropriation of the act as a *visheshana* or qualification of the self nor an implicate or moment in the consciousness of *ishta* or good. In other words, the motive is the cognition that something is to be done by me by my free will and this is independent alike of hedonistic considerations of good or advantage to self and of any representation of the act as *purushavisheshana* or qualification of the self. It is purely *svechchhādhina*, *i.e.*, does not depend on any other condition than the agent's free and undetermined will so that it is a mistake to try to deduce or infer it or further analyse it into simpler components. Motivation, in other words, means the indetermination of the agent expressing itself in the determination to accomplish a particular action—his absolute indetermination, *liberum arbitrium*, or liberty of indifference, as expressing itself in the cognition that something is to be accomplished by his will as freely willed. Hence there is here not merely the cognition that something is to be willed or accomplished but also that this willing is itself freely willed, *i.e.*, is dependent only on the agent's pleasure. There is thus a will to will, *i.e.*, pure will in which the agent expresses his freedom of indetermination by willing, *i.e.*, signifying his assent to, the accomplishment of the act by his will. The bare consciousness that something is to be accomplished by my will does not therefore suffice to constitute the motive, there being also involved the fact that the accomplishment of the act as thus intellectually determined

is itself freely willed, *i.e.*, is non-dependent on or undetermined by anything else than the freedom of the agent or subject. We may compare this with the pure will as conceived by Augustine—the will to will which he assumes even in cognition as the will to know, *i.e.*, as the spontaneity of attention which is not resolvable into interest, intensity of stimulus or any other natural condition. It is however not to be conceived as blind spontaneity in so far as it involves the definite *cognition* that something to be accomplished by the will is freely willed.

The Prābhākaras however urge that this indeterminism is itself a moment in their doctrine of self-determinism. They admit that the will to accomplish is itself freely willed, *i.e.*, depends on the agent's undetermined freedom, but they hold that this undetermined freedom is itself determined or established by a process of mediation through self-reference. Thus according to them also the cognition of duty implies *svechchhādhinakṛtisādhyatājñāna*, *i.e.*, the cognition of the will to will, but they contend that this freely willed will is itself established by a process of mediation through self-appropriation or self-reference. In other words, there is inference involved in the process of motivation even though the motive is *svechchhādhinakṛtisādhyatājñāna*, *i.e.*, cognition of duty as freely willed. This cognition of freely willed duty is itself the *sādhyā*, the object established so that the *anumāna*, the inference is a process of self-mediation through which freedom, instead of being arbitrarily posited, posits, establishes itself through itself, in this inferential form. Thus the inference is as follows:—

Conclusion.

The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free will—(*pākaḥ svechchhādhina-matkṛtisādhyah*),

*Ground**Inasmuchas*

It is incapable of being accomplished except through my will —(svechchhādhinamatkṛtimvinā asattvé sati)

And is at the same time characterised by conduciveness to my good (madishtasāadhanatvāt)

Hence the process is one in which freedom mediates itself through itself, freedom being involved in the ground (hetu) and involved in the established consequence or conclusion (sādhya). Freedom thus establishes itself through itself there being indetermination alike in the will which is cognised to be indispensable for the accomplishment of the act and in the will to accomplish it which follows as a consequence from this cognition. But this self-mediation of freedom is not pure indetermination but self-determination in so far as it implies an act of self-reference or self-appropriation in the form of representation of the act as a specific determination (visheshana) of the self. Thus the process according to the Prābhākara is as follows:—

(1) There is svavisheshanavattāpratisandhāna or representation of something as svavisheshana or qualification of the self.

(2) This something which is represented as a qualification of the self is also cognised as incapable of being accomplished except through my free will.

(3) This conscious self-appropriation of what is thus cognised as depending on my free will leads to the cognition that it is to be accomplished by my free will.

II. We have so far considered the nature of the anumāna or inference involved in the case of an empirical action (kāmyakarma) such as cooking the meal. We shall now consider it in the case of the nitya or unconditional duties such as sandhyā or the daily prayer.

We have seen that in empirical actions the consciousness of duty (kṛtisādhyatājñāna) implies the consciousness of good (ishtasāadhanatā) as a condition. But the latter produces the former only as a purushavisheshana or specific qualification of the self. Hence it is this self-qualification or representation of the act as specifying the self which is the essential condition of the consciousness of duty, though in empirical actions such self-qualification takes place in connection with the consciousness of an anticipated good. In the case of the unconditional or nitya duty however the self-qualification is not mediated through any such hedonistic calculations of advantage or profit to self so that the consciousness of duty or kāryatājñāna follows immediately on the consciousness of it, the bare cognition of the injunction necessarily inducing the representation of it as a self-qualification or purushavisheshana. Hence the inferential process which establishes the kāryatājñāna or cognition of duty with reference to it is independent of any reference to any extraneous end such as is involved in an ordinary empirical action. Thus the inference involved in the case of a nitya or unconditional duty such as the daily prayer (sandhyā) is as follows :—

Conclusion.

I am now to (or under obligation to) offer my daily prayer—aham idanintanakṛtisādhyasandhyāvandanah.

Ground.

Because belonging to the twice-born caste, I am qualified by the enjoined ablutions, etc., of morning and evening—dvijātivé sati vihita sandhyā kālina shau-
chādimmattvāt.

Hence the steps in the inference are:—

(1) Vidhi, preraná or command embodied in the scriptural imperative as revealing (jnápaka) the enjoined ablutions and the like (vihitashauchádi).

(2) The representation of these enjoined ablutions, etc., of scripture as a qualification (visheshana) of the self—the representation which arises from the consciousness of the injunctions revealed.

(3) Kṛtisádhyatájnána or the cognition that the duties enjoined are to be accomplished by me, a cognition which results from the consciousness of the duties as qualifying or specifying the self.

In other words, the scriptural Imperative or Vidhi reveals the particular acts (ablutions, etc.,) as obligatory on the agent in consequence of which they are subjectively appropriated by the individual as determinations (visheshanas) of the self and this self-determination or self-qualification leads to the cognition that they are to be accomplished by the agent's will.

It is to be noted that the command in this particular instance is relative to a particular time, *i.e.*, to the sensible present (idāñintana) as experienced by the individual. Hence the resulting cognition of duty or kṛtisádhyatájnána is also relative to this particular time, *i.e.*, the cognition that it is to be accomplished is not a purely general consciousness that it is to be done at any time according to convenience but a specific cognition that it is to be accomplished *now*, *i.e.*, within the felt present as experienced by the agent through his mental continuum which is in time.

Against this view of the Prábhákaras the Naiyáyikas urge: how can time be a qualification of the purusha or individual (kálasya katham purushavisheshanatvam)? One may concede ablutions (shaucha), etc., as qualifying the individual (purushavisheshana) though their effects

of cleanliness and the like, but it is difficult to conceive how the appointed time, *viz.*, the sensible present (*idánintana*) can also similarly qualify the individual.

The Prábhākara's answer: puruṣa's *jīvana*, *i.e.*, the mental continuum of the individual is in time and the individual is related to time through his mental continuum. (1) *svavrittijīvanavattvasambandhena tasya (kālasya) puruṣavisheshanatvāt*, (2) *vihitkālaajivitvādvā*. In other words, in the case of unconditional duties such as the morning or evening prayers, what qualify the individual are not merely the enjoined ablutions, etc. (*śauchádi*), but also the appointed time (*vihitakāla*), or rather the ablutions, etc., and puruṣa's experience as enduring in the time appointed (*vihitkālaajivitva*). Thus though time considered objectively may not be a qualification of the individual, it certainly determines the individual in so far as the latter endures in time. The individual as enduring in time is thus related to order in time and his experience as enduring in the appointed time (*vihitakāla*) is also an experience of the time in which it endures. In this way he becomes conscious of the appointed time through being qualified by it through his life-continuum which endures in time. His life-continuum as enduring in time thus constitutes the sensory basis of localisation in a time-scale and order.

Another objection which is raised in regard to the Prábhākara inference is: how can the act (ablutions, etc.) which is objective can be *puruṣavisheshanatvāt*, *i.e.*, become determined as a *visheshana* or qualification of the individual (puruṣa)? How is it possible, in other words, for an objective act to appropriate to itself the character or form of being a subjective determination or qualification of the individual? The Naiyāyika here objects: the acts (empirical such as cooking or

non-empirical such as prayer) may possess ishtasádhana-tva or conduciveness to the agent's well-being as a mark from which one may infer that they are kṛtisádhya or to be accomplished by oneself, but they can in nowise be qualifications of the self (svavisheshanavat). Some acts may be specially fitted to produce certain results there being yogyata or suitability in certain acts for certain results. In this sense we may speak of an inherent ishtasáadhanatá in certain acts, *i.e.*, an inherent capacity to produce certain desired results. Thus we may speak of an inherent conduciveness to desired results or good in the acts of cooking, rituals and sacrifice, and the like—an ishtasáadhanatva or conduciveness to good being yágapákanishtha, qualifying or being inherent in, yága (religious sacrifice) and páka (cooking). It is however absurd to conceive of these objective acts as thereby becoming purushavisheshanavat, *i.e.*, becoming determined as qualifications of the individual or appropriating to themselves the character of being subjective determinations of the agent.

It may be argued, what qualifies the individual is not the act as such which is objective but the ichchhá or desire which is induced by the act. This desire is certainly a qualification of the self even if the mere act is not, and it is this desire as qualifying the self that serves as the mark (linga) from which results or follows the cognition that it is to be done. The Nyáya objection to this is: there is no vyápti or invariable connection between ichchhá, desire and yágádikriyá or particular acts such as rituals and sacrifice. Hence we cannot suppose that these acts will necessarily induce desire or ichchhá in the agent. Moreover even though there were invariable connection between such acts and the desire to accomplish them so that the desire might be treated as a mark or sign of the acts,

yet such desire may be mere blind impulse and thus would not account for the element of cognition (jñána) in the cognition of duty (káryatájñána) which is supposed to result from it. In other words, there is neither any necessary connection between the acts objectively considered and any conative impulse in the individual nor any proof that such impulse, even if there be any such necessary connection, is an intelligent impulse or desire implying the *cognition* that it is to be accomplished by the agent's will.

In reply to all this the Prábhákaras point out : when we say that the act to be accomplished is svavisheshanavat, i.e., determined as a visheshana or qualification of the self, all that we mean is that there is either a cognition of the qualification (tajjñána, visheshanajñána) or a cognition of relationship with the qualification (tatsambandhajñána, visheshanasambandhajñána). In other words, self-qualification means either the cognition of the act as a qualification of the self or the cognition of it as being connected with such a qualification. There is nothing objectionable or paradoxical in this as the Naiyáyikas themselves conceive of the Vishaya or object as qualifying the subject in one or other of these senses. Thus they speak of kámyasáadhanatá or conduciveness to the agent's desire, in the vishaya or external object. Here therefore they admit something in the object which has a subjective signification or meaning. How is this subjective signification in the object to be conceived? How are we to conceive of the object as being characterised by conduciveness to the subject's desire or want? It must be by conceiving the kámanávishaya or object of desire as being determined or conditioned either by a cognition of the want or desire (kámanájñána) or by a cognition of intimate connection with the want or desire (kámanásambandhajñána). As the Naiyáyikas thus admit a subjective

determination in the desired object in the form either of a cognition of the desire as constituting it or a cognition of essential relationship with the desire, so likewise do we, the Prábhākaras, conceive of the objective acts as becoming determined as qualifications of the self through the cognition either of these qualifications or of relationship with these qualifications as conditioning the acts. In fact, it is hardly consistent for a Naiyāyika to quarrel with a Prábhākara on a point like this. Both accept self-determinism and therefore for both alike the Purusha or individual is himself the conditioning or determining factor in volition. The only difference arises from the way in which the Naiyāyika would conceive the form of this self-determination which according to him is always a form of hedonistic valuation—*i.e.*, a form in which the act is cognised as conducive to the agent's good. But even for the Naiyāyika the acts themselves (cooking, etc.) considered objectively are external goods being suited for certain results and without any effect on the agent's consciousness till they are subjectively self-determined as worth striving for or deserving conscious realisation by will. They are not *antarbhūta*, internalised, internally or subjectively appropriated, till there is this subjective valuation and selection, *i.e.*, subjective self-determination with reference to them. The self thus must determine its own values for itself even according to the Naiyāyika and it is through the *sambandhajñāna*, cognition of relationship with itself, that it thus determines the merely external good or object as a good for itself. *Vastutah tadvattājñānam tatsambandhajñānam tajñānameva va na tu pakshoapi tatrāntarbhūta iti kāmyasādhana-tājñānasyapi kāmanāsambandhajñānātma-katayākāmanājñānātma-katayā vá anupapatyabbhāvāt.*

Hence the essential difference between the Prábhākaras and the Naiyāyikas is not in regard to the question of

self-reference and self-determination so much as in regard to the form of this self-reference which with the Naiyāyika is always a form of hedonistic valuation. Further according to the Naiyāyika as *icchā* desire may exist *svarupatah*, i.e., as mere conscious desire without being self-conscious or involving consciousness of the self as desiring, the *sambandhajnāna* or cognition of relationship through which the external good is subjectively appropriated is the self's cognition of the *object* as good and not necessarily a distinct consciousness of the self whose good it is. In other words according to Nyāya the object may be self-appropriated as good to itself without any distinct consciousness of the self to which it is cognised as a good, such self-consciousness being distinct only in special cases and being ordinarily at the background. For the Prābhākaras however there is no self-appropriation without definite self-reference and thus all desire is self-conscious involving a clear consciousness not merely of the act to be accomplished but also of the self as qualified by the act.

6. In the previous section we have considered the various conceptions of the relation of *kāryatājñāna* or cognition of duty to the other conditions of volition. Thus far we have considered three different forms of this relation—the Nyāya and the Prābhākara forms as well as a form of indeterminism which differs from both.

(1) According to the Nyāya form, the cognition of duty (*kāryatājñāna*) is a component in a psychological compound involving the cognition of good (*ishtasādhana-tājñāna*) as its other constituent.

(2) According to the Prābhākaras—the cognition of duty is a distinct psychosis which is *established* or produced by the representation of the act as specifying the self. Hence there is inference involved in the process of arriving at the cognition of duty, this cognition

following as a consequence from the representation of the act as self-appropriated.

(3) According to others however, there is neither a psychological compound nor any inference involved. The cognition of duty is simply the cognition that it is to be accomplished by my will as depending on my svecchhá or freedom. Svecchhá-dhina-kṛtisádhyatá-jñanameva káryatájñanam. This is indeterminism, the will through which the act is cognised to be accomplished being also cognised as undetermined, or as depending purely on the agent's freedom.

Some however consider this indetermination to be itself mediated. Thus they put this indeterminism in the form of an inference or anumána as follows :—

(4) Take the act of cooking (páka) for instance. The inference may be stated thus :—

Conclusion.—The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free will—pákah svecchhádhina-matkṛtisádhyah.

Ground.—Because being distinct from mere exertion or effort such as the exercise of the muscles it is at the same time incapable of being accomplished except through my free will—shramádibhinnatvé sati svecchhá-dhinamatkṛtim viná asattvát.

Or again thus :—

Conclusion.—The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free will—pákah svecchhádhina-matkṛtisádhyah.

Ground.—Because being distinct from exertion as such it is at the same time that which is non-existent in the absence of my willing it—shramadibhinnatvé sati matkṛtivyatirekaprayuktavyatirekapratiyogitvát.

Here there is no svavisheshanavattva or self-reference as a condition. Hence it is indeterminism rather than self-determinism, though it is not unmediated indeterminism as in the third form explained above, but a species of self-mediated indeterminism in which freedom

realises itself through itself *in vacuo* as it were independently of any specific determination by the self. Thus the act of cooking is *asat*, unreal or non-existent but possible and the step here is from possibility to actualisation, the transformation being accomplished by the will as dependent on the agent's freedom (*svechchhá-dhinamatkṛti*). There is no self-appropriation of the act either through any hedonistic calculations of advantage or profit or through any pure representation of it as a self-qualification. Hence sheer exertion (*shrama*) has to be excluded to limit the sphere of the choice; the value-cognition (*ishtasáadhanatájñána*) being omitted from the conditions of the willing, the sphere of volition has to be definitely limited so as to exclude all mere *shrama* or exertion—willing for the sake of the effort of willing. The willing must have an object other than itself, *i.e.*, must be defined by being limited to something objective and external to itself.

The *Prábhákaras* and the *Naiyáyikas* both reject this form. According to them there must be either cognition of self-reference (*svavisheshanájñána*) or cognition of good (*ishtasáadhanatájñána*) in the motive. An action which is neither cognised as good or advantageous nor represented as a self-qualification, can have no impelling force. In fact, the above process is a pseudoprocess simulating a ground or reason where there is none. Thus my ungrounded freedom (*svechchhá*) becomes the *hetu*, ground or reason, of the act being willed. But how can the groundless be itself a ground? As a matter of fact there is here a specific ground surreptitiously introduced behind an appearance of indetermination or groundlessness. For the ground (*hetu*) which is *svechchhá-dhina matkṛti*, *i.e.*, my will as purely dependent on my wish or pleasure, contains *ichchhá*, wish, as an element. There is thus an antecedent *ichchhá*, wish, or will, in

the *hetu* or ground. How is this wish or will to be understood? It may be a desire for pleasure (*sukha*) or for absence of pain (*duḥkhābhāva*) or may be pure desire implying nothing but self-reference or *svavisheshana*. Thus in any case we cannot avoid either self-reference (*svavisheshanatājñāna*) or the cognition of good (*ishtasāadhanatājñāna*).

(5) There is yet another form in which the relation of *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or cognition of duty is conceived with reference to the other conditions of volition—a form which Gāgā Bhatta notices in the “*Bhāttachintāmani*.” In this form *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or cognition of duty is conceived to produce *prabṛtti*, volition, by being subject to *ishtasāadhanatājñāna* or cognition of good. In other words, the relation of the duty-cognition (*kṛtisādhyatā*) to the value-cognition (*ishtasāadhanatā*) is not merely that of community of *vishaya*, object, the act which is the object or *vishaya* of the one being also the object of the other as conceived in the ordinary *Nyāya* analysis. There is besides a relation of dependence or subordination—a relation which makes the cognition of duty dependent on or subject to the cognition of the value. This is thus a compromise between the *Prābhākara* and *Nyāya* views recognising as it does a relation of dependence without admitting any inferential process or any absolute independence or distinctness of psychoses. (*Kechittu idānintanamatkṛtisādhyatājñānam hetuḥ, tat cha idānintanamadishtasāadhanatājñānādhinam iti tadabhāvāt na prabṛtīḥ ityāhuḥ*).

The objection to such a view is: even in the absence of the volition that should follow as an effect, there may be such cognition of subjective capacity or competency in the form: if it be willed by me the desired result will surely be realised. In other words, such cognition of subjective competency being present

and yet volition being non-existent, the former cannot be the ground of volition. Tadanukulakṛtyabhávé api yadi mayá kriyāte tadā idam bhaviṣhyati iti etādrishakṛtisādhyatājñānasya tadānimapi sattvāt. “(Bhāttachintamani).” (It is to be noted however that in this objection kṛtisādhyatājñāna is not interpreted as the cognition that the act is to be accomplished but merely as the cognition that it is capable of being accomplished if I will it. The force of the objection being derived entirely from this interpretation, it is hardly a valid one as it can be easily perceived that the propounders of the view understood kṛtisādhyatājñāna only in the first sense).

Note on Ishta in Ishlasāadhanatā.

What is it that constitutes the desired object (ishta) an object of desire? What is it that constitutes its worth or value as an object of desire? What is the good the cognition of which is a condition or cause of desire? We have already discussed the question partially in course of the previous exposition. We shall now conclude by comparing the Chārvāka and the Nyāya views on this question of the nature of the good. We omit the Prābhākaras for the obvious reason that the good is not, according to them, one of the essentials of the volitional process.

For the Chārvākas the good is either sukha or duḥkhābhāva. By sukha the Chārvākas mean empirical pleasure, particularly the pleasure of the senses and the body. They believe neither in spiritual, non-sensuous pleasure nor in any Transcendental Bliss or Ānanda such as the Vedāntists conceive. Similarly duḥkhābhāva signifies for the Chārvākas freedom from bodily suffering. Of course the Chārvākas do not believe in the possibility of unmixed pleasures in life. Pleasures are mixed up

with pain, but this does not make them worthless. On the contrary pleasures are to be sought as being the only possible good in life and the highest good consists in the enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure with the suffering of a minimum of unavoidable pain. The highest good consists thus in a maximum of pleasure with a minimum of pain and all relative good consists in a balance of pleasure over pain just as all relative evil consists in opposite. Hence for the Chárvákas all actions are empirical being the resultant of the two forces of attraction of pleasure and repulsion of pain and the highest good does not differ in kind or quality but only in degree from relative and empirical good.

According to the Naiyávikas however there is a difference in kind or quality between empirical actions prompted by attraction (rága) and aversion (dvesha) and the non-empirical impulse towards the highest good which is moksha or the Freedom of the Life Absolute and Transcendental. Thus in empirical actions the object of volition is either sukhaprápti, attainment of happiness, or dukkhapārihāra, the avoidance of suffering. Hence such actions depend on or presuppose the attraction of pleasure (rága) and the repulsion of pain (dvesha). Thus they are not free action in the true sense of the term being under the sway of the two forces of attraction and aversion and thus cannot ensure the condition of Absolute Freedom of the Moksha State which is the highest good. As a matter of fact happiness cannot be the highest good because it is always mixed up with pain. Nor can the avoidance of pain under the influence of dvesha, aversion or repulsion be such a good, because aversion itself being of the nature of pain, or unhappiness, there can never be absolute and complete cessation of pain under its

influence. Further if a man were to be actuated by calculations of eternal happiness (nityasukha), he would never attain the Freedom of the Moksha state—his very motive to realise it for the sake of the possible happiness will be a source of bondage, for attraction (rāga) is the prius in consciousness of the state of bondage. It is true that dvēsha, aversion, as motive to mukti or liberation, will equally bind (dvēshasya bandhana samājnānāt), but dukkhadvēsha, aversion to suffering, is not a necessary condition for dukkhaparihāra or realisation of freedom from suffering. Such dvēsha or aversion is the determining condition of empirical actions which seek relative and not absolute freedom from pain, but it has nothing to do with the Transcendental Impulse towards absolute and complete freedom from suffering. Such impulse does not imply aversion (dvēsha) which is itself a form of suffering, nor does it imply rāga, attraction, inasmuch as the absolute freedom from suffering which it aims at is not anything positive so as to be anukula or positively favourable to the self. In fact this absolute freedom can be conceived only as apratikula or not unfavourable and therefore cannot either attract or repel as do ordinary empirical objects of desire. It follows therefore that there are two kinds of objects of desire or ishta: (1) those that are relative and empirical implying attraction (rāga) and aversion (dvēsha) in the agent, (2) that which is absolute and non-empirical and the desire for which is pure and not pathological. It is to be seen also that the relative goods fall into the two classes of (1) *positive* empirical pleasure which is relative and (2) *relative and partial cessation* of pain.

As regards these empirical pleasures it may be noted that they are recognised to differ not merely in degree but also in kind. Thus Gangesh as well as Mathurānātha

(author of "Máthuri") both refer to vaijátya, *i.e.*, specific differences of quality, in the different kinds of svargasukha, happiness in heaven, promised as the reward of different religious sacrifices or yajnas, the alternative supposition being that these sukhas, amounts of happiness, differ from one another not qualitatively, but quantitatively, either in respect of duration or of number (samkhyá).

CHAPTER II.

THE ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS OF DUTY.

In the previous chapter we have considered the psychological basis of Hindu Ethics, *viz.*, the analysis of *prabrtti* or volition. We shall consider now the Hindu analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty. The Doctrine of Conscience constitutes an important part of psychological Hindu Ethics. It is elaborated in connection with the interpretation of the scriptural code of duties laid down by the Vedas. Since the moral code according to the Hindu primarily signifies the code of scriptural commands, the analysis of conscience necessarily involves the analysis of the *shástrika* imperative as embodied in the code of Scriptural duties. We shall therefore have to consider the Doctrine of Conscience in the light of the analysis of the Scriptural Imperative.

The consciousness of duty implies not only karma or an act to be accomplished and the consciousness of it as duty or morally imperative but also righteousness, *dharma* or merit as accruing from the proper accomplishment of the duty. Since nothing is duty which does not conduce to *dharma* or righteousness, the question has to be first considered as to what is signified by *dharma*, righteousness or merit. We shall therefore first explain the conception of *dharma* or righteousness in Hindu Ethics and in particular its relation to karma or acts prescribed as duties. This is a necessary preliminary to the analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty which presupposes not only *karmas* but also *dharma* or merit as resulting from the proper accomplishment of karma.

(i) For the Sāṅkhya, a specific function of the mind;

(2) For the Shákyas (Buddhists), an auspicious disposition of the mental continuum ;

(3) For the Arhats (Jainas), certain subtle forces in atoms as the causes of specific consequences or effects ;

(4) For the Vaisheshikas, certain specific qualities in the Atman :

(5) For one school of the Mimámsakas (the Prábhākaras), something transcendental (A-purva);

(6) For the Bháttas, the sacrificial acts and other ceremonies.

Sámkhyástu manaso vṛttivishesham dharmam áhuh
Shákyástu chittasya shubhám vásanám,
Arhatástu káryárambhakán sukshmán murtimatánh
 pudgalán dharmam áhuh,
Vaisheshikástu átmano visheshagunán,
Mīmámsakáh ekadeshinastu apurvameva
 dharmam áhuh,

Yágádireva dharmashabdaváchyam iti Bháttáh.

Hence according to Sāṅkhya righteousness and unrighteousness do not touch the individual (Puruṣa) in his transcendental nature, but appertain only to the mind which is a modalisation of Prakṛti in the empirical state of parināma or transformation. It is Prakṛti which evolves under Puruṣa's transcendental influence into the empirical world consisting of empirical subjects with minds and organs of experience on the one hand and

objects of experience on the other, and it is only in relation to the empirical order in which empirical subjects stand mutually related in a common world of objects that the question of right and wrong and of morality and immorality has any significance. Morality and immorality, righteousness and unrighteousness have thus only an empirical significance and therefore are functions of the mind (*manas*) which is the organ of empirical life rather than attributes of the Transcendental Self, *Atman*, or *Purusha*. The individual in his transcendental nature is no more touched by righteousness and unrighteousness than the crystal is tainted by the colour of *Yapá* (*hebescus*) that stands near it. There is nothing but a 'transcendental shine' round about *Purusha* as a consequence of the empirical modes and forms which *Prakṛti* undergoes under *Purusha*'s influence. This is however no real enrichment of *Purusha*, no *bhoga* or experience of *Purusha* in a transcendental sense, but is only of the order of *pratibimba*, reflection or phenomenal appearance.

Thus for *Sāṅkhya* the Self in its transcendental nature remains eternally pure, untouched by righteousness and unrighteousness and the forms of experience. For the *Vaisheshikas* however (and also for the *Naiyāyikas*), the Self (*Atman*) is not untouched by righteousness and unrighteousness, but is determined by both in its phenomenal, empirical life of *samsāra*. There are indeed a phenomenal and a transcendental life of the *Atman* or Self, but the phenomenal life belongs as much to the Self or *Atman* as the transcendental life, and does not appertain *merely*, as according to *Sāṅkhya*, to the mind or any special organ of experience. Thus according to the *Nyāya-Vaisheshikas* though the transcendental life is a supermoral plane of being of the *Atman* in which it is free from righteousness as well as unrighteousness, there

is also an empirical life of the Self—a life of Samsāra, in which the Atman becomes implicated in the moral order and determined by righteousness and unrighteousness. But such determinations are not permanent modifications of the Atman and can be removed by a process of spiritual discipline by means of which the Self may recover its transcendental purity of being free from the taint of experience or samsāra—a purity of being in which the Atman becomes a pure spiritual substance without knowing, feeling or willing, *i.e.*, devoid of all experience.

Thus for the Nyāya-Vaisheshikās righteousness is a quality of the Atman or Self, *i.e.*, is a subjective category to be distinguished from the objective act (karma) as well as from any impersonal transcendental category (Apuṛva) which may be generated by it. Nor is it any objective quality of an act which has any such supersensuous category in its aid or support (Apuṛvopakritakarmaguna). In other words, according to them, moral merit has only a subjective significance there being no merit in the act itself or any other objective category, no objective right or wrong. This is why abhisandhi, intention is necessary to constitute merit or demerit, the intention being pure, vishuddha in the case of merit or righteousness. Thus righteousness (dharma), according to Prasastapāda, is vishuddhabhisandhi, is born of the purity of the intention, *i.e.*, of the intention free from pride and the like (dambhādira-hitasamkalpavishesha) so that there is no righteousness even in good acts prompted by impure or evil intentions, *e.g.*, by pride or vanity, etc. Similarly in unintentional acts, *i.e.*, acts which are accidental and unpremeditated, there is neither merit nor demerit though the consequences may be good or evil. There is thus no unintentional wrong in a strictly moral significance, the

intention being absolutely essential to constitute moral right and wrong. According to Sridhara however there is sin (*adharma*) even in unintentional acts (*akāmakṛta*) in so far as they indicate *pramāda* or a lack of moral earnestness, *i.e.*, moral relaxation or carelessness in the agent. There are however cases of unintentional acts in which there can hardly be any question of habitual carelessness and in so far as these are not exempted from moral judgment there is evidently a deviation from the subjective standpoint. It is however probable that Sridhara's view was largely influenced by the medieval system of *prāyashchitta* or expiation enjoined even for *akamakṛta* or unintentional acts.

Just as righteousness is an effect of pure intention so also unrighteousness results from evil intentions (*dushtābhisandhi*). Hence where the intention is evil there is unrighteousness even if the actual result of the action be good or beneficial. Righteousness and unrighteousness are thus subjective categories, determinations or qualities of the *Atman* or Self that result from the purity or impurity of its intentions in volition. Secondly they appertain to the Self in its phenomenal life, *i.e.*, as participating in experience and therefore implying *purushāntahkaranasamyoga*, *i.e.*, the contact of the Self, *Atman* or *Purusha* and the *Antahkarana*, the internal organ or instrument of experience, *i.e.*, the mind. It is in so far as there is this contact of the Self and the mind that there is experience and it is in so far as there is experience that there is righteousness or unrighteousness. Thirdly, righteousness and unrighteousness are *atindriya*, *i.e.*, supersensuous. They are qualities or determinations of the Self, but not in the sense in which pleasure and pain are qualities of the Self. These latter are objects of internal perception—they can be perceived by means of the mind without the aid of the

external senses. Not so however, righteousness or unrighteousness. These are objects of yogic intuition only, *i.e.*, the intuition of the Sages and not of ordinary mortals who can perceive only their effects, namely, happiness and unhappiness. Fourthly, righteousness and unrighteousness are the effects of experience—they are born of the Self's participation in Samsāra or empirical life. Hence they are effects and have a beginning in time. They are thus contingent phenomena and thus cannot be eternal. Being non-eternal they must also perish in course of time. How then do they cease to be? Righteousness is the cause of fruition or happiness and thus it may exhaust itself by the last fruition, *i.e.*, by the experience of the last happiness. Hence it is antyasukhasamvijnānavirodhi, *i.e.*, contradictory to or cancelled by the experience of the last happiness, the last fruition. Contrarywise unrighteousness is cancelled by the experience of the suffering due. But these are not the only ways in which righteousness and unrighteousness may wear away. They may also be destroyed by the knowledge of the true nature of things. Such knowledge by clarifying intellectual vision and removing all delusion destroys attraction (rāga) and aversion (dvesha) which are the causes of volition (prabrtti) and thereby of participation in experience and samsāra. In this way by inducing the individual to withdraw from empirical life it ensures his freedom from the moral order of karma and of right and wrong and thus prepares the way to his mukti or liberation. The fire of knowledge consumes his sanchita or accumulated karmas, meritorious and demeritorious, which are thus destroyed before maturing into their proper effects. There are also no uttara karmas or subsequent actions, *i.e.*, actions, right or wrong, subsequent to the awakening of such knowledge. In other words, knowledge of the

true nature of reality is contradictory to any active participation in experience and thus there is no more any righteous or unrighteous action. It is only the *prárabdha* karma or acts which are already in the state of fruition, that take their course and consume themselves by the natural process of maturing into their proper effects.

Hence according to Sāṅkhya as well as the Nyāya-Vaisheshikas, righteousness and unrighteousness are subjective categories that appertain only to the empirical life. But while according to the Nyāya-Vaisheshikas they are subjective in the sense of being qualities of the Atman itself in the empirical state, for Sāṅkhya they are subjective in the sense of being functions of the mind which is the organ of experience in the empirical life. Hence for Sāṅkhya the empirical Self is an independent category, a modalisation or form of Prakṛti which is independent of the Transcendental Individual or Puruṣa. It is Prakṛti which evolves into the empirical self under the reflection of Puruṣa and it is this empirical self which functions in the acts of merit and demerit. For the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas however there is no such absolute dualism of the empirical self and the Transcendental Self, the Atman, which participates in experience and thereby is qualified by righteousness and unrighteousness being also the Atman which through spiritual discipline becomes free from the dross of experience and thereby recovers the Transcendental purity of its being.

According to Buddhists also righteousness is an empirical and subjective category. Thus it is *vásaná*, disposition of the *chitta* or, mental continuum—a continuum which is annulled in the transcendental state. Hence dharma, righteousness has only empirical significance and is subjective or mental in essence. But it is

not a passing function, state or *vṛtti* of the mind. A function or *vṛtti* is a fleeting, momentary state; but righteousness (*dharma*) is essentially a *vāsanā*, trend or disposition of the mind. The disposition is much more than a momentary state or function of the mind—it is an enduring trait or tendency of the mind. Every righteous act conduces to such a tendency and every new one strengthens this tendency. And it is the cumulative effect of such acts transforming and modifying the entire personality and producing a disposition or inclination towards righteous acts that constitutes the righteousness of the mind. Every single righteous act, in other words, is more than a momentary function of the mind fleeting over its surface—it implies a more or less permanent modification of the mind reaching down to the subpersonal and subconscious strata and thereby generating a definite tendency or disposition in a specific direction. It is not the momentary function but the enduring disposition which is thus produced that constitutes *dharma* or righteousness of the mind.

Hence according to Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists, righteousness and unrighteousness are subjective categories. They have also only an empirical significance being relative only to the empirical life. But while for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas they are qualities of the Self or Atman, for Sāṅkhya as well as for the Buddhists they belong only to the mind or mental continuum and not to the Self. For Sāṅkhya however they are mere functions (*vṛttis*) of the mind, and therefore nothing but fleeting and momentary states. According to the Buddhists however every such momentary function implies an enduring modification, a specific impetus or disposition of the mental life, and it is this more or less permanent trait, tendency or disposition of the

mind which is so produced that constitutes righteousness and the opposite.

Opposed to these conceptions of righteousness (dharma) as a subjective category is the view of the Mimāṃsakas according to which dharma is objective or external. According to the Mimāṃsakas, dharma or righteousness is essentially of the nature of an artha or good, *i.e.*, of the nature of something objective and not a subjective trait or state—a thing worthy of being aimed at or desired rather than a subjective quality or disposition to be acquired or cultivated. But it is not a mere artha but an artha which is sanctioned by chodaná or vidhivākya, *i.e.*, by scriptural prescription (chodanálakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmah). What, then, is the nature of such artha? What is the nature of an artha prescribed by scripture as distinct from an artha of non-scriptural significance? This raises the question as to what makes an artha to be artha, a desirable object an object worthy of desire. What then is it that constitutes an artha to be what it is? What, in other words, is the essence or constitutive principle of the good? The Mimāṃsakas answer this question in terms of pleasure and pain. According to them whatever does not produce pain (duhkha) in excess of pleasure (sukha) is an artha or good and whatever produces pain in excess of pleasure is an artha or evil. (Arthamsukhá-
dhikaduhkhájanakatvam—"Subodhini"). Hence according to the Mimāṃsakas we have artha or good not merely where there is an excess of pleasure over pain but also where the pain does not exceed the pleasure that may be derived. This is what constitutes the nature of artha or good in general and dharma or moral good is a specific form of this generic good, *i.e.*, the good or artha which is sanctioned by scriptural prescription or vidhivākya. The idea is that there are, not only arthas of scriptural significance but also arthas which are

laukika, empirical or non-scriptural in nature. The Mīmāṃsakas extend this division not merely to arthas but also to anarthas or evils, *i.e.*, according to them there are not merely scriptural and non-scriptural arthas but also scriptural and non-scriptural anarthas. For example, certain forms of animal slaughter (himsā) are enjoined by scripture. Involving as they do the infliction of suffering on sentient beings they are evil or anarthas, but they are anarthas prescribed by scripture as distinguished from ordinary evils or anarthas of nonscriptural import. Thus we have scriptural arthas and anarthas as well as non-scriptural arthas and anarthas. The latter are the dr̥shtārthas and dr̥shtānarthas, *i.e.*, of empirical import or significance while the scriptural arthas and anarthas are adr̥shta, *i.e.*, of non-sensuous or non-empirical import. In other words, we have not merely empirical good and empirical evil but also non-empirical good and non-empirical evil. The latter are revealed by Shāstric prescriptions just as the former are determined by secular experience. Dharma or moral good is essentially non-empirical in nature and is revealed by scriptural prescriptions. As such it is distinguished alike from dr̥shtārthas and dr̥shtānarthas, *i.e.*, from empirical good and evil. As essentially an artha or good it is also distinguished from adr̥shtānarthas or non-empirical evil, *i.e.*, evil enjoined by Shāstric prescriptions. There is no dharma in such evil even though prescribed by Shāstra because it is essentially evil or anartha while dharma is essentially artha or of the nature of good. A dharma must therefore satisfy two tests :—(1) it must be an artha or good, *i.e.*, must not produce pain in excess of pleasure (sukhādhikaduhkhājanaka), and (2) it must be sanctioned by chodanā, or Shāstric prescription. Dharma is thus the artha or good which is of non-empirical or

Shastric import. This non-empirical character belongs also to the opposite of dharma, *i.e.*, to moral evil or adharma. Adharma is also non-empirical, *i.e.*, adṛśtān-
artha or non-empirical evil and not an artha, good or desirable object. Hence there is no adharma in dṛśtā-
nārtha or empirical evil just as there is no dharma in dṛśtārtha or empirical good. It is only in regard to the adṛśtārthas and anarthas, *i.e.*, in regard to the non-empirical good or evil that there is any question of dharma or adharma, all empirical good and empirical evil being devoid of moral significance.

It is not clear from the above however as to what in particular constitutes a non-empirical good or a non-empirical evil. Is it the act enjoined by scripture that constitutes an adṛśtārtha or adṛśtānārtha in the sense of dharma, merit, or adharma, demerit? Or, is it some effect or consequence of the act, something which results from or is revealed by it? The Mimāmsakas divide into two schools as regards their answer to this question—the school of Prabhākara and the school of Kumārila Bhatta.

(i) According to the Prābhākaras dharma is not a subjective category and therefore not a quality of the Self or Atman as is conveyed by its rendering into such equivalents as righteousness, virtue, merit, etc. But it is also not for that reason to be identified with the kriyā or act enjoined by scripture. In fact, it is a new category distinct alike from any subjective condition or state and the mere external act enjoined by scripture. It is revealed by niyoga, *i.e.*, the imperative or command involved in a Shāstric prescription, or more precisely, it is revealed by preraná, *i.e.*, by the authoritative suggestion to the will implied in such a command or imperative. This preraná is a kind of átmákuta, *i.e.*, wave, excitement or impulsion in the Atman or Self—an excitement which becomes bhautikavyáparaheṭu, *i.e.*, the cause of certain physical

processes or effects. Dharma is thus an objective category, but is non-empirical or supersensuous in nature being revealed by the authoritative suggestion involved in the moral imperative or *niyoga*. In the Sutra *chodanálakshanah arthah dharmah*, the meaning is: even in certain scriptural prescriptions or *chodanávákyas* there is an element of evil or *anarthá* and such *anartha* is a moral evil or *adharma*. Consider for example a scriptural injunction such as *shyenena abhicharan yajeta*—one who wishes to kill his enemy should perform the ceremony of *shyena*. Here the form is that of a recommendation or injunction (*chodaná*)—*yajeta* being in *vidhilin*, *i.e.*, in the optative or potential mood and thus implying a specific recommendation to him who wants to dispose of his enemy. But as the enjoined ceremony involves the infliction of pain on the enemy and therefore injury or *himsá*, it is essentially *anartha* or evil and is thus a moral wrong (*adharma*). To exclude such *anarthas* or evils in the Vedic prescriptions or *chodanávákyas*, the Sutra defines *dharma* as consisting essentially in *artha* or good. Thus *artha* in the definition excludes all *anarthas* or evils, even the *anarthas* involved in some of the Vedic prescriptions. Hence such prescriptions do not constitute *dharma* or moral right, though they may lead to specific results. It is only *Shástric* prescriptions which lead to *artha* (and not to *anartha* or evil) that result in *dharma* through their supersensuous effects (*Apurva*). These *Shástric* prescriptions include *nittanaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties as well as *kámyakarmas* or acts from empirical motives. In either case there is *dharma* or moral good in so far as there is no *anartha* or evil involved in such prescriptions. But in the case of the *nittanaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties there is no positive good or *artha* in a positive sense, *i.e.*, they do not produce pleasure, but they also do not produce pain (*duhkha*) in excess of pleasure

(sukha) and in this sense are arthas and therefore dharma. Through the proper accomplishment of these duties the mind is purified and thus the knowledge of reality (jñāna) is attained which leads to Transcendental Freedom or Moksha which is freedom from pain (dhhkhābhāva). In the case of kāmya or empirical duties however there is artha in a positive sense, positive sukha or pleasure and therefore also dharma in so far as there is no anartha or evil involved. In either case however the dharma or moral good is not the act itself but the Apurva or supersensuous verity which it generates or involves and which is revealed by the prerana or impulsion in the Atman produced by the niyoga or the command involved in a Shastric injunction.

(ii) According to the Bhāttas however *yágādi*, i.e., the ceremonial and sacrificial acts, in themselves constitute dharma or moral good. Dharma is thus no non-empirical category, no supersensuous potency (Apurva) with which Vedic prescriptions are charged but the prescribed acts themselves. In fact dharma is shreyaskara, conducive to good, i.e., works for the agent's nihshreyasah or highest good. These ceremonial acts (yágādi) are conducive to good (shreyaskara) in this sense and therefore are dharma. In fact, there is no difference in this respect between kāmyakarmas or conditional duties with reference to something desired for empirical pleasure and the nityanaimittika karmas or unconditional duties. The latter conduce to good quite as much as the duties prompted by empirical motives and are dharma only as thus conducive to good. Hence the Sutra chodanā lakshanah arthah dharmah is not intended to exclude chodanalakshanah anarthas. This cannot be the intended meaning as all Shastric prescriptions are dharma and therefore are artha and not anartha or evil. The anartha or evil which comes within the scope of a

Shāstrīk prescription is only by way of prohibition (*nibṛtti*) and thus constitutes the subject-matter only of *nishēdha-chodanās* or prohibitory and negative prescriptions. The prohibition or negation of an *anartha* or evil thus prescribed is itself an *artha* or good and thus is *dharma*. We have thus *dharma* as constituting the content of Shāstrīk prescriptions in two forms. In *Vidhi-chodanās* or positive Shāstrīk prescriptions, the *dharma* is a positive good (*artha*), *viz.*, the good involved in the act enjoined; while in *nishēdha-chodanās*, *i.e.*, prohibitory or negative prescriptions, the *dharma* is abstention or cessation from some *anartha* or evil, *i.e.*, from the sin and consequent punishment entailed by the *nishiddha* or prohibited action.

Hence while according to Sāṅkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya-Vaisheshika systems *dharma* is essentially righteousness or virtue and thus a subjective trait or disposition of the mind or the self, according to the Mimāṃsakas it is an objective category consisting, according to the Prābhākaras, in *Apurva* or a supersensuous verity involved in the Vedic prescriptions, and, according to the Bhāttas, in the prescribed acts themselves, *i.e.*, the acts prescribed by Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. But the question remains still to be considered as to how *dharma* or righteousness is related to *Karma*, *i.e.*, the external act of duty. If *dharma* is a subjective category, is it an effect of the accomplishment of the *karmas*? How is it related then to the scriptural and non-scriptural *karmas* respectively? If it is an objective category, is it the duty itself, or an objective accomplishment of the duty, or an objective effect of the accomplishment? Is it scriptural duty only? Or is it non-scriptural duty as well? Or is it mere ethical duty as conducive to the life of the spirit, not necessarily implying scriptural sanction? These are questions that necessarily arise in

connection with the question of dharma or righteousness. As involved in the question of dharmā, they are also implicated in the consciousness of duty. We shall therefore next consider those questions before we proceed to the analysis of conscience proper.

(1) What, then, is the moral value of karma according to the Bauddha? From what has been already explained it is obvious that for the Bauddha there is no merit in karma or duty in an objective sense and that it assumes a moral significance only as subjectively willed and accomplished and thus as modifying the subjective disposition of the agent. Hence according to him there is no inherent moral worth in karma, but only in its conduciveness to the purification of the mind. Thus the Shastric karmas have no inherent worth or excellence, their moral value being conditional only on their conduciveness to spiritual perfection. In so far therefore as Shastric and ceremonial acts fail to conduce to the life of the spirit, they are devoid of moral value and cannot be morally obligatory. There is no good making a fetish of Vedic prescriptions, and the exercise of proper discrimination is necessary in the ascertainment of true moral duty. To be sure there are special moral codes even for the Bauddhas themselves. Thus there are different shilas, virtues, and charyyās, duties, laid down for the Upāsakas, devotees, and for the shrāvakas, learners, but they are so laid down not because they have any mysterious moral potency but only because they conduce to spiritual culture and thus are means to ethical discipline. Hence according to the Bauddhas even when karma is to be considered as having any moral significance, it is from the ethical standpoint as conducing to spiritual perfection and culture rather than from the standpoint of pure ceremonialism and formalism.

(2) The Sāṅkhya in some respects resembles the Buddhist in this ethical view of karma, but there are also important differences. Thus according to Sāṅkhya there is no special spiritual significance attaching to Vedic (ānushravika) karmas. They involve himsā, *i.e.*, injury to sentient creatures, and thus cannot but lead to evil. Hence they cannot conduce to real spiritual good which is the agent's freedom from the taint of Samsāra or empirical life. It is this freedom, apavarga or moksha, this freedom from the whirlpool of the phenomenal life, that constitutes the highest purushārtha or spiritual good. Compared with this even svarga or happiness in heaven is too insignificant a purushārtha to be worthy of desire. This svarga indeed comes often in the wake of the proper accomplishment of the Vedic prescriptions but as an effect that comes into being in time it is also bound to lapse and cease to be in course of time. It is thus contingent and perishable and thus can appear only as dukkha or suffering in comparison with the imperishable or eternal good which constitutes the essence of Transcendental Freedom or Moksha. Vedic Karma thus cannot lead to anything which is really good or worthy of desire. In so far as they are tainted by the impurity of himsā or injury to sentient beings, they are bound to bring suffering to the agent according to the law of karma or moral justice, and even when they lead to svarga or happiness in heaven they conduce only to a transient and perishable good and therefore a good or purushārtha which can appear only as evil by the side of the imperishable Freedom which constitutes the essence of Moksha or Apavarga. And what applies to Vedic actions applies also to other empirical actions prompted by motives of gain or advantage. These also lead to suffering in so far as they involve the infliction of suffering, and even when

they produce happiness, that happiness being perishable and liable to increase and decrease can appear only as evil (Dṛṣṭavadānushravikah sa hyavishuddhi-kṣhayāti-shayayuktah—"kārīka." Kāmyeakamyepi sādhyatvāvisheshāt-Vijnānabhikṣhu). In other words, according to Sāṅkhya, there is real spiritual value neither in dṛṣṭa and kāmya karmas, *i.e.*, ordinary ethical actions but done from empirical motives, nor in ānushravika karmas *i.e.*, ceremonials enjoined by the Śāstras. They may lead to svarga, happiness in heaven, but this being perishable is only dukkha, *i.e.*, a form of suffering. Besides, the impurity of injury (himsā), etc., involved in Vedic karmas will lead to suffering in due course even though the religious merit acquired thereby may bring about happiness in heaven for the time being. Hence for the Sāṅkhya as for the Bauddhas the ceremonial is to be judged by ethical tests, but while for the Bauddhas there is no special significance attaching to ceremonials, *i.e.*, no potency or power in them to produce specific effects, it is not denied by Sāṅkhya that ceremony has a certain efficacy in leading to svarga or happiness in heaven. Such happiness however being perishable, the desire for it is condemned as a "form of avidyā or nescience, *i.e.*, as arising from aviveka or absence of the proper discrimination of the true nature of reality. Such non-discrimination is the ground of all impure actions and arise from a preponderance of the constituents of Tamas or Inertia and Rajas or Energy in the chitta or empirical self. When the Tamas and the Rajas Gunas will give way to the constituent of Sattva or Intelligence-stuff so that there will emerge in the empirical self a preponderance of Sattva over the other two constituents, non-discrimination will also give way to right discrimination or vivekakhyāti which will lead to Moksha or the true Freedom of the individual. It

is the Sāttvika Karmas, not originating in passion or intellectual indolence, that conduce to this sattva-vivṛddhi, or preponderance of Sattva in us, and such actions have thus real spiritual value, not the Vedic actions nor ordinary ethical actions from material motives of gain.

(3) The Nyāya-Vaisheshikas however do not go as far as the Sāṅkhya in the condemnation of ceremonialism. According to them, righteousness, dharma is indeed a quality of the Self (Atmaguna) and therefore subjective in significance, but this subjective quality or trait is itself to be acquired through the proper discharge of an objective code of duties. These duties are the sādharma-dharmas or duties of universal scope and application and the Varnāśramadharma or the duties of station in life. It is through the proper discharge of these common or universal duties and the special duties of one's Varna or social class and of one's Ashrama or specific stage in spiritual growth that one realises that special quality of the Self which constitutes dharma, virtue or righteousness. While the sādharma or common dharmas constitute his properly ethical duties, the Varnāśramadharma comprise both ceremonial actions as well as the duties of station in life. Hence ceremonial actions are not to be condemned as they are not devoid of moral significance as the Sāṅkhya supposes. They conduce to dharma or righteousness when duly accomplished and are thus obligatory conformably to the social class, temperament and special powers of the moral agent.

According to Nyāya-Vaisheshikas therefore ceremonials are not to be discarded as morally useless. On the contrary, they are essential and indispensable for moral culture according to the social position and spiritual growth of the individual. But they are essential and indispensable not in the sense of being charged with

any non-natural magical potency, but in the sense of being conducive to the moral perfection of the agent. Hence ceremonials have validity and justification only from the ethical standpoint, *i.e.*, as being conducive to moral improvement and culture, and are not obligatory *per se* nor as mysterious agencies of magical potency. This therefore is an attempt to vindicate ceremonials on rational grounds instead of simply accepting them on trust or on the authority of the Vedas. It thus stands midway between the unmitigated condemnation of ceremonialism on the one hand (as in Sāṅkhya) and its blind acceptance on the other (as in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's school). According to it, ceremonials have moral value, but only because they conduce to moral well-being. It is only in this sense that even Vaidha Himsā is justified, *i.e.*, himsā or injury which is sanctioned by Viḍhi or Vedic injunction. Such injunctions constitute a part of the moral code which is obligatory on every individual in accordance with his station in life. Such injunctions are thus authoritative as being conducive to moral well-being and moral training. This applies not merely to the beneficial part of these injunctions but also to himsā and the like which they may involve in special cases. Even these latter when enjoined in the Shāstric code cannot be really evil but must be conducive to real good though we may not perceive how this can be. Hence the injunctions of scripture, even those that enjoin himsā or injury to others, have authority, but not as arbitrary fiat whose authority we must not challenge, but as conducive to the good of the individual.

(4) The view of the Purva Mimāṃsakas is the diametrical opposite of the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in this respect. While the latter defend ceremonialism on ethical grounds and thus try to give a rational explanation of the ceremonial actions, the Mimāṃsakas

resolve even the ethical into the ceremonial and derive their validity from Vedic authority or scriptural prescription. Thus according to them the duties *all* come under the class of ceremonial actions and are authoritative only as being prescribed by Shástric injunction. This applies both to the nityanaimittika-karmas or unconditional duties and kámya-karmas or ordinary ethical duties from empirical motives. They are obligatory only as prescribed by an external Shastric code of injunctions and prohibitions (vidhinishedha) and not as conducive to moral well-being or perfection as Nyáya supposes.

The above is thus an attempt to vindicate even the ethical from the standpoint of the ceremonial. It is the view of the Purvamimámsakas and particularly of the Bhátta School of the Purvamimámsakas who represent the extreme externalistic conception of morality and accept ceremonialism in all its arbitrariness.

(i) Thus according to the Bháttas, the ceremonial and sacrificial acts in themselves constitute dharma. Since they are prescribed by Shástra they must conduce to the agent's good and as thus conducive to good (shreyaskara) they are dharma whose nature is to conduce to the agent's highest good or nihshreyasah. This applies both to the nityanaimittika-karmas or unconditional duties and kámyakarmas or ordinary ethical duties from empirical motives, the former producing beneficial results (phala) just like the latter and thus being duties, *i.e.*, obligatory on the agent.

(ii) The Prábhákaras however do not carry externalism as far as the Bháttas. They do not impugn the authority of the Vedic injunctions and ceremonial actions. On the contrary they accept these as the content of duty just as the Bháttas do. But they give an altogether different explanation of their authority. It is derived

according to the Prābhākaras not from their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequence to be inferred from their being scripturally prescribed as the Bhāttas suppose but from their intrinsic validity as self-positing Duty or verity of the Moral order. This constitutes their Apurva intrinsic validity or as impersonal ontological verities of the moral order. It is revealed through a self-evidencing experience in the Self which constitutes *preranā* or moral prompting of the imperative. The Bhāttas also assume Apurva, but this is, according to them, only a certain conduciveness to specific ends in the prescribed acts or duties and not the intrinsic essence of these acts as self-validating, self-establishing realities of the Moral order. Nor is it known, according to them, by any unique feeling of moral impulsion but only by implication (*arthāpatti*) from their being scripturally prescribed as duties. Since they are prescribed by Śāstra, they must be dharma or duty and since dharma is *Shreyaokara*, conducive to good, these duties must be conducive to specific ends such as happiness in heaven, etc. By implication it follows that there is Apurva or objective potency in these acts for specific ends or consequences. This Apurva however is not itself dharma, the acts themselves as scripturally prescribed being dharma and Apurva being only an implication of their essence as dharma or moral duty. The Naiyāyikas also accept Apurva but only as a subjective disposition or modification of the self, an *Atma-samskāra* or specific subjective tendency which matures into consequences of happiness and suffering in a non-natural way according to the principles of moral justice. It is thus a subjective tendency and not an objective karmic potency, and is known by inference from its effects. The Prābhākaras however accept Apurva only in the sense of the intrinsic moral authority or

validity of the prescribed acts as impersonal moral verities. It is known neither by implication nor by inference but is immediately revealed to the self in the unique feeling of moral impulsion or *preranā* which is self-evidencing like the Self. It is this *Apurva* which appertains necessarily to the prescribed acts of scripture as duties that constitutes their moral authority or validity. Though the duties consist in the Shástric prescriptions, their moral authority is independent of Shástra being due to their ontological essence as duty which implies *Apurva*. *Apurva* is thus the *ratio essendi*, the reason or ground of their objective validity, while *preranā*, moral impulsion is the *ratio cognoscendi*, the reason or ground of the objective validity being subjectively known. The act has intrinsic authority on the moral agent as self-established moral verity which is its *Apurva*. This is revealed to the Self through moral prompting or impulsion which every such act necessarily induces, and this is *preranā*. Through the conception of *Preranā* and *Apurva* the *Prábhákaras* thus seek to get over the pure externalism of the *Purvamimámsa*. By the conception of intrinsic moral authority of duty as duty they are also able to distinguish between a disinterested, non-utilitarian morality of the *nityanaimittika* or unconditional duties and the utilitarian prudential morality of the *kámya* or conditional duties. For the *Bháttas* however there is no such disinterested morality in the strict sense, *dharma* necessarily implying conduciveness to good in the conditional as well as the unconditional duties. The *Bháttas* are also unable to get beyond ceremonialism and externalism as they regard Shástric prescription not only as the only ground of the moral authority of the duties but also as the only evidence of their conduciveness to good.

(5) In the preceding section we have considered the externalism of the *Purvamimámsa*, particularly the

Prābhākara view which builds an ethical interpretation of conscience and duty on the foundation of an external code. In this section we shall discuss the views of the Uttarmimāṃsā with regard to this question of the ethical value of ceremonials. Shankara's views are of special interest in this respect. In a synthetic scheme of the moral life as a gradation of ascending stages Shankara tries to find a place for ceremonialism as well as ethics proper by their demarcation relatively to the spiritual end aimed at. Rāmānuja however recognises only ethics proper, *i.e.*, the ethical duties only, as conducing to divine knowledge. Some Rāmānujists however recognise the ceremonial duties also, these being required, in their view, for the preservation of the body and other auxiliaries of the spiritual life proper.

(i) *Shankara's view.*—Thus according to Shankara there are two mārgas or paths of the spiritual life. (a) One is the path (mārga) of prabṛtti or desire. It is the path intended for the person who participates in empirical life and who is governed by the feeling of attraction and aversion. Duty in this path, is what best subserves desire or kāmanā. Hence duty (karma) is here a means to the satisfaction of desire; *i.e.*, to the realisation of the desired ends or consequences. These ends may be empirical (dṛṣhta) or non-empirical (adṛṣhta). Hence there are dṛṣhtārthaka-karmas or duties of empirical import and adṛṣhtārthaka-karmas or duties of non-empirical import. The non-empirical duties are laid down in Vaidika-karma-kānda, *i.e.*, in that part of the Vedas which deals with the nature and significance of karma. The empirical duties are known from vyavahāra, *i.e.*, from the customs and practices of men, and also from empirical sciences such as āyurveda, science of medicine, nitishāstra, science of the rules of conduct, etc. These empirical and non-empirical duties together constitute

the moral code for the way of desire, *i.e.*, they are the duties of the person who desires to make the best of his empirical life. They however do not constitute the highest morality. Ensnaring man in the toils of the empirical life (*samsāra*) they ensure only a relative satisfaction and not the highest satisfaction of freedom from all limitations. They have indeed a moral significance since merit (*dharma*) and consequent possibilities of karma are generated thereby. But their real value is in preparing the individual towards the higher morality of cessation (*nibṛtti*). This latter is the other path or *mārga*. It is the path of knowledge and realisation in which the empirical life of duties becomes merged in the end. (*Sarvakarma pārtha jñāné parisamāpyatā*). Some Shankarites hold that the life of duties is only an inducement, consequences like happiness in heaven being held out with a view to draw on the ignorant multitudes. (*Ajnaprarochanārthatvāt*—“*Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi*”). These consequences attract them to the life of duties which is a precondition of the higher life of dispassion. (b) This latter is the higher life of the spirit. It is the life of absolute cessation from desire and therefore from duties prompted by desire. It thus is the sphere of the ethical virtues proper, *i.e.*, of the disinterested virtues practised without reference to any extraneous, empirical end. It is the sphere of the fourfold training of the four disciplines (*sādhana-chatur-śtaya*), the sphere of purely ethical or spiritual culture which leads at last to Self-knowledge (*Atmajñāna*) and through Self-knowledge to that Freedom-in-lifetime (*Jivanmukti*) which is the highest consummation of the spirit. The highest end is therefore the realisation of Self-knowledge, *i.e.*, of the knowledge of the Self as identical with *Brahma*. By realising this knowledge the Spirit shakes off its limitations and bonds of finitude

and recovers its true essence as the unlimited and eternally accomplished being. The highest duty is that which conduces to this knowledge and the duties of the empirical life have moral significance only as a preparatory training for the discharge of the higher duty which leads to Self-knowledge. For Shankara therefore the consummation of the ethico-spiritual life is a stage of the spirit towards which the perfection of knowledge is essential. The highest duties are those which conduce to this end of knowledge and all other duties are duties only as preparatory to the duties which culminate in true knowledge. Hence the highest duties are noetic rather than ethical and even the ethical duties are of moral significance as leading up to the noetic duties of the four disciplines, *i.e.*, to duties which are strictly speaking *jñānāṅgas*, constituent members or moments in the realisation of knowledge. According to Shankara therefore the duties of the empirical life have no spiritual significance except as preparatory to the higher duties of contemplation on the ultimate essence of the Transcendental Reality so that we must distinguish between two planes or paths of the moral life—(1) the plane of Lower Ethics, *i.e.*, of the morality of worldly men which has only a worldly or empirical significance, or at best a mediate or indirect significance for the true ideal of the spirit which is a transcendent, non-empirical ideal, and (2) a plane of Higher Ethics, *i.e.*, of the higher morality of the dianoetic virtues which conduce directly to the realisation of knowledge and of freedom in knowledge. In this latter plane the ethical or worldly duties cease and only contemplation and its auxiliaries remain.

N.B.—In *Manu* and the *Gītā* however a third plane or path is recognised, *viz.*, *Niḥṛttakarmamārga* or path of disinterested duties. It is a synthesis of Shankara's

two paths of desire (*prābr̥tti*) and cessation (*nibr̥tti*). Shankara's higher path of *nibr̥tti* or cessation from activity presents only a negative ideal which leads necessarily to spiritual bankruptcy. It implies in its later stages the cessation of all duties including *nityā-naimittika* or unconditional duties as well as the *kāmya* or conditional duties. It is therefore a condition of spiritual void without content, *i.e.*, the negation or death of Spirit. Such *nibr̥tti* or cessation according to the *Gītā* cannot be an end-in-itself and can be recommended only as preparatory to the attitude of disinterestedness and detachment. The highest ideal is that which fills this void of *nibr̥tti* or cessation with concrete content, *i.e.*, which brings disinterestedness to bear upon the accomplishment of the duties of life—the ideal or plane of *nibr̥ttakarma* or disinterested performance of duty for duty's sake. It is the plane of *karma* without material motives, *i.e.*, of the *nityānaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties to be done simply from the sense of duty.

(ii) *Rāmānuja's view*.—The view of Rāmānuja furnishes a close parallel in this respect to that of the *Gītā* and of Manu. According to Rāmānuja also the highest stage of the spirit is not one of *karmasanyāsa* or freedom from duty as Shankara supposes, but one of moral obligations to be discharged disinterestedly without any desire for the consequence. But these duties have spiritual significance, according to him, not in themselves but in so far as they are serviceable to divine knowledge. Thus according to him works are to be abjured when they are obstacles to divine knowledge and to faith. There are *punya*karmas or works of religious merit. These lead to specific ends or consequences such as happiness in heaven (*svargādīphala*). There are also *pāpa*karmas or works of religious demerit. These lead to the opposite consequences, *viz.*, suffering and punishment. All *pāpa*karmas or

works of demerit, are obstacles to divine knowledge. Meritorious works (punyakarmas) are also obstacles when accomplished from interested motives, *i.e.*, for reward or happiness. Only when the latter are accomplished disinterestedly from a sense of pure duty, are they conducive to divine knowledge. Even then however they are unable to accomplish this end through themselves, but such meritorious works disinterestedly accomplished are a means to that predominance of the power of enlightenment (sattvavivṛddhi) which qualifies us for the spiritual life. In fact, mere works cannot produce anything but impermanent and insignificant results. They thus conduce to ends which are only relative and insignificant and cannot themselves lead to Divine knowledge which is of absolute worth or value. (Kevalakarmānām alpāsthira-phalatvajñānam cha karmamimāmsāvaseyam—‘Śrībhāshya’). Such works are to be performed throughout life, *i.e.*, in all stages or Ashramas of the spiritual life (Evam-rupayā dhruvānusmṛteḥ sādhanāni yajñādini karmāni.... tadutpattaye sarvānyāśramakarmāni yāvajjivamanuṣṭheyāni). Hence there is no supermoral plane of being, no plane of karmasanyāsa or freedom from the obligations of duty. Even the highest stage requires the due discharge of the unconditional duties (anabhisamhitaphala-karma) without desire for the consequence. Such duties are sattvavivṛdhi-janaka, *i.e.*, increase our power for enlightenment, and are obligatory throughout life, *i.e.*, in all stages of the spirit including the stage of absolute or divine knowledge (jñānavivṛddhi cha karma punyapāparupam.....Tasya cha jñānotpattivirodhitvam jñānotpattihetubhūtasuddhasattvavivṛddhirajastamavivṛddhidvārena.... Tannirasanam cha anabhisamhitaphalena anusthitena dharmena).

(iii) *The view of Venkatesha (of the Rāmānujist School).*—According to Rāmānuja works are to be judged

by their conduciveness to divine knowledge and therefore only works of religious merit accomplished without desire for the consequence are to be recognised as of moral value. According to Venkatesha however works are to be judged by their conduciveness to the realisation of the good and the avoidance of evil. Works therefore which are means to the attainment of the good are right. Similarly works which ensure the avoidance of evil are also right. Now good and evil may be empirical or non-empirical and there are *laukika* or natural means as well as *alaukika* or non-natural means for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil. But while the secular or natural means assure only empirical results, the non-natural or scriptural means accomplish both empirical and non-empirical ends. The *laukika* means are known either by induction based on observation or from the various sciences such as Medicine, Morals, etc. (*Laukika hitāhitayoh anvayavyatireka āyurvedanitishāstrādikam pramānam*.—‘*Nyayaparishuddhi*’ by Venkatesha). The *alaukika* or non-natural means are known from the Vedas (*Alaukikahitāhitayostu vedah pramānam*). Even the natural means are not to be neglected. They are required for the preservation of the body which even the devotee who aims at meditation cannot do without. But they are to be resorted to only in such ways as not to hinder or impede the non-natural means prescribed by scripture. (*Tadapi yogasāadhanabhutasharirakshanārtham mumukshānāmapi shrutismṛtyādigavirodhena anusaraniyam*.) The scriptural prescriptions have only good and evil in view. Whatever is scripturally enjoined or forbidden is good or evil according to the scope and sphere of such injunctions and prohibitions: (*yachcha shrutivihitam tadakhilamapi yathādhikāram hitam yachcha tannishid-dham tadakhilamapi ahitam...adhikārivishesham apekshya hi sarvo vidhīrnishedhashcha*). But how can there be

conduciveness to good in all scriptural works? Such works include unconditional duties as well as conditional duties for the accomplishment of relative ends. How can these conditional duties be regarded as conducive to anything really and absolutely good? Further the scriptural duties also involve destruction of life. How is such destruction compatible with their conduciveness to good? The answer is that scriptural prescriptions always have reference to persons specifically coming within their application. There are persons who desire happiness and the cessation of unhappiness. For them the *laukika* means which may lead to suffering are undesirable in comparison with the scriptural means which produce the happiness without producing suffering. (Nanu abhichārādikarmanām anarthahetunām kshudrapuru-shārthasādhanaṇām cha kāmānām karmanām katham hitatvam? Uchyate—adhikārivishesham apekshya hi sarvo vidhīrṇishadhashcha . . . yo hi sukham dukkhanibṛttim cha ichchhati tasya tatsādhana apekshamānasya laukikeshu sādhaneshu prabṛttasya teshām nirayādi hetubhūtānarthahetutvena tatparihārāya anarthahetutvarahitah sukhādy-upāyāḥ pratipādyanté.) In fact, there is a justification for the conditional duties not only from this but also from the higher standpoint of the spiritual ideal of liberation or freedom. The devotee who aims at spiritual freedom must practise the prescribed duties up to his death. For this he must look to the preservation of his body. It follows therefore that for the sake of mere self-preservation not only himself such as destruction of the enemy by scriptural means but also conditional duties for such relative and minor ends as bringing about a rainfall or ensuring a good harvest, are necessary. In this sense there is a moral justification even for those conditional scriptural duties which aim at relative and natural ends such as rainfall, economic comfort, etc.,

just as there is a justification even for destruction of life for the sake of preservation of the Self. As regards conditional duties which are prescribed for non-natural ends; they are raised, by being done without desire, to the position of the unconditional duties and are thus morally obligatory. Lastly, the unconditional duties are the means of avoiding evil and are thus good for all. In other words, the *himsá* which is prescribed by *Shástra* is only for self-preservation necessary for devotion. Similarly the conditional duties are means to devotion either as conducing to *natural* ends such as the necessities of physical life; or as accomplishing non-natural ends and thereby attaining the status of the unconditional duties through the attitude of disinterestedness. The unconditional duties are necessary for all for the avoidance of evil to which they are the means. The *Shástrika* prescriptions are thus our benevolent guides on the path of life full of dangers and obstacles. We are the children of *Shástra* and *Shástra's* love to us is like that of a thousand parents. Mumukshorapi rakshakakshatriyádyabhavé rákshasádyabhibhave cha átmarakshanáartham abhichárah kartavya eva...anyathá aharaharanushtheyasyáprayánád-anuvarttaníasya karmáderuchchhedaprasangenopáyanishpatte mokshásiddhiprasa-
ngát. Vṛshtynnádídṛshṭáṛtháni cha Sarványupáśanáni-
shṭotpatyóupáyikatayá tattadapeksháyámanushtheyáni.
Páraloukikam tu tatphalabhisamdhi-virahena karmayo-
gánushthánadasháyám nityánaimittikeirekikṛtya kartta-
vyáni. Neimittikáni hi sarváni prasaktánarthaparihárá-
thatayá sarvahitáni eva. Evaṁ nityáni...atah... "Shástram
hi vatsalataram mátápitṛsahasratah " iti.

Hence according to Venkatesha the natural means known from experience are to be resorted to only in such ways as not to conflict with the non-natural means of scripture. These latter are superior to the natural

means for the accomplishment of natural as well as non-natural ends. The Shástrika means do not bring suffering while the natural means may entail consequences of suffering and mischief. Further the natural means are of no avail for the accomplishment of non-natural ends, but the Shástrika means accomplish both natural and non-natural ends. Both natural and Shástrika means however are instruments for the attainment of good and avoidance of evil. This is true even of the Shástrika prescriptions which recommend destruction of life. Such destruction is prescribed only for self-preservation which even the pious devotee cannot do without. This also holds good in the case of the conditional prescriptions having empirical and relative ends in view. Such empirical ends are required for the natural life which the devotee has to live through the body to which he is attached. The conditional duties which have non-natural ends in view are however necessary in another way. By being done without desire they become the same as the unconditional duties which are indispensable for keeping out of harm's way.

With Venkatesha, therefore, the ceremonial code loses its magical character and becomes homogeneous with the known laws of conduct, *i.e.*, with ethics. The scriptural prescriptions are only better and surer means of attaining happiness and avoiding unhappiness and evil. Men, by following these injunctions, are prevented from running into devious ways of mischief and misery in the pursuit of the ends prompted by desire. There is a legitimate satisfaction, according to Venkatesha, even for *prabṛtti* or desire—a satisfaction which Rámánuja will not allow. According to Rámánuja all desires must be subdued as being obstacles to divine knowledge. According to Venkatesha even desires have their place in the ethical life, *i.e.*, as means to meditation and devotion which

lead to spiritual freedom. Thus works from desire are not to be condemned altogether, neither empirical works nor the non-empirical works prescribed by scripture. Both are serviceable for the accomplishment of specific ends required even by the devotee, but as the non-empirical works are more effectively useful for these purposes, the empirical secular works must always be resorted to subserviently to the non-empirical works.

The above is a fairly complete survey of the relation of Karma to the moral life as conceived in the different systems of Hindu Philosophy. We have seen that Karma includes, for the Hindu, both secular works based on experience and ceremonial duties prescribed by scripture. The secular works as conducing to relative empirical ends are regarded as having a certain value. But the greatest importance is attached to the scriptural duties which are either rationally justified or accepted on their own authority. The Sāṅkhya alone is an exception in this respect condemning as it does all ceremonial actions without exception because of the evanescent character of their effects and of the impurities of animal slaughter, etc., which they involve. Even the Sāṅkhya however recognises in the scriptural duties a certain efficacy to lead to consequences of happiness and the like.

Hence with nearly all Hindu systems the code of duty comprises not only the ethical code proper but also the ceremonial code of Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. The analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty thus resolves itself into the analysis of the consciousness of authority which attaches to a scriptural imperative or prescription. What is the nature of this Imperative or Command? How does it present itself as authoritative to the consciousness of the Moral agent? What precisely is its relation to the motive of the latter? These are some of the questions which arise out of the imperative and

impelling character ascribed to Vidhivákyaṣ or prescriptions of scripture. The answer to these questions gives us the analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty.

In the previous chapter we have dealt with the psychology of volition with special reference to the question of the motive to will. We have there considered two principal views of the character of the motive. It can be seen that these different views of the psychological motive will lead in their ethical application to different views of conscience and of schools of ethics. The question of conscience is the question of the relation of the psychological motive to the moral imperative. Hence the conceptions of the motive and of the moral imperative will lead to corresponding differences in the conception of conscience. We may suppose, *e.g.*, that all acts are done with a view to some ishta, a desirable end or good, that this ishta or end is pleasure or happiness, or that it is some form of satisfaction other than pleasure, or again that it is an end other than either pleasure or satisfaction. Or, we may suppose that some acts are their own ends and do not stand in need of an ishta or extraneous end. It is obvious that these different views of the motive will also lead to different conceptions of the moral imperative and thus to different views of conscience. Similarly we may also conceive Vidhi or Scriptural Imperative in as many different ways. We may suppose, *e.g.*, that it is only an additional motive appealing by means of ishtasādhantá or conduciveness to good. This will give us the hedonistic or Eudæmonistic view of conscience. We may suppose again that it is an independent source of authority which provides a new end, or again that Vidhi is its own end. It is obvious our conception of conscience will differ in each case according to our conception of the Shástric Imperative.

We have therefore to consider the nature of Vidhi-Vákya or Scriptural Imperative and the character of its

impelling force or obligatoriness, *i.e.*, we have to consider not only the general character of the Shástric Imperative but also its relation to the empirical motive of the individual. We shall therefore first consider the general meaning or import of a Vedic prescription and we shall next consider the relation between the imperative or command involved in such a prescription and the empirical will of the individual.

The meaning of chodaná, Vidhivákya or Vedic Prescription :—

What then is the nature of a Chodaná or Shastric prescription? What is the special mark or function of a Vedic injunction which distinguishes it from an empirical imperative or command? The question is considered in the 'Shavarabháshya' on the Jaimini Sutras where the nature of chodaná is described. It is pointed out that a Shástric prescription has evidential value and validity in regard not only to the present but also the past, the future, the super-sensuous, the remote and the mediate. Hence it transcends all the limitations of space and time and produces knowledge only of what is artha, tattva or reality. It is thus superior as a source of knowledge to sense-experience (indriyas) as well as the other sources of knowledge. These latter cannot cross all limits of space and time while chodaná transcends all limitations. Chodaná bhutam bhavantam bhavishyantam sukshmam vyavahitam viprakr̥ṣtam ityevam játiyam artham shaknoti adhigamayitum, na anyat kimchāna indriyam. Chodaná thus bridges the gulf between the empirical and the non-empirical, the phenomenal and the transcendental. No other pramána or means of knowledge is capable of this. Hence chodaná has the highest authority as pramána and this constitutes its obligatoriness on the moral agent as duty or dharma.

The question therefore is : how is such a chodaná or Vedic prescription empirically known? How is the authority of a Scriptural Imperative empirically revealed to the moral agent? This leads us to the next question, viz.

The Genesis of Vidhipratyaya, Conscience, or Consciousness of the Imperative.

The question here is : how does this Moral Imperative as embodied in a Scriptural Prescription establish itself as authoritative in the consciousness of the moral agent? What is the nature of the process by means of which a Vidhivákya or scriptural prescription reveals itself as obligatory or morally binding?

It may be supposed that we have here only a particular form of physical or psychological necessity, that the command establishes itself in consciousness just as will accomplishes itself in the action willed, i.e., by a process in time. This is the view of the Bháttas according to which the Imperative is of the nature of bhávaná, becoming. There is a moral order and there are facts relating to that order whose nature is that of causation. These are the moral causes which are analogous to physical causes.

The Prábhákaras here join issue with the Bháttas. Scriptural prescriptions are of the nature of niyoga which is indeed a fact of the moral order, but is a realised or accomplished fact and as such is not becoming but being. This distinguishes its relation to the moral agent from kriyākartṛsambandha, the relation of the doer to his deed. The latter is a relation of causation, of psychological determination of the will. Hence it is essentially process, becoming or bhávaná in which the motive prompts or realises the act. Here however we have the revelation of something accomplished to the consciousness of the moral agent, a verity of the moral

order revealing itself as self-established, self-authoritative Law to the individual. Hence we have here an original or unique relation—the relation of a command to the agent commanded (preishya-preisha-sambandha) which differs radically from the relation of Kartá or agent to his kriyá or action willed. The latter is a relation of causation while this is only a relation of revelation which makes known the Law (prabartaná *jñápayati*). Revelation is not causation being merely illumination or enlightenment. Niyoga only reveals the Law but does not compel, moral prompting being entirely different from physical or psychological prompting.

The Bháttas however contend that the assumption of two kinds of relation is uncalled for and unnecessary. The concept of becoming (bhávaná) suffices to explain the authority of a Scriptural Imperative. When one hears a scriptural injunction one is conscious of two bhávanás or operative processes. It is these two processes that account for the obligatoriness or moral authority of such injunctions. (*Iha hi lin ádi yukteshuvákyeshu, dvé bhavané pratiyaté shabdabhávaná arthabhávaná cha.*) Thus one becomes conscious of a shabdabhávaná or operative process of the imperative when one hears a scriptural injunction and one is also conscious of an arthabhávaná or process of becoming in the self through which the imperative is realised in action. These two processes together constitute the mode of operation of the Vidhi or Scriptural Imperative in consciousness. One is a vyápára or operative process of the shabda, *i.e.*, of the Imperative itself. It is shabdabhávana, the operative agency of the categorical Imperative which calls forth purushaprabhṛtti or volition in the moral agent. The other is a vyápára or operative process in the purusha, *i.e.*, in the individual himself. It is arthabhávaná or operative agency of the individual's will which

brings about the act. The one is a process outside the individual, the other a process within him. The shabda-vyápára, the causal operation of the Imperative induces purushavyápára, the process of volition in the individual, and this latter realises the act which is to be done.

Yobhāvanakriyākartṭṛvishayaprayojakavyāpārah
 , purushasthah sa arthabhāvanā yastu shabdaga-
 taprayojakavyāpārah yatra purushaprabṛtti,
 sādhyatayā pratipādyate sa shabdabhāvanā
 (“*Nyāymanjari*”)

Tatra purushaprabṛtṭyanukulobhāvayetuh vyā-
 páravisheshah shābdibhāvanā. Sá cha linam-
 shena uchyate. Lin shravané ayam mām
 pravartayati, matprabṛtṭyanukulah vyāpāravān
 ayam iti niyamena pratitih. Sá cha bhāvanā
 amshatrayam apekshate sādhyam, sādhanām iti-
 karttavayatām cha. Kimbhāvayet, kena bhāvayet,
 katham bhāvayet. Tatra Sādhyākānkshāyam
 ārthibhāvanā sādhyatvena anveti.

(“*Arthamimāmsā*” of *Laugākshi*
Bhaskara a writer on *Purra-*
mimāmsā).

In Kantian language we may say there is an operative agency (vyāpára) of the Pure Reason prescribing to the will, *i.e.*, laying down a certain form for the guidance of the latter. This is shābdibhāvanā or shabdavyāpára. It is to be distinguished from ārthibhāvanā or purushavyāpára which is the will realising something, *i.e.*, seeking a particular satisfaction or accomplishing itself in a specific way.

How then are the two bhāvanás related? According to Kumārila, the relation of the two operations being that of ekapratyayābhidheyaṭva, *i.e.*, being expressed in one and the same affix, there cannot be any priority or posteriority

between them, logical or 'chronological. As a matter of fact, the shabdabhávaná necessarily involves the arthabhávaná. Thus the shabdabhávaná, the operation of the Imperative supposes three things : (1) sádhyā or something to be realised, (2) sādhanā or means whereby to realise this something, and (3) itikarttavýatā or manner of realising this something by the proper means. Now the sādhyāmsha, *i.e.*, the object to be realised by operation of the Imperative is the inducement of purushaprabṛtti, the volition of the agent. This inducement of the agent's will leads necessarily to the realisation of the empirical action which is arthabhávaná. Hence arthabhávaná is a necessary implicate of shabdabhávaná being involved in its sádhyāmsha or part constituting the object to be realised.

Consider for example the case of any particular Vidhi or Imperative such as 'yajeta' (sacrifice in such and such ways). Here the injunctive or imperative consists of two parts—(1) the part which constitutes the dhātu or root expressing the nature of the act, *viz.*, the sacrifice, and (2) the affix or pratyaya which expresses the act in the form of a command or imperative.

The latter, *i.e.*, the pratyaya or affix again is divisible into (1) akhyātaṭva, *i.e.*, conjugational affix in general common to all tenses (dashakálādhikarāna) and (2) liṅtva which expresses the element of imperative or command.

Now what is expressed here by the affix or pratyaya, *i.e.*, by the injunctive or liṅ of the akhyāta? It expresses both shabdabhávaná, *i.e.*, the prompting force or operation of the imperative and arthabhávaná or operation of the will which brings about the act of sacrifice. Thus the operation of the imperative (the shabdabhávaná) consists in the inducement of the agent's will (purushaprabṛtti), this being its sádhyāmsha or object to be realised, and the

will which is thus generated necessarily leads to arthabhāvanā, *i.e.*, the realisation of the act of sacrifice. Hence the operation of the imperative necessarily involves the operation of the empirical will which brings about the act, so that the two bhāvanās, processes or operations are co-ordinate, the one necessarily implying the other.

Some Bhāttas however differ from Kumārila in this respect, *i.e.*, as regards the two processes being co-ordinate or same in rank. Thus some hold that as the shabda-bhāvanā induces or leads to the arthabhāvanā, the former is primary (pradhāna) while the latter is auxiliary (guna). Others again hold that as it is the artha, the object which is realised that determines the operation of the injunctive, the arthabhāvanā is the principal operation, the shabda-bhāvanā being only auxiliary or subservient.

The Prābhākaras however do not accept two bhāvanās or operations. We are not conscious of two bhāvanās or processes when we hear a scriptural injunctive or Vidhivākya. We are conscious only of one bhāvanā or process, *viz.*, the process of volition in the agent which realises the act. This is arthabhāvanā which is subordinate to the Vidhi whose essence is injunction, *i.e.*, revelation of the Law as authoritative as distinguished from causal determination or compulsion. The *liṅ* expresses this injunctive or imperative character of the Vidhi or scriptural prescription and not any causal operation (bhāvanā) nor the meaning of the root (dhātvartha). A scriptural command or Vidhi is obligatory by its very nature and necessarily reveals itself as authoritative or binding in the consciousness of the agent. It is cognised through a unique mode of consciousness, ātmakutavishesha, *i.e.*, a specific wave, excitement or impulse in the Self which is svaprakāsha or self-luminous like the Self. Chodanāvākya, the scriptural prescription, is the

occasion, *nimitta* or *karana* which induces this feeling of impulsion in the Self. On hearing such a maxim or prescription one becomes conscious of this impulsion in one-self. It is a self-validating experience, this *Átmákuta* or impulsion in the Atman which validates the Moral Imperative in consciousness. This *Átmákuta* is not however peculiar to moral impulsion or *preranā*. It exists also in *laukikapreranā* or non-moral impulsion. For example, it is present in request, invitation and other non-moral experience. Psychologically this moral *preranā* and the non-moral or *laukika preranā* are the same. In both cases there is this *Átmákuta* or impulse in the Self. This is a unique feeling which cannot be further analysed. If one has experienced it one knows what it is; if one has not experienced it one cannot understand what it is. It is a self-validating impulsion which is induced by *shabda* or verbal command and has thus the latter as its *pramāna* or instrumental cause. We first know it in empirical, non-moral experience as in request, invitation and the like. In the case of *chodanāvākyas* we have a certain *nirupādhika vidhi* or unconditional command which necessarily induces this feeling of impulsion. This is the knowledge-inducing or *jñāpaka* function of a scriptural maxim or *vidhivākya*. By producing this impulsion or *Átmákuta* it becomes *prabartaka*, a motive to the will. The Imperative thus impels only in the sense of revealing the Law as duty, i.e., by inducing the knowledge of its authority. It is this sense of the authority of the Imperative in the form of the cognition that it is binding or obligatory on me as duty that constitutes the *pravartakatva*, the power of motivation of the *Vidhi*. *Preritoahamatra iti tu jñānajanakatvam vidheh prabartakatvam*.

Linadibhyo vidhih pratiyate katham? ...vyutpatishcha asya vyavahārāt avakalpate, gachchha, adhishva,

itti shrnvan briddhah cheshtamáno dr̥shyate. Chestá cha svā́tmani prabarttiká avagamapurviká dr̥sh́tá. Pratyakshadr̥sh́te cha amrá́dau sukhasádbhanatayá anvayavyatirekábhyám avagaté tadanusmaranát prabartámánah kasmimshchidátmákuté samupáté sati bhautikam vyápáram árabhaté. Sashcha átmadharmanah átmá iva svasamvedyah. Ahámpratyavagamyo hi átmá nasau parasmai darshayitum shakyaté, na cha na charchhayitum shakyaté. Tathá ayam átmani bhautikavyápáraheta átmakutavisheshah na pramá́nántaravedyah bhavati. Nácha na vedyaté...shabdebhyah sah avagamyate tathá na anyatah iti ataeva pramá́nántaragocharadharma ityá́huh.

The átmákuta is thus no subtle force acting on the agent. Its function is to move the agent by making the Vidhi known. This motivation by revelation of the Law is radically different from bhávaná. The latter is causal determination or compulsion; this is mere illumination or enlightenment.

The Naiyáyikas however reject the Bhátta as well as the Prábhákara conception of the Moral Imperative. According to them there is here neither any impersonal operation of the Imperative (shabdabhávaná) nor any unique feeling of impulsion. The authority of the Vidhi is only the desire for the consequence presenting itself in the form of moral obligation or duty. There is nothing unique in this consciousness of authority, it being only a form of phalechchhá or desire for the consequence. As ichchhá or desire it is svasamvedya, *i.e.*, known through itself. It is not shabdaikagocharah, induced only by shabda or verbal command. Being a compound of smṛti, past experience, and abhilásha, desire, it may arise with or without a verbal command (smaranát abhiláshena vyavahárah prabarttate—"Nyáy-manjari"). The Imperative appeals through this experience of the

consequence which it promises or holds out. Its validation in consciousness is therefore only *purushavyápára*, i.e., a process in the moral agent consisting in the impulsion of desire which arises from the expectation of the consequence. Scriptural Imperatives are of course personal commands being the prescriptions of the Lord to imperfect finite beings. There is compulsion implied in such commands but this is only because the Lord creates good and evil through his injunctions and prohibitions. Whatever the Lord commands is good and is good *because* the Lord commands it. Similarly whatever the Lord forbids is evil and is evil because the Lord forbids it. The authority of the scriptural prescriptions on the will of the agent is thus a *vyápára* or process in the agent himself: it is the desire for the good and aversion towards the evil involved in the injunctions and prohibitions of scripture as the Lord's commands. It is these desires and aversions in the agent that are the real operative forces and moral authority is the operation of good and evil through the agent's subjective desires and aversions. .

Hence according to the *Naiyáyikas* *Vidhi* is a personal command which compels acceptance through *phalechchhá* or desire for the consequence. It is thus compulsion, but only the compulsion of the subjective desire for good acting through the command of a Superior Person and compelling obedience through the promise of the result. It thus differs from *shabdabhávaná* which is an impersonal operation of the Imperative on the consciousness of the agent and acts on the latter independently of *phalechchhá* or desire for the consequence. It also differs from *niyoga* which reveals the imperative as an end in itself through the feeling of *átmákuta* or impulse in the Self. The *átmákuta* only enlightens, revealing the Law as self-authoritative or obligatory in itself; it does not compel

as according to the Naiyáyika nor act through the phalechchhá or desire for the consequence.

Vidhi therefore may be conceived either as Personal command or again as mere Impersonal Law without a personal source or authority. Again it may be supposed to act empirically through phalechchhá or desire for the consequence or non-empirically either through the impersonal operation of the Imperative or by mere revelation of the Law. The consciousness of Vidhi thus involves preraná or sense of obligation in the agent which may be conceived either as obligation to a Superior Person or again as the impulsion of Impersonal Law realising or revealing itself in consciousness as authoritative. We shall therefore have to consider the nature and implications of this preraná or sense of duty or obligation which a Vidhi necessarily implies.

Analysis of Preraná or Sense of Obligation.

We have seen that it is the very nature of Vidhi as Imperative to inspire the consciousness of duty or obligation in the agent. We shall therefore have to consider what is involved or implied in this impelling character of the Imperative. Hence we shall have to consider not only the nature of this impulsion or preraná but also the source from which it is derived. And we shall also have to consider how this obligatoriness or impelling character stands related to the act which is commanded. Lastly we shall have to consider whether such obligation implies the *subjective* freedom of the *moral agent* and any *objective* personal source of the Imperative. Hence the questions to be considered are:—

(a) Whence does Vidhi derive its prerakatva obligatory force on the moral agent? What is it that determines the authority of the Imperative in the consciousness of the individual? Is it ishtasáadhanatá or conduciveness

to good? In that case, what is this *ishta* or good? Is it *sukha* or empirical pleasure? Or is it *duḥkhabhāva*, *i.e.*, mere freedom from suffering? Or is the Imperative its own end which validates itself independently of any extraneous end?

(b) What is the nature of this impelling character or *prerakatva*? What is moral impulsion or moral prompting? Is it compulsion? Or is it inducement by mere enlightenment? Is there any difference between moral and psychological prompting?

(c) How is *prerakatva*, the impelling function of the Imperative, related to *anushteyatva* and *kāryatva*, its function of objective prescription of a duty? How is subjective obligation related to the objective act enjoined? What is the *objective* content of the subjective impulsion or obligation? Is it the imperative or command itself? Or is it something other than the command, *i.e.*, some *ishta*, end or good which is implied in the command?

(d) What does *prerana* or obligation imply *subjectively* and *objectively*? Does it imply freedom in the *subject* who feels the obligation? Does it again imply any *objective* personal source of the Imperative to whom the subject is to owe his obligation?

We have already partially considered the first two questions in connection with the Genesis of *Vidhi-Pratyaya*. We shall here go over the same questions again from another point of view. This will be necessary as much for a complete analysis of *prerana* or obligation as for a fuller and more detailed consideration of these questions:

(a) *The source of the obligatoriness of Vidhi.*

The first question to be considered therefore is: what is the source of the obligatoriness or impelling character of the Imperative? Is the *Vidhi* or Imperative cognised as authoritative because of its conduciveness to good? Or, is it authoritative in itself? It will be seen that the

answer to these questions will depend on our conception of the psychological motive? If the motive is always the consciousness of some good, the Moral Imperative must also appeal through the consciousness of good. If the motive however implies no such consciousness, the imperative will be obligatory independently of all considerations of utility. The question of the ultimate source or ground of moral obligation is thus intimately connected with that of the nature of the psychological motive.

In the "Analysis of Volition" we have seen that—

(1) For the Chārvākās, the motive is always pleasure and volition follows *necessarily* when there is a balance of pleasure over pain.

(2) For the Naiyāyikas, the motive is some ishta or good, but this is not necessarily pleasure. It is either pleasure or the avoidance of pain in the case of kāmyakarmas, *i.e.*, ordinary empirical actions from material motives. These suppose attraction (rāga) and aversion (dvesha) in the agent and thus have pleasure and the avoidance of pain as motives. But for the mumukshu, the person seeking Transcendental Freedom, the ishta or good is dukhena ātyantikah viyogah, total and absolute freedom from suffering. It differs essentially from the avoidance of pain which is prompted by aversion. Aversion is itself of the nature of pain and the avoidance of pain which it prompts is tainted by the pain of the aversion which prompts it. Hence freedom from pain thus attained is never absolute freedom. But the freedom which the mumukshu seeks arises from dispassion or virakti. Hence there is neither attraction nor aversion here, the motive being the prompting of total and absolute freedom from suffering sought from a dispassionate contemplation of the vanity of all things temporal. We have thus according to the Naiyāyika not merely the pathological motives of the attraction of pleasure and aversion towards

pain, but also a non-pathological motive in the case of the person seeking his Transcendental Freedom, a motive which consists in the pure or dispassionate desire for Moksha as the total and absolute freedom from suffering. Further, according to the Naiyáyika, motives are not given matters of fact which act mechanically on the agent. They are themselves the effects of subjective valuation or subjective self-determination, what is pleasure to one and therefore a motive, being not necessarily pleasure to another or a motive.

(3) For the Prábhákaras, however, the motive is not *ishtasáadhanatájána* or consciousness of a good, but simply the cognition of something to be done as produced by the representation of it as specifying the self. It is the act to be done as self-appropriated or self-referred which is the real motive and this need not present itself as a good in order to move the will.

The motive thus may be conceived either as the mechanical attraction of pleasure, or as a subjectively determined value of good, or again as the Self itself as identified with the act to be done. These psychological differences in the conception of the motive will lead to corresponding differences in the conception of duty or moral obligation. If the motive, *e.g.*, is mechanical attraction, moral obligation will be only mechanical compulsion. If the motive on the contrary is the good as subjectively determined, moral obligation will be only the authority of the agent's freely chosen end or good presenting itself as duty to his will. Lastly, if the motive is simply the act as self-referred, moral obligation will be only the Imperative presenting itself as Law to the agent.

(1) Thus, according to the Chárvákas the motive being nothing but the mechanical attraction of pleasure, duty or obligation is only the mechanical impulsion of an

anticipated happiness. The consequence or end, *viz.*, a balance of pleasure over pain, constitutes, according to them, the essence of the psychological motive. Moral obligation is the operation of the psychological motive in moral action and is thus only the attraction of the possible pleasure or happiness to be derived therefrom. The obligatoriness of the Moral Imperative is therefore only the causal operation of a foreseen or anticipated happiness on the agent's will.

(2) According to the Naiyáyikas however, the motive being the consciousness of *ishta* or good, the Imperative derives its force from a sanction, *viz.*, *ishtasáadhanatva* or conduciveness to good. The obligatoriness of the Imperative is thus the worth or excellence of its end appealing to the consciousness of the agent. But as this worth or excellence itself depends on the agent's *kámaná* or desire for the good and therefore on subjective valuation or subjective preference, obligatoriness also depends on the subjective *kámaná* or force of the agent's craving for the end or good. This *kámaná*, subjective craving or conative impulse in the agent, may be pathological or pure. In the case of *kámyakarmas* or actions from material motives, it is pathological being either attraction for the good or aversion towards evil. In the case of the desire for *Moksha* or Transcendental Freedom on the contrary, it is pure being free from all pathological attraction (*rága*) and aversion (*dvesha*). *Kámaná* or subjective craving is thus a necessary factor in all action, being a determinant of the subjective worth or value of the end that constitutes the motive. In this sense it also determines obligatoriness of the Imperative just as does the worth of the end or good. A distinction however has to be made between the subjective and the objective aspects of the good as worthy or excellent. The fact that the good acquires subjective value or worth

through subjective preference or self-determination does not imply that it is objectively neutral. On the contrary it has objective intrinsic worth or excellence though this is presented to the subject only through subjective preference. Without an objective value there cannot be a subjective value, though the latter implies, besides the objective value, an act of subjective valuation or preference. The moral value has thus authority in two senses. In the first place, it has objective intrinsic authority as worthy or excellent, independently of the agent's choice or preference. Secondly, it has subjective authority and this depends on the agent's *kámaná* or desire for the particular value or end. Even in this case however the value itself is not created by the act of subjective valuation but only takes a subjective significance through it besides being a value in itself. Hence the authority in this case is not brought into being, but only *subjectivised* or presented to the consciousness of the agent through his *kámaná* or desire. This constitutes obligatoriness or subjective authority of the moral value which is thus a compound of the objective authority of the end and the force of the subjective desire or craving. Hence according to the *Naiyáyikas*, obligatoriness is to be distinguished from the objective authority of the Imperative. In either case the authority is due to the Imperative being conducive to some desired end or good. But the objective authority arises from the intrinsic worth or value of the end or good, while obligatoriness is due to this objective value being subjectively appropriated through a particular *kámaná* or desire. In other words, there is an intrinsic worth in certain ends which ought to determine choice and this is their objective authority which is thus independent of our actually choosing them. When they are actually chosen, they acquire subjective in addition to their objective authority and this is their obligatoriness.

The Naiyáyikas point out that the nature of moral obligation would be inexplicable without the conception of an end, good or ishta to be attained, there being no discrimination possible between virtue (dharma) and vice (adharma) without such a conception. «Itarathá (phalábhávó) hi arthánarthaviveko na siddhyati («Nyáyamanjari»). It is through the *phala* or consequence, for example, that the wrongness of an act, like taking a Brahmin's life, becomes intelligible. Take away the consequence and the negative injunction forbidding such an act loses its meaning. (Eyam punah brahmahat-yádurapi naivástyadbarmatá ('Nyáyamanjari').

(3) According to Kumárika, the end, consequence or *phala* determines only the motive and the choice, but not the obligatoriness of the *Imperative*. The moral authority of the *Imperative* is thus independent of the end or consequence. The latter as constituting the motive is a psychological condition of the moral action, but does not determine the moral worth or excellence of it which has intrinsic authority on the agent as Law. The *phala* or consequence is only *prabarttaka*, i.e., a psychological motive but is not *vidheya*, i.e., the object of the *moral imperative*. It is a *psychological* implicate of the moral action, an end as motive being necessary for moral as for all action, but it is not a *moral* implicate of the *Imperative* which is obligatory independently of the end or consequence. The *phala* may even be a metaphysical implicate of the *vidhi* or command, a command implying necessarily something to be accomplished, but it does not constitute its *moral* authority or obligatoriness.

This view of Kumárika differs from the Nyáya view in two essentials. In the first place, a *phala* or consequence has to be conceived according to Nyáya, not merely because otherwise the *Imperative* will not be psychologically impelling but also because otherwise the distinctions

of right and wrong will all be meaningless. According to Kumārila, the phala or consequence has to be conceived because it is a logico-metaphysical rather than a moral implicate of the command or Imperative. Secondly, according to Nyāya, the consequence as good or excellent determines the objective authority of the Imperative though not its subjective obligatoriness which implies something more, *viz.*, the agent's subjective preference or kámaná. According to Kumārila however the consequence enters only into the psychological motivation of the act, and does not determine its authority or obligatoriness on the agent.

Kumārila's view, it will be seen, provides a plausible ground for the distinction of kámyádhikára or relative application of the Imperative and nityanaimittikádhikára or its unconditional application. Thus the Imperative in the first instance is hypothetical being conditional on the agent's kámaná or desire: if you desire the end or consequence, *e.g.*, Svarga or happiness in heaven, the Imperative binds you, embraces you within the scope of its authority. But even in this case, the authority is independent of the end, though *coming into operation only after the choice*. In the case of nityanaimittikádhikára or unconditional application of the Imperative, there is also phalakámaná, desire for an end, *viz.*, pratyaváyábháva or avoidance of the sin that would follow on non-performance. Here throughout life the agent is adhikṛta or niyukta, *i.e.*, under the authority of the Imperative. But it is not because of the phala or consequence, but because he is niyuktapurusha or morally appointed by the Imperative, that the latter binds him. There is indeed an end even in nityanaimittika or unconditional duty, but it is only the agent's motive that has reference to this end and not the authority of the duty. The Imperative would not have existed except for the artha or end to be realised by

the act, but it does not derive its imperative character from the end, but has intrinsic, independent authority of its own. The end is thus a psychological implicate or accompaniment of the Imperative, and does not constitute its moral authority.

(4) For the *Prābhākara*s, however there is no extraneous end in the Vidhi as Imperative, *morally*, *psychologically*, or *metaphysically*. The Imperative is its own end and constitutes the sanction, the motive as well as the moral authority of the Vidhi. It is the independent, intrinsic authority of the command which determines motive and choice. The very meaning of the Vidhi as a command implies this authority on the agent which thus determines choice because it *ought* to determine choice. The Vidhi thus constitutes its own end and does not imply any extraneous end as motive. The Naiyāyika who conceives an external sanction for the Imperative cannot explain moral obligation by his superfluous conception. Beyond the external end there must be another and thus the chain will drag on lengthening from end to end. Consequential or prudential morality thus leads to an indefinite series of ends that has no end. The external end to have moral authority must lead to another, and that to another and so on indefinitely. We are thus in the *anavasthā* or instability of an endless regress which the Naiyāyika can avoid only by investing the external consequence with intrinsic independent authority. But such superfluous assumption of an extraneous end which is an end-in-itself is neither legitimate nor self-consistent. If an extraneous end were to establish the authority of the Imperative in consciousness, it must also itself be established likewise through another, and if an end-in-itself is to be conceived it is superfluous to assume any extraneous end of moral authority. The fallacy of the Naiyāyika consists in

conceiving moral or Shastric Imperative on the analogy of secular injunction. Since the latter appeals through an external sanction, there must also be a sanction for the scriptural Imperative. The Naiyáyika forgets that in the case of the latter we have something which is ultimate, irreducible and absolute, while in the former only that which is derived and relative. This essential difference between a Shastric and a secular injunction implies a corresponding difference between their respective authority. A secular injunction has only derived and relative authority: it is heteronomous. A moral injunction (Vidhi) has absolute and independent authority: it is autonomous (*svatantra*). Shástra is not so weak as to be incapable of realising itself. In fact even in secular injunction the impulsion itself is a unique feeling and not a form of the desire for the consequence. A consequence may be ordinarily implied, but the prompting of the injunction is not the prompting of the consequence through a subjective desire. The Naiyáyika also makes the mistake of supposing that the psychological motive is necessarily the consciousness of some *ishta* or good. It is this erroneous psychology which vitiates his conception of moral authority or obligation. The motive to will is simply the consciousness of something to be done as produced by the representation of the act as a self-qualification. It is thus the self itself as identified with the act to be done which acts as motive, and not the consciousness of any good. In moral prompting, the real motive is thus not any consciousness of good but the Imperative itself as qualifying or specifying the Self. The real motive is thus not the prompting of any extraneous end or *ishta*, but the prompting of the Imperative in consciousness, the consciousness of it as duty as arising from the representation of it as qualifying the Self. This *preraná*, subjective prompting or consciousness

of obligation as produced by the revelation of the Law in consciousness is all that is required to move to action and not any consciousness of an extraneous end as the Naiyáyika thinks. As a matter of fact there is no such end or phala in nityachodanáś or unconditional duties: these are obligatory throughout life and have to be accomplished without reference to any good to be attained. These therefore cannot be satisfactorily explained according to the Nyáya consequentialism. The Naiyáyika is wrong in conceiving an end or phala as a necessary accompaniment of the Vidhi or Command. A Vidhi does not imply more than two anubandhas or necessary accompaniments of itself, *viz.*, (1) adhikáránubandha or niyojya, *i.e.*, an agent or person commanded (kasya niyogah) and (2) vishayánubandha, the act commanded or enjoined (kutra niyogah). The consequence or end is not one of these auxiliaries or necessary accompaniments of the Imperative. The phalakalpana or conception of an end is purushavuddhiprabhava, a representation of the understanding of the individual. It is thus relative to the understanding of the individual and not shástriya, *i.e.*, the intended meaning of scripture (atahparam phalakalpanam purushavuddhiprabhavañ na shástriyam—"Nyáyamanjari"). The scriptural meaning implies only two conditions of the Imperative, *viz.*, a niyojya or agent commanded and a vishaya or act commanded. The command impels simply by revealing the act as obligatory. Where the agent is impelled by lipsá or desire for the consequence as in kámyakarmas or duties from empirical motives, the Imperative becomes udásina, indifferent or morally neutral. Thus the Imperative in kámya duties merely declares the act being a means to the end desired, its operation consisting only in the establishment of this sádhyasáadhanabháva or end-and-means relation and not in the investment of the end with

moral authority. The Vidhi thus does not derive its force from any extraneous end either in *kámya* or in *nitya* or unconditional duties. In an unconditional duty, the Imperative is its own end and sanction and is thus self-authoritative or self-validating, while in *kámya* actions it is without any imperative character, its function being merely to establish a relation of means and end between the act and the consequence desired to be attained thereby: *Váhye tu prabrttilakshané bhautiké vyápáre yatra lipsyádi prabarttakántaram asti tatra bhavanti api vidheh prayok-trshaktih udásté.*

Pratishedhádhipikaré api pratyaváyo na kalpaté
 Nishedhyavishayádeva labdhatvádadhikárinah
 Tatrásau kalpyamáno api narakádiphaládayah
 Avaidhatvam prapadyeta, na hyákánkshedrshi
vidheh.

Vidherapekshé dvé eva niyojyavishayau prati
 Tatpurané trptastu na vánchhaté tatoadhikam
 Niyojyastávadetávánkruddho arihananodyatah
 Vishayastannibrttishcha niyogo yatra gamyaté
("Nyáyamanjari")

What is true of Vidhi or positive injunction is also true of Nishedha or negative prescription. Here also there is no extraneous end, the Imperative being authoritative in itself and constituting its own end. The conception of an extraneous end, *e.g.*, avoidance of *pratyaváya* or sin and consequent penalty is *purushavuddhiprabhava*, a product of the understanding which has nothing to do with the intrinsic moral authority of the prohibition. The prohibitory Imperative has both the two necessary accompaniments (*anubandhadvaya*) without reference to any ulterior end or consequence. Thus the *adhikára*, the scope of the Imperative is given in the *nishedhyavishaya*, the prohibition of the act. Hence the Imperative does

not need to point beyond itself to any extraneous end. What it prescribes is simply refraining from the act forbidden, *i.e.*, non-doing of what is not to be done. The doing here prescribed is thus not non-doing or refraining from the non-doing or not-to-be-done action. It is only avoiding or refraining from the non-doing and not the consequences of the non-doing or not-to-be-done action which the Imperative has in view. By doing one simply avoids the non-doing and what the non-doing is. There is thus no ulterior end, no pathological motive, the Imperative or doing which is not non-doing or refraining from the not-to-be-done act being itself the end.

Hence the Imperative directly imports nothing but Niyoga or the command enjoined. This is true of the positive as well as the negative form of the Imperative, there being no direct implication of phalasáadhanatá or conduciveness to an end in either case. But the phala or consequence may be indirectly implied in some cases, *e.g.*, in the case of Imperatives which prescribe duties with reference to the satisfaction of particular desires. These are the kámyakarmas or duties to be performed in view of some desired end or good. Empirical motivation being the essence of such actions or duties, there is necessary implication of an end or consequence. But such implication is indirect and not direct, the moral authority of the Imperative being independent of such implication. Thus (1) according to some, the Vidhi or Imperative being universally authoritative (sarvatrapreraka) cannot lose its imperative character (vidháyakatva) even in kámyakarmas. Hence it has moral authority even in these duties for the realisation of empirical ends—a *quasi*-obligatoriness which does not come into full operation on account of the agent's subjective desire for the consequence. Hence its actual operation becomes restricted to the itikartyavatámsha, to the manner of accomplishing the end and does not extend

to the phalámsha, the end itself. In other words, the Imperative merely reveals the act as a means to the end desired instead of establishing its authority or obligatoriness on the agent. Objectively the Vidhi indeed implies this authority as an Imperative or Command but this fails to come into operation on account of the agent's subjective desire for the end. Since the agent is moved by his desire or lipsú, the Vidhi becomes udásina, morally neutral or inoperative. The Moral Imperative can only be absolutely, independently authoritative. It thus necessarily loses its character of motivation where a pathological desire comes into operation. (ii) Others of the Prábhákaras hold however that the Injunctive (Linádipratyaya) directly imports only the Command, Niyoga or the act as duty, but since the agent (niyojya) must also be actuated to the act commanded, it follows by logical implication (sámarthyā) that the act in question must be conducive to the end which brings him under the scope of the Imperative. The direct meaning of the Vidhi is thus the act commanded and the phala or end enters through the adhikáránubandha or condition of its application: the duty can impel only as the agent comes under its scope, and as this adhikára or application of the duty implies the agent's desire for the end, the end is logically implied in the duty or Imperative. In other words, the Vidhi as Imperative signifies mere *objective* duty, and since it can acquire subjective authority only through the agent's desire for the end which brings him under its application, the end must also be logically implied in the Imperative as being involved in the condition of a proper adhikári or agent under the Imperative. (iii) According to others again the phala or end is involved by implication in the very meaning of the sentence embodying the command. Thus there is anvaya, connexion by meaning or import, between the niyojya, the person commanded and the

vishaya, the act commanded. Now the *niyojya*, the agent commanded, in the case of a *kāmya* duty for the satisfaction of a desire, is a person who is under the influence of the particular desire (*e.g.*, desire for *svarga* or happiness in heaven). It follows therefore that there must be a nexus of meaning between the enjoined acts (*e.g.*, the sacrifice and the like) and the agent under the injunction (*e.g.*, the person desiring the happiness of heaven). But such connexion of meaning would be impossible if the sacrificial acts (*yāgādi*) were not related to the desired end, *viz.*, happiness in heaven, as *gūṇa* to *pradhāna*, *i.e.*, auxiliary to principal or means to end, from which follows *sādhyaśādhana* or the relation of means to end between the enjoined acts and the desired consequence. Hence according to (ii) and (iii) the end (*phala*) is *implied* in *kāmyakarma* though not directly present in the consciousness of the Imperative as authoritative or morally impelling, while according to (i) the presence of the end to the agent's consciousness as a motive makes the Imperative morally inoperative. (*cf.* "Vivaranaprameyasangraha.")

N.B.—Some of the *Prābhākaras* conceive *phalāsādhana* or conduciveness to an end even in *nitya* or unconditional duties, though not admitting a direct knowledge of it in the person commanded. The end is only *implied* in the command, but not consciously present to the agent as a motive.

Hence according to the *Chārvāka*, the obligatoriness of duty is only the mechanical attraction of pleasure while according to the *Naiyāyikas* it is only its *ishtasādhana* or conduciveness to an end appealing through the agent's desire. For the *Bhāttas* and the *Prābhākaras* on the contrary it is independent of extraneous ends, an end being only necessary to constitute the psychological motive and not the moral authority of the duty according to the

Bhāttas, and being only implied and never consciously present to the agent, if present at all, according to the Prābhākaraś. These different views of the nature of moral authority or obligatoriness imply also correspondingly different views of the nature of the operation of the Imperative on the agent's consciousness. The next question therefore to be considered is

(b) *What constitutes the prerakatra, the impelling force of the Imperative or Vidhi.*

The question here is: how does the moral Imperative act on the agent's will? How does it influence consciousness so as to lead to the accomplishment of the duty? Does it act mechanically just as one physical object acts on another? Or does it act in some other manner which differs altogether from mechanical action and constitutes a category by itself?

(1) We have already seen that for the *Chārvākas* the obligatoriness of the Vidhi is only the attraction of pleasure. Hence in this view the operation of the Imperative on the agent's will will be only the mechanical attraction of the anticipated happiness. This is extreme hedonistic determinism.

(2) As against this we have the Refined Consequentialism and Self-determinism of Nyāya which recognises a pure desire for the Good besides the pathological motives of pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding. According to this view the Imperative being obligatory through ishtasādhana-tā or conduciveness to an end, the operation of the Imperative in consciousness is the operation of the desired end or good to which it conduces. But since the end itself is constituted or determined by the subjective desire or kāmanā, the action of the Imperative implies also the action of the desire in the agent's consciousness. The operation of the Imperative thus

consists in awakening the dormant desire by presenting adequate means for satisfying it. The Imperative presents the duty as conducive to the end. If the agent's desire is awakened thereby, the duty acts on the agent's will as being conducive to the desired end. Provided there is the desire or *kāmanā*, the *Vidhi* becomes operative, but the particular *kāmanā* or desire depends on the agent's subjective preference.

(3) According to *Āumārila* the operation of the Imperative is independent of any extraneous end just as is its authority or obligatoriness. A scriptural Injunctive (*Vidhivākya*) is charged with a peculiar prompting force (*shabdabhāvanā*) which is of the nature of causation. This calls forth *purushaprabhrti*, the agent's will which leads to the accomplishment of the act (*arthabhāvanā*).

(4) According to the *Prābhākaras*, we have here something different from causation or *bhāvanā*. *Bhāvanā* is that in the agent which causes what was not: it is the causality of the will and actual willing or *kṛti*. *Niyoga* is not *bhāvanā* in this sense: it does not cause or determine or bring into being. It is only a *preranā* or authoritative suggestion to the will. This suggestion is only the revelation of the Law as imperative and is distinct from physical or psychological compulsion or determination. *Preranā*, moral prompting, implies *praiśhyapraishasambandha*, the relation of the command to the agent commanded. It thus differs from *bhāvanā* or causation which is *kriyakartṛsambandha* or relation of the act of willing to the agent who wills it. Through this relation of command to the commanded, *preranā* or moral obligation is realised or revealed to the agent. Hence it comes first, is primary (*prathama*) in the consciousness of duty or moral impulsion. There is also *kriyakartṛsambandha*, the relation of the act to the agent willing, but that is only secondary or derivative

(páschátyah). Ayam adyah sambandhah, páschátyahstu kriyakartṭṛsambandhah.

Tatra hi praishyapraishasambandhayo sambandho avagamyaté. Kimānyashcháttra kriyakartṭṛsambandho nāvagamyaté? Na brumah nāvagamyaté iti, kim tu praishyapraishalakshanah api sambandhah prathamam avagamyaté. Preshito hi kriyám karttum udyachchhati. Satyam kriyasambandhitayá sambhantsyaté kriyayá cha ('Nyayamanjari').

Moral Impulsion thus involves the agent's relation to the command as well as his relation to the act commanded, but the latter is derivative being mediated through the former relation which is the revelation of the Law. The latter thus implies the former as its reason or ground, the agent's relation to the act or actual willing of the duty implying, besides the psychological process of the moral choice, the consciousness of the Imperative as its ground or prius. We have thus two moments or factors in the complex constituting moral willing—(1) the bhautikavyápara or empirical process in the agent which is derivative and secondary and is of the nature of bhávaná, causation or becoming and (2) the ground or reason of it which is preraná or moral impulsion and is mere revelation of the Law as distinguished from compulsion, mechanical determination or causation.

It may be objected that preraná or moral impulsion is itself a form of action or kriyá and thus the two sambandhas or relations are same in essence. But this misses the fundamental character of moral obligation which is only knowledge-inducing (jñápaka) and not action-making (káraka). Enlightenment (jñána) is not causation (kriyá). The rational motive is no subtile force, jñápaka, what reveals, and káraka, what compels, being fundamentally distinct. The Vídhi, the Imperative is a motive (prabarttaka) simply by its function of revelation

of the Law, *i.e.*, of the act as something commanded. Its suggestive force is through an appeal to the reason, but does not amount to a compulsion of the will. Nanu nedam ubhayam bhavati presah api kriyá eva. Prabarttanam hi kurvvan prabarttayati ityuchyaté, soayam kriyásambandhah eva bhavati na tatoanyah praishyapraishasambandhah iti. Preritoaham atra iti tu jnánajana-katvam vidheh prabarttakatvam sah eshah prabarttanam jnápáyati na karoti iti anyah eva ayam kriyakarttṛsam-bandhát praishyapraishasambandhah ('Nyáyamanjari').

There are different forms of preraná, impulsion or suggestion as in request (anurodha), invitation (nimantrana), favour-seeking (adhyeshana), etc. These are expressed by the different moods, *viz.*, lota, liṇ, etc. They are only different *modes* or *modalities* of preraná or suggestion, being due to the differences of upádhis or modalising circumstances (Aupádhikáh abántarabhedáh). The modalising factors are the circumstances of its prayoga or application, *i.e.*, the particular position of the impelled relatively to the preraka or person impelling. Thus the suggestion (preraná) may be of an equal to an equal (samavishayaprayoga), or of a superior to an inferior (hinavishayaprayoga), or again of an inferior to a superior (jyáyavishayaprayoga). In each case we have impulsion or suggestion in a particular form or mode and the particular form or mode is determined by the special circumstances of the suggestion as arising from the position of the person suggesting relatively to that of the person to whom he addresses his suggestion. In every case we have therefore the same thing, *viz.*, impulsion though particularised or modalised by the peculiar circumstances of its application. In no case however is this impulsion of the nature of causation or compulsion. It is always suggestion by enlightenment and is to be distinguished from nijartha which is compulsion. Herein

the relation of praisha or command differs from the relation of doer and his deed (kriyákartṛsāmbandha). The latter admits of different degrees of freedom: the agent may be partially compelled (kārīta). Not so the former, there being no compulsion in inducement by knowledge which only reveals the Law and leaves the agent free to choose. The function of enlightenment ends with producing the consciousness of the Imperative, the actual willing of it being left to the agent's freedom, while the function of causation extends to actual willing, i.e., to a determination of the agent's choice. It is for this reason that preraná, moral impulsion or persuasion is possible only in the case of the prabartamána, the person capable of free will and choice: e.g. a tree which lacks this freedom of the will is also incapable of preraná or moral persuasion by knowledge. (Anyá hi karotu, kuryát iti pratitih, anyá cha kárayati iti pratitih. Prayojakah vyápáraḥ hi nijarthah, jñápakah vyápáraḥ tu liparthah. Tatra hi káryam pashyataḥ prabarttanam, iha tu prabarttityasya káryadarshnam iti mahán bhedaḥ. Praishah prabarttamánam prerayati na aprabarttamánam sthávaram iti, na bañāspati uchyate yajasveti. Na sthāvarādeḥ ayogyatvāt "Nyaya-manjari").

This impulsion or preraná is an Atmadharma or subjective determination of the Self. Like the Atman or Self it is svasamvedya, known only through itself. It is not pramānāntaravedya, known through any other cognitive process or means of knowledge. It is an ultimate irreducible fact of consciousness just as the Self is or just as volition is. It is essentially a kind of Atmákuta, wave, excitement, or impulse in the Atma which is not bhāvaná or becoming strictly speaking, but which is itself the hetu, ground or reason, of the bhauti-kavyápára, the empirical, psychological process which constitutes the willing of the act commanded. It can

only be felt where there is an imperative or command (shabda, vādhivākya) present to consciousness. It follows therefore that dharma, the code of duties that are morally obligatory, can be known only through shabdapramāna or scriptural commands: the duties imply preranā, moral impulsion and are revealed through preranā and therefore can be known only through authoritative commands (shabda) and not through any other pramāna or means of knowledge.

According to the Prābhākaras therefore impulsion through suggestion or command is essentially of the nature of enlightenment or inducement by knowledge which does not interfere with the agent's freedom or compel obedience. It is thus no conative impulse in the agent, though it may lead to it through the agent's subjective choice. It is however not the simple cognition of a fact, but the cognition of an act or duty to be accomplished, implying a unique feeling of excitement or impulse in the Atman which is not however conative impulse or force. We have thus in preranā something which is new and unanalysable, a new category of determination which is not physical or psychological determination. It is determination or impulsion without compulsion or mechanical constraint on the freedom of the will. According to the Bhāttas however the two determinations are of the same order. The śābdibhāvanā, the action of the Imperative is however trans-subjective, being the operation of the Impersonal Law on the agent's will, while the ārthi-bhāvanā, the realisation of the Imperative is *intro*-subjective being the agent's accomplishment of the duty through the psychological operation of the motive. For the Naiyāyikas on the contrary, there is no *ex*-subjective or trans-subjective operation, the action of the Imperative being only the operation of an end

or 'good' influencing will through the agent's desire or *kāmaná*. . . .

(c) The question however remains to be considered as to what constitutes the *object* of the Imperative as distinguished from its mode of operation on the agent's consciousness. Though distinct from the question of operation or action, it is also closely connected with it. The action, the mode of operation of the Imperative, may be conceived only psychologically as the operation of an end or object of the Imperative as distinct from the Imperative itself, an end which operates through the agent's choice. It may also be conceived unpsychologically as independently operative, an end of the Imperative to be accomplished being admitted at the same time as a psychological motive. Lastly, the imperative may be conceived as being itself its own end and therefore as the object to be accomplished, no extraneous end or object of the Imperative being conceived. We have therefore to consider this question of the end or object of the Imperative and its relation to the impelling function of the Imperative.

What, then, is the object of the Imperative? What is the *anushtheya*, the thing to be accomplished in the Imperative? Is the *ājñá*, the command, itself the *anushtheya*, the object to be accomplished? Or, does the command point beyond itself to something to be accomplished? What is the *kárya*, the objective content of the duty in the Imperative? Is the Imperative or command itself the duty that impels? Or, is the *prerakatva*, the impelling function of the Imperative, distinct from its *anushtheyatva* or function of an objective prescription of something to be accomplished? Is the command distinct from what is commanded as duty? Or is it itself the duty which is commanded to be accomplished?

(1) The Bhāttas hold that the *anushteya*, the object of the Imperative, is an *ishta*, end or good. The command necessarily refers to this end to be accomplished, an end being *logically* implied in the command as well as required for *psychological* motivation in the execution of it. The *moral* authority of the command is however independent of this end which is only a psychological and logical implicate of it. The moral impulsion (*shabdabhāvanā*) is expsychological, the operation of the end being confined to *arthabhāvanā* or the psychological process of the accomplishment of the duty. It is only through a specific content as end or object that the operation of the Imperative embodies itself in concrete empirical willing.

(2) According to the Naiyāyikas, however, there is no preraka or impelling function of the Imperative independent of its function of the prescription of an end to be accomplished. The end as subjectively determined by the agent's desire or choice is not only the object of the command or Imperative but also the sanction of its authority or impelling function. We no doubt speak of the Imperative or *vidhi* as being itself impelling (*preraka*), but this is mere usage or convention (*vyāvahāramātra*). The *ājñā*, the command, is not itself the *sampādyā*, the object to be accomplished. The agent (*anushtātā*) certainly does not consider that the command (*ājñā*) is itself to be accomplished (*sampādyā*). In accomplishing his duty he is conscious of accomplishing some *ishta*, end or good of his own. It is this *ishta* or end therefore that constitutes the object of the Imperative or Command, the *ājñā*, the command itself serving only as an incitement to the same or as a sanction (in the juristic sense). Hence what impels is not the Command itself but the end or good which it holds out. As a matter of fact, there may be

impulsion even without a command, e.g., men may be prompted to action from the mere knowledge of a possible good even when such knowledge is not acquired or conveyed through any Imperative or Command.

Ajñā hñāma naivānyasampādyatvena gamyaté
 Nānushthāturīyam buddhirājñā sampādyatāmiti „
 Ēnam hi yasya kasyāpi prabarteta sa ājnayā „
 Na cheha vālomattādivachanāt yatnavarjilāt „
 Satyapi preranājñāne prabartanté sachetasah „
 Bhayam nāshankaté yasmātphalam vā āpi samibhitam „
 Tathāvidhasya rājnoapi nājñānusthiyaté janaih „
 Vartamānāpadeshēapi phalam yatra avogamyaté „
 Tatra pravartaté loko linādishvashrūteshvapi „
 Bhavatyārogyasampattirbhunjānasya haritakim „
 Tatkāmo bhakshaye chcheti ko visheshah prabarttané „
 Anvayavyatirekābhyām tadevamanumanyaté „
 Prerakatvam phalasyaiva na niyogātmanah punah „

The prerakatva, the impelling function, thus belongs to the phala, consequence or end, and not to the command itself. The command only incites by indicating the end to be accomplished and is not itself the thing to be accomplished. If the command were itself the object to be accomplished, men would be prompted to act even from the suggestions of little children and insane people. Men do not execute even the commands of the sovereign from the simple consciousness of a command without any hope of gain or fear of loss. And even where there is no impulsion through a command or imperative, men are actuated to specific acts through the simple expectation of a good. Consider the case, for example, of the person actuated to take myrobalan from a knowledge of its healing virtues. His knowledge may be only an inference based on agreement and difference and such inferential knowledge is sufficient to impel provided he

desires the healing in question. There is therefore no imperative necessary in impulsion, the consequence or end being the only necessary condition of impulsion. It is this end which is accomplished in the accomplishment of the duty and it constitutes not only the object of accomplishment in the duty but also its impelling force on the agent. It is wrong to make a distinction here between the object of the Imperative and its impelling force. The Bhátta conception of a shabdabhávaná or operation of the Imperative which is underived and independent of the object or end to be accomplished, is arbitrary and inconsistent with actual facts. Experience testifies not only to impulsion without an imperative but also to suggestions which are unavailing or fail to impel because of the absence of an end.

For the Naiyáyikas therefore the object to be accomplished is an end which is other than the Imperative or Command, an extraneous end which validates the Imperative and imparts to it its impelling character. Hence impulsion is derived or mediated through the end which alone has intrinsic value and validity.

(3) For the Prábhákaras however the Imperative itself is its own end having absolute value and validity. There is therefore no extraneous end, not even as a psychological or logical implicate. The anushtheya, the thing to be accomplished, is the Imperative itself, the command (ájná) and the object of the command (anushtheya) being one and the same thing. That this sameness or identity is not apparent to us is due only to our intellectual indolence. When Law or Vidhi is the motive, the sense of an unsatisfied demand accompanies the action from beginning to end. It is this demand of the Law or Command which acts as the spur to action, and the fulfilment of the Command or Niyoga requires nothing but the agent and his actual willing it. There

is thus no extraneous end involved, neither in the moral authority of the Command nor as a logical implicate of it nor also as a psychological condition of motivation, the Imperative or Command being itself the motive, the end and the sanction. Hence what is anushtitha, accomplished in the execution, is the ájñá or command, the preraná, the subjective prompting or impulsion, being itself the sampádyá, the object of accomplishment. According to some however there is a distinction between the *subjective* prompting or preraná of the Vidhi and the objective duty or kárya, a distinction however which does not imply absolute separateness or independence of meaning. Thus (1) some hold that the prerakatva, the impelling function is shábdá, *i.e.*, the primary and direct meaning of the Imperative or Injunctive, while káryatva, the function of objective prescription of a duty is ártha, *i.e.*, follows by implication. (2) Others however consider the káryatva or objective function to be the primary meaning and prerakatva or impelling function to be merely implied. In any case however there is only one meaning of the Imperative and not two, *viz.*, one with the other as necessarily implied—either prerakatva, subjective prompting with aparítyaktakáryabháva or necessary implication of an objective right or duty, or káryatva, objective duty with aparítyaktaprérakabháva or necessary implication of subjective impulsion.

N. B.—Vidyánandi in the Ashtasahasri enters into an extremely acute analysis of the meaning of Niyoga or Command with special reference to these two functions of objective prescription and subjective impulsion. The various possible interpretations of Niyoga which he considers in this connection constitute an invaluable contribution to the Doctrine of Conscience remarkable alike for the depth, the profundity and the subtlety of the analysis. There are according to him altogether

eleven different interpretations of Niyoga or the Moral Imperative. Thus :—

(1) According to some, Niyoga is *káryarupa*, *i.e.*, of the nature of something to be done or ought to be done. Hence it refers to *objective* right, right as right considered objectively. Right or Duty thus conceived as having objective value and validity, *i.e.*, as an objective fact belonging to the Moral Order, is the essence of the Moral Imperative or Command which constitutes Niyoga. Niyoga is thus objective duty (*káryarupa*) as distinguished from subjective prompting (*préránárupa*), but it is *shuddhakáryarupa*, pure, unconditional duty, duty as duty without the *visheshanas* or modalities. It is not this or that duty, but duty as such without the particular mode. "Give unto such and such persons," "sacrifice in such and such ways," etc.,—these are duties, obligations to be discharged, but not pure duty, but only modalities, *visheshanas* or particular modes of duty. Niyoga is what is common to these all without the modalities or *visheshanas*—it is pure (*shuddha*) and absolute (*anyani,apeksha*). This particular act or that particular act—these are only modes that do not enter into the pure consciousness of duty—neither the particular mode of the act, nor desires (*e.g.*, *Svargakámaná*) and other psychological accompaniments. As to *prerakatva*, the subjective prompting or motive—that also does not enter into Niyoga as such. The accompanying modalities and the psychological accompaniments have alike to be stripped off from Niyoga which is pure, unconditioned objective Right. The purity of Duty as Duty must not be spoiled by importing anything extraneous into it.

(2) According to others, Niyoga is *preraná*, the subjective prompting and not anything objective such as the act. This prompting or moving force cannot be

ignored in the Niyoga. The objective factor, that which is to be done, is only an objective accompaniment and is inessential. It is the subjective prompting that is essential—the preraná in the sense of psychological motivation. The duty as such is only a means to the subjective impulsion. Take away the latter and Niyoga loses all significance. It is the subjective impulsion or prompting that constitutes the value and the validity of the Niyoga. Niyoga is thus essentially this subjective prompting or prerana, the objective duty being only an accompaniment or means to it. But it is shuddhapreraná, pure, unadulterated preianá, or moral prompting from the pure sense of duty without pathological or material motives. It is this pure impulsion from the sense of duty for duty's sake that constitutes the essence of the Niyoga or Command, not the objective duty or act commanded. The agent does not consider himself appointed (nijukta) under the Law unless he also feels that he is prerita, subjectively impelled or prompted by the sense of duty. It is preraná or subjective prompting therefore that is the essential factor in the command, the objective duty being inessential or adventitious.

(3) According to others, Niyoga is neither pure objective duty nor the mere subjective prompting, neither mere káryarupa nor mere preranárupa, but preranasahitakáryarupa, i.e., kárya or objective duty as supported by the sense of preraná or impulsion. The emphasis is on the objective aspect, but the subjective impulsion must also be there. The pure act, the thing to be done, considered in itself, is not sufficient to constitute duty which must also present itself as *my* duty (mama idam káryam). Hence it must also be subjectively impelling, must operate as a motive on the agent in order to be presented as *his* kárya or duty. It completes itself in the kárya or duty and therefore the objective factor is

principal, but it must also present itself as *māma kárya* or *my duty* and therefore *preraná* or subjective prompting is also necessary.

(4) According to others, *Niyoga* is *preraná*, subjective prompting, in the first instance, and *kárya* or duty only for the sake of the realisation of this *preraná*. Hence it is *káryasahitapreraná*, subjective impulsion modalised into objective duty. It is the subjective factor that is primary, but the objective duty as giving form to the subjective *preraná* is also necessary.

(5) According to others, *Niyoga* is morally valid, authoritative. It is this which constitutes its *prerakatva* or *prabartakatva*. But whence does it derive this binding force, this authority on the agent or subject? The external act, the objective duty or *kárya* cannot have binding force on the subject. There is no *natural* link between the *kárya* or duty and its *preraná* or validation in consciousness. The *Kárya*, the external act, cannot exercise authority on the free subject. It derives its authoritativeness by *upachára* or projection, not from its own nature. The duty validates itself in consciousness. There is *pramānavyápára*, a process of validation, through which it establishes itself. What then is the process? How does the duty establish its authority on the agent? The act as objective external fact cannot be obligatory on the subject. Its authority is only by *upachára*, projection, of the Self on the external duty. It is the Self as *Chaitanya* or Illumination which is the real *Pramána* or validating authority. The *Prameya*, the object, is object because of the subject which is *chidátmaka* or Illumination. The object shines, is established as object, through the light of the validating subject which is the true validating authority. Its authority is thus derived from the subject or Self which is the *Light of Intelligence* or

Consciousness. It is this Light of Consciousness which is transferred by upachára to the external fact thereby investing it with objective authority or validity. The free person does not submit to the dead matter of fact: it is the fact that derives its binding force from the Self which is the Light of Intelligence.

(6) According to others, Niyoga is káryapraranayoh sambandhah—the sambandha or link between the kárya or duty and the praraná or subjective prompting. It is neither kárya or the act as duty, nor the agent's subjecting prompting, but the relation between the subjective and the objective factors—a certain indissoluble nexus between the agent and his present duty.

(7) According to others, Niyoga is not bare sambandha or relation, nor mere kárya or duty, nor simply the agent's prompting, but is the samudaya, the entire complex of the duty, the prompting and the nexus. It is an organic whole of consciousness consisting of the subjective factor, the objective factor and the nexus—the concrete experience which is neither the one simply nor the other simply. By themselves these are all abstractions, Niyoga being the concrete whole of experience consisting of all these together.

(8) According to others, Niyoga is Tadubhaya-vinirmukta, is free alike from the subjective and the objective factors, being neither praranásvabháva, subjective impulsion, nor káryasvabháva, objective duty. These are only modalities which are conditional, but Niyoga is absolute, unconditional Imperative and therefore represents something Transcendental. Brahma is this Niyoga—the noumenal reality, the Absolute. It is the accomplished (siddha) Absolute that manifests itself to you under the phenomenal form of kárya or sádhyá, the form of something to be accomplished. Because Brahma is accomplished (siddha), prerakatva, subjective prompting,

kárya, objective duty, etc., must all be only phenomenal forms. They are modalisations of the timeless under the form of time.

(9) According to others, Niyoga is the yantrárurha agent, the agent as the master of a machine or as using a certain instrument. The agent uses an instrument to accomplish something, to work out some end, and Niyoga is the agent as working out his end, the agent representing himself as driven along the path of fruition (vishayárurham átmánam gamyamánam prabártaté). The agent desires something which sets him to work along a particular line and Niyoga is the agent considering himself as vishayárurha, i.e., as the master of or realising the object of his desire. Hence Niyoga is the agent conscious of himself as rising to fruition through a particular line of action. It is the agent's subjective impulsion along a particular line as determined by the sense of progressive fruition. Hence it is preranárupa or subjective impulsion but not pure impulsion without pathological motives, but impulsion as determined by empirical ends and sustained and fed by the sense of progressive realisation.

(10) According to others, Niyoga is bhogyarupa i.e., something which fulfils, something which conduces to fruition. It is therefore essentially an object, an object which conduces to the Self's fruition or fulfilment. But such an object cannot be considered as detached from the subject; the bhogya, the object of experience or fruition, points necessarily to a bhoktá, experiencer or subject that is fulfilled. Hence there is self-reference (mamatvena vijnána) niyoga as bhogya or object conducing to fruition becomes merged as it were in the subject that is fulfilled (bhoktari vyavasthitam). But this is not all: bhogya implies also feeling of ownership (svámitvena abhimána), the feeling of self-appropriation. There is a bhogya or object of fruition only through the sense of ownership or

self-appropriation, bhogya or fruition necessarily implying the self as being fulfilled and therefore as being enriched by or as appropriating the object to itself. Niyoga therefore as bhogya or conducing to self-fulfilment implies this self-appropriation or svámitvena abhimána. But even this is not all. It must also determine the self as agent or doer (svam nirupáyaté), i.e., must be self-determining besides being self-determined or self-appropriated as bhogya or object of fruition. It is only as it determines the self as bhogya that the latter is a moral agent; till then he is not a moral agent and the Niyoga has no application. Niyoga is thus the self-determining and self-determined bhogya, the bhogya which constitutes its experiencer and is itself constituted by its experiencer. Further as bhogya or object of fruition; it is not siddha, accomplished, but sádhyá, to be accomplished. In other words, it represents a satisfaction which is *to be* thus implying an element of becoming—the realisation of what is possible. Hence Niyoga is the self-appropriated and self-determining bhogya in the form of a duty to be accomplished. But it is not pure unconditioned duty (shuddhakáryarupa) without subjective or psychological accompaniments but duty constituted by as well as constitutive of its subjective conditions.

(11) According to others, Niyoga is the agent himself (Purushaeva niyogah), the agent determining himself by the act (karyavishishtah purusha). The agent is both the sádhyaka, accomplisher, and sádhyá, accomplished. In accomplishing Niyoga, the agent accomplishes himself. It is not the act which is really accomplished or sádbhita, but the agent who acts. The agent no doubt says to himself "this is my kárya or duty", but this is only because he conceives himself as fulfilled in this particular mode. It is the agent therefore that realises himself and the agent is therefore the Niyoga.

Hence Niyoga may be conceived either (1) as unconditioned objective duty, or (2) as pure subjective impulsion, or (3) as duty with preraná as auxiliary, or (4) as preraná with duty as an accompaniment, or (5) as the free person prescribing freely to itself, or (6) as the bare link between the preraná and the duty, or (7) as the entire complex of the duty, the preraná and the link, or (8) as the Transcendental Absolute as the negation of both preraná and duty as phenomenal forms, or (9) as empirical preraná or impulsion implying pathological motives and also the objective act as conditions, or (10) as empirical duty implying subjective determination and realisation in time, or (11) as the Self itself. It will be seen that (9) is the hedonistic and empirical form of pure, unconditioned prerānarūpa just as (10) represents the empirical form of unconditioned kāryarūpa. Again both (5) and (11) consider Niyoga from the standpoint of the Self but while (5) considers the Self as *Self-validating*, *Self-establishing* experience, (11) considers it as *Self-fulfilment* or *Self-realisation*. Lastly, both (5) and (8) emphasise the factor of validation through the Light of Consciousness or chaitanya, but while in (5) this is considered from the standpoint of the individual subject or Self, in (8) it is regarded as the essence of the Transcendental Brahma or Absolute.

(d) We shall now consider the last question, viz., the implications, subjective and objective, of Niyoga as the Moral Imperative. Two questions will have to be discussed in this connection :

(1) Does Niyoga imply *subjective* freedom or the agent's free will ? And

(2) Does Niyoga imply an *objective*, personal source—a superior or Perfect Person as the Lawgiver to the Moral agent ?

(1) As regards the question of subjective freedom, it is contended that it is a necessary implication of the

Moral Imperative. The Imperative, it is argued, being *prabartanárūpa*, or actuating in character, necessarily implies a corresponding capacity or competency in the agent to accomplish it. It would be a moral as well as a logical absurdity for the Imperative to actuate the agent to anything which it is not in his power to accomplish. The "Ought," the Imperative of the *Vidhi*, thus necessarily implies "can," *i.e.*, the agent's capacity to accomplish it. (*Prabarttanárūpo hi Vdhih arthāt samihitasādhanaśaktim vodhayati. Prabarttanā cha ashakyavishayāṇā sambhavati; iti shyādeva aprāmānyam-Pārthasārathimishras "Shāstradīpika"*). Hence there cannot be any moral injunction in respect of the impracticable or impossible—a command which enjoins the unattainable or impracticable loses all moral significance and authority by the very fact.

It follows therefore that the agent's subjective competency or freedom is a psychological as well as a logico-ethical implicate of the Moral Imperative. The Imperative can impel or actuate only through the agent's subjective consciousness of competency or freedom as a psychological condition, and it would be a logical absurdity which would deprive it of its validity or moral authority if the imperative were to enjoin anything which is by nature beyond the power of the agent to realise. *Niyoga* thus implies the agent's subjective freedom psychologically, logically as well as morally.

(2) As regards the question of an *objective* implication of a personal source, there are two schools of Hindu thought, *viz.*, (i) the school of *Paurusheya-vādinās* which conceives a personal (*Paurusheya*) source of the *Niyoga* and (ii) the school of *Apaurusheya-vādinās* which conceives it as Impersonal Law without any personal source. Thus according to the *Chārvākas*, the *Bauddhas*, the *Jainas*, the *Nyāya-Vaisheshikas* and the *Rāmānujists*, *Niyoga* is

a Personal prescription of a superior to an inferior being, while according to the Puryamimámsakas (*i.e.*, the Bháttas, the Prābhākaras, etc.) it is Impersonal Law without a Lawgiver.

For the Chārvākas however Niyoga is only the command of the earthly king (rājājñá) and not of any perfect person as ordinarily assumed. As a matter of fact there is no such perfect person nor any supersensuous satisfaction which he can vouchsafe as the sanction of the command. Wordly pleasures are the only possible pleasures and the law of the king as the dispenser of earthly happiness is therefore the true Moral Law.

For the Jainas and the Bauddhas however, the Law is the declaration of the Áptas or Seers of the transcendental plane—persons who by acquiring personal experience of matters of spiritual significance are competent judges of what is truly right or wrong. Hence Niyoga represents the verdict of spiritual experts, persons who have acquired spiritual insight and vision. The Vātsyāyanabhāshya notes the following characteristics of these spiritual experts or Áptas: kim punaráptánám prámānyam? Sákshátkṛtadharmatá, bhutadayá, yathábhutáarthachikhyápayishá iti. Áptáh khalu sákshátkṛtdharmānā idam hātavyam ayamasya hānihetuh idam asya adhigantavyam ayamasya adhigamaheturiti bhutáni anukampanté. Teshám khalu bai prānabhṛtām svayam anavavudhyamānānām na anyat upadeshát avavodhakaranamasti, na cha anavavodhe samihavarjanam vá, na vá akṛtva svastibhāvah, nápi asya anyah upakárahah api asti, hanta vayamebhyo yathadarshanam yathabhutam upadishámah.

An Ápta, therefore, is one who is possessed of—

Sákshátkṛtadharmatá, *i.e.*, right judgment as to what is dharma or duty by virtue of direct, personal experience.

Bhutadayá, compasssion towards all sentient creatures sincerely wishing that they should know the right from

the wrong, the beneficial from the injurious, in order to attain the one and avoid the other.

Yathábhutárthachikhyápayishá, the desire to teach sentient beings the nature of things as they really are, *i.e.*, to teach them as to what is really injurious and should be avoided and what is really beneficial and should be sought—a desire which proceeds from the knowledge that they cannot themselves know either the one or the other and the means of avoiding the one or attaining the other, and also that they have not anybody else to help them to a knowledge of these things.

It follows from the above that the Ápta is free from the faults and shortcomings which vitiate the knowledge of ordinary mortals—the faults, *e.g.*, of carelessness (*pramáda*), error (*viparyaya*), greed (*vipralipsá*), defects of sense-organs (*indriyadosha*), etc.

It is the declarations of these Áptas, perfect or perfected persons, that constitute Niyoga according to the Bauddhas and Jainas. But this does not imply however that there is an eternally perfect being whose commands constitute the Moral Imperative or Niyoga. The Bauddhas and Jainas, being atheists, do not admit any such eternally perfect being. In place of such a being they assume an endless series of perfected persons who acquire perfection in course of time—an endless series in which the preceding Áptas stand as preceptors to those who succeed.

The Nyáya-Vaisheshikas and the Rámánujists on the contrary conceive an Isvara or Lord as the prescriber of the Moral Law, an Eternally Perfect being who lays down the duty for man in a code of injunctions and prohibitions. But while according to Rámánujists the commands represent the Intelligence of the Lord, *i.e.*, his knowledge of what is truly right and what is wrong, according to the Nyáya-Vaisheshikas they represent only the will of the Lord, *i.e.*, his mere pleasure or fiat,

The Purvamímamsakas however do away altogether with the conception of a personal source. Niyoga in their view is an impersonal verity of the Moral Order—a Law which has intrinsic validity without being a personal command. For what is Niyoga? It is Vidhivákya, *i.e.*, the declaration of scripture. Now a declaration (vákya) is its own evidence or pramána. It is self-validating, self-evident by nature and can be overthrown only by vakṛdoshā or fault of the speaker. But the Vedas have no speaker or Vaktá, there is no personal source of the Apaurushéya Vedas. Hence there is also no vakṛdoshā, no fault of the speaker to vitiate the purity of the Vedic declarations. Such declarations have thus intrinsic validity without implying a personal source. These self-evident, self-authoritative Vedic Declarations constitute the Moral Law which is Niyoga. The moral Law is thus the Impersonal Law of the Vedas without a lawgiver.

The Naiyáyikas however point out that the mere absence of vitiation by the speaker's faults does not constitute the pramánya, the evidential value or validity, of the Vedic Declarations. This is only a negative condition of their validity which supposes also other positive conditions such as direct experience, etc. Without these the Scriptural Declarations will lose all authority. The Mímamsaka conception of the self-evident character of all declarations is an arbitrary assumption which does not bear examination. The Mímamsakas ignore the element of personal experience and other positive factors involved in the validation of the Moral Imperative.

We have so far considered the nature and implications of the Moral Imperative without reference to the nature of the specific duties enjoined. We have seen however that there are not only nityanaimittika or unconditional duties for the individual but also kámyakarmas or duties

which are conditional on the agent's subjective desire for an end. The question therefore remains to be considered how the Imperative is to be conceived in regard to these conditional duties. These duties imply the agent's desire for empirical ends and yet according to the Bháttas and the Prábhákaras the Imperative is independent, in its authority as well as its operation, of any subjective desire of the agent. We shall therefore have to consider now :

The Nature of the Imperative or Vidhi in the conditional duties (kámyakarmas), particularly those that involve evil in the form of himsá or injury to sentient beings.

Such himsá or destruction of life is part of many kámya duties such as shyena, agnishoma, etc. Thus shyena is the specific ceremonial duty which is obligatory on the individual who wants to destroy his enemy. In so far as it enables him to attain this end it involves anartha or evil in the form of destruction of life. The question therefore has to be considered how from the Prábhákara and the Bhátta standpoints these can be conceived as obligations or duties conducive to the agent's merit, particularly the acts involving anartha or evil.

(a) *The Prábhákara view:* The Prábhákaras contend that the Imperative as prabarttaka, morally obligatory or impelling, requires only two things, viz., a niyojya or person commanded and a vishaya or act commanded. These are the anuvandhadvayas, the two necessary accompaniments, of Vidhi or Moral Imperative. Now in kámyakarmachodaná or injunction as to a conditional duty we have these two anubandhas or necessary accompaniments respectively in the person desiring something and the act which is laid down for the satisfaction of the desire. For example, in the injunction svargakáma yajeta, he that desires happiness in heaven must perform this particular sacrifice, we have the adhikáranubandha,

the subject of the command, in the term "svargakāma" or 'the agent who desires happiness in heaven' and the vishayānubandha, *i.e.*, object or act commanded, in the term yajeta, 'the injunction of the particular sacrifice.' It follows therefore by logical implication that the act, *viz.*, yajikriyā or particular sacrificial ceremony which is the bhāvártha or object of the injunction, must be svargasādhana, *i.e.*, a means to the desired happiness in heaven. If these were not so, the term svargakāma would be meaningless. Why should there be reference not merely to an agent but also to an agent desiring a particular end, *viz.*, a specific satisfaction or happiness, if the enjoined duty had nothing to do with the particular end in question? It therefore necessarily follows that the act of sacrifice is a means (sādhana) and the happiness in heaven the end (sādhya) and "there is sādhyasāadhanabhāva or relation of means and end between them. Hence this sādhyasāadhanapratiti or sense of a means-and-end relation is *logically* implied in the prompting of the Imperative or Vidhi. But in this case the prabarttakatva, the impelling character, of the Vidhi as the Moral Imperative, does not extend to svargādiphala or ends of happiness in heaven, etc. The agent is prompted by his own subjective desire or lipsā towards this end, and as this empirical, pathological motive intervenes in a kāmya duty prompted by the agent's desire, the Vidhi as the non-empirical moral motive becomes udāsina or indifferent. In other words, the Imperative is deprived of its character of moral impulsion or motivation through the presence of the empirical or material motive. The only operation of the Imperative in this case is to produce the sādhyasāadhanapratiti or consciousness of the act as a means to the desired end, and to indicate the itikartyavyatā, the manner of accomplishing the act and thereby the end to which it is a

means. These are the only functions of the Imperative in the conditional duties which imply desire in the agent and refer to specific empirical ends. In the nitya or unconditional duties however there being no extraneous end or consequence, there is also no subjective desire or *lipsá* as a motive. Hence the Imperative here is a motive to the act itself, its function extending to motivation as well to the indication of the manner of accomplishing the duty in question. The two *anubandhas* or accompaniments here are :—(1) the *niyojya* or *adhikári*, *i.e.*, the agent commanded, in this case irrespectively of his personal craving or wish, and (2) the *vishaya* or *bhávártha*, *i.e.*, the act enjoined. Since there is no subjective motive, the *vishaya*, the objective act, is itself the moving or prompting force.

Now let us consider the cases of *agnishomiya himsá* and *shyena*. The one involves evil in the form of *pashugháta* or slaughter of animals, this being part of the sacrificial ceremony. The other also involves evil, *viz.*, in the form of the destruction of the enemy, this being the object of the *shyenayága* or ceremony of *shyena*. Now we have seen that in the case of *kámya*, empirical or conditional duties (including *gyotishtoma*, *shyena*, etc.), the *prabartakatva*, the prescriptive or prompting function of the Injunctive as constituting *shástriyaprabr̥tti* or moral impulsion consists only in indicating the *itikartavyatá*, the manner of accomplishing the act (including the *sádhyasáadhanapratiti*, the inducement of the means-and-end consciousness), but does not cover the *phalámsha*, the consequence or end desired to be accomplished. Now in *Agnishomiya himsá* or injury to life involved in the ceremony of *Agnishoma*, the *himsá* or element of injury *viz.*, animal slaughter (*pashugháta*) is included in the *itikartyavyatámsha* or manner of accomplishing the ceremony and is therefore covered by the *shástriyaprabr̥tti*,

the moral function of the Imperative. Hence such himsá or injury to life is morally legitimate (*vaidhá*), and the *sámányavidhi*, the general prescription which prohibits himsá or injury to life (*e.g.*, *ma himsyát*, thou shalt not take life), has therefore to be limited, restricted in its scope, by the *visheshavidhi*, the special injunction which prescribes the *agnishomiya himsá* in the sacrificial ceremony of *jyotishtoma*. But in the case of the *shyena* ceremony however, the himsá, *viz.*, *shatrumárana* or destruction of the enemy is *phalámsha*,^a part of the end or object which is aimed at. It does not fall within the *itikarttavayatámsha*, *i.e.*, the part of the injunction which relates to the manner of accomplishing the *shyena* ceremony. For this reason it cannot be covered by the moral function of the Imperative or *Vidhi*, *i.e.*, the function of the injunction which prescribes the *shyena* ceremony for the person who wants to destroy his enemy. Hence the *sámányavidhi* or general injunction which condemns injury to life (*himsá*) is not restricted in its application here, *i.e.*, it condemns *shyena* as *adharma* or morally evil.

It follows from the above that, for the *Prábhákaras* *shástriya himsá*, destruction of life having scriptural sanction, is right or wrong according to the nature of the particular injunction which leads to or involves it. Thus scriptural injunctions include *nitya* or unconditional duties and *kámya* or conditional duties (including *jyotishstoma*, *shyena*, etc.). Now of these only *arthas*, *i.e.*, those that are *sukhádhikaduhkhájanaka* in the sense of not being fraught with unhappiness in excess of the happiness, are *dharma*, *i.e.*, morally right or morally good. *Shyena*, *e.g.*, is *adharma*, morally evil because it is *anartha* or evil, *i.e.*, evil as leading to unhappiness in excess of happiness. But it is not simply because it is an *anartha* or evil that it constitutes moral wrong or *adharma*, but because it is an *anartha* or evil which is scripturally condemned or

prohibited. In other words, only such anarthas as are prohibited by Shástric command are moral evils, and shyena as involving himsá or injury to life in its phalámsha or end aimed at falls within the scope of the general prohibition of himsá or injury to life—a general prohibition which is restricted only in respect of such injury as is involved in the manner of accomplishing an act and not as an end or consequence desired to be accomplished. Contrarywise only arthas, *i.e.*, acts or objects which do not produce unhappiness in excess of happiness are dharma, morally good or morally right. But all arthas are not morally good, only chodanálakshana arthas, *i.e.*, arthas having the mark of scriptural sanction, constitute moral duty. Thus there may be some arthas which are desirable from the non-shástriya or secular standpoint. These are not dharma. Similarly there may be some anarthas which are undesirable from the empirical standpoint—anarthas as producing unhappiness in excess of happiness. But these will not constitute moral wrong unless prohibited by shástric prescription. It follows therefore that there may be some arthas and some anarthas which are devoid of moral significance. Thus nonprohibited anarthas are neither right nor wrong; similarly nonprescribed arthas are also neither the one nor the other, and it is possible that there may be specific objects or acts which are neither arthas nor anarthas, and these also are morally neutral.

It follows from Prabhákara's view that the prámánya, the authority or authoritative character of vedic injunctions, is independent of any extraneous consequence or end, any fruition or satisfaction to which it may conduce. This is true of the nitya or unconditional as well as the kámya or conditional duties enjoined by the vedas. In both cases the authority is independent of any ulterior end, and since in the conditional duties the agent is

moved by his subjective desire, the authoritative or imperative function of the injunction, relates only to the itikartyavatá, the manner of accomplishing the act and to the sádhyaśádhana-pratiti or inducement of the knowledge of means-and-end relation, between the act and the end aimed at. The authority in this case is logical rather than strictly moral—the imperative ensuring validation of the consciousness of means-and-end relation and of the manner of accomplishing the act rather than impelling the will or prabh̥tti through its authority. In nitya or unconditional duties however there being no intervening subjective desire, the authority extends to the will and determines it through its moral validity or prámánya. In either case therefore the prámánya or authority is established through the duty which is enjoined and not through any ulterior fruition or satisfaction which it may ensure. And this is true of all Vedic prescriptions, their validity or authority being constituted by the prescribed acts or duties independently of extraneous ends (sarvasya vedasya kárye eva prámányam.) Where such ends exist as in kámya or conditional duties, the Injunction loses its character of moral impulsion or authority, its only function being to indicate the act as a means to the end and the manner of accomplishing it. It follows from this that all Vedic prescriptions are validated through the duties enjoined and that prescriptions which lay down ends-in-themselves independently of specific acts or duties are apramána or unauthoritative. Hence, the Atmasvarupaparavákyas of the Upanishads, i.e., the Texts which declare realisation of the Self's true nature as the highest end, are unauthoritative. Such declarations enjoin a static fruition for the moral agent—the fruition of rest in the Self's true nature as distinguished from an act of duty to be done, an end therefore, which is other than any

specific act to be accomplished. Hence they cannot be valid or authoritative.

According to the Prábhákaras therefore the Vedic Law as Vidhi or Moral Imperative is not the eternally self-accomplished fruition of the Absolute as realised consciousness or experience presenting itself as an end to be realised. It is the act of duty itself in its pure essence, the act as having self-enclosing, self-validating authority, the act as an impersonal verity of the moral order as distinguished from a fact given in experience. Vidhi, in other words, is the self-positing and self-positing duty which is as different from the being of a given fact as it is from becoming. It is accomplished, realised being as distinguished from the static being of a given matter of fact, the being or reality which constitutes the validity of a self-authoritative duty or imperative as distinguished from the being of a self-accomplished experience or fruition. It is this accomplished being as the duty that comes up to us in the form of a categorical imperative. The authority of the Imperative is only the self-validation of the Duty in consciousness as an accomplished verity of the moral order: it is the Law revealing itself to consciousness in its essence as having dynamic reality or the validity of a duty to be accomplished.

Such injunctions as are artha constitute dharma or morality according to the Prábhákaras, *i.e.*, injunctions which do not produce unhappiness in excess of happiness constitute moral right, while injunctions which are anarthas as producing more unhappiness than happiness are not morally right though having scriptural sanction. It is these injunctions which are really accomplished in the agent's accomplishment of his duties and not any ulterior end or consequence. Since in *kámya* or conditional duties the agent is moved not by the injunction but by his subjective desire for an end, these are not strictly

duties in the moral sense: they are pseudo-duties whose only function is to indicate the manner of accomplishing an end without prompting or impelling the will which is the true function of a duty as having moral authority. Hence it is the unconditional duties without any extraneous end or consequence that are duties in the strict sense. The prompting here is the prompting of the Imperative and not of any extraneous consequence or end, and is therefore strictly moral prompting or impulsion as distinguished from the empirical prompting of desire. It is therefore the accomplishment of such duties with *prabṛtti* or will determined by moral as distinguished from pathological prompting that constitutes man's proper course. Such duties performed for duty's sake constitute morality (*dharma*), *i.e.*, the accomplishment of the Imperative for the sake of the Imperative without reference to any ulterior fruition or satisfaction. This is also man's highest good, his *nishreyasa* or *paramapurushārtha*—this *niyogasiddhi* or accomplishment of pure duty as distinguished from the realisation of an ulterior end or happiness. It does not lead to happiness in heaven (*svarga*) or any other ulterior satisfaction which is implicated only in the *kāmya* or conditional duties. These latter refer to a *phala* or extraneous result, such *phala* being *ākshiptā*, drawn on or implicated by, the fact of the subjective desire which prompts, though not implied in the imperative or impelling function of duty as duty. This impelling function becomes inoperative by the very fact of the subjective prompting in a conditional duty which thus lacks true moral significance or value.

N.B.—Some points however remain obscure in the *prābhākara* doctrine. (1) Does *Niyoga* imply *vyāpāra* or a process of becoming? Is it something that realises, posits itself? In that case, it is *bhāvanā*, becoming, and not being which contradicts the doctrine of a Moral Order

as a system of established or accomplished moral facts? Is it then not *vyápāra* at all, no process of becoming, but mere *svabhāva* or essence? In that case, what is it the essence of? Is it *vishayasvabhāva*, the essence of the enjoined duty? In that case, *Niyoga* is the act itself, the act in its pure essence, not a fact in its pure essence. But the question in this case is: is the *vishaya*, the act which is the object of the *Niyoga*, *siddha*, accomplished, or *asiddha*, un-accomplished, *i.e.*, *vidyamāna* existent, or *avidyamāna*, non-existent, at the time of the *niyoga*? If it is non-existent, then how does it become *vākyārtha*, the import of the categorical proposition? An hypothetical proposition may refer even to the non-existent, but a categorical proposition refers only to what exists. To say that the non-existent may be clothed with an imagined (*kālpanika*) reality and thus be the import of a categorical proposition is to deprive *Niyoga* of its character of an objective, ontological verity, *i.e.*, of its character of an accomplished fact in an established Moral Order. It is to give it only *kālpanika*, imagined existence subject to all the forms and categories of the understanding. Again, if the *vishaya*, the act in its essence, is existent (*vidyamāna*), then it is *siddha*, accomplished and cannot be accomplished again. Lastly, if it be partly existent and partly non-existent (*i.e.*, ideally existent and actually non-existent), then by as much as it is non-existent by so much it cannot be the meaning of the categorical proposition, and by as much as it is existent by so much it cannot be accomplished. Is it then *phalāsvabhāva*, of the essence of an end, as distinguished from *vishayasvabhāva*, the essence of a duty? This will be consequentialism as distinguished from the realistic ethical pragmatism of *Niyoga* as act-essence or *vishayasvabhāva*. The difficulty here however is: the *Niyoga* as looking forward to an end will imply also

an end of this end and also another end for the latter and so on *ad infinitum*. Again the end as end being avidyamána or unrealised cannot be the import of a categorical proposition. (2) Again Niyoga is pramána, validates or establishes itself as authoritative. But what is Pramána? Pramána is chidátmaka, self-validating experience or position in consciousness. Niyoga as pramána is therefore bare pratibháša or position in consciousness and thus we get neither its káryarupa, the form of duty nor its preranárupa, the form of impulsion. These must be therefore only illusory superimpositions on Niyoga as mere self-evidencing experience. This is the objection of Brahma-váda or Absolutism against the doctrine of Niyoga as mere Impersonal Law. Niyoga in this view is samvidátmaka, the self-revealing Spirit itself and is not Pure Act or Duty as an impersonal ontological verity. (3) Thirdly, Niyoga is either of the form of duty (káryarupa) or of the form of moral impulsion (preranárupa.) This Niyoga again is Apurva which constitutes dharma or merit, *i.e.*, Niyoga as accomplished constitutes merit. But the Prábhákaras reject alike the Nyáya-Vaisheshika conception of Apurva as Atmasamskára or subjective disposition of the self and the Bhátta conception of it as kriyáshakti, *i.e.*, an objective potency of the act itself. Hence the question is: where does Niyoga reside as Apurva and as constituting the agent's dharma or merit during the interval of its accomplishment? Further how can it be Apurva or Dharma as pure káryarupa or duty or as pure preranárupa or moral obligation and impulsion? In either case we shall have the accomplishment of that which in its true essence is always to be. And further there is no difference in this case between the Niyoga as accomplished and the Niyoga as unaccomplished, at least it is not clear what this difference, if any, *positively* is. Niyoga as Apurva is not karmika

potency nor a samskāra or disposition of the Atman. What then, is it positively as distinguished from unaccomplished Law? (4) Lastly, what is the nishreyasa or highest good in the sense of paramapurushārtha or ultimate and highest end of the individual? The Prābhākaras describe it as niyogasiddhi, the realisation of the Imperative, *i.e.*, its realisation in the case of the nitya or unconditional duties (Tasmāt nityeshu niyogasiddhireva purushārtha, niyogasiddheḥ paramapurushārthatvāt—"Chitsukhi" reporting Prābhākara's view). What, then, is the essence of this realisation of the Imperative? We have already seen how the Prābhākaras avoid a positive definition of it. They merely reject the Nyāya-Vaisheshika and Bhātta conceptions. Hence it is not clear what constitutes the positive content of Prābhākara's moksha. This moksha as Transcendental Freedom is described as niyogasiddhi or realisation of the Imperative, but niyoga is always either preraná, impulsion, or kárya, duty: it is not clear how it can be accomplished or realised without being deprived of its very nature. There is also no possible locus of it in the interval of realisation or accomplishment, and thus Prābhākara's moksha as consisting in the realisation of Niyoga remains merely a negative concept. Shálikanātha (a disciple of Prābhākara) however, in the "Prakaranapanchiká," in the chapter on Tattvólóka mentions duhkābháva or freedom from suffering as Prābhākara's moksha. According to him there are two courses—the course which leads to svarga or happiness in heaven and the course which leads to moksha or freedom from suffering. The former comes on the wake of kámyakarmas or conditional duties depending on the agent's desire, while the latter is brought on by self-knowledge (Atmajnána), the discharge of the unconditional duties (nityanaimittika-karmánussthánā) and the varjjana, eschewing, of the conditional duties (kámya) and of the nishiddha or

forbidden actions, by an agent who is virakta, dispassionate or indifferent to allurements of pleasure or happiness. Hence Prabhākara's moksha, according to Shālikanātha, is more than mere niyogāsiddhi in the sense of the disinterested discharge of the unconditional duties: it is not merely the accomplishment of the duty but is also self-knowledge besides conducing to an end, *viz.*, dukkhābhāva or freedom from suffering. But this is practically giving up Prabhākara's speciality and conceding everything to Kumārila. An extraneous end is assumed as completing the accomplishment of the Niyoga and even the Upanishad texts declaring self-knowledge as the highest end are rendered authoritative by being brought under a chodanā or injunction, *viz.*, ātmajñāna-chodanā or command enjoining self-knowledge. Says Shālikanātha: ato vishayavisheshasambhogah eva ānandah iti sundaram, *i.e.*, the satisfaction which consists in the enjoyment of specific objects is one way to svarga or happiness in heaven. It is not moksha however which is the end or good which results from the cessation of all empirical suffering: mokshastu sāmsārikadukkhopashmāt purushārtha iti pushkalam. What, then, is this moksha or liberation? He is said to be liberated who by subduing his desire for empirical life full of woes, religiously refrains from the pursuit of empirical ends as well as from the acts which are forbidden as sinful, whose merit as well as demerit have worn out, and who by the cultivation of self-knowledge as a religious duty with the aid of moral tranquillity, application, sexual continence etc, has completely destroyed the entire mass of responsibility for his doings. Kah punarmokshah? yah khaluh sāmsārikebhyah dukhēbhyah gatasprah sah nishidhebhyaḥ abhyudayasāhdanebhyaḥ cha nibarttamānah dharmādharmau kshayam nayan shamadamabrahmacharyyādikāṅgapabrmhitena ātmajñānena "na cha

pūnarābharttateh" iti choditena nihsheshakarmāshayam nāshayan. muchyate (Shālikanātha's "Prākaranapan-chika.")

(b) *Kumārila's view*: We have seen that Prabhākara interprets dharma as chodanālakṣhanah arthah in the sense that it includes anarthas which have the mark of scriptural sanction as well as arthas which are without scriptural sanction. In other words, according to Prabhākara there may be arthas i.e., objects not producing unhappiness in excess of happiness, which may not be scripturally enjoined. These are not dharma, duty or moral right. Similarly there may be anarthas or evils as producing more unhappiness than happiness and these may be scripturally enjoined. These also are not moral duties or dharma. Only arthas are dharma and of these only such as are scripturally enjoined. For Kumārila however whatever is scripturally enjoined is an artha and also a moral duty or dharma. Hence scripture cannot enjoin anartha or evil: it only forbids or prohibits the pursuit of such anartha. A scriptural law (chodanā) may be either a positive injunction (Vidhi) or a negative prohibition (Nishedha.) It relates to an artha or positive end in the first case and prescribes its accomplishment as duty. In the latter case it relates to some anartha or evil and prescribes cessation or abstention (nibṛtti) from it. It is these negative prescriptions as prohibiting anartha or evil and wrong actions that are implied by chodanālakṣhanah anartha or anartha having a scriptural mark. They are not anarthas having scriptural sanction as Prabhākaras interpret them, but anarthas scripturally indicated for abstention or cessation. Such anarthas are adharma, morally evil or wrong, as prohibited by scripture and not morally neutral or indifferent having scriptural sanction as Prabhākaras contend. There are no anarthas positively enjoined, anarthas being always the object

of prohibition and never that of a positive injunction. Contrarywise only anarthas are the objects of scriptural prohibition, and there are no objects of prohibition which are arthas or positive ends as Prábhákaras hold. There may indeed be anarthas which are not prohibited by Shástra and thus are morally neutral, but whatsoever is thus prohibited is an anartha and therefore adharmā or morally evil, and never an artha which is morally neutral as Prábhákaras contend as possible. Similarly there may indeed be arthas which are not scripturally enjoined and thus are morally neutral, but whatsoever is so enjoined is an artha and therefore dharmā, morally right, and never an anartha which is morally neutral as Prábhákaras conceive it to be possible. For Kumárika an end is a logical and psychological implicate of a scriptural Imperative, though of course it does not constitute its moral authority. Hence an end, either positive realisation of a good or negative cessation from an evil, being necessarily implied, an Imperative as injunctive or prohibitive must necessarily refer to an artha or anartha. Hence there cannot be positive injunction of an anartha nor negative prohibition of an artha. Kumárika further holds that there is no rule that the validity of the Vedas consists exclusively in the obligatoriness or authority of specific acts as duties. With regard to the Upanishad texts at least it must not be denied that the validity accrues from something other than an act or duty, *i.e.*, from the intrinsic value or excellence of the Self in its true nature as an accomplished reality as distinguished from an act to be accomplished. It cannot be supposed that the Self is a duty to be accomplished by the will. It follows therefore that Shabda, verbal testimony, is not necessarily and invariably in reference to some kárya or duty to be accomplished *i.e.*, it is not invariably a command but may also be a simple declaration of truth,

(Sārvasya Vedasya kārye eva prāmāṇyam iti na niyamah. Upanishadavākyaṇām . Atmasvarupaparatvaṁ na nirākarttavayam. Na avashyam prabrṭtyādhinā vyutpattih. Tasmāt naikāntata kāryathata shabdānām. "Shāstradipika")

According to Kumārila therefore an end is implicated logically and psychologically in every scriptural Imperative prescribing a duty, but does not constitute its moral authority or validity as duty which depends purely on its own nature as duty. But this holds in case of texts that prescribe duties, *i.e.*, are of the nature of imperatives or commands. There are however other texts which are not imperatives but simple declarations of truths or accomplished realities. Such for example are the Upanishad texts which declare the intrinsic worth or excellence of the Self in its true nature. In this case the nature of an accomplished reality is declared as an end-in-itself, and the validity or authority of the text is consequent on this self-accomplished end or value which is thus not merely a logical or psychological implicate of the declaration but also constitutes its content and determines its validity. We have thus two kinds of scriptural declarations:—(1) those that are moral imperatives in which ends are non-morally implicated or involved, but which are not themselves validated or established as morally authoritative through such ends, and (2) those that are declarations of accomplished facts having intrinsic value or excellence and are thus established through these as being themselves their own ends.

What, then, are these ends which are non-morally implicated in Moral Imperatives? According to Kumārila, we have two kinds of these ends, (1) dukkhāsambhinnam sukham, *i.e.*, unmixed happiness or happiness unadulterated by unhappiness, and (2) nityasukham, *i.e.*, eternal happiness, unending satisfaction or bliss. The former

constitutes *nihshréyasah* or *summum bonum* in the lower sense, an inferior sort of *summum bonum*, which is only unmixed happiness but not eternal happiness as it may be exhausted through fruition or *bhoga* and thus end in a rebirth. The course which leads to it is the course of the accomplishment of *kāmya* or conditional duties—the course of *vihitakāmyakarmānusthāna*. As it does not lead to an enduring and imperishable fruition, it is only a relative best. A better course is that of the discharge of the *nitya* or unconditional duties and the realisation of *Atmajñāna* or self-knowledge. These are *dharmādharmavirodhi*, *i.e.*, opposed to *dharma*, merit, as well as *adharma*, demerit. Hence they may bring on the destruction of both in the end, thereby conducing to an eternal happiness or *nityasukha* (according to some followers of Kumārila) or the Self's freedom by the destruction of all its specific qualities (*samastavaisheshikātmagunochchhedah*) according to others. Hence while the lower course of the conditional duties leads only to some kind of unadulterated happiness, the higher course of the unconditional duties and self-knowledge leads to a lasting fruition either as *samastavaisheshikātmagunochchhedah*, *i.e.*, enduring freedom through the destruction of all the specific qualities of the Self, or as *nityasukha*, *i.e.*, eternal happiness.

Let us now consider the nature and implications of a specific duty involving evil in some form such as *himsā* or destruction of life. Take the case of the ceremony of *shyena* whose end is the destruction of the enemy. We have seen that according to Kumārila whatever is positively enjoined by scripture is an *artha* as well as *dharma* or duty. Now *shyena* is the object of a *Vidhichodanā* or positive injunction. Hence it is *svarupatah dharmah*, *i.e.*, moral duty considered in its own nature as scripturally enjoined. But *shyena* also leads to an *anarthaphala*, *i.e.*, evil consequence or result, *viz.*, the destruction of the

enemy. How is such an evil consequence or anartha to be reconciled with the nature of shyena as duty which is always artha or good? Kumārila's view is that the consequence or end, being only a *nonmoral* implicate of the duty, does not affect its nature as *morally* authoritative. The duty as a moral imperative is an artha even though there may be an anartha or evil in its implication of an end or phala which is non-moral. The evil or anartha in this case is himsā or destruction of life which is the object of the scriptural prohibition "thou shalt not take the life of a sentient being." Hence it is not merely anartha or evil but also adharma or moral evil. Now this adharma or moral evil appertains to the consequence or phala which is implicated in the moral imperative but is not essential to its nature as moral duty. Hence the nature of the latter as moral duty and therefore as artha or good is not affected by association with such moral evil as its consequence. It may be called moral evil only by upachāra or transference of the nature of the end to itself, but in itself it is not adharma or moral evil. This holds good in spite of the fact that the moral evil of the consequence or phala will bring on its own retribution in the form of naraka or suffering in hell, for it is not shyena itself which brings on this retribution, but it is the evil involved in the consequence. This evil being destruction of life which is scripturally prohibited must mature into its own punishment in due course but not because of the ceremony of shyena as an enjoined duty but because of the forbidden consequence of injury to life which is not necessary to its moral authority as scripturally enjoined. There are indeed certain exceptional or special cases in which destruction of life is allowed by the Vedas. These are the six exemptions, *i.e.*, the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting such destruction. Destruction of life is legitimate, *e.g.*, in protecting

the life of a cow from the attack of an átatáyi or enemy, in saving the life of a Brahmin, etc. In such circumstances there is no evil in shyena if there is no natural or laukika means available. In all other cases shyena involves evil, but only indirectly or mediately through the consequence or end and not in its own nature as duty. Such evil brings on naraka or suffering in hell, but shyena itself does not bring about this suffering. [This is also the view of most Neo-Niayayika writers and also of Vishvanátha, but is opposed to that of Old Nyaya writers (e.g., Jayanta) and of Sankhya, both the latter condemning shyena as anartha or evil.]

Let us consider the above with reference to the three parts or constitutive factors of a Vidhi or Scriptural Injunction. We have seen that an injunction usually consists of (1) a sadhyámsha or part prescribing an end, (2) a sáadhanámsha or part indicating the means and (3) an itikarttavayatámsha or part showing the manner of accomplishing the act indicated as means. Now according to the Prábhákaras, the end or consequence being not implied or imported by the moral function of the Imperative, shyena which involves prohibited himsá or destruction of life in its phalámsha or end cannot be morally justified. According to Kumáрила however the moral function of the Injunction covers all the three parts of end, means and manner of accomplishment, but unequally, viz, *primarily* the means or act (e.g., the Yága or sacrifice) and the manner or mode of accomplishment, and *only by implication* the end, sádhyá or phala such as happiness in heaven, etc. Further Vidhi or moral Imperative has authority even in the kámya or conditional duties as revealing (jñápaka) the sadhyasadhanatá or conduciveness of the act to the end desired. But the phalakámaná or desire for an end depends on the purusha, the agent, and therefore it is the purusha himself who

causes the *prabṛtti* or will to the accomplishment of the end. (Svayameva hi jánanti purusháh karttavyam iti svayameva purushaprabṛttih—Rámachandra's "Siddhántachandrika" on the "Shástradipika"). But since the Imperative is also *prabarttaka*, obligatory or morally impelling, the *sadhyaphala*, *i.e.*, the end to be accomplished, is also in a secondary sense *vidheya*, duty or object of the Imperative. Hence, in *kámya* or conditional duties like *shyena*, the scope of the Imperative extends also to the end or consequence though only indirectly by implication or in a secondary sense, but since this consequence is a prohibited *anartha* or evil in certain cases, *e.g.*, *kimsá* or destruction of life, there is *adharma* or moral evil on account of such consequence. But such *adharma* appertains to the end and does not taint the nature of the *shyena* itself in its own nature which is *dharma* or duty. The *shyena* is thus *svarupatah dharmah*, *i.e.*, is morally legitimate in its own nature as a duty primarily imported by a positive injunction, but since it brings on *shyena-janyahimsá*, *i.e.*, prohibited destruction of life, mediately through its consequence or end, it is regarded as morally wrong (*adharma*) by superimposition (*upachára*), *i.e.*, the superimposition of the consequence on the act itself which leads to the consequence.

It follows therefore that according to the *Prábhákaras* evil or wrong can be justified only as implicated in or as a necessary part of the duty itself. It cannot be justified as an end aimed at. According to *Kumáрила* however such evil or wrong may be indirectly implicated in a relative or conditional duty depending on the agent's desire though it cannot be primarily imported by the Imperative. Thus there is a duty even with reference to the accomplishment of an end which is morally evil or wrong: one may seek it in the proper manner or one may be remiss even in this. The duty therefore is with reference

to the mode of accomplishing the end and one may acquire merit or demerit by conforming to the rules or not conforming thereto. The end is thus only indirectly implicated in such a duty, and though the evil of the end may result in the agent's demerit, yet this is other than the demerit which may accrue to him on account of his not properly accomplishing his duty with reference to the end. (In this sense even the sharper and the robber have their specific duties: they must conform to the rules, to their special codes failing wherein they will be failing in their duty.)

In the foregoing analysis we have considered evil and particularly moral evil with reference to positive scriptural prescriptions or injunctions, *i.e.*, we have considered how far and in what sense such injunctions can be said to imply anything which is wrong or evil in its nature. It now remains to be considered in what sense such evil is to be regarded as constituting the object of the negative prescriptions or prohibitions. This leads us to :

The Doctrine of Nishedha or Scriptural Prohibition according to Prabhākara and Kumārila respectively.

(1) *Prabhākara's view*: We have already seen that, according to the Prabhākaras, an anartha may be anartha or evil merely from the laukika, secular standpoint, or simply from the Shāstric, scriptural standpoint, or from both. Now scriptural anarthas, whether simply scriptural, or scriptural as well as secular, may be the object of a scriptural prohibition as well as a scriptural injunction. It is only anarthas which are scripturally prohibited that constitute adharma or moral wrong. An anartha is scripturally enjoined in a kāmya duty, and as the injunction in such a case is without moral force because of the agent's kámaná or subjective desire, such anartha is devoid of strict moral significance, *i.e.*, is neither moral nor immoral. Provided therefore that an anartha is not

specifically prohibited in some other prescription, it may be the object of a positive injunction without being either right or wrong. But if it is prohibited elsewhere it is wrong because of such scriptural prohibition. Further all scriptural prohibitions have only *anartha* in view, *i.e.*, *anartha* in the sense of producing more unhappiness than happiness. Such *anartha* may not be *anartha* or evil from the secular standpoint, but it is always *anartha* in the Shástric or non-empirical sense.

It is these *anarthas* which constitute the object only of scriptural prohibitions that constitute moral evil or moral wrong. But the prohibitions do not refer to any ulterior end or consequence such as sin of the agent (*pratyaváya*) and his consequent punishment in hell: it is not reference to any such extraneous end that constitutes the moral wrongness of an act which is prohibited. On the contrary, the prohibition itself constitutes the wrongness in question. As a matter of fact the prohibition involves nothing beyond the two essentials of a *niyoga* or command, *viz.*, (1) a *niyojya*, *adhikṛtapuruṣha* or person on whom the command is binding, in this case every man who feels the desire for the forbidden indulgence, and (2) a *sádhana*, means or instrument for the accomplishment of the command which in this case is *nibṛtti* or cessation from the forbidden act. These are the only necessary accompaniments of the prohibition as imperative or obligatory so that no *phalakámaná*, no desire for any ulterior end or consequence such as *pratyaváyábháva* or freedom from the taint of sin, is necessary. The mere presentation of the enjoined duty is sufficient for the agent's cessation: the imperative is self-appropriated as a *purushavisheshana* or specification of the Self, and thus acts as the deterrent. There is no pathological desire which acts as the counteractive to the forbidden impulse, no extraneous end or consequence, the carrying

out of the command, in other words, the required cessation or abstention, being itself its own end. Hence the only purushārtha or end which is accomplished by the cessation is niyogasiddhi or accomplishment of the command, the siddhi or accomplishment in this case being negative abstention or overcoming of a positive craving.

(2) *Kumārila's view* : According to Kumārila however the desire for an end is a psychological condition of volition in every case, i.e., in the negative as well as the positive form of it. Thus there is hitaprāpti or attainment of the good as a motive in positive willing (prabṛtti) while there is abhitaparihāra or avoidance of evil as a motive in negative willing or nibṛtti. The law of selection and rejection as a psychological condition thus holds good in all cases, even in moral willing from the consciousness of duty. Hence in nibṛtti or cessation in view of scriptural prohibition or nishedha, there is desire for an end, viz., the desire to avoid subjective sin (pratyavāya) and its consequence of suffering in hell (naraka). This is the ahita or evil which is sought to be avoided by such cessation just as in vidhi or positive injunction there is the realisation of a positive end or good (hita), viz., happiness in heaven and the like.

It follows therefore that according to Prabhākara the prohibition, though binding independently of the agent's desire for an ulterior end such as freedom from sin, is yet conditional on his feeling the forbidden impulse. It is thus conditional in one sense and unconditional in another : provided you feel the impulse, the prohibition binds you, but you cannot avoid coming under its authority if you are under the sway of the impulse. Further such impulse is a prius only of the application of the imperative to your case, it is not a condition of the accomplishment of the imperative. The imperative is accomplished purely through the moral prompting without

requiring a nonmoral psychological motive for its accomplishment. It is otherwise with the positive injunctions. These are unconditionally authoritative, independently even of a psychological prius of subjective impulse. They are accomplished likewise through themselves without implying any extraneous desire. The so-called conditional injunctions are not true moral injunctions. They imply a subjective prius of empirical impulse and for that very reason are not duties but mere facts resulting from psychological causes. According to Kumārila however there is desire for an end in all scriptural imperatives, negative and positive. Such desire is a psychological condition of the accomplishment of the duty though not necessary for the moral impulsion or obligatoriness of the imperative. This is true not only of the unconditional but also of the conditional injunctions as well as the prohibitions. The prohibitions however imply something more: they imply a forbidden impulse in the agent as the prius of their application. Hence they are conditional on the agent in two ways, conditional on a forbidden impulse in him and conditional on his desire to avoid the consequence thereof. The former is the prius of the application and the latter of the accomplishment of the prohibition. The conditional injunctions are also similarly conditional in two ways, conditional on an empirical impulse which in this case is a condition of application as well as of accomplishment of the enjoined duty. Thus the prohibitions and conditional injunctions are doubly conditional according to Kumārila: in either case there is not only desire for an end as a condition of psychological motivation but also an impulse (to be checked or realised) as the condition of the moral application of the command. The unconditional injunctions however apply without reference to any subjective impulse and thus are conditional on desire only in respect of psychological prompting.

Hence according to the Prabhākara the moral imperative, positive or negative, is independent of pathological motivation, though in the case of the latter there is a psychological prius of forbidden impulse to be counteracted. Moreover the conditional injunctions resulting from subjective prompting are without moral force. According to Kumārila however, even the unconditional injunctions imply psychological motivation through the desire for an end. In the prohibitions and the conditional injunctions there is moreover an additional psychological prius of impulse as the condition of application. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara however admit that the moral motive or prompting of the Law is the essential factor which may require a pathological psychological prompting as a secondary accompaniment or may not require it. In either case therefore the moral intention is primary and an extraneous desire is either unnecessary or merely subsidiary. Another question however arises here : the moral intention may not only refer to an extraneous end through the implication of a subjective desire, but may also lead to unintended or undesired consequences fraught with good or evil. How far are these consequences of moral significance ? Do they lead to the agent's merit or demerit ? Do they affect in any way the moral nature of the acts whose collateral accompaniments or consequences they are ? This leads us to the question of *the subjective and objective rightness or wrongness of an act considered as such.*

The question is : whether rightness or the opposite appertains to the act in its own nature apart from the subjective intention of the agent or whether it attaches to it only through the agent's conscious choice. In the former case, there will be responsibility even for unintended and accidental acts, *i.e.*, merit or demerit will accrue therefrom. In the latter case there will be

responsibility only for acts from conscious foresight and choice. Is the act, then, in itself right or wrong? Is it a source of merit and demerit on its own account, or only through the subjective intention? Is moral responsibility determined purely by the nature of the act, or by the subjective intention, or by both conjointly?

Consider the following cases :—

(1) When the forbidden anartha or evil, *e.g.*, destruction of life condemned by scripture, is intended as a consequence, but is remote and mediated (*vyavahita*), though certain. (a) Thus there may be death in consequence of festering boils, ulcers, etc., which may again be hastened by means of poisoning (*vishaprayoga*), sword-stroke (*khaḍgāghāta*), etc. Here death is caused by the latter through the intervening boils, ulcers, etc., and the question is how far this tantamounts to murder and the consequent guilt thereof. (b) Similarly death may be caused by means of the *shyena* ceremony, the *shyena* generating *maranāpurva* *i.e.*, a non-natural potency which causes the death in question. Here also death is caused mediately, the intervening factor here being a non-natural agency as distinguished from the natural factors in the previous instance. Is this then also equivalent to murder? (c) Again, one may worship the Shiva Deity with a view to lay down one's life at the holy pilgrimage of Kāsi. Here also a non-natural means is employed and the question is whether the agent is chargeable with the guilt of suicide.

(2) When the anartha or evil is unintended and accidental, being the unforeseen consequence of an act done originally with a good intention, *e.g.*, when there is death of a cow caused by its falling in a well that has dried up and thus has failed of its original beneficial purpose of supplying drinking water to the locality.

(3) When the anarttha or mischief is an accidental consequence of an act which is morally indifferent (neither good nor evil), *e.g.*, the throwing of a javelin which by missing its aim kills a Brahmin.

The question is : how far is the agent morally responsible in each of these cases ? Has he incurred demerit because of the consequence of his action ? Or has there been no demerit in so far as there has been no subjective intention and choice ?

Here there are different views :—

(1) Some hold that right and wrong relate always to the agent's motive. There is indeed an objective factor, *viz.*, the nature of the act or its consequence. But not until these are subjectively foreseen and intended, is there any moral responsibility. Himsá, *e.g.*, destruction of life, may be considered merely objectively as maranaphalavyápára, *i.e.*, as a series of events ending in a death. Thus regarded it is not adharma or morally wrong : it is only an objective happening in nature, a chain of objective conditions and circumstances culminating in the death of a particular being. Himsá may also be defined as pránaviyogávachchhinna-prayojakavyápára, *i.e.*, as a voluntary act which ends in a consequence of death. Even in this case it would not be necessarily wrong as the consequence in question may be no part of the intention of the voluntary action. Lastly, himsá may be defined as maranaphaloddeshena anushtithiyamána maranaphalapravayakavyápára, *i.e.*, as a voluntary act culminating in death in consequence of the act being willed deliberately with the object of bringing about the death in question. In this case the himsá is morally wrong (adharma), but not if it is scripturally sanctioned (as *e.g.* in destruction of an enemy by means of shyena), nor also if it comes under the six exceptions allowed as in protecting the life of a cow or a Brahmin.

Hence in the absence of subjective intention (uddesha) the *kupakartá*, the owner of the well, is not responsible, *i.e.*, incurs no sin, for the death of the cow; the *paribeshayitá*, the person who serves the meal, is not responsible for the death of the *bhoktá*, the person who eats it; the *galalagnánnamṛta*, the person who dies of choking while taking his food, is not *átmahantá*, guilty of suicide. Because there is no uddesha or subjective intention of *himsá* or injury to life, therefore there is no sin in these cases. The upholders of subjective rightness exempt even unintentional causing of a Brahmin's death from the category of acts to be regarded as sinful: when the *nārācchaprakshepa*, the throwing of the javelin which causes *Bráhmaṇamarana* or death of a Brahmin, is *anyoddeshakṛta*, is thrown with a purpose other than that of causing the Brahmin's death, it is not *Brahmahantṛtva*, *i.e.*, not culpable destruction of a Brahmin's life. It is regarded as culpable destruction by *gaunavyapadesha* and *lakshaná*, *i.e.*, in a secondary sense to indicate the social loss. The penalty for such unintentional destruction of a Brahmin is only half, and is merely *vāchanika* or customary being imposed for social reasons and not for any sin (*pratyaváya*) incurred. But where there is uddesha or subjective intention, there is sin even if the consequence is remote and mediated as in *khadgá-ghátēna branaparamparayá maranam*, death caused by by a deliberate injury on a festering boil. In this sense there is sin in destruction of life by *shyēna* and other non-natural means, provided of course that such destruction does not come under the six exemptions or is otherwise positively enjoined by scripture.

(2) Others however hold that rightness and wrongness are objective categories independent of subjective intention or uddesha: they belong to acts considered objectively as conducing to good or evil without reference to the

agent's foresight and choice. The upholders of this view hold that every forbidden act is charged with a 'narakasādhana-apurva, i.e., a supersensuous potency for evil which necessarily leads to suffering in hell and this is independent of uddesha or the agent's subjective intention. In other words, there are objective supernatural potencies associated with certain acts and these bring on a specific suffering or a specific happiness as the case may be, even when the agent has been led into these acts purely by accident without conscious intention and foresight. Hence every such act is a sin and thus prāyashchitta or proper expiation is also obligatory on the agent in every instance. Hence the man who kills a Brahmin is guilty of culpable destruction of a Brahmin and must undergo the full twelve years' religious penalty even if he has killed him by pure accident. Ordinarily no doubt akāmakṛta i.e., accidental and unintentional acts, are visited only with half the penalty, but this does not apply to acts which are scripturally forbidden. These latter produce pratyavāya apurva or religious demerit and must be expiated by the full penalty imposed.

According to Vishvanātha however there is no sin only where adṛṣhta or supernatural means are used, in every other case the sin depending on uddesha or subjective intention of the agent. Hence there is no sin in shyena. Shridhara however holds that there is sin in all akāmakṛta or unintentional acts, this being due not to any objective potency in the acts to lead to a specific punishment such as naraka or suffering in hell, but being due to the pramāda, carelessness or inadvertence which such acts imply. The agent is responsible for this carelessness and is thereby responsible also for the acts.

N.B.—With these conceptions of objective rightness we may compare the Buddhist conception of institutional morality and institutional responsibility. The Buddhists

hold that there is responsibility not merely for the objective consequence of any particular action, but also for all the consequences of all the actions which the founding of a particular institution may entail. Thus the founder of an institution is morally responsible for *all* the good and evil effects of the institution, present and future, even effects which come about long after his death. For example, if a religious ceremony involves *prānihimsá* or animal sacrifice, then the person who first initiates the ceremony is responsible for every life that is sacrificed for the sake of the ceremony in question. (*Devakulādi pratishthāpanam, tatra sattvāh hanyanté. Taddevakulādyapabhāgāt tātkaṛtṛnāṃ santānaparibhāgānvayam apunyamapi jāyate.*—"Madhyamikāvṛtti" by Chandrakīrti).

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

The "Analysis of conscience" has shown that the consciousness of duty presupposes specific impulses in the agent to be regulated, subdued or moralised. Thus there are pathological feelings determining the so-called conditional duties which are obstacles to ethical disinterestedness and must be restrained with a view to the proper discharge of the unconditional duties. There are also the immoral impulses and passions which are prohibited altogether and these have also to be subdued. A classification of these impulses and passions from the psychological as well as the ethical point of view is thus a necessary sequel to the analysis of conscience in the Psychological Ethics of Self-Purification. In this chapter we shall consider the Hindu Analysis and classification of the Springs of Action, and we shall find that the Hindus tackle the problem not merely from the theoretical standpoint of psychological mechanism but also from the ethical standpoint of moral worth or value.

The subject is treated in Vaisheshika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya as well as Vedānta systems. The Vaisheshika treatment of the question is to be found in Prasastapāda's Bhāṣhya on the Vaisheshika sutras which I have supplemented by occasional references to the Nyāyakandalitikā. As regards the Nyāya view however I have considered it necessary not only to refer to Vātsyayana's presentation of the subject but also the classification in the "Nyāyamanjari" of Jayanta Bhatta which is slightly different and in some respects fuller. My presentation of the Sāṅkhya treatment is based mainly on the Vyāsa-Bhāṣhya on the Pātaṅjala sutras while the Vedānta view I have tried to expound

from one of the latter writings which, as we shall see, presents many special points of interest in several ways.

I. THE VAISHESHICA CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

Prasastapáda considers the subject of the springs of Action in the Gunagrantha of his Bháshya on the Vaishe-
shika sutras. According to him there are two roots or Springs of the process of willing, namely, Desire (Ichchhá) which is always the desire for pleasure or happiness, (Sukha) and Aversion (Dvesha) which is the aversion towards pain (Duhkha).

(A) *Analysis of pleasure or Sukha.*

The nature of pleasure is that it is characterised by a peculiar consciousness of gratification, a sense of favourableness or anugraha, and its specific effects are (1) this sense of favourableness, (2) a feeling of attraction towards the pleasurable object (Abhishvanga) and (3) certain bodily expressions such as the brightness of the eyes, the face, etc. (Nayanádi-prasáda, Vaimalya).

It is to be observed that the effect of favourableness gives us the subjective side of pleasure while attraction represents its objective or conative aspect. Lastly the physiological effects, namely, the brightness of the eyes, etc., are also taken into consideration.

In the Nyáyakandalitiká the effect of favourableness is very fully explained. It is pointed out that pleasure being by nature favourable is the experience of the object which reacts favourably on the self producing the consciousness of fruition. This constitutes the subjective appropriation of the pleasure. Pleasure being once produced produces also the consciousness of itself as favourable to the self and this constitutes the self's

approval of the pleasure. Hence according to this interpretation there are no unfelt or unrecognised pleasures, a conclusion against which the Vedāntist will cite such familiar states as the unconscious happiness of a dreamless sleep and analogous experiences.

Prasastapāda next enumerates the conditions which induce pleasure, which are :— (1) proximity to the desired object, (2) consciousness of some good to be attained, (3) stimulation of the sensibilities by the object, (4) organic equilibrium (*svastatā*) and (5) merit (*dharma*).

It is pointed that *ishtopalabdhi* or prospect of some good to be realised by the object is a necessary condition of pleasure, for the person who is drawn towards some other object feels no pleasure from the experience (*Vishayāntara-vyāśaktasya sukha-anutpādāt*). Hence pleasure presupposes not only subjective predisposition towards the object but also active interest and attention for the time being, this being the pragmatic aspect of all feeling.

It is also assumed that besides the natural causes, pleasure also supposes certain other conditions of a non-phenomenal character. These are the moral causes or conditions of pleasure such as *dharma*, merit or righteousness of the subject. The assumption is that the life of a spiritual being cannot be explained merely by natural causes without reference to his freedom. It is freedom that distinguishes the spiritual from the merely natural agent. A spiritual being is the creator of his own values, and his pleasures and pains should be regarded in the last analysis as the fruition of his own self-determined activity, his own karma.

In the *Nyāyakandalitikā* three other kinds of pleasure are also recognised, *i.e.*, pleasures which are induced by conditions different from those noticed above. Thus we have pleasures of reminiscence (*Smṛtijam*) and pleasures

of choice and resolution (Sankalpajam). These are not sensory feelings and do not depend on the condition of the stimulation of the sense-organs. Thirdly, there is in the case of those who have attained a true knowledge of the self a kind of satisfaction even when we have neither object (Viśhaya), nor desire (Ichchhá), nor reminiscence, nor anticipation—a kind of felicity which results from (1) self-knowledge (atmajñána), (2) self-collectedness (shama), (3) contentment (santosh), (4) the consummation of righteousness (prakṛsta dharma).

Hence two kinds of pleasure are to be distinguished :

(1) Lively and fleeting pleasures—the pleasures arising from the titillation of the flesh. These include the sense-feelings as well as the pleasures of reminiscence and choice. All these arise from attraction towards the object and consist in a feeling of restlessness.

(2) A quieter and more permanent form of satisfaction, pleasure in self-centered repose and calm and therefore free from mental unrest.

It is to be seen that the latter is not the same as the refined pleasure of the Epicurean. The Epicurean's refined pleasure presupposes a minimum of objective conditions and is therefore heteronomous. Here however no objective condition is recognised, the pleasure arising wholly from within, being the manifestation of the felicity that belongs by nature to the self.

(B) *Analysis of Pain (Dukkha).*

Just as pleasure is characterised by the sense of favourableness so pain has the opposite characteristic of unfavourableness (upaghāta). The effects of pain are : (1) unfavourableness, (2) aversion towards the object causing pain (dveṣha) and (3) paleness (dainya, vicchháyatá). Similarly the conditions which induce pain are :

(1) proximity towards an object of aversion (anavipretavishaya-sānnidhya), (2) apprehension of evil (anishatopalavdhi), (3) stimulation of the sense-organs by the object, (4) absence of organic equilibrium and (5) demerit. There are also pains of reminiscence and of anticipation in which there is no sensory stimulation. But there is no transcendental suffering corresponding to the transcendental bliss which belongs by nature to the self.

(C) *Analysis of Desire (Ichchhā).*

From the feelings of pleasure and pain arise two kinds of reaction of the will, *viz.*, desire (ichchhā) and aversion (dvesha).

Desire is defined as aprāptaprārthanā, the yearning for the unattained. It is either egoistic (Svārtha) or altruistic (Parārtha). An egoistic desire is the desire to attain something for the self of which it is not yet in possession as when we say 'may this happen to me' (aprāptasya vastunah svārtham prati yā prārthanā idam mé bhuyāt). An altruistic desire is the desire to attain something for another of which the latter is not yet in possession as when we say 'May this happen to him' (Aśya idam bhavatu). The Nyayakandalikā does not recognise the ego-altruistic form of desire as an independent class.

The conditions of desire are :—(1) Connection of soul with the mind (ātmamana-samyoga, (2) Experience of pleasure, (3) Recollection of pleasure leading to the expectation of similar pleasure in future.

In the case of the absent object the desire is supposed to arise from the recollection of it as a means to pleasure. In this case the absent pleasure moves the will through the representation of it by the mind. This brings out the pragmatic aspect of cognition. Even á representation is a motive because of the consequence to the subject

(Phalasya prayojakatvát). An idea of the good is therefore not a mere idea, but also an incipient activity to realise the good.

The Nyáyakandalitiká here points out that desire is a stretching forward as well as a stretching backward, a double-faced psychosis which points alike towards the future and the past. Thus we may desire to attain the unattained, to realise the unrealised. This is one form of desire. But there is also another form of it, which is the desire to live over again through the past. Thus the desire for the object of pleasure generates the effort to realise it which has therefore a forward reference. Similarly the desire to recollect the past restores the past in the form of memory. (Upádánaichchhátaḥ tadanugunah prayatnah bhavati, smaranaichchhátaḥ smaranam).

In the Nyáyakandalitiká these two aspects of desire are considered to be independent phenomena. In the Vyása-bhāṣhya on the Pátanjala sutras however they are shown to be closely related and to constitute the two different marks of all transformation (parināma). It is there pointed out that change of form involves the twofold process of the transformation of the potential into the kinetic and of the kinetic into the sublatent. Hence even the present state (the kinetic, vartamāna) contains within itself the marks of the past (the sub-latent, atita) and the future (potential, anāgata). The present that stretches beyond itself into the future is thus the present which has drawn the past into itself. Desire therefore as a present state of unrest is both a reinstatement of the past and an anticipation of the future.

(D) *The Springs of Action under Desire.*

After analysing desire Prasastapáda next considers the Springs of Action coming under desire.

These are :—

(1) *Kāma*. According to *Prasastapāda* it signifies the sexual craving in ordinary usage, but when particularised may also designate longing for happiness in heaven (*svargakāmanā*), for wealth (*artha-kāmanā*), etc.

(2) *Avilāsha*, Appetite for food and drink (*bhojanam tatra icchhā abhilāshah*).

(3) *Rāga*, Passion which is the desire for a recurring enjoyment of objects (*punah-punah-vishaya-ranjana-icchhā*).

(4) *Sankalpa*, Resolve which is the desire to realise what is not yet (*anāgatasya arthasya karanechchhā*).

(5) *Kārunya*, Compassion which is the desire to remove the sufferings of others without any prompting of self-interest (*svārthamanapeksha paraduhkha-prahānechchā*).

(6) *Vairāgya*, Dispassion which is the desire to renounce the world from the perception of its faults (*dosha-darshanāt vishaya-tyāgechchhā*).

(7) *Upadhā*, Insincerity which is the inclination to deceive others (*parapratāranechchhā*).

(8) *Bhāva*, which is a carefully concealed desire—a desire without physical expression but manifested by signs (*anatanigūrechchhā lingair-āvirbhāvita yā icchhā sā bhāva*).

(9) *Chikirsha*, Desire for Action, *Jihirsha*, Desire for appropriation, and the various other forms of desire arising from the differences in their corresponding actions (*kriyāvedāt icchābhedāh*).

It will be seen that *Prasastapāda*'s list notices the individualistic appetites (*e.g.*, the appetite for food and drink) as well as the cravings of the sex which are non-individualistic and serve the preservation of the race.

Secondly, it also recognises the difference between a desire as such and the more enduring and persistent form of it which we call passion (*Rāga*).

Thirdly, a distinction is made between desires for enjoyment and desires for action. This is the basis of the difference between passion and resolve. Passion is a Bhogechchhá, a desire for enjoyment or fruition while Resolve is a Karanechchha, a desire for action, a desire to realise the unrealised. In passion the subjective aspect of desire is prominent, in Resolve its objective aspect.

Fourthly, Dispassion is regarded as a form of desire and not as a form of aversion. The reason is that aversion or hate in any form is believed to be inconsistent with the mental equanimity and calm of the state of Transcendental Freedom or Moksha to which Dispassion is recognised to be a necessary means.

This is also the underlying purpose in the inclusion of compassion among the forms of desire rather than of aversion. It is to be seen however that while the negative feeling of compassion is recognised by Prasastapáda, the corresponding positive virtue of the Buddhists, *viz.*, rejoicing at the good of creatures, muditá, maitri, is not noticed. This omission is significant from the biologist's as well as the sociologist's point of view. For the maintenance of life as well as social stability removal of suffering is perhaps more imperatively necessary than the furtherance of happiness. This is why it is easier for us to sympathise with suffering and misery than rejoice at the good fortune of our fellow-beings. It also explains the elaborate provisions of society for the detection and punishment of crime and its comparative deficiency in regard to positive reward of merit and service. In fact, it is this consciousness of the interminable suffering of life that accounts for the Hindu preference of Dispassion to Compassion as the means to transcendental satisfaction. Compassion is a virtue of the lower order: it may alleviate suffering to a certain extent but cannot remove it altogether. It thus gives us a relative best rather than the

absolute best, and the uncompromising idealist who seeks an absolutely perfect order should turn away from the world, *i.e.*, should refuse to participate in a life which is a mere compromise. Hence he must cultivate Dispassion which is the desire to renounce all desires and this will lead to his freedom in the end. It must be noticed here however that the great teachers of Buddhism and Jainism insist on vicarious suffering for others among the perfections, though it does not appertain according to them to the Transcendental State. The Vaishnava scriptures, *e.g.*, the Bhágavat, and the Vaishnava teachers, *e.g.*, Rámánuja, go further recognising Compassion for suffering as among the perfections of the Mukta and indeed of Bhagavána himself.

(E) *Analysis of Dvesha, Aversion, and of the Springs of Action which are Forms of Aversion.*

Aversion is described by Prasastapáda as being of the nature of a consuming flame that produces a burning sensation, as it were, in the subject (Dveshah prajvalat-makh).

Its conditions are :—(1) The contact of the soul with the mind (átma-mana-samyoga), (2) experience of suffering, and (3) recollection of suffering leading to the apprehension of it in future.

The Springs of Action which are compounds of Aversion are :—

(1) Krodha, Anger. It is the form of aversion which exhausts itself after a momentary ebullition and is the cause of certain physical expressions such as violent tremor and agitation of the body as a whole as also specific changes in the organs of sense and motor activity (sharirendriyádivikárahetu kshanamátrabhávidveshah krodhah).

(2) Droha, Revengefulness. It has no perceptible physical expression (*alaksñita-vikāra*), is long-mediated (*chirānuvaddha*), and terminates only with the infliction of some actual injury (*apakāra-avashāna*).

(3) Manyū, Concealed ill-will. It is the aversion which an injured person feels towards his malefactor, but on whom he is conscious of being powerless to retaliate; (*apakītya pratyapakārāsamarthasya antarnigurhah dveśah*). Hence it is a special form of revengefulness—revengefulness conscious of being impotent to retaliate, and it is therefore also without physical expression like revengefulness in general, being seated (*antarnigurha*) deeply within the inner life of the soul.

(4) Akshamá, Jealousy. It is the aversion which one feels towards the good qualities in another (*paragune-shu dveśah*).

(5) Amarsha, Envy. It is the aversion which arises from the sense of relative inferiority. (*Svāgunapari-bhavasamutthah dveśah*.) Hence it is Jealousy become self-conscious.

It is to be seen that the forms enumerated under Dvesha are emotions and sentiments rather than active impulses. They however lead to conation and are therefore included among the Springs of Action.

We should note also that Prasastapáda's analysis is on a scientific basis only as regards the two main classes, *viz.*, Desire and Aversion. The rest are mere enumerations based on observation. At the same time Prasastapáda shows an acuteness of psychological analysis which will do credit to any of the modern psychologists.

Thirdly, we should observe that Prasastapáda gives us a mainly psychological classification, but the division of desires into egoistic and altruistic is also on a socio-ethical basis.

Fourthly, we should note that Prasastapáda does not trace all impulses to one root, *viz.*, the desire for the good. This is the view of Sócrates who thus resolves evil into something negative, *i.e.*, as the privation of good. This is wrong according to Prasastapáda. Pain could not be the mere privation of pleasure because it is never experienced as such and also because a mere negation can never be an object of willing.

Lastly, it is to be remarked that the connection of the soul with the mind is recognised among the conditions of Desire as well as Aversion. But as in the Transcendental state this connection ceases, Desire as well as Aversion and their special forms must be regarded as appertaining to the empirical life as distinguished from the Transcendental. They are thus pathological. At the same time we have a special form of Desire, *viz.*, Dispassion which is not pathological but pure and which therefore characterises the intermediate stage of the spirit between the purely empirical and phenomenal and the absolutely Transcendental and non-empirical.

II. NYAYA CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

According to the Vaisheshikas, there are two roots of the will, namely, Desire and Aversion. The Naiyáyikas, however, resolve these into something more ultimate, *viz.*, Error, Delusion, Moha. The subject is treated by Vátsyáyana as well as by later writers on Ancient Nyaya, *e.g.*, Jayanta Bhatta. The later presentation, however, is in some respects fuller and more advanced than the earlier.

(A) *Vátsyáyana's Classification of the Springs of Action.*

According to Vátsyáyana the passions and emotions are to be traced ultimately to one root, *viz.*, Delusion, Moha.

From Delusion arise Attraction towards the favourable object (Anukulavishayeshu rágah) and Repulsion towards the unfavourable object (Pratikulavishayeshu dveshah). From attraction and aversion arise the various forms of the passions and emotions such as Mendacity (Asatya), Deceitfulness (Máya, Kapatatá), Greed (Lobha), etc. These lead to conation (Pravṛtti) which may be either righteous (Shubhá) or unrighteous (Ashubhá).

Vátsyáyana's classification thus differs from Prasastapáda's in two respects. In the first place Vátsyáyana traces attraction and aversion to something more ultimate, *viz.*, Error. Secondly, in addition to the purely psychological classification of the springs of action on the basis of the original difference between attraction and aversion, he also suggests an ethical classification on the basis of the rightness and the wrongness of the conduct to which they lead.

It is also to be seen that Vátsyáyana considers the disorder of the reason to be the ultimate source of the passions. This intellectualistic contempt of the passions is also a characteristic of the Stoics. There is, however, one important difference between Vátsyáyana and the Stoics in this respect. For the Stoics the impulses in themselves are not passions—they are transformed into the passions only when under the influence of error they are carried beyond their natural limits. Vátsyáyana, however, makes no distinction between the natural impulses and the passions. According to him all impulses are to be traced to the disordered reason and therefore are to be regarded as subversive of the tranquillity of the soul. This applies to the righteous as well as the unrighteous impulses which are alike bonds that bind the soul to the life of Samsára. Hence the non-phenomenal, transcendental life is a life of absolute freedom, of freedom not only from the natural bonds but also from

the obligations of the moral life. The released individual is one who has refused to participate in the phenomenal life, has annulled his will-to-live (*Trishná*) by withdrawing his assent to *Samsára* and all that comes with it.

(B) *Jayanta's Classification of the
Spirings of Action.*

Jayanta's classification in the "*Nyāya-Manjari*" represents the later treatment of the subject from the standpoint of Ancient *Nyaya*, and is more profound and complete than the earlier presentation of *Vātsyāyana*.

According to Jayanta, cognition (*Pravṛtti*) is to be traced to three roots, *viz.*, *Moha* (Delusion), *Rāga* (Attraction), *Dvesha* (Aversion).

Delusion (*Moha*) is defined as the erroneous judgment implying an assent of the will (*Avasāya*) which arises from the failure to discriminate the ultimate transcendental nature of things (*Vastu-paramārtha-aparichchheda-lakshana-mithyā-avasāya*).

It is regarded as the crowning folly (*Pāpatama*) because attraction and aversion cannot arise except through *Moha*, Error or Delusion.

The emotions and springs of action which are compounds of Delusion are the following :—

(1) *Mithyā-jñāna*, Erroneous Cognition. It is the erroneous judgment which ascribes to a thing the nature of something else (*Atasmin tat iti jñāna*).

(2) *Vichikitsā*, Perplexity, Scepticism. It is the judgment or attitude of the will which arises from the absence of certain or definite knowledge (*Kimsvititi vimarsha*).

(3) *Māna*, Vanity. It is the consciousness of a false superiority produced by the ascription to oneself of excellences which one does not possess.

(4) *Pramāda*, Inadvertence. It is neglect of duty arising from the absence of earnestness.

From Delusion arise the impulses of Attraction and Aversion and the compounds coming under them. *Rāga*, Attraction, is characterised by desire for the object that is regarded as favourable (*Anukuleshu artheshu abhilāshalakshanah rāgaḥ*).

The compounds coming under Attraction are the various forms of Desire. These are :—

(1) *Kāma*, sexual craving. *Prasastapāda* extends the meaning also to longing for happiness in heaven, for wealth, etc.

(2) *Matsyara*. It is defined as the unwillingness to part even with that which is not diminished by sharing with others : *Yat anyasmai nivedyamānamapi dhanavat na kshiyate tat aparitṛyāgechchā*.

(3) *Sprhā*, Worldliness. It is the desire for worldly possessions and things that are non-spiritual : *anātmiyavastuāditsa*.

(4) *Trṣṇā*, Will-to-live. It is the desire to live again as produced by the representation of a possible recurrence of this phenomenal life : *punarbhava-pratisandhāna-hetubhuta-icchā*.

(5) *Lobha*, Greed. It is the desire to obtain a forbidden thing : *nishiddha-dravya-grahanechchā*.

Next as to *Devesha*, Aversion.

It is the opposite of Attraction and is characterised by repulsion towards the object regarded as unfavourable : *pratikuleshu asahalakshanah dveshaḥ*.

The compounds under aversion arise from the various forms of repulsion : *asahana-bheda-prakāra-bhedāt*.

These are :—

(1) *Krodha*, Anger. It is an explosive emotion of the painful type, sudden in appearance and painful to the subject like a burning flame (*prajvalātmaka*). Its

physical effects are certain expressions of the eyes, the eye-brows, etc.

(2) Irshyá, Envy. It is the Aversion which arises from the perception of even the most ordinary advantages by others : Sádharane api vastuni parasva darshanát asahanam.

(3) Asuyá, Jealousy. It is the grudging sense of the superior qualities in another : Paraguneshu akshamá.

(4) Droha, Malevolence. It is the disposition to do injury to others.

(5) Amarsha, Malice. It is revengefulness without physical expression, that is, is the long-cherished but carefully concealed desire for revenge in one conscious of being powerless of doing an injury in return : adarshitamukhádívikárah param prati manyu.

It is to be observed from the above that Jayanta considers the enumerations under Delusion (*e.g.*, erroneous judgment, perplexity, etc.) to be independent motives to will, and he holds that the forms under attraction and aversion act as motives only under the influence of Delusion. Hence according to him, we have two kinds of the springs of action both arising from Moha or the disorder of the reason : (1) those that are derived immediately from Moha and as such are motives to the will, (2) those that act through attraction and aversion. The difference between these two classes lies in the fact that the springs of action which arise immediately from Moha are characterised by a minimum of feeling while those that act through attraction and aversion are characterised by a marked preponderance of feeling. It is also to be noted that by including erroneous judgment, perplexity, etc., under the springs of action Jayanta brings out an important psychological truth, *viz.*, the pragmatic aspect of cognition. It is a mistake in this view to consider cognition apart from conation. An act of

knowledge is at the same time a conative attitude implying a reaction of the will and a preparedness to respond in a specific way. This conative aspect of cognition comes out clearly in the last two enumerations under this head, *viz.*, vanity and inadvertence, the first of which consists in the overestimation of the subjective factor in all action and the second in the underestimation of the objective factor. The folly of the vain person is ultimately an illusion in regard to the subjective conditions of action, while that of the careless person is an illusion in regard to the objective conditions.

Secondly, we should note that Jayanta's classification is scientific only as regards the three main classes, *viz.*, Attraction, Aversion, and Delusion. The rest are mere enumerations without any scientific basis. At the same time certain forms of passion are noticed that have escaped even so competent an observer as Martineau. For example, while noticing revengefulness in general Martineau has not analysed that particular form of it which is characteristic of the person who is conscious of being too weak to retaliate. This holds good also in respect of Matsyara under Attraction and its corresponding feeling, namely, Irshyá, under Aversion, and also of Worldliness, Will-to-live and the enumerations under Moha.

Comparing now Jāyanta's enumeration with Prasastapāda's we notice that the enumerations under aversion (*dvesha*) are much the same in both, but the enumerations under attraction diverge widely in the two lists. For example, in Jayanta there is no mention either of Dispassion or of Compassion. Similarly in Prasastapāda we miss Jayanta's *Trshná* and *Sprhá*. Jayanta excludes Dispassion from his list of the passions and emotions possibly because while the passions according to him are the effects of the disordered reason which erroneously conceives as a good what is in reality its opposite,

dispassion is the means through which the soul is liberated from the bondage of these passions. But according to Prasastapáda the ultimate roots are the feelings of attraction and aversion and these need not be regarded as co-effects of some cause still more ultimate such as Moha. Hence there is room in Prasastapáda's scheme for the inclusion even of the Transcendental Impulse of Dispassion.

III. PATANJALI'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

He considers the subject in Sutra 34 of the Sádhanapáda in the Yoga Sūtras.

According to him, the passions of cruelty, mendacity, sexual indulgence, etc., are to be traced to three roots:—Greed (Lobha), Anger (Krodha) and Delusion (Moha). For example, cruelty in the form of animal slaughter may originate in greed or the desire for the pleasures of eating. It may also originate in anger produced by any injury received from the animal. Lastly, it may arise from the sophisticated idea that animal slaughter in connection with particular religious ceremonies is a source of merit to the agent (Vitarkáh himsádayah lobha-krodha-mohapurvakah: Yoga Sūtras: Lobhena mámsacharmárthena, krodhena apakṛtamanena, mohena dharmo me bhaviṣyatiti: Vyása-bhāṣya. Mohena yajñárhahimsayá nirdoṣho dharmo bhaviṣyatyevam rupena ityarthah: Yoga-vártika).

These passions again may determine the moral agent in various ways. Thus some may indulge their passions by overt acts, some again may persuade others to acts that will gratify themselves, while some may merely assent to such acts in others (Vitarkáh himsádayah kṛtakáritánumodita lobhakrodhamohapurvakáh). All these again may be of various degrees of intensity. Some

may be mild and comparatively harmless, some again of mean (Madhya) intensity and therefore not to be neglected, and some violent (Adhīmātra) and urgently requiring control.

Vyāsa in his commentary goes a step further in this quantitative division. According to him each of these degrees is capable of a further sub-division on the same quantitative basis. Thus within the class of the feeble impulses we may notice the three grades of the extremely feeble, the moderately feeble and the feeble approaching the mean in intensity.

It is to be noted that Patanjali does not teach the extirpation of the passions as the Stoics do. He only insists on a gradual conquest of such passions as overthrow the balance of the spirit and disturb its peace. In fact he makes a distinction between passions that are to be uprooted altogether and those that may be permitted under certain special conditions. Thus the impulses of cruelty, mendacity, etc., must be put down by all means and in all Bhūmis or levels of spiritual life. Thus it will not do to excuse oneself for cruelty because one belongs to a specific class of men, *e.g.*, the class of fishermen, nor because it is perpetrated in a particular place, *e.g.*, in a place of pilgrimage, nor also because there is a special occasion, *e.g.*, an auspicious hour or auspicious day. These passions have no place in the moral life and therefore are to be uprooted altogether.

It is to be seen therefore that according to Patanjali some impulses must be put down altogether and in all conditions but other impulses may be permitted in certain conditions and within certain limits, and the gradation of the passions in respect of intensity or strength indicates the practical method of restraining the impulses or uprooting them altogether where necessary. In this respect Patanjali's view may be compared with that of Aristotle and his

rule of the golden mean. The mean according to Aristotle is not necessarily the quantitative mean; it is the mean of the particular ethical context in every particular case and therefore the mean that errs neither by excess nor by deficiency. Aristotle does not show how this mean is to be realised by the individual by a proper ordering of his passions and emotions. What Aristotle does not furnish in his ethical scheme Patanjali gives us in his theory of the quantitative gradation of passions. As the passions cannot be extirpated all at once, the practical moralist should begin with the strongest and the most violent forms of it. After subduing these he should turn next to the weaker and less obvious forms. It will be seen therefore that in a really comprehensive scheme of ethical discipline Patanjali's method will have a place in no wise less prominent than Aristotle's. Aristotle's scheme provides the theoretical rule for deciding as to the necessity of repression. Patanjali's scheme indicates the course of practical training which must be undergone for the actual attainment of self-mastery.

IV.

THE VEDANTA CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

The subject is very fully treated in the "Jivanmuktiviveka" of Vidyāranyasvāmi. In this work the author classifies the springs of action on the basis of certain spontaneous and instinctive tendencies.

The causes of anger and other motives are certain latent and residual tendencies (samskāras) in the mind produced by habitual past indulgence. These tendencies are the Vāsanās, and constitute the sources of the emotions and passions which are unreflective and spontaneous.

These subjective predispositions or *Vasanás* are either good (*shuvá*, auspicious) or evil (*ashuvá*, inauspicious).

The evil tendencies are the cause of of birth and participation in *Samsára*. These are :-- (i) Desire for popularity (*Lokavásaná*), (ii) Desire for learning and reputation for piety (*shástra-vásaná*), (iii) Desire for carnal pleasures (*deha-vásaná*) to which some add also (iv) certain mental traits (*mánasa vásaná*) such as boastfulness (*dambha*), pride (*darpa*), etc.

ACCORDING TO A SECOND INTERPRETATION,

Mánasa-Vásaná signifies those unrealised desires which flit over the surface of the mind without being subjectively appropriated, the passing wishes (*Kámyamána*) that seem to have no effect on personal life, as distinguished from.

Vishaya-Vásaná or desires realised and appropriated by the self (*bhujyamána*).

The purer inclinations (*Suddha-Vásaná*) are supposed to lead to cessation of life (*Janmavináshini*). They are distinguished from the baser passions by the fact that they are not unreflective or spontaneous but involve judgment of the truth. These are :—

Sympathy with the happiness of others (*Maitri*).

Compassion towards the suffering (*Kárunya*).

Rejoicing at the good of sentient creatures (*Muditá*).

Indifference or neutrality towards the unrighteous (*Upekshá*).

Self-collectedness and tranquillity of the mind (*Shama*).

Repression of the external senses (*Dama*).

Endurance of pain (*Titikshá*).

Renunciation (*Sanyása*).

It is to be noted that the distinction between unappropriated desires and desires consciously approved and

chosen is of profound significance from the ethical standpoint. Our modern ethical treatises notice only the more obvious and potent forms of the passions and impulses, that is, those which either pass into overt action or are consciously approved by the moral agent. The passing wishes and unappropriated desires are ignored on the assumption that since they have no effect on the personal life they are without ethical significance. Research into the life of the subconscious is however, bringing out the significant fact that these fleeting desires, are neither arbitrary nor unimportant, but are the occasional expressions of an undercurrent of a deeper subliminal personality which may under certain circumstances be strong enough to upset the conscious life of the moral agent.

Secondly, we should note that in addition to the usual Vedanta virtues of equanimity, repression of the senses, etc., this author notices also the altruistic impulses of compassion, sympathy, etc. It may not be hazardous to conclude from this that these are only later additions under Buddhist influence.

We should note also that Maitri corresponds to the Christian virtue of goodwill and Muditá to that of peace with all sentient creatures. Hence Muditá as the harmony of the individual with the rest of creation represents on the objective side the state which is represented on the subjective side by the virtue of equanimity (Shama). Shama is a state of internal equilibrium and self-harmony while Muditá is harmony with creation in general.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have so far considered, in detail, the subject of the Springs of Action as presented in the various systems of Hindu Philosophy. If now we consider all these presentations together, we find that one of the special characteristics of the various psychological analyses of

the passions is the description of their physiological expressions and effects which are always fairly accurate and exact. Another characteristic of the psychological analyses is the idea of psychological composition in the genesis of the complex emotions and passions, the doctrine of the compounding of elementary mental states into complex compounds. A third feature of these analyses is the recognition of the residual, the instinctive, and the subliminal even in our ethical life and its psychological basis. Another characteristic of the various Hindu classifications of the *Springs* is the attempt at a non-empirical explanation of the passions with a criticism of their values based thereon. Thus the passions are judged and appreciated not so much by reference to the standard of the empirical order and its maintenance and progress as by reference to their conduciveness to the life transcendental and absolute. It is in fact this transcendental standpoint that underlies the doctrine of Error as the ultimate cause of the passions which bind the individual to the phenomenal life of *Samsára*. But this transcendentalism and intellectualism, however, is counterbalanced by a corresponding pragmatism in their empirical investigations where cognition is always viewed in its pragmatic aspect as intellection in the service of life and therefore closely connected with the life of will or volition. It is also to be seen that there is an attempt throughout to overcome the dualism of the transcendental and the empirical worlds by the assumption of some kind of transcendental impulse even in the empirical life, a pure aspiration as distinguished from the pathological yearnings of the natural life. This is the significance of the *Sáttvika* emotions, the *Shubha-vásanás* which have transcendental *Sukha* or happiness for their object as distinguished from empirical pleasure. These are the pure impulses which drive out the impure ones and thus bridge

the gulf between the transcendental and empirical worlds.

The psychological ethics of the Hindus is therefore not only theoretical but also disciplinary and practical always keeping in view the practical end of leading spirit beyond the empirical life to that which is non-empirical and transcendental. But the transcendental life which it aims at is not a life of co-operation and freedom in co-operation, but one of absolute freedom and perfect autonomy of the self. It is here that it furnishes the strongest contrast to Buddhist, Vaishnavika and Christian ethics all which recognise self-realisation through the life corporate as the highest ideal of the spirit.

CHAPTER IV.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE VIRTUES.

In chapter III we have considered the Hindu classification and analysis of the Springs of Action, the *pravṛtti-mūlas* or roots of the will regarded both in their psychological and ethical aspects, and in Part I we have considered the Hindu enumeration and classification of the duties, i.e., *dharma* or morality considered objectively as embodied in a code of injunctions and prohibitions. In this chapter we shall consider the Hindu classification of the virtues and their opposite, i.e., the duties considered as subjectively appropriated by the moral agent and thus realised as ethical attributes or determinations of the personal life.

The virtues are considered in detail by Ancient Nyāya writers as well as by Patanjali and his commentators. There is also an interesting Buddhist treatment of the subject which I have appended as a supplement. Incidentally I have also referred to the Jaina treatment.

The Nyāya-treatment of the subject appears both in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the Nyāya-Sūtras as well as in later writings such as the "Nyāya-manjari" of Jayanta Bhatta. For the Pātanjala treatment of the question we have not only the sūtras of Patanjali but also the Vyāsa-bhāṣya thereon. The Buddhist and Jaina treatment are obtained from Buddhist and Jaina writings.

A. Vātsyāyana's Classification of the Virtues.

Vātsyāyana classifies will (*pravṛtti*) into *Pāpātmikā*, wicked, impious, and *Shubhā*, pious, auspicious. The latter leads to *Dharma*, righteousness, while the former produces *Adharma*, unrighteousness.

I. Adharma, unrighteousness takes three forms with reference to the originating condition or source, *viz.*

- (1) Unrighteousness which depends on the Sharira, the body, as its instrumental condition ;
- (2) Unrighteousness which arises from the improper use of speech, Vák or verbal utterance ; and
- (3) Unrighteousness which originates in the mind (Manas) as the instrumental condition.

The forms of unrighteousness that are connected with the activities of the body or Sharira are :—

- (1) Cruelty (Himsá) .
- (2) Theft (Steaya, Chaurya)
- (3) Sexual Indulgence (Pratishiddha Maithuna).

The vices originating in *speech* as the instrumental condition are :—

- (1) Mendacity (Mithyá)
- (2) Causticity, Asperity, Tartness of expression (Parusha, Katukti)
- (3) Scandal, Insinuation (Suchaná)
- (4) Gossip (Asambaddha)

The vices originating in the mind as the instrumental condition are :—

- (1) Hostility, Ill-will towards others, malevolence (Paradroha)
- (2) Covetousness in respect of what belongs to another (Paradravyábhípsa)
- (3) Irreverence, Impiety, Scepticism, Want of faith in the scriptures (Nástikya).

It is to be seen that the enumerations under the last head, *i.e.*, the class of vices depending on mind as the instrumental condition, differ from the lists under the first two heads in being more properly subjective dispositions or modifications of the personal life than active tendencies manifesting themselves in overt acts. In this respect they may be regarded as internal determinations

of the moral personality which are either of the nature of impeded or inactive emotions or general temperamental characters which do not reveal themselves in any one particular act or set or class of acts, but give a specific direction or trend to the volitional life as a whole.

It is also to be observed that the enumerations under the vices connected with speech are a special characteristic of the Hindu treatment of the question, the comparative neglect of which in Greek and Christian Ethics unmistakeably establishes the refinement of the Hindus in this respect who would not excuse even a *harsh word* which does no visible wrong to anybody like cruelty, ill-will and the other vices.

It is however to be noted that the inclusion of theft with cruelty and sexuality under one class, *viz.*, class of vices depending on the body as the instrumental cause, is artificial and forced to a degree. It may be possible however to justify this by pointing out that just as cruelty implies injury to the person and sexuality involves injury to the race so does theft involve injury to the individual not by any harm done to his body or person but by the misappropriation of his property. It is however doubtful whether the commentator Vātsyāyana had all this in his mind while making his classification.

II. Next as to Dharma, Virtue, Righteousness :

It is threefold like *adharma* or unrighteousness, comprising

- (a) The virtues of the body or *Sharira*,
- (b) The virtues of speech, and
- (c) The virtues of the mind

The virtues of the *body* are :—

- (1) Charity, Bounteousness, Munificence (*Dāna*).
- (2) Succouring the Distressed (*Paritrāna*).
- (3) Social Service (*Paricharana*).

The virtues of Speech are :—

- (1) Veracity (Satya).
- (2) The uttering of beneficial speech, *i.e.*, speaking always with a view to the good of mankind (Hitavachana).
- (3) Gentleness and Agreeableness of Speech (Priyavachana).
- (4) The reciting of the scriptures (Svādhyāya, Vedapāthādi).

Lastly, the virtues of the mind are :—

- (1) Kindness, Tenderness or Benevolence (Dayā).
- (2) Unworldliness, Indifference to material advantages (Aspṛhā).
- (3) Reverence, Piety (Shraddhā).

It is to be seen that of the three bodily virtues, Dāna, Munificence is the opposite of the vice of theft which consists in appropriating what belongs to another. Similarly Paritrāna, succour, is the virtue corresponding to the vice of cruelty or himsā. This correspondence however is not obvious in the case of paricharana or social service and pratishiddha-maithuna or sexuality. It may be said however that just as paricharana consists in doing good to society so pratishiddha-maithuna rends the social fabric by loosening the social bonds and weakening the stock.

As regards the Vāchika virtues or virtues of speech it is to be observed that veracity corresponds to mendacity in the corresponding class of vices, Priyavachana to causticity or asperity, Hitavachana to scandal and insinuation, and Svādhyāya to gossip or idle talk.

Lastly there is also similar correspondence as regards the third class between benevolence and malevolence, unworldliness and covetousness, piety and impiety.

Again, it is to be observed that just as in the lists, under the vices, the virtues of the mind are of the nature of, emotions, subjective moods or temperamental traits which need not manifest themselves in specific overt acts rather than active tendencies involving specific activities and modes of conduct. Thus kindness or tenderness is a virtue which may not lead to a specific act, but this can hardly be said of veracity or social service or succour which are nothing at all without the overt acts on which they depend.

It is also to be noted that the virtues relating to speech constitute one of the specific Hindu contributions to the ethical knowledge of the world, the only virtue under this class which has received any special notice by ethical writers being veracity. That veracity is only one of the virtues of speech which may under special circumstances be required to be subordinated to other and higher considerations, was early recognised by the Hindus. (Thus in the Mahábhárata in the Rajadharmánushásanaparva in chapter 109, it is frankly recognised that there are circumstances where truth is falsehood and falsehood is truth and the righteous man in such circumstances prefers the latter. Thus the ruffian who is out for pillage and murder should not be told the truth, and if silence will excite suspicion it is proper even to put him on the wrong scent by telling a lie). It was assumed that the ultimate purpose of speech was the good (hita) of mankind and therefore if a rigid adherence to truth was likely to do more harm than good the evil should be averted by a lie, if necessary. Similarly one should seek to be agreeable as well as truthful, and if the plain blunt truth is likely to wound mortally it is a duty to avoid it or at least take off its edge as far as possible.

Another thing to be noticed here is the virtue of unworldliness or *Asprhá* in the third class. It may be said to be the characteristic Hīndū virtue indicating as it does the Hīndū conception of the highest Spiritual Ideal which is a life of detachment, *i.e.*, of absolute freedom and autonomy of the Self. This negative attitude to the world is however relieved to a great extent by the virtues of charity (*Dána*), succour (*Paritrána*), and service (*Paricharana*), which open the way to a more positive and useful view of life and a more humanitarian morality than that of the stern ascetic.

3. *Patanjali's Classification of the Virtues :*

Patanjali considers the virtues in the *Sádhanapáda* in connection with the question of the conditions to be fulfilled by those preparing for the life of Yoga.

The virtues, according to Patanjali, are the *yamas*, the restraints that purify the mind of the evil passions and thus clear the ground for Yoga. They thus form a subordinate class within the wider *Nyáya* classification of virtues—a class of virtues suitable only for Yoga.

These virtues are :—

Ahimsa—Tenderness, Benevolence, Good-will.

Though negatively described as abstention from *himsá* or injury to living beings, it also implies positive good-will and amity with all creatures. Further it is a virtue which is to be cultivated without any exception as to particular creatures and also without any restrictions as to specific occasions or particular methods : *Sarvathá sarvadá Sarvabhutánám anabhidroha*. Hence it is not allowable to make any exception in regard to *himsá* or cruelty involved in the sacrifices enjoined by

scriptures. These must be abjured just as the other forms of *himsá*.

Thus *Ahimsá*, kindness and good-will, implies some other virtues. It implies self-restraint and sacrifice in so far as some of the acts of cruelty are prompted by greediness or inordinate hankering. It also implies the subjugation of the feelings of aversion or hate which are also the determining conditions of cruelty in a great many cases. Again it implies the overcoming of intellectual indolence which is itself the cause of greediness and aversion and is also an independent cause of specific forms of cruelty such as scriptural sacrifices. Similarly *Ahimsá*, kindness, implies abstention from harsh words (*parushavachana*) as well as from acts of intimidation. In short, it is the highest virtue, the mother of all other virtues, and veracity (*Satya*) and the other virtues are to be practised only to the extent that they do not clash with this highest virtue of Universal Good-Will and Tenderness.

Satya.—Veracity. It is the opposite of mendacity and consists in correspondence in thought and speech with the objective fact or event as ascertained by valid proof. Thus when a thing or event whose nature has been ascertained by perception or inference or reliable testimony is correctly apprehended by the speaker and described faithfully in suitable terms so that there is no misapprehension of his meaning in the hearers, we have veracity or truthfulness. Veracity therefore implies two things: (1) that the object as ascertained by valid proof is to be correctly apprehended by the speaker's mind, *i.e.*, there should be no illusion or error (*bhránti*); and (2) that the speaker should faithfully describe his own idea in his speech, *i.e.*, there should be neither intentional deceit (*vanchaná*) nor indulgence in meaningless words (*pratipatti-vandhya*) from inability to express oneself. (Hence half-truths, evasions, subterfuges are to be treated

as lies, for though they may agree with some real objective state, condition or circumstance, they do not convey what the speaker has in his mind or means to convey). But even such agreement is not the only condition: even the most faithful, unambiguous and precise utterance would fall short of veracity in the true sense if it were not directed towards the good of creatures. Thus even the most truthful speech which hurts or injures creatures is to be reckoned amongst the forms of unrighteousness, not as the virtue of truthfulness. In this sense it is a sin to recount even another's real faults when such recounting will serve no good purpose. (Yathārthe vānmanase yathādr̥ṣtam, [yathānumitam yathāśhrutamī tathā vānmanashcha iti, paratrasvavodha-samkrāntayé vāguktā sā yadi na vanchitā bhrāntā vā pratipatti-bandhyā vā bhavediti, esha sarvabhutopakārártham prabr̥tta na bhutopaghātayā, yadi cha evam api abhidhiyamānā bhutopaghataparaiva syāt na satyam bhavet, pāpameva bhavet.)

Asteya.—Abstention from theft.. It is the opposite of *steaya* or unlawful appropriation of another's property and consists not merely in the abstention from the outward act of theft but also in inward uprightness or freedom from unlawful greed (*aspr̥hārūpaṁ*). *Steyam* *ashāstra-purvakam dravyānām parataḥ svikaranam, tatpratishedhah punaraspr̥hārūpaṁ asteyam iti* (Vyāsa-bhāṣya). Thus there are *pratigrahas*, specific acceptances authorised by *Shāstra*. With the exception of these, every other form of appropriation is unlawful and therefore classed under *steaya*. According to *Vijñānabhikṣhu* however this is only one interpretation of misappropriation or wrongful possession. According to another interpretation however every idea of ownership is rooted in error. Hence all appropriation is misappropriation and *asteya* is freedom from *steaya*, *i.e.*, from the sense of ownership or appropriation altogether. In this sense it is *aspr̥hārūpaḥ*, *i.e.*, of

the nature of *asprhá*, unworldliness, or absolute indifference to the material advantages of life. (*Pratigraha-vyavartanāya ashāstra-purvakem-iti. Athavā svikaranam mameti vuddhimātram bhramasādhāranāmiti tatpratishedhah tannibr̥t̥tiḥ tayāpi asprhamupalakshayitvāha asprhārūpa iti: "Yogavārtika."*)

• *Brahmacharyya*.—Continence which consists in the restraint which one imposes on one's desire for sexual enjoyment. It implies not merely the control of the genitals but also abstention from lewdness in thought, speech and the other organs of sensation and expression, *i.e.*, restraint here means restraint of every organ including the genital in regard to the matter of sexual enjoyment. (*Brahmacharyyam guptendriyasya upasthasya samyamah: "Vyāsa-bhāṣya"*). (*Samyama iti atropasargeṇa anyendriyasāhityamupasthasya grāhyam tenopasthasya vishaye sarvendriyavyāpāroparama iti lakshanam: "Yogavartika."*)

Aparigraha.—Unworldliness, Renunciation, *i.e.*, the attitude of indifference to material prosperity through the perception of its being tainted by cruelty (*himsā*) and the other faults. Thus the earning, hoarding and spending of riches all involve deceit (*asatya*), cruelty (*himsā*) and the other faults. (*Vishayānāmarjanarakshanakṣaṭasangahimsādoshadarshanat asvikaranam parigraha: "Vyāsa-bhāṣya"*). According to *Vijnānabhikṣu* this kind of unworldliness is to be distinguished from the indifference (*asprhá*) arising from the freedom from the illusory consciousness of ownership. This latter is *asteya*, uprightness, according to one interpretation. It differs from the indifference signified by *aparigraha* in being grounded in the sense of ownership as represented in the impulses of *dambha* (pride), *āśakti* (attachment), etc., while *aparigraha* arises from the consciousness of all material prosperity being tainted by the faults of

deceit, cruelty, etc. (Parigrāṇé himsādyā api doshaḥ teshām darśanāditi visheshanam dambhāśhaktyā-dinimittakāsvikaranēativyaptinirāsāyāiti : "Yogavartika.")

These virtues are to be practised without any restrictions as to class, profession, place or occasion. Thus abstention from cruelty is to be practised even by the soldier and the fisherman without reference to his profession or class. Similarly cruelty (such as animal sacrifice) is not allowable even in a pilgrimage or in an auspicious day. Nor is an exception to be made in practising abstention from cruelty in respect of a particular class of living beings as, for example, in respect of fish by the fisherman : Ebhirjātideshākālasamayānavachchhinna ahimsādayaḥ sarvathāiva paripālaniyāḥ sarvabhūmishu sarvavishayeshu, sarvatha eva aviditavyābhichārah sārvaḥśauma mahābratamityuchyate : "Vyāsabhāṣya"). The virtues are to be practised in all *bhūmis* or planes of the mind in regard to all *vishayas* or objects and in every respect without exception.

It is to be seen that a distinction is here made between the common man's morality and Yogika morality. It is assumed that the former consists of a multitude of moral codes which are unorganised and often mutually contradictory. Thus the common man has one code of morality for dealing with human beings and another code for dealing with lower animals, one code for civilised man and another for the uncivilised, one for his own countrymen and another for others ; and even the legal code varies in relation to the particular zone or plane of life which it is to regulate. Thus while human life is held sacred by law there is no similar punishment for the destruction of animal life. Similarly while flogging of adults and other similar acts are denounced as inhuman and brutal by customary morality, there is scarcely any indignation at similar treatment of the horse or the beast

of burden which is only too familiar an occurrence to attract any special notice. The truth is that in these as in many other instances we judge by different moral codes, *i.e.*, we recognise different moral planes to which we apply separate moral standards or norms disregarding the mutual contradiction or incompatibility of these standards. It is this multiplicity and conflict of moral codes that the Yogin seeks to overcome and reconcile by insisting on the highest standard of morality in all planes of life including the lowest.

Another characteristic of Patanjali's classification is the conception of Ahimsá as tenderness or good-will to sentient creatures as the highest of the virtues. This relieves his ethical system of the severity of egoistic rigorism which is a common charge against the Hindu conception of the moral life. Patanjali however recognises also the virtues of Aparigraha, unworldliness, and Asprhárupa-Asteya, *i.e.*, uprightness and freedom from greed as also essential to morality. Patanjali's conception may thus be regarded as an attempt to reconcile the ideal of a rigoristic autonomy of the self and freedom from desire with that of the altruistic seeking of the good of creatures through good-will and love. In this respect it is free alike from the defects of ascetic egoism and impassioned altruism. It is only too true that an immature and exaggerated altruism without any preliminary training in dispassion and self-restraint often degenerates into cynicism, contempt and world-hatred with the failure of the altruistic instincts, or rather it is only in so far as there is a dispassionate pursuit of the good of creatures that there is altruism in the true sense which without this self-control becomes only a disguised and subtle form of egoism that degenerates into unhealthy passions when circumstances prove unfavourable. In so far therefore as Patanjali insists on Ahimsá or good-will being

supplemented by *Asprhá*, unworldliness or dispassion, he touches on an inherent weakness in altruism which is itself to be practised under reservations if it is to produce truly beneficial results.

As regards *Satya* or veracity, it is 'to be seen that Patanjali emphasises two kinds of responsibility on the moral agent. Thus it is necessary to ascertain that the object has been properly cognised, *i.e.*, that there is no misapprehension in consequence of defective perception, misinterpretation or error. Secondly the object as thus apprehended must be faithfully described in speech, *i.e.*, confused utterance as well as intentional deceit must be avoided. It is therefore no excuse for the person practising veracity to plead ignorance, it being the duty of the truthful man to refrain from utterance till he has acquired all the knowledge under the circumstances. And it is also no excuse for him to plead accidental slips or unintentional misrepresentation, it being his duty to be careful, economical and precise in the use of words. Hence the truthful man must cultivate the habit of gravity and seriousness and a capacity for silence. But this is not all: truth which is not beneficial and wholesome is a pseudo-truth or falsehood, and when circumstances are such that a rigid adherence to truth will vitally injure a sentient creature, the bare truth should be avoided even by a lie, if necessary. The idea is that such lies are of the nature of truth, because the True is the Good and the Good is Truth, and the apparent falsehood that contributes to the world's real good is truth, while the truth that mars or frustrates the world's good is a pseudo-truth and an evil to be avoided like falsehood.

C. *Jaina Classification.*

Though Jainism does not come strictly under orthodox Hinduism, yet we may consider here some of the Jaina

classifications, not only for the philosophical interest they possess but also for purposes of comparison and contrast with the strictly Hindu standpoint.

I. Vidyānanda's Classification of the Virtues in the Ashtasahasri:—

The most interesting Jaina classification is that of Vidyānanda in the Ashtasahasri—which is a commentary on Samantabhadra's Kārik.

Righteousness (Punya) and unrighteousness (Pāpa) are characterised by Vidyānanda as depending on subjective intention or abhisandhi and not merely on consequences of happiness or suffering (sukha-dukkhapāla). Thus even non-sentient objects which are incapable of morality can produce consequences of happiness or suffering. Similarly the dispassionate saint who has attained to the supermoral plane of being is also the cause of happy or unhappy consequences to others. Hence morality and immorality do not arise merely from results of happiness or unhappiness but depend on subjective intention or abhisandhi which is absent both in the non-sentient objects and the saint.

What is the nature of this abhisandhi, subjective intention or attitude which determines right and wrong as distinguished from consequences of happiness or suffering? It is pure (Vishuddhyanga) in the case of righteousness (Punya) and impure (Samkleshānga) in the case of unrighteousness (Pāpa).

1. Samklesha, impurity (of intention), is either

(a) Ārta, of a distressing or afflicting nature, which may manifest itself in

(i) the effort to escape from contact with the unpleasant (Āmanojna),

(ii) the effort to attain the pleasant when separated from it,

- (iii) absorption in the experience of pain and suffering (Vedanā),
- (iv) desire for the acquisition of power not yet acquired (Nidāna, Aprāpta-aishvaryyaprápti-samkalpa), or
- (b) *Rāudra*, aggressive, violent, which also may take four forms, viz., the forms of
 - (i) Himsā—Cruelty,
 - (ii) Anṛta—Unruth, Mendacity,
 - (iii) Steya—Theft, Wrongful Possession,
 - (iv) Vishaya-samrakshana—Aggressiveness in the preservation of one's property.
- 2. Vishuddhi, Purity, is likewise either
 - (a) Dharmadhyānasvabhāva, i.e., of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of Dharma or Duty ; or
 - (b) Shukladhyānasvabhāva, i.e., of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of purity or perfection (Shukha).

This, it will be seen, is a new classification of the virtues, based not on the consequences of happiness or unhappiness but on the purity or impurity of the subjective intention or attitude of the moral agent. Hence the principle of classification is not any external consequence or result, but a state of internal determination of the Self or Atman, viz., that which the Atman becomes. This subjective determination takes the form of contemplation of Duty or Perfection in the case of Righteousness (Punya), and that of aggressiveness and absorption in pain in the case of unrighteousness or Pāpa. Thus this subjective self-determination is not the pure willing of the Moral Law, but is the concrete determination of the self in reference to positive content which consists in the ideal of duty or perfection in the case of righteousness or virtue and the states of affliction and aggressiveness in the case of unrighteousness. Hence we have here

a synthesis of externalistic, consequential morality with the internalism of the theory of self-determination. While the consequence by itself does not determine virtue or the opposite, it furnishes the content as it were in relation to which the subject has to determine itself in the direction of righteousness or unrighteousness. Thus *Himsá*, cruelty, regarded merely as a consequence of unhappiness to creatures, is neither righteous nor unrighteous, but when it results from the aggressive nature of the moral agent it is no longer morally neutral but becomes a form of unrighteousness reflecting as it does a specific act of self-determination on the part of the self as a consequence of the specific impurity of aggressiveness in the will. This aggressiveness or affliction again as a specific psychic state cannot be pure, abstract willing but necessarily signifies concrete self-determination in reference to positive content. Thus the state of affliction implies concrete self-determination in relation to the experiences of want, misery and suffering, thus implying consciousness or determination of the self in reference to its condition of passivity, helplessness and weakness, just as the state of aggressiveness implies the determination of the self in respect of its consciousness of strength, power and vigour.

II

ANOTHER JAINA CLASSIFICATION.

Ásrava is that by which karma enters the soul.

Samvara is the *Nirodha*, i.e., the arrest of *Ásrava*, the arrest of the flux of Karmic matter into the soul.

Dharma (Righteousness) is one of the means (*Upáyas*) of *Samvara* or arrest of Karma.

Dharma is *Uttamáh*, *Uttamagunaprakáshayuktah*, is connected with, or manifests, excellences of the highest quality.

The Dharmas, Virtues or Excellences, are :—

- (1) Kshamá, Forgiveness,
- (2) Mádava, Mridutá, Humility,
- (3) Árjava, Rijutá, Sincerity, Straightforwardness,
- (4) Shautha, Cleanliness,
- (5) Satya, Veracity,
- (6) Tapas, Practice of physical hardship and privation
in view of the acquisition of strength of will
for devotion
- (7) Tyága, Renunciation
- (8) Ákinchanýa, Strenuousness,
- (9) Brahmacharyya, Continence.

This, it will be seen, is a mere enumeration of the virtues without any scientific basis of classification. But the Jaina list does not include the other-regarding virtues of Benevolence, Succour and Social Service. This shows that the Jaina virtues aim more at self-culture than at social service. This is particularly evident in respect of the virtue of Forgiveness or Kshamá in the Jaina list, a virtue which we miss in the Hindu enumerations proper and which consists primarily in effecting the moral uplift of the forgiving person at the expense of the forgiven.

D. BUDDHIST CLASSIFICATION.

We shall now conclude by a study of the Buddhist treatment of the virtues. Buddhism, like Jainism, does not come properly under Hinduism, and as we shall see Buddhism furnishes in certain respects a very essential contrast to the Hindu ideal of life. But it is also this contrast with Hindu Ethics that necessitates some consideration of Buddhist ethics here without which the Hindu standpoint cannot be fully understood in its true significance.

The subject of the virtues is considered in the *Mādhya-mikāvṛtti* by Chandrakīrti where the virtues are classified into

I. *Vijnapti-samutthāpikā*, i.e., morality which is overt and expressed •

II. *Avijnaptayah*, or non-manifested moral traits, subjective dispositions without physical expression.

III. *Paribhāganvyamī Karma*—righteousness and unrighteousness arising from institutional or communal responsibility through the righteous and unrighteous acts of the community or the institution. •

IV. *Chittābhisamskāra-manaskarma*, i.e., righteousness and unrighteousness arising from subjective determinations as revealed in the conscious effort of the mind (*manaskarma*).

I. As to the *Vijnaptisamutthāpikā*, i.e., Moral traits that express themselves in overt action. These are *Kushala*, *Viratilakshana*, i.e., beneficial, in the case of righteousness, and *Akushala*, *Aviratilakshana*, i.e., noxious or injurious, in the case of unrighteousness. They comprise

(1) *Vāk*, i.e., the virtues of speech and the corresponding vices. •

(2) *Vispandah*, *Shariratheshta*, i.e., the virtues connected with physical activities and the corresponding vices.

II. As to *Avijnaptayah*, i.e., traits or dispositions that are non-manifest or without physical expression (*paranna vijnāpayantī iti avijnaptayah*—i.e., do not manifest themselves to others). These are internal subjective traits or dispositions without external manifestation, and comprise

(1) *Avijnaptayas*, subjective dispositions, which are *Aviratilakshanah* or *Akushalasvabhāvah*, i.e., of a hurtful or injurious nature, and •

(2) *Avijnaptayas*, dispositions, which are *Kushala-svabhāvah* or *Viratilakshanah*, i.e., of a beneficial nature,

As examples of avijnaptayās under class (i) we have (a) the evil or unrighteousness that goes on accumulating, determining and modifying the character from the moment it is subjectively resolved that "from this day forward I shall earn my living by plundering and by killing sentient beings" even though this resolution may not be immediately put into execution, and again, (δ) the Akushalalakshanasamskāras or unrighteous tendencies and dispositions that go on accumulating to the fisherman from after the moment the fisherman completes the weaving of the net which will be an instrument or means of killing fish.

(Adya prabhṛti mayā prānināṁ hatvā chāuryam kṛtvā jivikā parikalpayitavyā iti upagamalakshanāt pravṛtti tadakārinoapi akushalakarma iti upagamalakshanāt sata-tam avijnaptayah upajāyante kaivartādinām cha jālādi-parikarmakālāt prabhṛti tadakārināmapi yā avijnaptayah upajāyante tā etā aviratilakshanah avijnaptayah.)

The difference between the two examples above lies in the fact that in the first instance there is nothing but the outstanding resolution or subjective choice, there being no overt action, while in the second there is Avijnapti, i.e., a subliminal tendency with cumulative effect after an overt act, viz., the weaving of the net. Hence Avijnaptayah represent the subconscious determinations of the self in continuation of a specific modification of the moral personality, a modification which has been initiated by the first step in a specific line of conduct, a step which may consist either in an outstanding subjective resolution or choice or in the first of a series of overt acts.

Similarly we have also subconscious determinations of a beneficial nature (Kushalasvabhāvah, Viratilakshanah), determinations which may result either from a subjective act of a pious resolution or from the outward objective

performance of the first of a series of meritorious acts. Thus I may decide to abstain from the path of evil and cruelty (adya prabhṛti pránatipátādibhyah prativiramám iti) and from the moment I resolve to do so there is subconscious modification of my personality in the direction of righteousness which goes on accumulating even when there is no conscious endeavour to better and improve myself in the intervening time. Similarly I may perform an overt act of merit and from the moment I do it there is subconscious determination of my self in the direction of virtue which goes on accumulating even in states of unconsciousness or sleep (pramattádi-avaśthá). (Kāya-vāk-vijnāptiparisañāptikálakṣhanātpṛabhṛti tadut-tarakālam pramattádi-avaśthasyāpi yāh kushalopāya-svabhava avijnāptayah upajāyante.)

III. As to *Paribhāgānvayam karma* or morality arising from communal responsibility. This again takes the two forms of—

- (1) Apunya, demerit or unrighteousness, and
- (2) Punya, merit or righteousness.

1) Thus we have *Paribhāgānvayam Apunyam*, unrighteousness accruing to us from the unrighteous acts of the institutions we have established. Take for example the establishment of a religious institution such as the worship of a particular god or goddess. Now such worship may lead to animal sacrifice and this is an evil. The responsibility for this evil lies with the author of the institution, i.e., Apunya or demerit must accrue to him for every such unrighteous act of the institution. (*Paribhāgānvayam apunyam, yatha devakulādi-pratisthāpanam. Tatrasattvāh hanyantó. Taddevakulādi upabhāgāt tatkartṛnāmsantāna-paribhāgānvayam apunyam api jāyate.*)

(2) Similarly we have also *Paribhāgānvayam Punyam* or righteousness accumulating to the author of an institution for the good effects of the institution.

IV. Lastly as to Chittābhisamskāra-Manaskarma. This is the merit (or demerit) arising from Manaskarma, conscious effort or self-determination of the mind in the direction of righteousness (or unrighteousness). Hence it is to be distinguished from subconscious modification of personality (avijnaptayah) as well as from overt acts of merit or demerit (vijñaptayah). Thus it implies conscious determination of the self as distinguished from the subconscious modifications after a conscious act, but this conscious determination is a mental act (manaskarma) without objective or physical manifestation. There are three forms of this self-conscious determination of the Self.

(1) Ātmasamyamakam chetah or viparyyayah—the conscious effort after self-restraint or the opposite,

(2) Parānugrahakam chetah, or viparyyayah, i.e., the conscious effort after benevolence or the opposite,

(3) Maitram chetah or viparyyayah—the conscious effort after amity and peace with all creatures or the opposite.

It is to be seen that the Buddhist analysis of the virtues is suggestive of unique and original norms in ethics. Thus the Buddhists recognise subconscious and unconscious morality and not merely the self-conscious morality of orthodox ethics. Thus ordinarily it is said, if we have pravṛtti, a voluntary act, we have merit or demerit. But the Buddhists with their fine ethical sensibility suggest an entirely new norm in ethics. Even outstanding resolutions, outstanding arrangements, have moral effect because they influence the subconscious or subpersonal strata.

Similarly the Buddhists also speak of institutional morality, and this is a new category which has to be added to modern ethics. By institutional morality the Buddhists mean that given any institution, the founder of the institution is responsible for the good and evil

effects of the institution. This is the conception of communal and posthumous ethical responsibility—a conception which furnishes the strongest contrast to the Hindu ideal of ethical self-autonomy and self-determination as implied in their doctrine of karma.

If now we compare the cardinal Greek virtues with the Hindu lists we find that the virtues of the mind, *viz.*, Detachment (Asprhá), Compassion (Dayá), and Reverence (Shraddhá) are specially Hindu. We may contrast them with the characteristic Greek virtues which are Justice and Friendship, *i.e.*, Justice based on a proper regard for the rights of others and friendship which is a social feeling. It is otherwise with the Hindus. Instead of friendliness which is based on strongly defined individuality and worldliness, they recommend compassion (anukampá) and faith (paralokashraddhá). These two are also the characteristic Christian virtues, but according to the Hindu these are to be cultivated with a view to Asprhá, unworldliness, or detachment, which is the highest virtue, *i.e.*, from a standpoint which is diametrically opposed to the Christian ideal of life.

It is also to be seen that the Hindu virtues are not merely negative consisting in merely abstaining from vice. Thus the lists include not merely Asteya, abstention from theft, Asprhá, unworldliness, etc., but also the positive virtues of charity (Dána), succour (Paritrána) and service (Paricharana), and in Patanjali we have also Ahimsá in a positive sense as universal good-will and tenderness as the highest of the virtues, the root of all other virtues. These virtues also provide for social service besides self-culture but for the Hindu it is self-culture that is highest in rank and social service is only a means to self-culture and self-autonomy to be attained by cultivating Asprhá or unworldliness.

CHAPTER V.

SPECIAL FEATURES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HINDU ETHICS

We shall now consider the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus as a whole with a view to find out what is really significant as well as what is distinctive or characteristic in the Hindu treatment. As regards the Analysis of Volition we may observe that the Hindu treatment has almost a modern note about it. The distinction between volition proper and the organic activities and the analysis of the motive with special reference to the consciousness of good or the absence thereof are in line with the modern treatment of these questions. The distinction however between the cognition of an act as distinguished from the passive cognition of a fact, between prudential (*kāmya*) actions and moral actions proper in their *psychological* aspects, and between the positive and the negative forms of volition, are all specifically Hindu. The analysis of the process of choice with special reference to the consciousness of freedom and with reference to the *order* as distinguished from mere number of the conditions of choice, is also a contribution to the Psychology of volition. The forms of determinism and indeterminism which are discussed in this connection in a purely psychological reference are without parallel in modern ethics and modern psychology both in respect of subtlety and profundity. The analysis of the deterrent and of the suspension of the deterrent with reference to the psychology of temptation and suicide, and particularly of the operation of the deterrent in the negative as well as the positive forms of willing, is also another special feature of the Hindu treatment. The Nyāya

conception of a specific *order* in pains and pleasures as an operative factor in choice is an addition to the Benthamite calculus which will do credit even to a modern psychologist. Of modern significance is also the relativistic conception of willing as dependent on the agent's condition and capacity relatively to the time and the circumstances of the willing.

As regards the Analysis of Conscience, it may be observed in the first place that the category of Dharma or morality is considered from the subjective as well as the objective points of view. And from the subjective standpoint it is considered not merely as a function of the mind (*Sāṃkhya*) but also as a determination of the substantive Self (*Nyāya*) resulting from the purity of the intention. Similarly from the objective standpoint it is considered not merely as external *Shāstrika* prescription (*Bhātta*) but also as *Apurva* which is the essence of duty as an accomplished verity of the Moral Order (*Prābhākara*). It may be observed also that morality is regarded as having only relative and empirical validity in all Hindu systems except the *Mimāṃsaka*, the idea being that the righteousness which accrues to the agent through the accomplishment of the duties being an event in time cannot be a natural or essential accompaniment of the Self in its *true* nature. This holds good even of the *Rāmānujists* who recognise an essential difference between the natural unmediated morality of the empirical life and the morality of the transcendental life which is transfigured by meditation through the act of self-surrender to the Absolute. In this latter stage morality is divested of its subjective character as seeking of the subjective end and becomes the realisation of the Absolute in Self so that self-love becomes transformed into the love of God. The *Purvamimāṃsakas* however, and particularly the *Prābhākara* school of the *Purvamimāṃsakas*, ascribe a

transcendental significance to morality, conceiving the highest end of the spirit as consisting in Niyogasiddhi or realisation of the Moral Imperative. The Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta as well as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems on the contrary ascribe only a relative significance to morality on the ground that it conduces to no lasting fruition and also entails suffering. But while the Sāṅkhya condemns such morality altogether, particularly the morality of scripture as entailing suffering through the impurities of destruction of life, etc., recognising only a higher noetic morality of Sāttvika duties as leading to the discriminative knowledge of Spirit, the Shankara-Vedāntists and some of the Rāmānujists justify even the lower morality as subservient to the higher ethics of the transcendental life. The frank recognition of the evil-element in the himsā of animal slaughter even from the standpoint of ceremonial ethics is another merit of the Hindus, and the attempts to reconcile the authority of the natural reason with that of Śāstrika revelation in this connection are only an indication of their synthetic mind, however scholastic the solutions may appear to be. Of particular significance in this connection is the Prābhākara justification of Śāstrika himsā as 'mere means and the condemnation of it when desired as an end-in-itself. It represents the most remarkable attempt at a purely ethical explanation of duty from the standpoint of moral disinterestedness on the basis of a purely external code. The conception of Apurva as an ontological verity of the Moral Order which is self-established and therefore an end-in-itself constitutes the foundation of the Prābhākara rigorism which is elaborated out of the scriptural code. It is a contribution to the analysis of duty which implies not merely an external code but also a moral verity as a new category which comes into operation through the modalities. The Sāṅkhya rejection of the external

Shāstrika code, the Nyāya and the Rāmānujist attempts at a rational ethical interpretation thereof, and the Shankara-Vedānta differentiation of the two paths in which externalism is merged at last into the higher ethics of the noetic duties, are the various Hindu devices to transcend the purely ceremonial standpoint. They are indicative not only of a frank recognition of the inadequacy of ethical externalism but also of the need of a rational justification thereof from the internalistic standpoint of self-purification. The recognition of a prudential morality of the conditional scriptural duties besides the disinterested morality of the unconditional duties is also an indication of the synthetic mind of the Hindus. Even the Naiyāyika recognises disinterested morality from his utilitarian, consequential standpoint by admitting a non-pathological motive which is neither attraction nor aversion. It works for the highest end through the unconditional duties—the end, *viz.*, of absolute freedom from suffering. This end being negative does not imply pathological feelings such as attraction or aversion. There is thus a non-pathological feeling, *viz.*, the desire for the highest end—a non-utilitarian motive for the end of freedom from suffering which operates through the unconditional duties. Hence there is disinterested morality even for the Naiyāyika who accepts ethical as well as psychological utilitarianism or consequentialism. Contrarywise even the Prābhākaras recognise an interested morality which they reconcile with their ethical purism by divesting it of its strictly moral character. Thus the conditional duties, according to the Prābhākara, are not devoid of authority, but as this authority is of the logical order as distinguished from the moral authority of duty it does not impair the disinterestedness of morality proper. The conditional duties are therefore to be accepted along with the unconditional duties, but while

the latter are to be accomplished as moral duties, the former have to be recognised as expressing the nature of things as the basis of action. This is how the Prābhākara provides interested morality in his scheme of ethical rigorism. The Prābhākara synthesis in this respect is the counterpart of the Nyāya synthesis of moral disinterestedness with psychological and ethical consequentialism. The same synthetic spirit is also to be remarked in the analysis of conscience which is considered not only in its ethical aspects and implications but also always with reference to the positive psychological bases, *viz.*, the conditions of the psychological motive. Noteworthy also in this connection are the comprehensiveness, the subtlety and depth of the analysis which considers moral obligation not only with reference to the moments of subjective impulsion and objective duty, but also with reference to the nature of the operative process which it involves as well as the implication, of subjective freedom and an objective personal source. The Nyāya conception of a purely psychological operation of the Moral Imperative through the desire for consequence is significant in this connection, particularly in view of the Nyāya conception of this Imperative as a Personal command which is law-making. The Bhātta and the Prābhākara conception of a moral motivation distinct from psychological motivation through the desire for the consequence is also a contribution to the Doctrine of Conscience. Particularly important in this connection is the issue which is raised by the Prābhākaras against the Bhāttas as to whether moral causation is to be conceived on the analogy of physical or psychological causation. The Prābhākara contention that this being mere revelation as distinct from compulsion we have here a category distinct from causation as ordinarily understood, is full of suggestion alike for the ethics of moral determination and the

metaphysics of causation. The Prābhākaras rightly point out that causality as an ethical category is to be distinguished from causality as a psychological or physical category. The Bhāttas however do not recognise any essential difference between the two, the moral operation of the imperative according to them being of the same order as psychological or physical causation, the only difference being that it is an impersonal action of the law as distinguished from the action of the desire in the agent. The Bhāttas thus secure the autonomy of moral authority as independent of an end or consequence which however operates causally on the will analogously to natural causation. In so far however as they assume also a logical end of this moral authority which operates as a psychological motive in the agent, they also provide the natural heteronomy of the will in their ethics of moral autonomy and impersonal operation of the Imperative. The Bhātta view thus represents an extremely original reconciliation of the naturalism of psychological willing with the independent authority of moral duty. The Nyāya conception of a subjective and objective moral authority is also a unique synthesis of ethical necessity with ethical freedom based on a purely psychological interpretation of moral motivation. The Naiyāyika contends that the moral end operates psychologically through the agent's desire without impugning either moral freedom or the autonomy and independence of moral authority. The Prābhākaras however analyse moral obligation into a unique feeling of impulsion in the self which is induced by the knowledge-inducing function of the Imperative—a function which is distinct alike from impersonal causal operation or compulsion and psychological motivation through the desire for the consequence. It is through this feeling which is self-evidencing that duty as an ontological moral verity

establishes itself in consciousness and this is moral obligation. The Prābhākaras thus secure the autonomy of the Imperative not merely by recognising in it a new category distinct from the psychological end, but also by distinguishing its function of revelation of the Law from causal or mechanical operation on the will. The analysis of Niyoga in this connection with reference to the two moments of subjective prompting and objective duty, particularly the eleven different interpretations of Niyoga, constitute one of the most valuable contributions to the Doctrine of Conscience. The moral proof of freedom as implicated in the consciousness of duty is not specifically Hindu, but considered as a supplement to the psychological proof of it as implicated in the consciousness of willing it is characterised by a comprehensiveness of point of view which is lacking in the western treatment. The Hindu treatment of an objective implication of a Personal Source of the Moral Law is also very full and comprehensive, the question being threshed out from nearly every point of view. Lastly, the Hindu conception of subjective right as implying not only the agent's intention but also the purity of this intention such as freedom from pride, vanity, etc., is quite in agreement with modern ethics. Similarly the Hindu conception of objective wrong even in the absence of the agent's intention, *i.e.*, of wrong and consequent responsibility on account of the agent's inadvertence which it implies, is perfectly rational and legitimate. The conception of a penalty in the latter case as required for merely social reasons (*i.e.*, for impressing on men's minds the need of carefulness in view of the harm which may otherwise be done) is also a very sane view of moral responsibility.

Characteristic then in the Hindu analysis of conscience are not only the conceptions of morality as a subjective and an objective category, of objective as well as subjective

rightness, of duty as an ontological verity of the moral order, and of conditional and unconditional duties, but also the distinction between the moral prompting and the Imperative or duty which prompts, the conception of a moral operation of the Imperative as distinguished from the operation of desire in the agent, of a moral causation as mere revelation as distinguished from natural causation or compulsion of the will, and lastly of the importance of purification of the motive from all empirical inclination with a view to the disinterested accomplishment of the unconditional duties which is the highest morality. The importance which is thus ascribed to the unconditional duties is a necessary corollary of their conception of the highest end as the non-empirical Transcendental Freedom of the Spirit. The way of experience is not the way to this non-empirical end or goal and this necessitates purification in the sense of freedom from all empirical desire as a negative condition of the realisation of the highest end. At the same time the empirical duties are not discarded altogether but are recognised as having a certain value especially as a preliminary moral discipline to the higher morality of the unconditional and noetic duties. It is the unconditional and noetic duties therefore that are highest in rank as leading direct to the Freedom and Autonomy of the Self which is the highest end, and the ethical and empirical duties have value only as preparatory to the higher duties. The highest ethics, according to the Hindu, is therefore the ethics of knowledge and purification of desire, *i.e.*, the ethics of the negation of empirical life, but the lower ethics of the practical life is also recognised as a preliminary training to the higher discipline of the spirit. We have already seen that this is also a characteristic feature of the Hindu treatment of the Springs of Action and the classification of the Virtues. The passions and impulses are considered in view of this

non-empirical end of the spirit and even the social virtues are recognised only as conducive to self-autonomy and spiritual freedom. The highest virtue is thus unworldliness just as the purest impulse is dispassion, and these are the steps or stepping-stones as it were on which the individual ascends to his non-empirical ideal from the plane of the pathological impulses of his phenomenal life.

The Psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore essentially a scheme of practical ethics which has in view the realisation of the Transcendental Ideal of the Spirit. In so far as this ideal is conceived in the main as the negation of the empirical, phenomenal life it is also a scheme of practical ethics which has the annulment of the practical life for its object. It is, however, a scheme which is not metaphysically deduced or merely assumed as a first principle, but is also expounded on a positive basis of psychological observation and analysis of the conditions of volition and the springs of action. This is a special feature of Hindu Psychological Ethics in which the scheme of the unconditional and noetic duties is conceived not merely in view of the non-empirical transcendental ideal of freedom but also with reference to the positive conditions of their accomplishment through the non-pathological or Sāttvika impulses and emotions. It is these which constitute the links as it were between the empirical life of the individual and the non-empirical goal which he is to reach. Through these pure impulses free from empirical taint the individual is prompted to the accomplishment of the unconditional and noetic duties which by inducing disinterestedness and knowledge effects at last his freedom from the bonds of experience. The highest ethics of the Hindus is therefore this ethics of disinterestedness and contemplation and their psychological ethics is only the explication of this higher ethics with reference to their positive and practical conditions.

The Psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore a synthetic scheme of the practical and positive conditions of the realisation of disinterestedness and the contemplative virtues as preparatory to the non-empirical and intellectual ideal of freedom-in-knowledge—a scheme of ascending stages of realisation through the secular, the scriptural-conditional, and the scriptural-unconditional duties merging at last into the noetic duties proper which are essential to absolute knowledge. It is thus regulative as well as empirical, noetic as well as practical, a synthetic plan of progressive approximation to the non-empirical spiritual end through a graded scheme of duties defined with reference to their positive psychological bases and conditions.

PART III.

THE ETHICO-SPIRITUAL IDEAL OF THE HINDUS (MOKSHA) AND ITS REALISATION (MOKSHASÁDHANA).

We have seen how the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus aims at the inwardisation of merely objective morality by laying down the principles and conditions of self-purification. Self-purification, however, is not the highest spiritual end, but is only a means to the highest end which is Moksha or Freedom of the life absolute and transcendental. We shall therefore consider now the Hindu Doctrine of Moksha or the Freedom of the Spirit and of Mokshasádhana or the means of its realisation. In so far as this freedom has to be regarded in relation to a prior state of bondage, the Doctrine of Bandha or bondage of the phenomenal life has also to be considered in connection with the Doctrine of Transcendental Freedom. We propose to consider these from the standpoint of the different systems of Hindu Philosophy, and for the sake of convenience we propose to treat the ideal and the means of its realisation separately in two sections.

1. THE SPIRITUAL IDEAL OF THE HINDUS : THE DOCTRINE OF MOKSHÁ OR SPIRITUAL FREEDOM.

We have already seen that the highest ideal is conceived in Hindu Philosophy as a state of freedom from the bonds of the empirical life and therefore as a negation of experience which, however, may or may not be conceived as also a reaffirmation or restoration of it from a higher

standpoint. Thus the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya and the Shāṅkara-Vedānta all conceive the highest ideal as the negation of the phenomenal life, while the Rāmānujists contend that this negation is only a step in the reaffirmation and restoration of experience from the absolute standpoint. But while in the Nyāya and Vaisheshika systems this negation is conceived as itself constituting the essence of the transcendental life, according to Sāṅkhya and Vedānta the highest state is conceived also as the realisation of a positive transcendental content such as Blessedness or Knowledge besides being the negation of all that is empirical.

MOKSHA ACCORDING TO THE VAISHESHIKAS.

Thus the highest freedom is described in the Vaisheshika system as the negation of all empirical content in the self. Sridhara in the Nyāyakandalitikā describes Vaisheshika Moksha as the absolute destruction of the nine specific qualities of the Self. (Navánám ātmavisheshagunánám atyantochchedah mokshah.) The nine specific qualities of the Self are :—Intelligence (Buddhi), Pleasure (Sukha), Pain (Duhkha), Desire (Ichchhá), Aversion (Dvesha), Conation (Prayatna), Righteousness (Dharma), Unrighteousness (Adharma) and predisposition due to past experience (Samskāra). All these become extinct, according to the Vaisheshika, in the state of Transcendental Freedom. Hence it is a state of freedom not only from pleasures and pains but also from intelligence or consciousness, a state therefore of unconsciousness or absolute cessation of all experience in the self. It is therefore not even a state of self-knowledge, though according to the Vaisheshikas it is *produced by* self-knowledge and the accomplishment of the unconditional duties. The Vaisheshikas contend that though it is a state of negation

of all experience yet it is a state of felicity, *i.e.*, of the felicity or satisfaction that belongs by nature to the self. This is how the Vaisheshikas meet the objection of the critics who say that Vaisheshika Moksha is indistinguishable from the unconsciousness of material bodies such as that of a pebble or a piece of wood. But the difficulty still remains as to how a state of felicity is to be conceived which is not an experienced felicity, *i.e.*, of which there can be no consciousness whatsoever. The Vaisheshikas argue that there is felicity in the self-centered repose and calm of the self, a felicity which may be realised by means of self-knowledge, self-collectedness, contentment and the highest righteousness. But since they maintain that this state of pure being of the self is also free from intelligence or consciousness, this felicity can only be a felicity of quiescence and sleep, the rest and calm of materiality as their critics point out. Further since happiness is always a felt happiness according to the Vaisheshikas it is a contradiction to suppose that there is natural felicity in the self even in the absence of consciousness.

MOKSHA ACCORDING TO NYĀYA.

The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vaisheshikas in all essentials in this negative conception of Moksha as the freedom of the spirit from the bonds of experience. But they point out that freedom from suffering which is the essence of true spiritual freedom entails also the abjuration of happiness which is inseparable from suffering. The highest state, according to the Naiyāyika, therefore is not freedom from experience for its own sake, but total and absolute freedom from suffering (*Duhkkena ātyantikah viyogah*), and this implies not only renunciation of happiness which is always connected with pain,

but, also the negation of the empirical life. For the Naiyāyika therefore the cessation of the empirical life is only a moment in the realisation of that freedom from pain which is the highest end. The Naiyāyika is also more consistent than the Vaisheshika in the rejection of a transcendental felicity in the self as distinguished from empirical pleasure. The Nyāya contention is that happiness has to be renounced as being inseparable from suffering, and as there is no experience of suffering in the highest state of freedom from pain there is also no experience of any transcendental felicity or satisfaction in the positive sense. It may be called a felicitous state only in the negative sense, i.e., as a state of freedom from the unrest of life and experience. The Naiyāyika points out that though the psychological reality of pleasure as a positive experience cannot be denied, yet pleasure being inseparably connected with pain through the cause (nimitta), the substrata (ādhāra) as well as the experience (upalabdhi) of pleasure, there is no freedom from pain without the renunciation of pleasure along with it. In this connection the Naiyāyika refutes the views of the opponents and critics of Nyāya, particularly the views of those who conceive Moksha as a state of pleasurable experience. Against these the Naiyāyika points out that if a man were to be actuated by calculations of imperishable happiness and the like, he would not be free (mukta) in the true sense. He will be the slave of his desire for the happiness of Moksha, and this desire as a motive-force will be a source of bondage. It is true that aversion to pain as a motive to Moksha will equally bind (Dveshasya bandhana samājnāt), but this is why the freedom of Moksha which is total and absolute freedom from pain is to be sought only in dispassion and not in the pathological feelings of desire or aversion. Thus there is no pathological desire or

attraction for Moksha, as absolute freedom from pain. Attraction (rága) supposes a positive content which is anukula or favourable to the self, but freedom from pain is a negative ideal which is only not unfavourable (āpratikula) and not positively favourable. Similarly aversion also cannot be a motive for absolute freedom from pain. Aversion is itself a form of pain and thus cannot act as a motive for that which consists in the absolute cessation of pain. In short, the highest ideal conceived as the total and absolute cessation of pain is independent of all pathological motives, while the highest ideal conceived as a positive happiness necessarily implies impure motives and thus cannot lead to true freedom. The seeker of true freedom therefore seeks only cessation of pain from a pure feeling of dispassion without any pathological aversion as the motive (Advishan pravartamānah apratikulam dukkhahānam adhigachhati—"Nyāyavártika" of Udyotkara). Believers in the doctrine of imperishable happiness as the highest ideal contend that there is imperishable happiness in the self (Ātmani nityam sukhamasti) and that man's highest end is the realisation of this happiness. According to their view a variety of conditions would not all produce happiness in the absence of eternal, imperishable happiness in the self. In the phenomenal life there is no lasting manifestation of this happiness and the essence of the transcendental life consists in the full manifestation of this happiness. The Naiyāvika however points out that this psychologico-epistemological argument for the existence of imperishable happiness in the self will also equally prove the existence of imperishable suffering as well as imperishable desire and other states of consciousness (dukkhamapi nityam kalpayitavyam, ichchādayashcha—"Nyāyavártika"). Hence the argument consistently carried out will make every conscious state a resurgence of what is below the threshold. It will thus lead to Idealism

and will make the assumption of external objects superfluous. But the Mimāṃsakas who preach this will hardly accept this Idealistic metaphysic. Nor will the logical corollary of eternal suffering in the self be consistent with their doctrine of Mokṣha as the realisation of eternal happiness. In short, the doctrine of eternal, imperishable happiness being below the threshold in the phenomenal life will also imply that every state of consciousness lives an immortal life below the threshold and thus we shall have a most wonderful netherland of mental life in which states, contradictory and mutually incompatible, continue simultaneously in being so that desire continues alongside of aversion and pain endures by the experience of pleasure. Such will also be the state of Mokṣha in which the manifestation of the latent happiness will also involve the manifestation of the latent unhappiness. Further what does this abhivyakti, this manifestation of happiness in the self, mean? (1) If manifestation means cognition or knowledge of the happiness by the self, then the question is whether such manifestation is eternal or non-eternal. If it were eternal then there would be no distinction between the liberated (mukta) and the non-liberated (saṃsāraśtha). Further there would be no diversity in the emotional life, but only one unbroken continuum of happiness. Lastly there would be no possibility of suffering and therefore also no desire for freedom from suffering (duḥkha-jihvāsā) nor any toiling for liberation (Mokṣha-prayāsa) as a consequence. It is hardly to the point to argue that the body is an obstacle to happiness, and therefore there is need of toiling for the realisation of this happiness. The body is only a means of fruition (upabhoga) and therefore cannot be an obstacle. Further with eternal happiness of the liberated we may also imagine an imperishable body as the instrument (nimitta, sādhana) thereof. But if an imperishable body is felt to be an

absurdity so also must be eternal happiness. (2) Secondly, if the manifestation of eternal happiness is non-eternal (anitya), then there must be a reason why there is such occasional manifestation. You must postulate a connection of the soul-substance with its organ of experience, viz., the mind. This connection of soul and mind will have to be assumed as a condition of the manifestation besides the existence of eternal happiness in the self. In liberation these will be the only conditions of the realisation of happiness and no external objects will be required. In the same way, then, there may be sense-experiences (rupādivishayajñāna) without external objects being required. We shall thus have a strange sort of liberation which will not be detachment of the self (Kaivalya) in any case as there will be apprehension of all objects (sarvārthopalabdhi). Believers in the Doctrine of Eternal Happiness also prove their theory by an ethical argument. They point out that there is ishtādhigamārthapravṛtṭih, i.e., pursuit of the satisfaction derived from the good. Since this cannot reach its proper goal except in eternal happiness, therefore such happiness must exist. (Seyam pravṛtṭih nityasukhé arthavati nānyathā). This is a practical, ethical ground in proof of eternal happiness based on a positive basis of conative experience. It is assumed that conation as the pursuit of satisfaction would be senseless if there were no eternal happiness in which it could be fulfilled. The Naiyāyika however points out that it is not necessary to assume this. Conation is both rejection of the evil (anishṭahāna) and selection of the good (hitaprápti). Thus conation may have a negative as well as a positive end, and therefore freedom from pain (dubkhabhāva) may be an object of pursuit quite as well as a positive satisfaction (pravṛtti-dveitadarshanāt). There is no happiness without suffering, but there is freedom from both happiness and suffering. A conation is

thus fulfilled only in the negative ideal of absolute freedom and not in any positive satisfaction which invariably entails suffering. It is sometimes argued on the basis of scriptural authority that liberation must consist in some kind of imperishable happiness. For example, in the *Ānandashruti* the liberated is described as living the life of blessedness and felicity (*Muktah sukhi bhavati iti s hruyatē-Ānandashruti*). Such scriptural texts, it is held, contradict the view that there is no happiness in the state of freedom. The *Naiyāyika* however points out that what is really meant by happiness in such scriptural texts is mere relief from suffering. As a matter of fact the use of the term happiness to indicate mere negative relief is very common among men (*Dukkhābhāveapi sukhashabdah prayogah vahudbā loké*). *E.g.*, we describe the state of freedom from illness as a state of being well.

In this connection the *Naiyāyika* considers also some of the other views of Moksha, for example, the views of Patanjali and some of the Buddhists. Thus according to some Buddhists (and also Patanjali) Moksha is the destruction of the mind or mental continuum (*Chittam vimuchyate ityanyé*). It is argued that the mind is subject to attraction and other impulses. Since these can have no power over the self, the mind as subject to these must originate in a material medium or vehicle other than the self. The *Naiyāyika* however points out that if this were true, Moksha becomes possible after death (*ayané moksha siddhah*). The *Naiyāyika* holds that it is the self which becomes subject to the impulses through the mind which is its organ of experience. What is necessary is therefore the freedom of the self by the purification of its pathological dispositions and cravings. So long as these continue in the self there is no true freedom (which is the extinction of the possibilities of future experiences) even though there may be a temporary separation from

the mind through death. It is therefore a mistake to think that one becomes free from experience merely by being separated from one's mind which is the organ of experience. The mistake of these Buddhists arises from the erroneous conception that the Chitta or mind is not only the organ but also the subject of the experience. The subject is the *Ātman*, or self and the mind is the instrument through which the self becomes the subject of experiences.

Another Buddhist view is that *Moksha* consists in the arrest of the stream of consciousness (*santati anutpāda*). But this is also inadmissible according to the *Naiyāyika* for the simple reason that the stream as a concatenation of causes and effects (*kārya-kāranapravāha*) can never cease. The *Nyāya* contention is that an ideal which by its very nature can never be accomplished or realised actually is not admissible even as an ideal.

Lastly there is the view that *Moksha* consists in the cessation of the possibilities of future experience (*anāgatānutpāda*). The *Naiyāika* points out that the unborn future is of itself nonexistent and therefore nothing remains to be done according to such a view. The *Naiyāyika* means that the past as an accumulated mass of present dispositions with potency to mature in future experiences leaves scope for work to be done; but the future as future is simply nonexistent and the arrest of the future in this sense signifies nothing.

According to *Nyāya* therefore bondage is a condition of the *Ātman* or self, the condition of its being subject to experiences including feelings of attraction, aversion, etc., which lead to unhappiness. It is a condition of the self which comes about through its connection with the mind which is the organ or instrument of experience. The effect of such connection is not merely specific experiences in the self, but also certain tendencies or

dispositions (samskâras) in the self as a consequence of its experiences. The self's true freedom therefore consists not merely in the cessation of its experiences but also in the destruction of these latest tendencies which mature into future experiences through the self's connection with the mind when the suitable occasions arise. The destruction of these tendencies means the destruction of the future possibilities of experience, the negation of the will-to-live and not merely of the actual experiences into which it materialises. What is required therefore is something more than the mere severance of the self's connection with the mind. Such severance may be effected in death, in sleep, etc., but it does not produce real freedom, for the tendencies, the latent dispositions, remain in the self in spite of the severance and because of such dispositions there is fresh connection with the mind after an interval of rest, resulting in fresh experiences. What is required therefore is the destruction of these samskâras or dispositions in the self by self-knowledge and by self-purification through the performance of the unconditional duties. When the self thus masters its Tr̥shná or thirst for life by the destruction of even the subtle tendencies and dispositions, there is not only a cessation of all actual but also of all possible experience. Thereby the self becomes free from the miseries by being free from all experience and lives the life of calm and peaceful rest in itself. This may be a negative, pessimistic ideal, but it is the only one worth seeking since happiness is impossible without suffering. It is however not Buddhist Nirvâna which is annihilation of self instead of being the realisation of its freedom. Nor is it Shankara's Moksha which is self-annihilation in the Absolute instead of being true self-realisation. It is indeed the negation of all empirical content in the self, but this is because such content does not belong to the self's true nature.

THE SÁNKHYA DOCTRINE OF MOKSHA:

There are many points of similarity between Sāṅkhya and Nyāya in respect of this negative conception of Moksha as freedom from experience. In the first place, Sāṅkhya agrees with Nyāya in respect of its pessimistic conception of the highest end as total and absolute freedom from all kinds of suffering. It also agrees with the Nyāya view that the realisation of this end is possible only by freedom from all experience. Lastly it maintains that the self's freedom is not self-annihilation in Brahma, but the realisation of its distinctive reality as independent and autonomous. But while according to Nyāya this self-autonomy means the realisation of the self's essence as spiritual substance in which not even consciousness remains, according to Sāṅkhya the self is consciousness itself, not a substance, far less an unconscious spiritual substance. It is this Purusha as light of consciousness that shines forth in experience, and true freedom is the realisation of Purusha's essence as pure light or illumination. It is through Purusha's illumination that the non-manifest, formless Prakṛti becomes manifest as a world of forms, and it is in Purusha's experience that the world is fulfilled as a world of experience. Purusha is thus the bhoktá, the experiencer for which the world of experience comes into being. But Purusha is not experiencer in the Nyāya sense of being the material cause of experience, the soul substance to which experience appertains as a qualitative determination. Purusha is experiencer only in the sense of being the final cause, the end which is being realised by the world of experience. It is for Purusha's experience that a world comes into being, and it is also in Purusha's fruition that the world is fulfilled. Purusha accomplishes nothing for its own sake. It is inactive,

indifferent, self-accomplished Light from eternity. All activity belongs to Prakṛti which is the material and efficient cause of experience. Prakṛti functions towards Puruṣa's fruition, and the activities of Prakṛti result in Puruṣa's experience. How can the fruition go to Puruṣa if Puruṣa is not an active agent? This is not impossible the Sāṅkhya replies. The fulfilled subject is not necessarily also the fulfilling agent. Experience abounds in instances to the contrary (Akarturapi phalopabhogah anādyavat). Take the case of the preparation of the meal. The meal is prepared by the cook, but it is the king who enjoys it (annādi upabhogah rājno bhavati). Take another case. The battle is fought by the soldiers, but the glory or the defeat goes to the king. So is it with Puruṣa. It is the Understanding (Buddhi) that actively functions in experience, but it is Puruṣa that enjoys the results thereof. The Understanding is a form of Prakṛti, and Puruṣa enjoys in the functions of its Understanding through a beginningless relation of ownership with it. It is a unique relation, this relationship of ownership (svatvasvāmitvasambandha) which is to be distinguished from the relation of agent and instrument or of substance and attribute. It is the relation through which each Puruṣa is related to its Understanding or Buddhi which is an evolutes of Prakṛti. It accounts for the individual character of experience, the one-to-one ordering which gives uniqueness to my world as distinguished from yours. Through this relation Puruṣa attains fruition in the transformations of its Understanding. Pleasures and pains are functions of the Understanding, the transformations of the Buddhi which is their material vehicle or basis. Puruṣa is fulfilled through the transformations of its Buddhi which are reflected into it through the relation of ownership. The Naiyāyika believes in a real determination of the Self in experience.

But how can there be real determination when the Self in its true essence is said to be free from experience? There can therefore be experience only in the form of reflection or appearance in the Self. There cannot be real modification of the Self as a consequence. All modifications, all transformations belong to the Understanding, and Purusha's fruition is only "transcendental shine," mere *pratibimba*, reflection or appearance. It is in the reflection of the pleasures and pains of *Buddhi* in Purusha, the reflection of the determinations of the Understanding in the Original Light of all experience, that Purusha is fulfilled. This is Purusha's bondage, this accomplishment of the accomplished Light of consciousness through the reflection into it of the empirical objects, which it itself causes to appear. It is therefore *oupadhika*, phenomenal bondage, not real enrichment of Purusha. It is the cause of Purusha's suffering however, this experience of Purusha which is mere appearance. Realisation of true freedom means the cancellation of this appearance by the realisation of Purusha's detached essence through discriminative knowledge. It is because bondage is mere appearance that freedom is attainable. If bondage were natural (*svávāvika*), freedom would not be possible except by self-destruction. If Bondage were caused (*naimittika*), then the only possible causes being space (*deha*), time (*kāla*) and organisation (*avasthā*) the first two which are ubiquitous (*bibhu*) will not explain *bandha-vishesha*, the specific, individual character of the bondage or experience in every case, while the last being a characteristic of the physical body (*dehadharma*) will not account for Purusha's bondage. Bondage is therefore of the nature of *Bhrama* or illusion whose origin is to be sought in some adventitious factor or *Upādhi*. In this case the *Upadhi* is the attachment of Purusha to *Prakṛti*, i.e., Purusha's unique relation to *Prakṛti* through its specific Understanding in

each case, an Understanding which is an évolute of Prakṛti. It is this unique relation of every single Puruṣa to a specific understanding in Prakṛti, this *svāsvabuddhibhāvāpannaprakṛti-sāmyoga* which is without beginning in time, that constitutes empirical life or *janma*. It entails bondage through the experience it reflects in Puruṣa. It thus leads to *Aviveka*, non-discrimination or attachment of Puruṣa to Prakṛti. This *Aviveka*, non-discrimination, can be removed only by removing its cause which is Puruṣa's relation to Prakṛti through the understanding. This relation is beginningless, but not endless and can be terminated by *vivekakhyāti* or discriminative knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. With the realisation of Puruṣa's essential difference from Prakṛti the latter falls off from Puruṣa. The Understanding dissolves into the formless Prakṛti in this state and there is no experience as a consequence.

Freedom therefore is attained, according to Sāṅkhya, by the realisation of difference, *i e.*, the essential distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. It is therefore an intuition of difference as distinguished from the intuition of identity. It is intuition of identity that leads to *Moksha* according to Shankara, an intuition which involves the cancellation of difference as a moment. According to Sāṅkhya however what is required for *Moksha* is the accentuation of difference and not its cancellation, the accentuation, in other words, of the essential distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Through this differentiation Puruṣa recovers its singleness, *kaivalya* or detached essence. Hence *Moksha* is not the merging of the individual Self in Brahma but the realisation of true individuality in its detached essence. It is true freedom of the Self as brought about by the intuition of Self as distinct from not-Self, and not the freedom of self-annulment in Brahma through the intuition of the Absolute as the negation of all difference.

THE PURVAMĪMĀNSA DOCTRINE OF MOKṢHA.

The Purvamīmāṃsa Doctrine of Mokṣha furnishes a contrast to this negative conception of Mokṣha of Sāṅkhya and Nyāya. According to the Purvamīmāṃsā view the Self which is different in each body and ubiquitous, is both spiritual (*chidachit-rupahapi pratishariram bhinnah bibhushcha*—“*Advaitabrahmasiddhi*”). In respect of its spiritual part it is the seer, the witnessing subject of experience and is the object of the recognition: “I am he.” In respect of its non-spiritual part, it is subject to transformation in the forms of cognitions, pleasures, pains, etc.,. This Self is revealed only in self-consciousness. ² [*Tatrāpi chidamshena drashtṛtvam soham iti pratyabhijnā-vishayatvam cha Achidamshena jñānasukhādirupena parināmitvam. Sah (ātmā) ahampratyayeneiva vedyah.*]

In the Purvamīmāṃsa view therefore, pleasures, pains, etc., are not transformations of the mind (*manas*) or internal organ (*antahkarana*) as in the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta view, but are transformations of the non-spiritual part of the Self. The Purvamīmāṃsā also differs from the Nyāya. According to the latter the Self is a spiritual substance without any non-spiritual part, and pleasures and pains are specific qualities (*visheshagunas*) of the Self as a spiritual substance. According to Purvamīmāṃsā however the Self has both a spiritual and a non-spiritual part, and pleasures and other states are transformations (not qualities) of the non-spiritual part of the Self. The Self as experiencer (*bhoktā*) is thus subject to transformation, and this transformation of the Self through its non-spiritual part is beginningless (*anādi*) and eternal (*nitya*) in this sense. But the place of the fruition (*bhogasthāna*) such as heaven, etc., as well as the duration of the fruition (*bhogakāla*), are non-eternal (*anitya*). Neither creation nor reabsorption are accepted in the

Purvamimāṃsa system, Experience being explained as the beginningless transformation of the nonspiritual part of the Self leading to fruition. (Creation and reabsorption are accepted in the Nyāya-vaisheshika, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems, but not accepted in the Purvamimāṃsā, the Jaina and the Bauddha systems according to which there is no Isvara or Lord of the world as creator and destroyer.)

Hence as the world (jagat) is eternal, the bonds of experience are also without beginning in time (anādi). The Self's freedom (Moksha) is thus not a nibṛtti or cessation from activity, but the realisation of eternal happiness (nityasukhābhivyakti) with prabṛtti or active participation in the duties. Since in the freedom of absolute cessation from activity there is no activity of the indriyas or sensibilities, there is also no possibility of knowledge which presupposes sense-activity. Hence the self-realisation (Atmaprápti) which is ascribed to this state is only lapse into the unconsciousness of pure materiality. It thus cannot be an end worthy of being aimed at—this negation of the Self's spirituality into blind, unconscious materiality, and therefore the better course is the course of active participation which leads to eternal happiness and not mere cessation which leads to self-negation. (Ātyantika karmochenedarupamuktau indriyādirahitasya jñānāsambhavāt jarhatvena tādṛśhātmaprāptih apurushārthatvāt prabṛttireva shreyasi na nibṛttih.)

The above is a statement of the Purvamimāṃsā position in general with regard to the question of Moksha. It may be noted however that this general view is more in agreement with that of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Purvamimāṃsakas than with the Prābhākara rigorism and ethical purism. The view of Kumārila Bhatta is explained in the Shāstradīpikā by Pārthasārathimishra. Pārthasārathimishra explains Kumārila's moksha as Prapanchasam-

bandhavilaya, i.e., as dissolution of the individual's connection with an empirical world. It thus differs from Shankara's Moksha which in its negative aspect involves not the mere cancellation of our connection with the world but the cancellation of the world itself, not Prapan-chasambandhavilaya merely, but Prapanchavilaya. Prápancha, the world of experience, is illusory stuff according to Shankara, such stuff as our dreams are made of. With the intuition of the Absolute the principle of illusion being cancelled the world which is its construction becomes cancelled of itself (Avidyā nirmito hi prapanchah ; svapna-prapanchavat, prabodhena brahmavidyayā avidyāyām vilināyām svayameva vilīyaté.) There is thus a pseudo-reality attaching to the world according to Shankara which thus necessarily dissolves in the light of the intuition of Absolute Reality. According to Kumārila however this world does not dissolve, but only the bonds that attach the individual to a world thereby causing experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. There are Idealists like Sankara who ascribe only a pseudo-reality to the world. There are other Idealists who go further maintaining consciousness to be the only reality. Both these are wrong according to Kumārila. The world is not unreal, nor a mere dream-reality which can be cancelled by knowledge. It is a real world that binds us and the Moksha which man can aspire to attain is only the freedom of detachment from the world. Some of the Vedāntists and Buddhists describe Moksha as the being of pure consciousness which is realised through the negation of difference—a negation effected by means of the destruction of the residual tendencies of the continuum of conscious states (jñānasantānasya vāsanochchedāt vaichitryam hityā kevalam samvitmātrēna avasthānam iti kechit). Some of the Mādhyamikas and Yogācharas go farther and describe Moksha as the cessation

of the stream of consciousness like the extinguishing of the light of the lamp (*dīpasantānasya iva jñānasantānasya uparama*). The Shankāra-Vedantists again describe it as the realisation of the essence of Brahma as Consciousness and Bliss by the cancellation of the dreamworld we call empirical life. All these in Kumarila's view are open to the common objection that they suppose that the world is unreal and can be sublated like an illusion. But this is an untenable assumption. We cannot cancel the world; we can only cancel the phenomenal bonds that bind us to a world. Our attachment to the world is threefold being due to our connection with (1) a body as the abode of experiences, (2) sensibilities as the instruments of experiences and (3) objects (sounds and the like) as the objects that are experienced. (*Tredhā hi prapāñchah purusham vadhnāti*—(1) *bhogāyatanam shariram*, (2) *bhogasūdhanani indriyāni* and (3) *bhogyah shabdādayovishayāh*). Through this threefold connection the individual is a subject of experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. The freedom of the individual means the absolute destruction of this threefold connection with the world (*Tadasya trividhasya vandhasya ātyantikah vilayah mokshah*). Bondage is the individual's connection with the world in the threefold form—a connection which is the cause of empirical pleasure, pain, etc. Freedom is the cessation of this connection and thereby the cessation of pleasures, pains, etc. Whether the cessation of the latter implies the absolute negation of experience is a point in respect of which interpreters are not agreed. In fact there are two interpretations of Kumarila's position as regards this question.

(1) According to one view, in the state of Moksha merit (*dharma*) is completely exhausted and there is no fresh acquisition of merit and thus there is also no happiness as the effect of religious merit. Since such happiness has a beginning in time it must also perish in the course

of time. - But there is another kind of happiness which is not an effect in time. This is the natural happiness of the Self (svābhāvika ātmānanda) which remains over-powered (abhibhuta) in the empirical life but will come to manifestation in the state of metempirical freedom. This natural happiness of the Self is experienced through the organ of the mind alone without the aid of the external senses. In the state of transcendental freedom the mind persists through all the external senses (vāhyendriyas) cease. Consequently consciousness or intelligence also persists in this state.

(2) Others among the Bhaṭṭas hold that there is no experience of happiness because there is no organ of the mind in the Moksha state; neither is there any intelligence (jñāna), but there is only Shakti, capacity for intelligence, which is natural to the Self. This is Pārthasārathimishra's interpretation of Kumārila's Moksha.

N.B.—(1) According to Pārthasārathimishra therefore the Moksha of Kumārila and of the Nyāya-Vaisheshikas are the same. But they differ in one essential point. According to Kumārila either course is optional, *i.e.*, the pursuit of happiness in heaven through the path of the conditional duties or the pursuit of Moksha through the path of unconditional duties. According to the Nyāya-vaisheshikas however pursuit of happiness in heaven is to be abjured as necessarily involving pain along with happiness.

N.B.—(2) The view of the Prābhākaras, it may be noted, does not correspond to the Bhāṭṭa conception of Moksha either as realisation of happiness or as freedom from experience. The Prābhākaras define Moksha as Niyogasiddhi or realisation of the Moral Imperative as duty. For the Prābhākaras therefore Moksha is the accomplishment of duty for duty's sake, *i.e.*, the discharge of the unconditional duties as moral

verities having authority in themselves without reference to extraneous ends. It is therefore a state of unceasing moral activity which does not look forward to any ulterior end beyond itself. Some commentators however interpret Prábhákara Moksha as the realisation of freedom from suffering (*cf.* Shálikanátha).

N.B.—(3) The Jainas do not accept the negative conception of Moksha as the cessation of experience. Mallishena's criticism of the Nyáya view in the "Syádvádamanjari" deserves notice. Mallishena observes that (a) if in the Moksha state the Atman were to be reduced to a condition in which it is indistinguishable from material objects such as pebbles, etc., what is the use of striving after such a state? Better far is this phenomenal life (*samsáravasthá*) in which happiness comes to us at least at intervals tainted by suffering though it be. A state of absolute indifference in which there is neither pleasure nor pain, a dead level of emotional uniformity, is the negation of spiritual life. (b) The pure happiness which results from self-restraint and from indifference to things that are temporal is not only worthy of a spiritual being but also capable of being realised even in this life as is proved by the testimony of experienced men. It is an exquisite happiness, this satisfaction (*nibrttaja sukha*) which results from self-restraint, a pure pleasure as distinguished from ordinary pleasures which are mixed with suffering. It is known to those who practise self-restraint and it has to be accepted on the testimony of such spiritual experts or judges. (c) Even those who refrain from drinking the honey knowing that it is mixed with poison, do so only in the expectation of a better pleasure or satisfaction. (d) If pleasure be a good and pain be an evil in this life, they must be so in every other life. Contrarywise the absence of pleasure is an evil and

the absence of pain a good in all conditions. If the Moksha state were to consist in the absence of pleasure or happiness, it would be an evil and an undesirable consummation instead of being a desirable condition of the Self. (e) The contention that the prompting of pathological pleasure would be inconsistent with the self's autonomy and freedom in the Moksha state is based on a misconception. While the attraction of earthly objects is heteronomous, there is a higher pleasure which is not inconsistent with the Self's autonomy. It is based on a pure desire (*spṛhā-mātra*) which does not bind for the simple reason that it does not point beyond itself to anything that is external. It makes its appearance when one has ascended the penultimate stage and at last disappears in the ultimate perfection of the Moksha state. There is therefore at least one desire which is pure and not pathological—it is the desire which seeks the perfection of the Moksha state, and is not directed to anything external. Because it seeks nothing that is external, it cannot bind the individual, and it ceases of itself when the object, *viz.*, perfection of the individual in the Moksha state, has been attained or realised.

SHANKARA'S VIEW OF MOKSHA.

The conception of Moksha as a positive satisfaction is also a special feature of the Shankara-Vedānta system. The Shankarites also distinguish between relative and empirical pleasures and a higher pleasure or satisfaction which is absolute. But the essential feature of the Shankarite view is the conception of this higher satisfaction as something which eternally is and does not come into being through the instrumentality of Self-restraint and the like. The Shankarites contend that it is this eternally accomplished felicity that manifests itself in

empirical pleasure, and the realisation of this felicity is thus the accomplishment of the accomplished, the lifting of the veil that conceals this realised essence from view. The position of the Shankarites is very clearly explained in the "Vedānta-paribhāṣha" in the last chapter. The author first defines an end, *prayojana* or *purushārtha*. According to his definition, whatever being known is desired as a function or qualification of the Self is an end (*yat avagatam sat svavṛttitayā iṣyate tat prayojanam*). Ends are of two kinds : (1) direct and proximate (*Mukhya*), and (2) indirect or remote (*Gouna*). The direct ends are either happiness or absence of suffering, while indirect ends are those which are conducive to the direct ends. (*Tatra sukhaduhkhabhāvau mukhyé prayojané, tadanyatarasā-dhanam gounam prayojanam*).

Happiness again is of two kinds : (1) empirical happiness which is limited and relative and which arises from connection with external objects, and (2) transcendental happiness which is the Unexcelled Bliss that constitutes the essence of the Absolute. Empirical happiness is a partial manifestation of the latter through the mould of a mental function or psychosis. Transcendental Happiness is the essence of *Brahma*, the realisation of which ends the miseries of life by cancelling the illusion which is their cause. *Moksha* is the realisation of this highest satisfaction and it implies in its negative aspect the cessation of all suffering. (*Sukham cha dvividham, sātishayam niratishayam cha. Tatra sātishayam sukham viśhayānushangajanitāntahkaranavṛttitārātamyakṛtā-nandaleshābirbhāvavisheshah. Niratishayam sukham cha Brahma eva. Anandātmaka-Brahmāvāptishcha mokshah, shokanibṛttishcha*).

With reference to the objection that since this Transcendental Satisfaction as being the essence of the Absolute is an eternally accomplished fact and therefore

cannot be accomplished over again by human effort, the Vedāntaparibhāṣā points out that this is not impossible. As a matter of fact fruition (śiddhi) may be either of two kinds: (1) fruition consisting in the realisation of the unrealised (aprāptaprāpti) and the rejection of the unrejected (aparihṛtaparihāra), and (2) fruition consisting in the realisation of the realised (prāptaprāpti) and the rejection of the rejected (parihṛtaparihāra). In the latter case there is only either a re-realisation or a simple cancellation of an illusion. Consider for example the case of the person who in an excited state misses the necklace which is on his own neck. What is his feeling when he learns the truth? There is only a sense of re-realisation, of realisation of the realised, or possession of that which was never lost possession of. Consider again the case of the man who mistakes a garland of flowers for a snake. What is his feeling when he recovers from the illusion? There is only a sense of re-rejection, of rejection of the already rejected, of cancellation of the cancelled, of negation of what is not. So is it also in the case of Moksha which consists in the realisation of the Absolute. The Absolute is self-accomplished from all eternity, and the desire to realise the absolute is prompted only by a temporary illusion that it is unrealised. So too is it with regard to the cancellation of the empirical world. The world as mere illusory stuff is cancelled of itself, and the cancellation of it in Moksha is the cancellation of the cancelled, the rejection of what is rejected already. (Tathā Brahmarūpasya Mokshasya asiddhatva-bhramena tatsādhanā prabhṛtti, evam parihṛtasya api anarthasya nibṛtṭih mokshah.)

According to Shankara therefore Moksha requires not merely the Self's detachment from the world but the cancellation of the world itself. This distinguishes Shankara's Moksha from the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya as well as

the Mimāṃsaka conception. Further according to Shankara, the freedom of the Moksha state is not the realisation of the Self as a distinctive reality, but the realisation of it as nondistinct or identical with the Absolute. Here also Shankara differs from the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-vaisheshika philosophers. Lastly, the realisation of our identity with the Absolute implies, according to Shankara, not merely the realisation of our essence as accomplished consciousness or intelligence as the Sāṅkhya supposes, but also the realisation of the Ananda or Bliss which constitutes the essence of an accomplished reality. The Moksha state is thus one in which the individual becomes merged in the Absolute essence as accomplished Consciousness and Bliss—a state therefore of essential felicity as distinguished from the mere absence of suffering and misery as the Sāṅkhya supposes.

RAMANUJA'S VIEW OF MOKSHA.

The Ramanujists agree with Shankara in this positive conception of Moksha as a state of felicity and blessedness as distinguished from a state of indifference. But they differ from him in two respects. In the first place, they reject Shankara's conception of Moksha as self-annihilation in the Absolute in the sense of merging of the individuality of the individual. Secondly they differ from Shankara as regards his conception of the Self as Impersonal Consciousness and Bliss holding as against him that the Self is not intelligence itself but only an intelligent substance, a substance with intelligence as one of its many auspicious qualities. Intelligence is however not an adventitious quality of the Self which it may be with or without as the Nyāya thinks, but an essential quality (though a quality only) and therefore inseparable from the Self and necessary to it. The state of Moksha

is the realisation of the Absolute in the sense of a restoration of our harmony with it as factors occupying subordinate places in its life along with other factors of coordinate rank and subordinate to the whole. It is therefore not a state of self-annulment in the Absolute but only of self-surrender and renunciation with a view to the realisation of our true individuality as factors in the Absolute life.

The Self, Rámánuja points out, is the thinking subject, the "I" that thinks, and not pure consciousness or thought as Shankara holds. Shankara thinks the Self is nothing but pure, impersonal essence of Consciousness, the thinking subject (jñátá) and the object thought (jñeya) being illusory superimpositions on pure, Impersonal Consciousness which is the Self's true nature as identical with Brahma. Rámanuja contends that this is an inversion of the true facts. The thinking subject is not an attribute of the Self as pure consciousness, an illusory superimposition on its essence. It is the "I" or thinking subject that constitutes the Self and consciousness is only an attribute of it. We cannot suppose the Self to exist in its own nature even if the "I" or "thinking subject." It is therefore a mistake to suppose that the self should cease to be the thinking subject disappears in the Moksha state. If that were so the realisation of the ideal life would mean the extinction of the Self itself. (Yattu mokshadasháyámahamartho nánuvarttaté itih tadapeshalam. Tathá satyátmanásha evápavargah prakárántarena partijnátah syát. Na cháhámartho dharmamátram, yena tadvigameapyavidyánibhrttáviva svarupamavatishtathé; pratyuta svarupamevámahartha átmanah, jñánastu tasya dharmah.—"Shribhashya.")

Rámánuja thus distinguishes between the essence (svarupa) of the individual Self and its intelligence (jñána) which he regards as its attribute (dharma). Both

are eternal (nitya), immaterial (ajarha) and of the nature of felicity or bliss (ánanda-rupa). But while the essence (svarupa) is subject (dharmi), monadic (anu) and self-manifesting (svasmei svayamprakáshah) in the sense of being manifest to itself by itself, intelligence (jnána) is an attribute (dharma), which is ubiquitous (vibhu) though under limiting conditions, capable of expansion and contraction (samkocahavikáśhayogya), is non manifest to itself (svasmei sváprakásha), and is the manifesting agency of things other than itself (svavyatiriktaorakushaka).

The Self therefore is the "I" known as the subject of knowledge and it is this Self which reveals itself in the state of Moksha. Since it is manifest to itself by itself it is essentially an "I" or a thinking subject, and it is as this self-revealing "I" or subject that it manifests itself in the Moksha state. It is an unwarranted dogmatism to suppose that because the Self reveals itself as an "I" therefore it must be implicated in error or ignorance. The Self in its true essence is an "I" and therefore there can be neither error nor ignorance in the apprehension of it in its essential nature as an "I." (Atahamarthasyeiva jnátrtayá sidhyatah pratyagátmatvam. Sa cha pratyagátma muktávapi aham ityeva prakáshaté, sa sarvva "aham" ityeva prakashaté. Na cha "aham" iti prakáshamánatvena tasyá jnatvasmsáritvádiprasangah... Ajnánam náma svarupá jnánam anyathajnánam viparitjnánam vá. Aham ityevátmanah svarupam iti svarupajná narupo aham-pratyayo ná jnatvam ápádayati kutah samsaritam?—"Shribhashya".)

Hence for Ramanuja there is no such thing as the merging of individuality in Brahma in the Moksha state. Such merging is not merely the negation of individuality but also the negation of the Self itself. Moksha is merely the restoration of our harmony with the Absolute, the abnegation of individual self-will in order that His Will

may prevail and realise itself through our lives. We are not isolated beings but factors in the life of the Absolute having distinctive reality of our own, and our highest destiny is to realise ourselves by realising God's purpose in our lives. This is the essence of true freedom as distinguished from the false freedom of the assertion of individual self-will which leads only to discord and misery. The highest end is the life in harmony with the Absolute, the life of self-surrender to the purpose of the Lord in creation. It is a life of essential felicity and blessedness, a life in which the individual persists as a self-revealing thinking subject within the life of the Absolute and realises the Ananda or satisfaction which is natural to consciousness as revealing the true nature of things. Consciousness is by its very nature of the essence of felicity or Ananda. Its function is to reveal objects to the thinking subject, and in so far as such enlightenment of the Self through consciousness or knowledge is favourable (anukula) to the Self, there is *ánanda* or bliss. The *ánukulya* or favourableness is natural (*svábhávika*) since all objects have their being in the Lord. The *prátikulya* or unfavourableness is adventitious (*oupadhika*) being due to the illusory identification of the Self and the body (*dehátmabhrama*). Consider, for example, the instruments of destruction such as weapons, poisons, etc. What does their unfavourableness consist in? They are unfavourable only to the body, and yet since the self is illusorily identified with the body, they are also supposed to be unfavourable to the Self. In the Moksha state there is no such illusion and there is only the felicity or bliss that is natural to enlightenment by thought. If favourableness were not natural to objects, the same things would not present themselves as favourable after having presented themselves as unfavourable in another place and time. (*Ānandarūpatvam náma jñánasya prakāśhāvastháyám anukulatāyam*)

viṣṇuśāstrādīprakāśhanīvasare pratikulātvasya hetur-
 dehātmabhramādayah. Isvarātmakatvāt sarvveshām
 padārthānām anukulyameva svabhāvah, prātikulyam
 aupadhikam. Anyadānukulyam svābhāvikam chet,
 kasyachit kutrachit kāladeshādayah anukulāni chandan-
 akusumādini, deshāntarē kālāntarē tasyaiva taddesha eva
 tatkāla eva pratikulāni nasyuh—Lokāchāryya's Tattva-
 trayā)."

According to the Rāmānujists therefore the Self is not pure essence of consciousness but a thinking subject with consciousness as its essential attribute. Secondly, it is not absolutely identical with the Absolute life having a distinctive reality. Thirdly, Moksha is neither the realisation of the Self as an isolated being nor the merging of the Self in Brahma but the realisation of its true essence as a distinct but subordinate factor in the Absolute life. It is thus a restoration of harmony by the renunciation of self-will in favour of the will of the Lord. Lastly, this Moksha is essentially a state of felicity which follows as a consequence of the enlightenment of consciousness without any taint of error or illusion. The nature of such enlightenment is felicity since it reveals objects in their true nature as having their being in God and therefore as favourable to or conducive to the good of the Self.

N.B.—There are a few other schools of the Vedānta such as the Suddhādvaita school of Ballabhāchāryya and the dualistic school of the Mādhvas whose views of Moksha may also be considered here. According to Ballabha there are two kinds of Moksha suited to two kinds of temperament. Thus for the philosopher who chooses the path of knowledge Moksha is self-dissolution in Brahma, but for the pious devotee who prefers the path of faith and devotion Moksha is a tasting of the Lord's sportive activity in creation (yetu jñānaikah sannishthah teshām cha laya eva hi, bhaktānam eva bhavati lilāsvādah

atidurlabhah.—“Suddhādvaitamārtanda” of Giridhara-mahārāja). According to the Mādhvas however the essence of Moksha is neither self-dissolution nor mere enjoyment of the Lord’s sport, but becoming united with the Lord through the acquisition (by virtuous life) of a non-natural body whose essence is pure, unmixed bliss. Similarly another Vedānta commentator, Appayadikshita, describes Moksha as becoming one with the Lord and becoming possessed of the perfections of the Lord (Aishvaryyagunas). Thus the Lord is the Governor of the world and has the perfections not only of omniscience and omnipotence but also of effective desires (satya-kāmatva) and of effective resolutions (satyasamkalpatva). For the individual to be released means acquiring these perfections of effective will, effective desire, etc., and thereby becoming free from limitations. The released individual does not become reduced to pure consciousness (suddhachaitanya) as Shankara holds, but only becomes infinite and perfect. This Ishvarabhāvāpatti, this becoming God or becoming one with Him by inducing His infinitude and perfection in oneself, is, according to Appayadikshita, the release taught in the Shastras (*cf.* “Siddhāntalesha”). Yāmunāchāryya’s brief summary in the “Siddhitraya” of the various conceptions of Moksha as the realisation of the Absolute (Brahmaprāpti) may also be noticed in this connection. Says Yāmunāchāryya: Tathā paramapurushārthabhūtē brahmaprāptilakshanamokshē api svarupochehittilakshanah, avidyāstamayalakshanah, nihshe-shavaisheshikātmaguñochchedalakshanah kaivalyarupah, tadbhavaśādharmyalakshanah, tadgunasamkrāntilakshanah, tachchhāyāpattilakshanah, sāmsiddhikānandādis-varupāvirbhāvalakshanah, tadgunasambhavajanitaniratiśhayasukhasamunmeshopanitātyāntikatatkinkarat-valakshanah iti tathātathā vivadante. Hence Moksha

as the absolute life may be conceived, according to Yámunácháryya, as

(1) Svarupochchhitti; self-annihilation, Nirvána or extinction of the individual.

(2) Avidyástamaya, dispelling of Avidya, cancellation of nescience.

(3) Nihsheshavaisheshikátmagunochedalakshanah kaivalyarupah, the freedom of the soul by the destruction (uchchheda) of all its Vaisheshika or specific qualities.

(4) Tadbhávasad'harmya—approximation to or imitation of Brahma by the realisation of a state marked by resemblance to his being or essence.

(5) Tadguna-samkrántilakshanah—assumption by induction of the qualities of the Lord, the inducing of His qualities in the soul.

(6) Tachcháyápatilakshanah, attainment of His glory, splendour and light, the reflection of His grandeur, lordliness or majesty in oneself.

(7) Sámsiddhika- etc., -lakshanah, the realisation of the self's true essence as consisting in pure, natural bliss.

(8) Tadgunanubháva- etc., -lakshana, the state of being his sole and devoted servant as brought on by the emergence of unexcelled bliss due to the experience of His excellences or perfections.

Hence according to Yámunácháryya, Moksha, even as the realisation of the Absolute, may be conceived either negatively as self-extinction or as a positive realisation of absolute essence. The latter again may be conceived as a merging of self in the absolute or as being the absolute oneself. This latter again may be conceived either as mere freedom of the self from empirical life, or as the realisation of its essence as bliss, or as imitation of the Absolute in the Self, or as inducing of certain absolute

perfections in oneself, or as reflecting the majesty and glory of the Absolute in the Self, or lastly as realising the Absolute by surrendering oneself to it and becoming its sole and devoted servant.

The above is a fairly complete presentation of the Hindu doctrine of the Ideal Life as conceived in the different systems of Hindu philosophy. It will be noted that a common feature of these doctrines is the conception of the Ideal as a negation or, at least, as a transcendence of the empirical life proper. It is thus a super-moral spiritual ideal rather than a strictly moral ideal which the Doctrine of Moksha sets forth. Some systems, e.g., the Rámánujist and the Vaishnávik, ascribe a religious significance to this ideal by interpreting it as a life of devotion and worship of the Lord. But the general tendency is to regard Moksha merely as the realisation of the absolute life of freedom from the bonds of experience and Samsára. The question as to how this ideal is to be realised by the empirical individual is also discussed in all orthodox Hindu systems in their theories of Moksha-sádhana, i.e., theories of the practical spiritual discipline or training which is held to be necessary in order to realise the transcendental life of freedom from all limitations.

The Doctrine of Mokhasádhana.

As we have said above, the question of the Sádhana or right means of realising Spiritual freedom is also very fully treated in Hindu philosophy as being of direct practical import as distinguished from the purely theoretical question of the nature and essence of this freedom. The controversy here centres round the question of the 'relative importance' and efficacy of works, knowledge and faith as means to the realisation

of the absolute life. The main issue in this controversy is as to whether one of these courses can be held sufficient for the spiritual life or whether an organisation of different courses is necessary. This is really the question of the organisation of the personal life, *i.e.*, as to whether one ideal is to be the supreme or absolute ideal in terms of which all other ideals are to be valid, or whether there is to be a balancing and equilibration and harmonious cultivation of the different ideals. The latter is known in Hindu Philosophy as *Samuchchaya-váda* or doctrine of co-ordination as distinguished from the doctrine of a single and exclusive ideal.

It will be observed that the possible logical alternatives are :—

- (A) Only one course.
- (B) One with the other two as preparatory and ceasing after preparation.
- (C) One with the other two as auxiliaries.
- (D) Two and two (*samuchchaya*), both being co-ordinate.
- (E) All the three as co-ordinate.

Of these (A) comprises the three possible alternatives of

(1) mere works (*Karma*), (2) mere knowledge (*Jnána*), and (3) mere faith (*Bhakti*). Similarly under (B) and (C) we have (1) works as primary with knowledge and faith as (i) preparatory or (ii) auxiliary, (2) knowledge as primary with the other two as subsidiary and (3) faith as primary with the other two as subsidiary. Lastly, under (D) and (E) we have the various forms of the doctrine of co-ordination (*samuchchaya*), *i.e.*, the co-ordination (1) of works and knowledge, (2) of works and faith, (3) of knowledge and faith, and (4) of works and knowledge and faith, all the three.

It is however recognised that mere works without

knowledge or faith are of no use. Therefore the alternatives of (1) mere works and (2) of works with knowledge and faith as preparatory are not considered.

The Sāṅkhya insists on the course of mere knowledge as the proper means to Moksha. It is Viveka-khyati or the discriminative knowledge of Purusha and Prakṛti that leads to freedom of the Self by destroying Purusha's attachment to Prakṛti. Works are of no avail, neither secular works nor scriptural works. Both are perishable and both involve the impurities of destruction of life and the like (*Uṣhta vaś ānushravikah sah hi kshaya-vishuddhiyuktah*.—Vijñānabhikṣu). They therefore cannot lead to any lasting fruition, nor to any satisfaction which is pure and unmixed. This holds good also of the conditional (*kāmya*) as well as the unconditional (*akāmya*) scriptural duties (*kāmye akamyé api sādhyatva-visheshāt*.—Vijñānabhikṣu). The Pātanjala Sāṅkhya however recognises some other forms of works as necessary for purification and for destruction of the subtle tendencies and dispositions which disturb the practice of meditation. These are the works of self-restraint (*yamas*) and of self regulation (*niyamas*). Certain physical aids such as postures (*āsanas*) are also useful for meditation. Besides these, meditation on the Lord's glory and perfection is also an aid to dispassion (*vairāgya*) which is necessary for the proper discrimination of Purusha's essence. These are the pure works which lead to the knowledge through which freedom is realised. According to Patanjali therefore works are not to be abjured altogether, but the Sāttvika works as conducive to true knowledge must be performed duly till knowledge is attained.

Shankara also recognises a certain efficacy in works for Chittasuddhi or purification of mind, but works are not absolutely necessary in every case. Thus men may

be born pure of mind or may attain purification independently of works. In such cases works are not necessary, and knowledge of Brahma leads to Moksha without the aid of works. In all cases works cease with the attainment of the knowledge of Brahma, though in some cases works may prepare for such knowledge through purification of the mind.

The Nyāya-vaisheshikas and the Rāmānujists however emphasise the necessity of works as well as knowledge. The unconditional scriptural works are to be duly accomplished even when knowledge has arisen. They supplement knowledge by training the individual to disinterestedness and dispassion. Such dispassion with the knowledge of the vanity of things temporal quenches the will-to-live according to the Nyāya-vaisheshikas and thereby leads to freedom of Self. According to Rāmānujists dispassion is an aid to divine knowledge which by attaining its consummation in Bhakti or Faith and Prema or Love secures freedom by subduing individual self-will and reconciling the individual to the will of the Lord.

The controversy thus centres round the question of the place and relative significance of works, faith and knowledge in the spiritual life. The issues are between Intellectualism and Voluntarism, Activism and Quietism, Rationalism and Pietism. The familiar controversies amongst the medieval mystics, the scholastic disputes between the Thomists and the Scotists will furnish apt analogies to the Hindu discussions of these questions. But the Hindus, it will be noted, consider the question more from the philosophical and transcendental than from the purely religious standpoint.

The efficacy of works in conducing to freedom is variously explained by the Hindus in this connection. In the Bhāmati-tīkā on Shankara-bhashya four different views of works as being conducive to knowledge are

considered. Thus (1) according to one view, works have only a negative efficacy in conducting to Moksha. The unconditional scriptural works remove the taint of sin which is an obstacle to Moksha. By removing this taint it becomes conducive to Moksha through knowledge and meditation. (Atra cha yajñádīnām shreyasparipanthi-kalmashanivārṇasādhavārena upayogah iti kechit.) (2) According to others, the efficacy of works is not merely negative but also positive. Thus works become conducive to Moksha through an intervening merit (samskāra, punya) which it generates in the agent. Thus moralised and righteously disposed through the accomplishment of the works enjoined, the individual turns to unceasing and earnest meditation on the nature of reality. Such meditation at last destroys his nescience (avidyā) and the tendencies in the self generated by nescience. Thereby the Self reveals its purity, its freedom and its blessedness. (Purushasamskāradvārena, iti anyé. Yajñādisamskr̥to hi puruṣa ādaranairantaryādirghakālaināśevamāno brahmabhāvanāmanādyavidyāvāsanām samulakāśham kashati, tatah asya pratyagātmā suprasannah kevalo vishadibhavati.) (3) According to a third view, the efficacy of works consists in the cancellation of the debts or obligations (ṛṇa) that stand in the way of Moksha. (Aparé tu ṛnatrayāpākaranena brahmajñānopayogam karmanāmāhuh.) Thus an individual is under a threefold obligation in the empirical life. He has obligations to the Gods, to the forefathers and to the religious teachers or sages. All these obligations are sources of bondage and the effect of works is to ensure freedom through the fulfilment of these obligations. (4) According to a fourth view, it is not merely the unconditional works or duties that are efficacious in conducting to Moksha in the ways explained above but also the prudential works or duties enjoined for the satisfaction of

empirical wants. It is true that such prudential works are primarily laid down for the satisfaction desired and for those who do not desire Moksha they lead to no other end. But in the case of those who aim at Moksha they also are useful as being conducive to the meditation which leads at last to Moksha. (Anyé tu "tame tam vedānuvachanena brāhmaṇā vīvidishanti yajñena," ityādishrutibhyastattatphalāya choditānāmapi karmānām .. brahmabhāvanām pratyangabhāvamāchakshat.)

While therefore according to some only unconditional works are conducive to Moksha, according to others the efficacy of unconditional as well as conditional works consists in conducing to the meditation which leads to Moksha either (1) by removing the accumulated sins, or (2) by generating a merit which removes the taint of sin by leading to earnest meditation, or (3) by cancelling the bonds of the obligations. It will be observed that according to this view the lines of works and knowledge do not run concurrently as in the doctrine of Samuchchaya or co-ordination. In the Samuchchaya doctrine works (karma) and knowledge (jñāna) are equally contributory to, i.e., co-ordinate causes of, Moksha. Here works are made subordinate to knowledge as conducive to the latter. Hence in this view works are conducive to knowledge and knowledge is conducive to Moksha while in the Samuchchaya doctrine works and knowledge are jointly conducive to Moksha. This view also differs from Shankara's. For Shankara works are not necessary in every case. In some cases they may be conducive to knowledge by producing purification of the spirit, but the latter, howsoever attained, is the cause of Moksha through the knowledge of reality. Hence according to Shankara though works may be serviceable in some cases, they are not always required, while according to this view works are required in every case as being conducive to knowledge. In Shankara's view,

as well as in this, works must cease with the appearance of knowledge, but while in this view works are indispensable for knowledge, for Shankara they are not always necessary. The view of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā may be noticed in this connection. According to it works are mediately required for purification or removal of the taint of sin in the self. Without this self-purification there can be no knowledge of reality which leads to Moksha. Moksha has thus for its immediate cause the knowledge of reality, but in so far as this knowledge is mediated through works which cause the removal of sin, i.e., of the sin which is an obstacle to knowledge, works are also indirect or remote causes of the realisation of Moksha. (*Tatcha jñānam pāpakshayaṭ bhavati, sa cha karmānusthānāt, iti paramparayā karmanām api viniyogah.*) Hence according to the “Vedāntaparibhāṣā” works are necessary and not optional as in Shankara’s view, though indirectly or remotely necessary as causing the removal of the obstacle of sin. Hence this view is the same as No. 1 of the four alternatives of the Bhāmāti-tikā.

We have already seen that the Samuchchaya doctrine is essentially different from the doctrine enunciated in these alternatives. According to the Samuchchaya view, the unconditional duties are obligatory for the purpose of self-purification and cultivation of dispassion or ethical disinterestedness. Hence they are to be performed duly in all stages till Moksha is attained, i.e., their performance should continue even when knowledge has resulted from self-purification. This, for example, is the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Rāmānujists, etc.

Yāmūnāchāryya in the “Siddhitraya” considers the various alternative courses recommended for Moksha in the different systems. He considers five different alternatives in this connection. (*Tatsādhanato’pi karmayoga-*

labhyah, jñānayogalabhyah, anyatānugrhitānyatara-labhyah, ubhayalabhyah, ubhayaparikarmmita-svāntasyei-kantikātyantika-bhaktiyogalabhyah .iti) • Hence according to Yāmunāchāryya Moksha may be regarded as attainable through (1) Karmayoga or discipline of the duties, (2) Jñānayoga or the practice of meditation, (3) Anyatara, etc., i.e., either of the two alternatives of (a) works as principal with knowledge as auxiliary (sahakāri) and (b) knowledge as principal with works as auxiliary, (4) the co-ordination of works and knowledge, (5) Bhakti or faith with works and knowledge as preparatory disciplines. A special feature of Yāmunāchāryya's enumeration of the various courses is the recognition of the doctrine of the Anyatara or optional courses. According to this view, the choice is optional between the two courses, i.e., the individual is free to choose one or the other according to his own personal aptitude and inclination. According to Pārthasārathimishra's interpretation of Kumārila's view the individual is free to choose not merely the courses but also his *summum bonum* which is either Svarga, happiness in heaven, or Moksha, freedom from experience. The means is Jñānasahakṛtakarma for Svarga, i.e., works as principal with knowledge as auxiliary in respect of Svarga, and Karmasahakṛtajñāna for Moksha, i.e., knowledge as principal with works as subsidiary, in the case of Moksha or the realisation of freedom. Thus both knowledge and works are required in either case, but for happiness in heaven works are primarily necessary and self-knowledge is only an aid to the proper accomplishment of the works. In the pursuit of Moksha, however, self-knowledge is primarily necessary and the discharge of the unconditional duties is only an auxiliary aid to self-knowledge. Such self-knowledge with the aid of ethical disinterestedness as produced by the discharge of the unconditional duties leads to freedom in the sense of

Prapanchasambandhavilāya or severance of connection with the world.

The objection that Moksha is by its very nature an unattainable ideal is also discussed by the Hindus in connection with the question of the practical realisation of the ideal. The 'Nyāyamanjari' considers this objection in detail and concludes that such criticism is based on a shallow and superficial view of the circumstances that constitute our bondage in empirical life.

Critics indeed often express the view that Moksha is nothing but a pragmatic fiction. In their view it is a subjective construction which may be good merely for consolation in moments of sorrow and bereavement (shoka) and of anxiety and trouble (udvega), but it is useless and even harmful in the enterprise of life (udyamasamaya). There cannot be liberation according to them in the sense of freedom from the cycle of life or Samsāra and therefore there can also be no Purushārtha, i.e., spiritual end or good in the sense of freedom from experience. Those who allow themselves to be deluded by thoughts of Moksha forget that life has certain necessary accompaniments which cannot be got rid of.

Thus life involves the accompaniments (anubandha) of (1) certain specific obligations (ṛṇa) to be fulfilled, (2) the series of unavoidable miseries (klesha), and (3) the cycle of works and activities (pravṛtti). (1) The obligations include obligations to the sages (ṛshiṇa), obligations to the parental stock (pitṛṇa) and obligations to the deities (devaṇa). These obligations have all to be discharged. Thus obligations to the sages or spiritual experts have to be fulfilled by the practice of sexual abstinence and study (brahmacharyya). Similarly obligations to the parental stock have to be fulfilled by the begetting of children and thereby securing the preservation and continuation of the stock. Lastly the obligations to the deities have to be

fulfilled by the proper accomplishment of the sacrificial ceremonies as laid down in the Shástras. The discharge of these obligations will thus absorb all the time at one's disposal and hence there can be no leisure (avasara) for Moksha. As is pointed out in Jarámaryashrutih, our obligations (ṛna) continue all our life and cease only with death (mrtyu) and illness and physical incapacity (jará).

(2) Secondly, there are the miseries (kleshánubandha) as necessary accompaniments of life. They are the natural and necessary consequences of the Doshas or faults, *i.e.*, the faults of attraction (rága), aversion (dvesha) and delusion (moha). These faults lie at the very root of empirical life and the chain of miseries is only a necessary effect of the chain of the faults that underlies experience and birth into Samsára. Since birth into Samsára involves these tendencies or dispositions in the Self and since there are objects (vishayas) to stimulate them, there cannot be destruction of these Doshas, faults or evil propensities. As a matter of fact there is lapse even after they have been conquered and subdued: even sages and saints have been known to succumb when their dormant propensities have been stimulated by their proper external objects. There is therefore no real freedom from the inherent propensities and therefore also none from the miseries which are their natural consequences.

(3) Thirdly there is the cycle of Karma, merit-demerit (dharmádharma), birth, etc. Thus birth (janma) leads to karma or works of righteousness and unrighteousness, works generate merit and demerit, and merit and demerit result in a fresh birth with works, merit and demerit, etc. Thus the cycle goes on repeating itself without cessation, so that the chain of activity (pravṛtti) is a necessary accompaniment of life because of the effects of merit and demerit in all karma. Our deeds must necessarily mature into their proper effects. There can be no doing without reaping the

consequences thereof. There is Karmopashama, cessation or suspension of karma, only by its exhaustion through fruition (phalopabhogā). There is a natural causal relation (kāryakāranabhāva) between works (karma) and their proper effects (phala) and this holds good independently of the knowledge (jñāna) or the ignorance (ajñāna) of the agent or doer. Karmas thus cannot be exhausted by knowledge and the cycle of deeds, rebirths and fresh accumulation of deeds, etc., is thus an unending cycle that goes on revolving according to a fixed moral law in an unchangeable moral order. There is therefore no freedom from Karma just as there is no freedom from the miseries and the obligations.

It is customary indeed to distinguish four kinds of Purusharthas or ends, *viz.*, Dharma or righteousness, Artha or material wealth, Kāma or happiness and the absence of unhappiness and Moksha or freedom from life and its experiences. It is also customary to distinguish between righteousness and material wealth as mediate or indirect ends (*i.e.*, as means to ends) and happiness and Moksha as direct and immediate ends. Lastly, it is also usual to distinguish Moksha as *summum bonum*, Paramapurushārtha, or end *par excellence*, from righteousness, wealth and happiness as relative ends. But all these distinctions are open to the objection that they make of Moksha a possible end or good which is capable of being actually realised. As a matter of fact there can be no such ideal as Moksha simply because it can never be realised, and the right course is to seek the other three ends, *viz.*, righteousness, material prosperity and happiness (*i.e.*, one or other or all three) without bothering about any fictitious freedom from life and experience. As there is no such freedom, the individual should give up all thoughts of Moksha and should think only of the proper ordering of life with a view to realise happiness

therefrom ; (Mokshachārahcāhparityājya své grhé su-
kham āsyatām).

This view of the opponent to the Moksha doctrine is thus based on the impracticability of the Moksha ideal, *i.e.*, the impossibility of its practical realisation. It is assumed that the three accompaniments of life, *viz.*, the obligations, the miseries and the deeds, cannot be got rid of. As against this contention the Nyāyamanjari points out that there is no sufficient basis for such an assumption. (i) Obligation to the sages (ṛishiṇa), the forefathers (pitṛṇa), etc., is only a metaphor. There is no contract and therefore no obligation. (ii) Man is born free: the boy (bālaka) has no Rna or obligation (*cf.* Rousseau). (iii) Old age, death, etc., give us release from these obligations, debts or Rnas. This is the real purport of "jarāmryya" texts. It follows therefore that the so-called obligations are only aids to self-discipline. They have reference to the different stages (Āshrama) of life and are laid down in view of the special aptitudes and capacities of the different stages. Ordinarily there is a certain order in the unfolding of these aptitudes and capacities in the successive stages of the growth of the individual. The order of the disciplinary codes of the duties is devised in view of the ordinary, general run of men. But there are also exceptions to this rule, men of exceptional, supernormal spiritual capacity, and in such cases the order of the moral codes is not binding. Thus the order is binding on Aparipakkakashāya, *i.e.*, on him whose Kashāya or taint of Samsāra has not been purified, but for Paripakkakashāya or the person who is pure from birth, there is no Apekshā, necessity, of Ashramakrama, *i.e.*, of the order of the different codes as suited to the different stages. The order is not binding in such cases as because of an inherent freedom from taint there is no special need of additional purification in successive

stages. Hence for these there may be a direct transition from Brahmacharyya or stage of learning to Paribrajyá or stage of renunciation and universal life, *i.e.*, an intervening discipline of Gr̥hastā or family life is not necessary. But this holds good only in the exceptional cases and not in cases of ordinary men of average capacity in all which the order of the successive stages is compulsory. Hence there are two kinds of Brahmachāri or learners, *i.e.*, those who require no family life after the stage of learning and are learners as well as renunciates or mendicants all their life, and those who require family life after the stage of learning and sexual abstinence. In the case of the latter, according to some, a subsequent recluse life (vánaprasthya) is not necessary provided that there is due discharge of the duties without desire for the consequences (karmaphalābhisandhirahitakarttavýánusthána) besides practice of self-knowledge (Ātmajñána), *i.e.*, with the disinterested accomplishment of the duties combined with self-knowledge there may be Moksha even in the stage of family life without a succeeding life of retirement and hermitage being necessary. According to others however, after family life (gr̥hastáshrama) he may take either to hermitage (vánaprasthya) or mendicancy (bhikshácháryya) according as he is qualified by the family training (gr̥hát vanát vá pravrajat). Hence in this view the necessity of the order of the different codes is relative to the agent's spiritual growth, the order being binding on the immature and unnecessary for the mature. Some however think that the order is compulsory in all cases without exception. Whatever view may be entertained about the obligatoriness of the different codes, it is clear that their main object is the spiritual discipline of the individual with a view to his ultimate freedom. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that these obligations are a perpetual source of bondage

and leave no spare time (avasara) for Moksha. (2) The assumption that there is no release from the chain of miseries (kleshānubandha) is equally untenable. Release from this chain is possible by Pratipakshbahāvanādi, *i.e.*, by Pratipakshbahāvanā or contrary meditation and Abhyāsa or repetition. Thus contrary meditation is meditation on the vanity of the pursuits of life, *i.e.*, realisation of their true nature as incapable of yielding lasting and real satisfaction. It is contrary meditation as being contradictorily opposed to the usual erroneous idea of these as capable of yielding real fruition. It leads to Vishayadoshādarshana or realisation of the vanity of earthly things and constitutes the negative aspect of the meditation on the ultimate transcendental nature of things. Supplemented by Abhyāsa, practice, of dispassion (vairāgya), it leads to Doshānubandhanivṛtti, *i.e.*, cessation or eradication of the evil propensities that lead to misery. It is a mistake to suppose that our propensities are indestructible. They cannot be indestructible as they are (1) not accidental or uncaused (ākasmika), (2) not eternal (nitya), (3) not due to unknown and unknowable causes (nityājñātahetuka), (4) not irrepressible or ungovernable (ashakya-pratikriyā), (5) nor of such nature as to be unknown in respect of the means of repression thereof (ajñātashamanopāya). As a matter of fact, the propensities, *viz.*, attraction and aversion, have their ultimate root in Moha, Delusion, arising from Mithyājñāna or Erroneous Cognition. Error being the root of these propensities (doshas), right knowledge (śamyakjñāna) is the counteracting agency (pratipaksha). Thus right knowledge strikes at the root of the propensities by dispelling Mithyājñāna or the illusory idea of the worth or value of temporal things. With this illusion dispelled, there is evaluation of things at their true worth, *i.e.*, there is full realisation

of their utter worthlessness as means to fruition. This is Vishayadoshadarshana or perception of the vanity of external objects, and with this disillusionment as regards the true nature of objects there is also a cessation of attraction as well as aversion. The "Nyáyamanjari" notes that such perception of the vanity of things must be supplemented by meditation (chintá) and realisation by concentrated thought (bhávaná), *i.e.*, there must be realisation of the perception by means of earnest and prolonged meditation in order that the propensities may be destroyed with their roots. It is also pointed out that realisation implies mental equipoise and not Vishayadvesha, *i.e.*, there must be no antagonism and aversion to the objects in order that they may be realised as worthless. He that shows irritation at the natural imperfections of things is as foolish as he that is angry with the fire that burns the fingers on contact. (Sprshyamáno dahatyagniríti ko asmai prakupyaté.) The wise man therefore does not lose his mental balance either before the Anukula or favourable objects or before the Pratikula or unfavourable objects, but ascribes his happiness as well as unhappiness to the inevitable effects of his own doings. Thinking of the nature of things and of his own nature as determined by his own doings, he acquires an insight into the chain of causes and effects, and this insight (samyakjñána) produces mental equipoise. (Svakarmaphalamashnámi kaḥ suhṛtkashcha mó ripuh.) The meditation on the worthlessness of empirical pursuits is thus a sort of self-hypnotism which acts upon the forces of the subconscious and unconscious and thereby brings about the transformation of our nature or will. This is no casual or occasional remedy but Átyantikochchedha or extinction of the passions with their roots. The epicurean remedy by Upabhoga or enjoyment is absolutely useless: it only stimulates or fires the passions.

(*Trishnákhaniṛagádheyam • dushpura kena puryaté, ya mahadbhirāpi kshipraih puranāireva khanyaté.*) The course of meditation is thus the only proper course and the course of surfeit and cessation by fruition is bound to fail (*na jātu • kāmah kāmānāmupabhogena śāmyati*). Through meditation on the true nature of things there is cancellation of the illusion of the value of worldly pursuits, and this quenches the thirst for life and its desires and aversions which are the causes of misery. Thus comes release from the chain of the miseries.

(3) Nor is release from the chain of activities impossible as contended. With the extinction of the passions (*doshas*) the will (*pravṛtti*) ceases to accumulate Karma and thus there is cessation of Uttarakarma or futural possible actions. This is clearly stated in the Gautama-sutra: *Na Pravṛtti Pratisandhāya Hinakleshasya*—which means that for him whose Klesha, *i.e.*, passions and miseries, are Hina, quiescent, there is no reaction (*pratisandhāna*) of the will (*pravṛtti*). But this applies only to Uttara or future possible actions. Besides these there are also *Prāktanakarma*, *i.e.*, accumulated actions of the past with their effects including the part of the accumulated actions which is *Prārabdha* or in the process of fruition. The question therefore is: how is release possible from the *Sanchita* or accumulated past actions and from the *Prārabdha* part of the accumulated actions, *i.e.*, from the part which is already in the process of fruition in the life-time in question? As regards the *Prārabdha* part it is in all cases understood that it is to be exhausted only by actual experience (*bhoga*) in the particular life-time. (The idea underlying this view is that the actions which are in the course of fruition are part and parcel of the natural order of causes and effects. Any non-natural suspension of the course of these actions would mean a miracle which

snapped the natural link between causes and effects and upset the natural order.) The remainder of the accumulated actions, *i.e.*, the part which is not in course of fruition in a chain of natural causes and effects, is suspended by a different process. The *Mimámśakas* of course reject all ideas of the suspension or extinction of our actions holding that the cycle of Karma and birth into life as a consequence cannot be ended so that neither in this life nor hereafter is there release (*mukti*) from experience and Karma. Others however accept release as a fact holding either (1) that our accumulated actions are consumed by the fire of knowledge (*jñanāgni*) even before fruition (*bhoga*), or (2) that since Karma produces its effects with the passions (*doṣa*) as *Sahakāri*, therefore when the passions (*doṣas*) are destroyed, the Karmic potencies cannot mature, or (3) that the effects of our deeds are exhausted through a specific fruition in the *Yogin* who has attained true insight, *i.e.*, through the happiness produced by mental equipoise and contentment (*śama-santoshādijānitasukha*) and through the suffering of the hardships of physical heat, physical cold, etc., (*śītātapa-kleshādīdvāraduḥkha*), or (4) that the *Yogin* may consume the effects of his deeds quickly by simultaneous experiences through the assumption of different bodies, or (5) that even for the *Yogin* Karma must exhaust itself through its natural course of happiness in heaven (*svarga*) and suffering in hell (*naraka*), after which there will be *Moksha*. Hence neither the accumulated past actions nor the future possible actions are indestructible, nor also the chain of the passions and inherent tendencies which cause the miseries, nor again the obligations of life. Our miseries can be ended by knowledge and meditation just as our obligations can be transcended by the accomplishment of the duties. Lastly the chain of deeds and their effects can also be suspended by the extinction of

the passions, which prompt the deeds and lead to the miseries.

It will be observed that the cycle of life and its miseries, according to Nyāya, is : error (mithyājñāna), passions (doṣha), activities (pravṛtti) with merit and demerit (dharmādharma), birth into life (janma), misery and suffering (duḥkha), error (mithyājñāna), etc. The crowning folly is therefore Error, Mithyājñāna, Moha, which is the root, as we have already noted, of the attractions and aversions. Just as the cause of bondage is error of judgment, so also the means of release is intellectual insight, the knowledge of the true nature of things (tattvajñāna). As realists the Naiyāyikas define this knowledge as the knowledge of objects in their true nature, including even the Self within the category of objects, having *objective* essence or nature. In this respect the Nyāya intellectualism differs from that of the Shankara-Vedānta according to which the highest knowledge is not the knowledge of Self as an object distinct from other objects but the knowledge of it as the sole ultimate reality as pure consciousness or thought. The Naiyāyika points out that since there cannot be contradiction (dvairupya) in the heart of reality, Mithyājñāna or error must necessarily cease with the appearance of Tattvajñāna or true knowledge of things. It is assumed that knowledge itself is distinct from the object of knowledge and since true knowledge has the confirmation of the Viśaya or object while erroneous cognition has none, the former necessarily displaces or removes the latter. The former has moreover additional confirmation from inference and the other sources of knowledge. It will thus be observed that the assumption throughout is that the valid cognition displaces the erroneous cognition through the aid of the object and other extraneous means. This is in keeping with the realistic standpoint of Nyāya

and distinguishes the Nyāya view from that of Shankara-Vedānta. For the latter the cancellation of error is rejection of the rejected, the negation of what is not, a negative negation. But for Nyāya the error is a positive judgment and the negation of it is a real negation (aparīhṭaparihāra) through a positive realisation (apráptaprāpti) of the true nature of things, *i.e.*, a realisation of the unrealised as distinguished from the Vedānta intuition which is realisation of the already realised. The process of the realisation of knowledge is explained by Nyāya as follows: Pramāñnána-vishayabhāvanāprakarshadhyānavipákadhyānabhāvanāyām tasmināsthé tattvaprati-bodhi-jñānam pratyaksham utpadyate. In other words, there must be Pramāñnána or knowledge of the true nature of things in the first instance. But this is not all. After attaining such knowledge the individual must meditate thereon. This is Bhāvanā or meditation. When this meditation reaches its culminating point through a process of Dhyāna or continued, uninterrupted and arduous concentration thereon, there is not merely a bare cognition of things in their true nature but a realisation of this cognition in the form of a presentation or intuition. The bare thought or intellectual apprehension thus becomes transformed into a perception or intuition, and the process by means of which this is accomplished is a heightening of thought power by continued meditation and concentration of mind-energy. This is how conceptual knowledge is raised to the intuitive plane, and till this is accomplished there is no cessation of error nor the extinction of the passions. Hence according to Nyāya it is a positive intuition of the true nature of things which cancels illusion which is also a positive judgment. The cancellation of the illusion means not the cancellation of things or objects but only their transvaluation, *i.e.*, the realisation of their real

value in place of their face-value. This is Vishayadosha-darsana or realisation of the worthlessness of things and not Prapanchayitaya or cancellation of things as mere illusory stuff. There is only cancellation of the face-values and not cancellation of the things, the cancellation of the significance attached to them in the empirical state by the realisation of their true significance from the transcendental standpoint. The moments therefore in the intellectual intuition which conduces to Moksha are:— the realisation of things in their true nature implying realisation of what is really substantial and valuable as well as the realisation of everything else in its true nature as unsubstantial and worthless. The latter constitutes Pratipakshabhāvanā or counter-meditation and leads to cancellation of the illusory values ascribed to things in the empirical state. From the realisation of the true nature of things and the consequent perception through counter-meditation on the vanity of worldly pursuits arises dispassion (*vairāgya*) which is a disinclination for experience and fruition (*bhogānabhishvanga*). The essence of the counter-meditation consists in the endeavour to realise all things as productive only of pain and suffering. This is the Nyāya method of cultivating dispassion which is the effort to realise things as essentially evil even though actually they may lead to partial happiness in some cases. It thus differs from the Buddhist view according to which things objectively are nothing but painful stuff and not merely to be subjectively realised as such for ethical purposes. By this the passions are extinguished and the thirst of life (*trishná*) is quenched, and the individual, dispassionate and calm, becomes qualified for Moksha.

Hence according to Nyāya meditation on the nature of things is the cause of Moksha. Through this meditation there is extinction of the passions and release from

the miseries. Since the passions are auxiliary conditions of our past deeds maturing into effects and also of the future possible deeds, the extinction of the passions leads also to cessation of Karma, *i.e.*, both accumulated past Karma and future possible Karma. It is therefore knowledge that effects our release from Karma, *i.e.*, the knowledge of the true nature of things which destroys the passions. It is true that there is Karma even after knowledge, but according to the Nyāya-Vaisheshikas (as well as the Rāmānujists) there is no merit acquired by these Jñānottarakarmas or works done after the attainment of true insight. The Mādvās also accept Karma after knowledge, but according to them such Karma generates eternal merit (nityapunya). The Shankara-Vedantists hold on the contrary, that there is no Karma for the man of true insight, *i.e.*, no ceremonial duties, not even the unconditional duties. This is the doctrine of Naishkarma or cessation of duties after knowledge. Of course, the fourfold discipline (sādhana-chatushtaya) and the ethical virtues implied therein which have been acquired, continue, but they become natural and spontaneous, and consequently no merit is acquired thereby. Hence there is also no bondage as a consequence. Thus in the Shankara-Vedānta there is no obligation, no code of injunctions and prohibitions, no duties after knowledge. According to the Nyāya-Vaisheshikas (and the Rāmānujists) however, the unconditional injunctions are *duties*, *i.e.*, obligatory, even after knowledge, but there is no merit acquired thereby and no effect or consequence (phala), for they must be done without any desire for the consequence. The prohibited actions as well as the conditional duties cease after knowledge, and even the unconditional duties are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they are to be done according to one's capacity (yathāśakti). Only the Prārabdhakarmas, the actions

that are in course of fruition in the system of natural causes and effects, remain. With the exhaustion of these and consequent death of the individual, there is cessation of all Karma, and the individual becomes free in the true sense. Hence (1) according to Mádhyas, there are duties after knowledge with eternal merit, (2) according to Nyáya-Vaisheshikas, there are duties after knowledge, but not merit, (3) according to Shankara there is cessation of all duties with the attainment of knowledge.

The Rámánujists agree in the main with the Nyáya-Vaisheshikas in their view of Karma as a means to the realisation of Moksha, holding in common with the latter that the unconditional duties are to be performed without desire for the consequence even after the attainment of knowledge. They however go beyond the Nyáya-Vaisheshikas by insisting on the necessity of Bhakti, Faith, and Upásaná, Devotion, in addition to Karma and Knowledge. Thus according to them, Karma and Knowledge must culminate in Faith (Bhakti) and Love (Prema) before there can be release in the true sense. This is in keeping with the Rámánujist positive ideal of restoration and reconciliation with the world through resignation to the Absolute as distinguished from the Nyáya-Vaisheshika ideal of mere negation of experience and absolute self-autonomy. For the negative ideal of the latter, dispassion is the only proper course, a positive

resignation or surrender with a view to reconciliation with life by a process of transfiguration through the Absolute being unnecessary. For the Rámánujists however this is the very essence of true, concrete freedom as distinguished from the formal freedom of a negation without content. Hence according to them, the discipline of Karma and the discipline of knowledge are not in themselves sufficient: it is only as they culminate in the discipline of Bhakti or Faith that they attain their true end by being conducive to Moksha. (Karmayogabhaktiyogaprābhṛtinām bhaktidvāraiva sādhanatvam.) The nature of Bhaktiyoga is defined as follows:—Bhaktiyogānām yamaniyamāsanaprānāyāmapratyāhāradhāranādhyānasamādhirupāshtangavān avicchhinnasmṛtisantānasya rupah. ("Yatindramatadipikā" by Shrinivāsa). Hence it is of the nature of Smṛti or representation, an uninterrupted stream of representation which is characterised by the eight Angas or organs of Yogikā discipline, viz., (1) Yamas or virtues of self-restraint, (2) Niyamas or rules of conduct, (3) Āsanās or certain postures with a view to concentration of the attention, (4) Prānāyām of control of the vital forces through the regulation of the breath, (5) Pratyāhāra or mental rejection of all distracting agencies, (6) Dhāranā or apprehension of the object of meditation, (7) Dhyāna or meditation on the apprehended object without break or interruption, (8) Samādhi or becoming merged into the object as the result of

continued meditation. These are the eight Yogāngas or essentials of Yogika meditation, and Bhaktiyōga is the practice of faith in the manner set forth in those essentials. Bhaktiyōga again presupposes certain auxiliaries, the auxiliaries of Faith or Devotion. These are purification of the body (Viveka, Kāyashuddhi), dispassion (vīmoka, kāmanābhishāṅga), repetition and habit (Abhyāsa), the accomplishment of the sacrificial duties according to one's capacity (Kriyā, Panchamahāyajñanushthānam shaktitah), certain auspicious virtues such as veracity, straight-forwardness, kindness, charity, harmlessness, indifference, etc. (sātyārjavadayādānāhimsānabhidhyā-kalyānāni), freedom from elation in prosperity (anuddharsha) and depression in adversity (anavasāda). These are the auxiliary aids to the cultivation of Faith, and aided by these and cultivated in accordance with the essentials of yoga or meditation, faith becomes transformed into a living experience. Such faith again is two-fold, faith which is only a means to an end, *viz.*, the end of Moksha, and faith which is an end in itself. (Sa cha vivekavimokābhāyasa kriyā-kalyānānavasādānuddharsharupasādhana-saptajanyah. Evam sādhanasaptakānugṛhitabhaktih darshana-samānākārā. Sā dvividhā, sādhanabhaktiphala-bhaktibhedāt.) Faith is thus the means and faith the end. Through faith in which knowledge and actions culminate the individual attains that living experience

of unity with the absolute which constitutes true freedom and which is itself nothing but a living faith and love, an atonement in devotion and a restoration through surrender.

According to the Rámánujists therefore the steps in the realisation of Moksha are :—

(1) The abjuration of jñánotpattivirodhikarma, i.e., of actions which are obstacles to divine knowledge. These are the unrighteous actions (pápa) as well as the prudential actions (kámyakarma) prompted by desire. Through the preponderance of the factors of inertia (tamas) and of energy (rajas) they are obstacles to that mental equanimity which is a condition of true knowledge, and are therefore to be abjured.

(2) The proper accomplishment of the unconditional duties without desire for the consequence. These duties are the auxiliaries of divine knowledge (Anabhisamhitaphaláni karmáni brahmavidyotpádanáni). These auxiliaries of absolute knowledge (brahmavidyá) and faith (bhakti) which is the transfiguration of such knowledge are purification, dispassion, etc. Hence karmas are binding in all stages of life (sarváshramakarmápeksha), only for Moksha they must be done without desire for the consequence.

(3) Knowledge (jñána) which is Brahmajñána

or knowledge of the absolute. N. B. Lokácháryya holds that this is Tattvatrayajñána, *i.e.*, knowledge of the three Tatvas or categories, *viz.*, Brahma, the individual soul (jiva), and material objects (ajiva).

(4) Faith (Bhakti) which is defined as the representation of the ultimate reality (dhiuvánuśmṛti) which by continued and intense meditation (bhāvaná-prakarsha) becomes transformed into a presentation or intuition (darshanarupá). Such faith is also termed devotion or worship (upāsáná). This is the direct cause of Moksha, though indirectly Karuṇa and knowledge are also presupposed. Faith is thus a species of knowledge (jñāna-vishesha), *viz.*, knowledge of the form of an intellectual intuition or realised thought, *i.e.*, thought transformed into a presentation by means of unceasing and arduous meditation. Through such faith the Lord is gratified and pleased and releases the devotee by His grace (bhakti-prapattibhyám prasannah ishvara eva moksham dadāti).

It will be observed therefore that with the exception of the Bhakti school of Theism (*e.g.*, the Rámánujist and the Mádva schools) and the atheistic school of the Purva-mimámsá, there is general agreement among the Hindu systems as to the negative conception of the ideal life as essentially a state of quiescence. In this respect the Hindu ideal furnishes a contrast not only to the Jaina ideal of eternal progress but also to occidental ideals generally. According to Plato and Aristotle, the contemplative life is indeed the goal, but still it is life and not quiescence. Medieval Christianity however has laid more stress on the element of contemplation than on the element of life in the Greek view. Thus it has tended more and more to a negative view regarding the ultimate beatific vision as a state of contemplation bordering on quiescence. The West however has rejected this doctrine of negation in favour of a more positive

view. Thus the ideal of quiescence has given way to that of struggle for existence, and the element of life in the Greek view has prevailed more and more, while the element of contemplation has receded. This is quite in accordance with the Teutonic consciousness, Kant's doctrine of infinite asymptotic progress being virtually the philosophic reflexion of this Teutonic will-to-be. In orthodox Hindu systems, on the contrary, the negative ideal has generally predominated, the goal of Moksha being regarded as a transcendental state of deliverance from all activity or stress of life. This quietistic ideal has permeated even some of the theistic Bhakti systems whose conception of the final state differs very little from that of the beatific vision of Christianity. The heterodox Jaina system however preaches a doctrine of endless upper motion (anantagati) from Loka, empirical condition, to Aloka, transcendental condition,—motion which becomes infinite (ananta) after Mukti.

APPENDIX

THE MORAL STANDARDS IN HINDU ETHICS

An appendix on the Moral Standards is a necessary supplement to the presentation of the ethical system proper. The subject is capable of a twofold treatment, *viz.*, (1) with reference to the Svarūpa or definition of the Standard which is the question of the standard proper, and (2) with reference to its Prāmānya, evidential value and validity, which is a question of logic, epistemology and psychology. Both these questions are considered in the Hindu systems, and the epistemological and psychological issues are clearly distinguished from the ethical question proper. In the "Nyāyaratnākara," *e.g.*, the author (Pārthāsārathimishra) notes that with reference to the question of right or wrong (dharmādharma) two kinds of vipratipatti or doubt have to be resolved, *viz.* (1) as to the Svarūpa, nature or definition of right and wrong, and (2) as to the Pramāna or evidence in the matter of right and wrong (kim pramānake dharmah, kim svarupah iti). We propose to deal here with the definition of the Moral Standard as being the ethical question proper.

There are many definitions of the moral standard in Hindu Philosophy, some from biological, some from social and some from internal and other standpoints. For the purposes of the following exposition we shall follow the undermentioned classification as far as practicable:—

- I. The Standard as Custom and Tradition.
- II. The Standard as a Social Category.
- III. The Standard as an End.
- IV. The Standard as Law.

I. THE STANDARD AS TRADITION (LOKA-UPADESHA) AND AS CONSENSUS (LOKAPRASIDDHI).

In the "Nyáyamanjari" in discussing the moral standards Jayānta Bhatta refers to Loka-Upadesha, Tradition, and Lokaprasiddhi, Consensus, as the criteria of right and wrong. Loka-Upadesha, Tradition, is the standard according to those who hold that morality consists in the long-standing customs and usages that obtain amongst peoples. It thus differs from Lokaprasiddhi, Consensus, which is the standard according to those who insist on universal agreement of belief as the criterion of right and wrong. A distinction is thus made between Tradition and Consensus, the assumption being that as there are conflicting traditions obtaining amongst different peoples there cannot be anything certain or fixed in them to ensure their universal validity as the standard of right and wrong. Hence it is not enduring or long-standing customs that constitute the criteria of morality, but customs that are universally accepted as authoritative, *i.e.*, in respect of which there is consensus or universal agreement of belief.

In respect of consensus however there has been considerable divergence of views as to its ultimate character as a moral standard. Thus some have held Consensus in itself to be the test of right and wrong, while others have tried to resolve it into something more ultimate such as well-being and ill-being. Thus

(a) Some hold that Consensus as a standard is only secondary and derivative. The real standard is Well-being (upakāra) and Ill-being (apakāra), and Consensus or universal acceptance is the standard only as being conducive to this Well-being and Ill-being.

(b) Some again think that the ultimate standard into which Consensus is to be resolved is not mere Happiness

or Unhappiness in the psychological sense but includes also the biological criteria of Anugraha, Organic Well-being or Increase of Life and Pirhá, Organic Ill-being or Decrease of Life.

(c) Others think that there is a specific revelation behind Consensus, the Revelation of the Moral Law as produced by Shástra or Scripture. Consensus is based on this Revelation and derives its authority from the latter.

(d) Others again think that Consensus is not secondary or derivative as the standard of morality but is authoritative in itself and independently of any extraneous support.

II. THE STANDARD AS A SOCIAL CATEGORY.

The Standard as Social Good including Lokasthiti or maintenance of the Social Equilibrium and Loka-siddhi or Realisation of the Social Good.

In the preceding section we considered the moral standard regarded as Tradition and Custom. It was assumed that established usage of long standing has an authority in itself which validates its acceptance as the standard of right and wrong in the moral life. There is however no appeal here to social good as the ultimate criterion of the validity of custom though such reference may be indirectly implied. There are others however who insist on this test of social utility as the essential factor in the determination of right and wrong so that custom, tradition, etc., are authoritative only in a secondary sense as being resolvable into this ultimate test of social good. Thus the "Nyáyamanjari" notices also the following conceptions of the moral standard, viz., (1) the standard as Loka-sthiti or Maintenance of the Social Equilibrium, and (2) the standard as Loka-siddhi or Realisation of the Social Good.

It is to be seen that the conception of Loka-sthiti or Social Stability is more compatible with moral order than moral progress, while that of Loka-siddhi, i.e., Realisation of the Social End or purpose provides both for order and progress. It is also to be noted that the standard of Lokasthiti or Social Stability implies a relativism in the moral life which impairs its authority by depriving it of its absoluteness and necessity.

This relativism in the conception of Lokasthiti is very clearly brought out by Āryadeva in the Čatuhsatikā. It is pointed out that there being nothing durable or immutable in popular morality, it hardly inspires confidence in men's minds. (Anavasthitatvāt laukikasya dharmasya, tatrāstha na jyāyasi). Why? Because as righteousness (Dharma) is nothing but what maintains social stability, the social life is evidently superior to morality and determines the nature of the latter. Thus whatever is laid down by society for the regulation of family ties and relationships and of citizenship within specific territorial zones, e.g., what is laid down in regard to marriage and the like, is regarded as constituting morality. Morality and immorality are thus social conventions varying from zone to zone and age to age. There is nothing constant or eternal in righteousness, nothing that is fixed immutably by Nature, morality being merely a means of social conservation, the content of which must vary according to the changing circumstances, conditions and the particular organisation of the society which is to be conserved.

Yā yā lokasthitistāmstām dharmah. samanuvartatē Dharmādāpi tato loko valavāniva dṛshyatē. Loko hi yām yām sthitim vyavasthāpayati dēshakulagotrāchāravyavasthāyā kanyādānōdvāhānādikaṁ tām tām dharmah samanuvartatē. Tasyāh tasyāh sthiteh dharmah iti prasiddhigamanāt. Na cha 'eshah svabhāvavyavasthitasya

nyāyo yujyate, yat deshakālabhedayoh anyathātvāt anyāthā syāt.

On account of this relativism in the conception of Lokasthiti, the Mahānirvāntantra recommends Loka-Shreya, Social Good, as the moral standard, as distinguished from Loka-Sthiti or Social Stability. An attempt is thus made not only to get beyond the limitations of communal and regional morality but also to provide for moral progress besides moral order.

N.B.—It is to be noted that the conception of Loka-Sthiti appears also in the Mahābhārat but there it is interpreted as Lokapālana, Preservation of Living Beings, and not as mere Social Stability, i.e., Sthiti, Stability, in the Mahābhārat, is interpreted to mean Pālana or Rakshana, i.e., Preservation.

III. THE STANDARD AS END.

The Standard as End of Sukha or Pleasure

The hedonistic standard of pleasure also occupies an important place in the ethics of the Hindus. It is the Chārvākas that are credited with this sensualistic standard of pleasure as the guiding principle in morality. The Chārvāka motto of life is: live for pleasure as you can, and even if life is a blend of pleasure and pain the wise man should so regulate his life as to enjoy the maximum of pleasure with the minimum of unavoidable pain. It is sheer folly to forego pleasure because it is mixed up with pain just as it is folly to give up eating fish to escape the trouble of removing the scales and fishbones, or to give up cooking the meal to escape the annoyance of beggars infesting and disturbing us. On the contrary, we should be reconciled to life as it is and should endeavour to curtail our suffering as much as possible. This is true morality which consists in so regulating life as to make it

yield the maximum of pleasure. Similarly immorality consists in unnecessarily increasing the amount of avoidable suffering or pain. Hence rightness and wrongness are to be determined by reference to Uṣakāra, Well-being and Apakāra, Ill-being, i.e., by egoistic pleasure or happiness and egoistic pain or suffering and as the body as consisting of the elementary particles of matter is all that we mean by the self, soul or spirit, it is the bodily or sensual pleasures that count, and it is only the fools that sacrifice physical pleasures in anticipation of supersensuous pleasures to come in a future life. In fact there is no future life, the soul perishing with the disintegration of the body so that the wisely-regulated life is that which has made the most of this life so as to make it yield the maximum of pleasure. It is necessary therefore to live prudentially so as to increase our happiness and reduce our suffering in this life, and it is even proper to purchase the pleasures of life by incurring debts, and other similar means. (Ṛnam kritvā ghṛtam pivet.)

It is to be seen that the Chārvāka hedonism is gross and sensualistic as well as egoistic. It is the happiness of the self that counts in the last resort and a prudential and tactful regard for others with a view to self-gratification is the only form of altruism that is recommended as rational and proper. Similarly any discrimination between sensual and refined pleasures in view of qualitative superiority is condemned as foolish.

N.B.—It is doubtful however whether the Chārvākas really preached this gross hedonism which has been ascribed to them. The slokas ascribed to Vṛhaspati or some other Chārvāka teacher may be nothing but a caricature of their doctrine by their opponents, or they may be only exaggerated tirades of some Chārvāka controversialist against the conventional teaching then current. As a matter of fact we hear of different

classes of Chárvákas such as the Sushikshita or refined Chárvákas and the Dhurta or astute Chárvákas besides the usual run of the Lokáyatikas. They must have represented different grades of refinement in hedonism in their ethical teaching just as they are actually reported to have taught materialism, naturalism and scepticism in their metaphysical and psychological doctrines.

Some criticism of the Chárváka Hedonism.

The Chárváka sensualism has been severely criticised by all the orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy. The Nyáya, the Sánkhya, the Púrvamimámsá and the Vedánta systems are all at great pains to refute the dangerous creed of these free-thinkers. Thus Kumáрила in the Sloka-Vártika criticising the pleasure-theory, observes :

If rightness of conduct follows from well-being and wrongness from the opposite, how can contemplation be an act of merit or drinking be an act of demerit? (Anugrahát cha dharmatvam pirhátashchápyadharmatá, vadato japasiddhádípánádau nobhayam bhavet—"Sloka-Vártika," Second Adhyáya.) Or take the case of the dissolute rake. His sensualism may cause some little pain in the nature of compunction of conscience, but this is more than compensated by the intensity of the sensual pleasures he enjoys. Hence with the pleasure-theory as the standard of rectitude, the sensualist must be considered to be acquiring considerable merit by indulging in his sensualism (kroshato hridayenápi gurudarábhigáminam, bhuyándharmah prasajyeta bhuyasi hyupakáritá).

The above is a refutation of the pleasure-theory on the ground of the comparative feebleness of the pleasure in virtuous or meritorious actions and its superior intensity and strength in wicked and immoral actions. Others again refute the Chárvákas by dilating on the

transitoriness of pleasures and their impurity on account of their being mixed up with pain.

Thus Vijnānabhikṣu in his commentary on the Sāṅkhyasūtras condemns indiscriminate seeking of empirical pleasure as incapable of bringing lasting satisfaction to the individual. There is no lasting relief from the possession of wealth and other worldly advantages, for these are liable to perish or to exhaust themselves in the course of time and with the loss of these there is a recurrence of the pain. (Laukikādupāyāddhānāderatyantadukḥkhanivṛttisiddhirnāsti dhanādīnā dukkhé nivṛtté pashcāddhānādikshayé punarāpi dukḥkhanivṛttidarshanāt. —Vijnānabhikṣu.)

It cannot be denied that these material advantages bring some kind of relief, but it is neither absolute nor lasting relief, the pain recurring after an interval like hunger which revives sometime after appeasement. Moreover the relief which is thus earned by empirical means is like that of the elephant wallowing in the mud: just as the latter obtains relief against its bruised skin by soiling itself so does the person seeking relief from suffering through worldly gain and material advantages. (Dṛṣṭasādhana-janyānām dukḥkhanivṛttāvatyantapurushārthatvameva nāsti, yathākathānchit purushārthatvam tvastyeva. Kutah? Prātyahikasya kṣuddukhasya nirākaranavadeva tena dhanādīnā dukḥkhanirākaranasya cheṣṭanāt. Atah dhanādyarjané pravṛttirupapadyatē iti bhāvah. Kunjarashauchādikamapyāpātadukḥkhanivartakatayā mandapurushārtho bhavatyeva iti:—(Vijnānabhikṣu.)

Moreover this kind of relief earned by empirical means does not essentially differ from suffering. Why? Because there is no cessation of all kinds of suffering thereby. Again, even where these worldly means are effectual in giving satisfaction, they implicate their

possessor in sin because of the deprivation of others' claims. Lastly there is also pain in the effort which it is necessary to put forth for the acquisition of these advantages. (Sārvadukhkeṣhu dṛṣṭasādhānaih pratikārasambhavāt. Yatrāpi sambhavastatrāpi pratigrahapāpādyuttadukhāvashyakatvamāha. Sambhave'pi dṛṣṭopāyanāntariyakādidukhasamparkeivāśhyambhavāt :—Vijnānabhi-kshu.)

It is to be seen that this is also the refrain of the Shankarites' criticism of the Chārvāka Hedonism. In the Mahābhārat it is also pointed out that desire is insatiable because it grows by indulgence and hence there is no end to desiring and the consequent strife, pain and disappointment in the pursuit of pleasure (*cf.* Schopenhauer).

The question why pleasure is to be shunned like pain is also elaborately discussed by the Naiyāyikas.

Thus Udyotkara in the Nyāya-Vārtika in defining the highest ideal of life as Duhkhena Ātyantika Viyogah, *i.e.*, complete and absolute freedom from suffering, points out that there are altogether three views as to the relation between pleasure or happiness and pain or suffering :—

(1) It might be supposed that whatever is, is of the nature of pain : pleasure or happiness as a positive experience does not exist. (Sarvam svarupatah dukham : sukham svarupatah nāsti). This is the Buddhist view—a form of ontological pessimism which follows as a corollary from their doctrine of Universal Impermanence. Udyotkara rejects this view because experience contradicts it (pratyakshavirodhāt).

(2) It might be supposed that our so-called pleasures are only subtle forms of pain (Duhkhavikalpa), that happiness as an original positive experience does not exist (svarupatah sukham nāsti). Udyotkara rejects this view (1) on the psychological ground that it is incompatible with the twofold reaction of the will (pravṛtti), *viz.*,

as pursuit of the good and as avoidance of the evil, which supposes the existence of both pleasure and pain as original and positive experiences: and (2) on the moral ground that the purpose of righteousness (dharma) would be frustrated if happiness did not exist as a positive experience (happiness being the moral fruition or reward of righteousness).

(3) It might be supposed that pleasure exists as an original positive experience just as pain (svarupatah sukham asti) for it is so experienced by every individual (pratiteh), but there is no pure pleasure or happiness, *i.e.*, pleasure unmixed with pain. Udyotkara accepts this view. According to him pleasure exists just as pain, but they are Samánopalabhya, mixed up or involved in one and the same experience. Hence there is Abinábháva, inseparableness, of pleasure and pain, and this relativity of pleasure-pain consists in their—

(a) Samána-samittata, being produced by the same cause so that the causes that produce pleasure also produce pain (yánieva sukhásáadhanáni tánieva duhkhasáadhanáni).

(b) Samána-ádharatá, having the same ádhára, substrate or locus so that the conscious state which is regarded as the locus or Áshraya of pleasure is also the locus, Adhara or Ashraya of pain (yatra sukham tatra duhkham).

(c) Samánopalabhyatá, being experienced by one and the same instrument of experience so that the experiencer (here the manas, mind specifically) of pleasure must also be an experiencer of pain (yena sukham upalabhyaté tena duhkhamapi).

Hence Udyotkara concludes, Vivekahána or judicious selection of pleasure (as the Chárváka recommends) by sifting it from pain with which it is mixed up, is impossible. Therefore if pain is to be shunned, the wise man must be prepared to give up happiness along with it. Not that

there is no happiness as a psychological reality, only it does not exist unmixed with pain and should be treated as pain for purposes of ethical discipline. This is ethical pessimism as distinguished from the ontological pessimism of the Buddhists. Pain and evil are not constitutive principles of experience as the Buddhists think. On the contrary, the psychological reality of pleasure is a matter of immediate experience; only it should be treated as pain by the wise man because of its inseparableness from the latter.

The Standard as Ātma-Santosh, Self-Satisfaction, and as Atma-Labha, Self-Attainment or Self-Realisation

In this section we shall consider Transcendental Satisfaction as the moral standard as distinguished from empirical pleasure which is the Chārvāka view, i.e., we shall consider the standard regarded as the Shreyah or Good as distinguished from the Preyah, the merely Attractive, Tempting or Pleasant. It is to be seen that the conception of Transcendental Bliss is a necessary supplement to the negative criticism of the Chārvāka Hedonism without which the latter would continue to hold its sway over the mind in spite of the pain and evil which it may bring with it.

This conception of Transcendental Bliss occurs not only in the Upanishads, but is also to be found in Manu and Śaṅkara. Thus in the Upanishads a distinction is made between Shreyah or what is intrinsically excellent and good for the individual, and Preyah or what is merely pleasant. Shreya, the Good, consists in Ātma-Santosh, Self-contentment and Satisfaction, while Preya, the Pleasant, is connected with Vishaya-sukha or empirical pleasure. Every other pleasure is a reflection of Ātma-priti or Bliss that characterises the self, and hence Ātma-priti is the highest good and the standard of all good and evil. In fact whatever is done is done with a view to Ātma-priti

or Self-satisfaction so that *Ātma-prīti* is the highest good and the standard of all good and evil. It is this *Ātma-kāma* or Love of the Self, says the *Wrihadāranyaka Upanisad*, that reflects itself into all other forms of *Kāmaná*, Attraction or Desire. Thus the husband is dear to the wife not because of the wife's love for the husband but for the love with which the wife loves her own true self. Similarly riches are desired not because riches are themselves objects of love but because of the love with which the individual loves his own self. (Na vá aré patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati. Na vá aré vittasya kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati.)

Every particular desire is thus a reflection or mode of the desire for the realisation of one's true self which is the highest good, and this Good, *Shreyah*, is to be distinguished from Empirical Pleasure, *Preyah*, which arises from external objects. Thus in the *Kathopanishad* we have: The good, *Shreyah*, is one thing, and the pleasant, *Preyah*, is another. They attract the *Purusha* or individual in different ways by drawing them to different objects or ends. He who chooses *Shreyah* attains his highest good, and he who chooses *Preyah* is deprived thereby of his ultimate good or end. (*Anyachchhreyo'nyadutaiva preyasté ubhé nánáráthé purusham sinitah. Tayoh shreya ádadánasya sadhu bhavati, hiyate 'rthád ya u preyo bñrité.*)

Shankara commenting on the above points out :—

Good, *Shreyah*, means *summum bonum*, *Nishreyasam*, Highest Good, and is to be distinguished from the merely pleasant. These two, *viz.*, the good and the pleasant, being directed to different ends or objects, bind individuals in different ways with reference to their station in life. Of these, the good is constituted by truth, *Vidyá* or knowledge of reality while the pleasant is a mode of

illusion, error or Avidyā. Every individual is actuated to perform his duties under the influence of either of the two forces of Vidyā or knowledge and Avidyā or illusion. The individual that desires immortality is actuated by the idea of the good to eschew the path of pleasures, because without eschewing the pleasant there is no attaining the good. By seeking the good the individual realises the perfection and nobility of his soul. But the short-sighted fool that chooses the path of pleasures is deprived thereby of his ultimate good.

(Anyat prthak eva shreyah nishreyasam, tathā anyat utaiva preyah priyataram api. Tē preyah shreyasi ubhē nānārthē bhinnaprayojanē sati purusham adhikṛtam varnāshramādivishishtam sinitah vadhnitah. Tābhyām vidyāvidyābhyām āmakartavyatayā prayujyate sarvah purushah. Shreyah preyasor hi abhyudayāmṛtatvārthi purushah pravartatē. Anyatarāparityāgena ekena purushena sahanusthātum asakyatvāt, shreyah kurvatah sādhu shobhanam shivam bhavati. Yastu aduradarshi vimurhah hiyatē viyujyatē arthāt purushārtnāt paramārthikāt. Ko'sau? Ya u preyah vṛnitē upādattē.)

It is to be seen that the original passage speaks merely of a moral struggle as arising from two different possible ends which man may propose to himself—Shreyah, the Good, and Preyah, Empirical pleasure. Shankara however reduces this struggle to the metaphysical conflict between the Principle of Knowledge (Vidyā) and the Principle of Illusion (Avidyā). The choice of right as against pleasure brings in good while the opposite makes man lose his real good.

In Sloka 2 the psychological process underlying the choice of the good or the pleasurable is described. It is pointed out that the good and the pleasurable come to man in mixed forms, but the clear-sighted individual separates the good from the pleasurable, and then chooses

the good in preference to the pleasurable. But the dull in intelligence chooses the pleasurable for the sake of material gain such as the attainment of the unattained (yoga) and the preservation of the attained (kshema). (Shreyashcha preyashcha manushyam etah tau samparitya vivinokti dhiraḥ. Shreyohi dhira abhipreyaso vṛnitē; Preyo mando yogakshemāt, vṛnitē.) Shreya, the Good, is therefore mixed up in experience with Preya, the Pleasant; in other words, in the same situation there are possibilities of Shreya as well as Preya. The wise man therefore considers both sides carefully, weighs or estimates the relative worth of the virtuous and the pleasurable course, and thus separates the one from the other. When the two different courses draw him different ways, the wise man chooses the virtuous course in preference to the pleasurable one. The foolish choose, on the contrary, the latter for prudential reasons.

Commenting on the above Shankara points out:—

Though Shreya as well as Preya are under the control of the moral individual, yet owing to cloudiness of the intelligence they come to us mixed up. But the wise man knows how to separate the one from the other even as the swan knows how to drink away the milk by separating it from the water. In short, the wise man discriminates the good from the pleasant and after comparing their relative worth chooses the former. But the dull in intelligence, being incapable of discrimination, is led away by prudential considerations and chooses the pleasurable course as consisting of physical comfort and material prosperity such as possession of cattle, joy of family life, etc.

Yadi ubhé api kartuh sváyattē purushena, kimartham preya eva ádattē váhulyena loka? Satyam sváyatte, tathápi sáadhanatan phalatashcha mandabuddhinám durvivekarupó sati vyámishribhutó iva manushyam etah

prāpnutah shreyascha preyaśheha. Ato hamsa ivāmbhasah
 payāh, tātū shreyahpreyāpadārthau samparitya samyak
 parigamya samyak manasā ālochya gurulāghavam
 vivinakti prithak karoti dhīrah dhiman. Vivichya shreyo
 hi shreya eva abhivṛnitē preyaso 'bhyarhitatvāt. Yastu
 mando 'lpavuddhīh sa sadasaḥ vivekāśamarthāt, yogakṣhe-
 manimittam sharīrādyupachāyarakṣaṇanimittamityetaḥ,
 preyah pashuputrādīlakṣaṇam vṛnitē (Shankara-bhashya
 on sloka 2).

Hence there are two kinds of satisfaction: (1) Transcendental Satisfaction arising from Ātma-lābha or Self-attainment, which is Ātma-santosh or Self-contentment and (2) Empirical Pleasure arising from the possession of external objects.

In the "Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-saṅgraha" the relation between empirical pleasure and one's true self whose essence is self-contentment, is explained in detail. It is pointed out that empirical pleasure is desired only as it is believed to be a means to the realisation of one's true self. In fact, it is the self which is the dearest of all objects to sentient beings. The self is one's own (paramantarāh) as distinguished from other objects which are external; its essence is Ānanda, Transcendental Bliss, and it is the most beloved of all objects of love.

Ātmātaḥ paramapremāspadah sarvasharirinam
 Yasya sheshatayā sarvamupādeyatvamreḥchati.

(Sloka 627, "Sarvavedāntasiddhānta-saṅgraha.")

Anyasmāt api sarvasmādātmāyam paramāntarāh.
 (Sloka 628.)

Tasmādātmā kevalānandarupo
 Yah sarvasmādvastunah preshta uktah.

(Sloka 632.)

In the "Upadeshasahasri" (ascribed to Śhaṅkara) it is similarly pointed out that the Self is the end of all our activities, that there is no higher or better attainment than Self-attainment or Self-realisation, that all scriptural prescriptions and duties have this Self in view as the ultimate end.

Ātmalābhāt paro nānyo lābbah kashchana vidyaté.

Yadarthā vedavádāsheha smártāshehápi tu yāh

kriyāh.

("Upadeshasahasri.")

But this is true not merely of scriptural actions and duties, it also holds good in the case of empirical actions from material motives. Even these latter have self-attainment (Ātmalābha) as their ultimate end. But such actions whether prompted by motives of empirical pleasure or by the sense of duty or Dharma, do not lead to unqualified happiness; the resulting happiness is impure, *i.e.*, mixed with its opposite, *viz.*, unhappiness (viparyayah); also such happiness is Anitya, non-eternal, perishable. But the satisfaction arising from Self-attainment (Ātmalābha) is eternal. Again the satisfaction of self-attainment is autonomous, Svayamlabdha, while all other satisfactions are Anyāpekshah, dependent, adventitious, heteronomous.

Atmartho'pi hi yo lābbah sukhāyeshto viparyayah

("Upadeshasahasri.")

Svayamlabdhasvabhavatvātlābbhastasya na chānyatah

Anyāpekshastu yo lābbah so 'nyadr̥ṣtisamudbhavah.

("Upadeshasahasri.")

Hence the satisfaction in Self-realisation is (1) Pure, (2) Eternal, and (3) Svayam-labdha, *i.e.*, Autonomous,

Self-evidencing and Self-dependent, while other satisfactions, whether of pleasure-seeking or of performances for the sake of merit, are (1) Impure, (2) Transitory and (3) Anyāpekṣā, Dependent and Adventitious, and also (4) result from Anyadrṣhti, Attention to Things that are Non-spiritual.

This, it will be seen, is a new type of Eudæmonism, a kind of Transcendental Eudæmonism which radically differs from the Aristotelian Eudæmonism of the co-ordination of empirical pleasures. Similarly the conception of Self-attainment or Ātma-lābha is an original and unique form of the conception of Self-realisation which is to be distinguished alike from the Hegelian and Kantian conceptions of it in European Ethics.

Thus Ātma-santosh, Transcendental Satisfaction, is neither empirical pleasure nor the organisation of pleasures but represents the essential content and bliss that accompanies the eternally accomplished reality of the Self. Similarly Ātma-lābha is neither the positing of the Self as empty Law of Reason (without presentation in experience), nor the realisation of it by the co-ordination of conflicting impulses, but the rediscovery of an internally fulfilled Self which was missed only under the influence of an Original Illusion (Māyā).

There is thus an essential difference between Shankara's Transcendentalism and Kant's. Kant conceives the noumenal self as realising its rational freedom in Moral Consciousness as the Categorical Imperative of the Moral Law. Because the self cannot realise itself in the blind matter of sense which will never express its unity completely and fully, it presents itself as self-determining reason in the Categorical Imperative of Moral Consciousness, independently of and despite the opposition of our sensuous nature. Hence the autonomous self realises itself as a supersensuous reality as the Moral Law or

Ought of Moral Consciousness and not as a fact sensuously presented in experience. At the same time this Law or Imperative is not an arbitrary fiat or command but is the Law of Reason and thus implies rational necessity and not the freedom of indetermination. If now we compare Shankara's Transcendentalism with Kant's we find that in Shankara the negative attitude to empirical life is scarcely as pronounced as in Kant. In fact we shall see that some of the commentators have even tried to relieve the antagonism between the transcendental and the empirical by the conception of *Pratibimba*, reflection or copy, as we have in Plato. We thus see that in Shankara the transcendental is not merely the negation of the empirical but also in a sense its consummation and completion so that empirical values are the reflections, the imperfect and limited expressions, of the fulness of the transcendental self. Hence the transcendental self is an accomplished reality from eternity and does not require to realise itself as law in a specific act of the Self-legislating Reason. It is also autonomous in being essentially and independently real, *i.e.*, in being non-dependent on anything other than itself. It follows from this that it is of the nature of an eternally fulfilled experience whose essence is this consciousness of complete realisation or fulfilment as expressed in the feeling of contentment or self-satisfaction, and which is therefore to be distinguished from the self-realising ought or law of moral consciousness which is the reality of the Rational Self according to Kant. And just because it is not eternally fulfilled absolute experience embodying the quintessence of all reality it is the ultimate ground of all empirical reality, the source or fountain from which all other objects derive their reality.

This positive relation of the transcendental self to empirical life is brought out, as we have already stated,

in the doctrine of Pralimbā, reflection or copy by Shankara's commentators. Thus in the "Vedāntaparibhāṣa" we have a very interesting exposition of the doctrine as arising from the question of the true nature of Sukha or happiness. Sukha, happiness, says the "Vedāntaparibhāṣa", is of two kinds; (1) Sātishayasukha, relative or limited sukha, *i.e.*, sukha or happiness which is capable of being exceeded, and (2) Niratishayasukha, Unexcelled Bliss or unlimited happiness. The latter is the essence of Brahma or the Absolute. The former, *i.e.*, empirical pleasure, is a limited or partial manifestation of the latter, *i.e.*, a limitation of Transcendental Bliss or Happiness. This limitation is due to the defects and inequalities of the psychic modes through which the latter has to reveal itself in empirical life—defects and differences which are themselves determined by the dissimilarities in the objects with which the Antahkarana or mind is connected on different occasions. (Sukham cha dvividham, sātishayam niratishayam cha. Tatra sātishayam sukham vishayānushangajanitāntahkaranavṛttitāratamyakṛtānand-leshāvīrbhāvavisheshah. Niratishayam sukham cha Brahmaiva.)

The "Sikhamani" commenting on the above observes:—

Just as a particular psychosis, owing to the predominance of the essence of Sattva or medium of illumination partially reflects the intelligence which constitutes Chaitanya and thereby itself appears as a form of knowing, so also such a psychosis, by appropriating or reflecting in its essence of Sattva a ray of the transcendental Bliss that constitutes Brahma, itself appears as a partial or limited manifestation of happiness. It may be proved by agreement and difference that these psychic modes characterised by happiness are connected with specific objects of enjoyment (Yathā kvāchit antahkaranavṛttih

sattvagurajanyatāyā chaitanyagatajñānānśhapratibimbagrāhityena jñānam, tadā tadṛśi vṛttih tadgrat-ānandaleshapratibimbagrāhakatvāt sukhām iti vyapadishyaté; Tashyām sukhakakṣhanāyām vṛttāu anvaya-vyatiṛekābhyām sraḥchandanabanitādivishayāsambandhahetuh. Atāeva tattāratamyāt sukhātāratamyam). Hence differences either in the degree or in the nature of all empirical happiness must be ascribed to differences in their objective causes or conditions.

An objection however may be raised. 'If empirical pleasure is thus the psychosis that reflects into itself the transcendental Bliss that stands near it, why does it not reveal the transcendental felicity in its fulness in every case? But this does not happen as a matter of fact, for all pleasures would then be identical in nature and degree. The "Sikhāmani" disposes of this objection by pointing out that though this undivided Bliss always stands near the mind or Antahkaraṇa, yet it cannot be reflected by the latter in its fulness and purity on account of the influence of Mulā-Avidyā, an Original Illusion [Nanu yadi Ānandapratibimbagrahatvāt antahkaraṇāvṛttireva sukhām, tadā sannihita-paripurnānandasya api grahana-sambhavana sarvamapi sukhām ekarupam (ekarasaṁ nyunādhikyaarahitam iti yāvat—"Maniphrabha") syāt, iti chet na. Paripurnajñānavat akhūḍānandasya mulā-vidyāvṛttatvena idānim tadbhānāyogāt).

As we have already pointed out this affords an interesting parallel to the transcendentalism of the Platonic metaphysics. Plato also recognised an essential conflict between the pleasurable and the good, but instead of sharpening this conflict into positive opposition he sought to overcome the dualism by his theory of copies and his distinction of a sensuous and a supersensuous world. Thus the sensuous world is an imperfect copy of an ideal supersensuous world, and the transitory pleasures

of this life are the reflections in matter of the Ideal and Perfect Satisfaction that constitutes the good which is the governing principle of the supersensuous world. It is on account of union with matter that there arise the conflict and incompatibility of pleasures and the consequent strife and wickedness of this world. But in the ideal world there is perfect harmony, every Idea in the Ideal world being completely in agreement with the Idea of the Good and all pleasures being thus moments in the absolute satisfaction that constitutes the Good.

Hence with Plato as with Shankara empirical pleasure is a partial and imperfect manifestation of transcendental satisfaction, but while with Plato there is a harmonious co-ordination of specific pleasures in the supersensuous *Summum Bonum* or the Good which is thus a satisfaction constituted by a synthesis of individual pleasures, a synthesis which is lacking in the sensuous world of experience, with Shankara Transcendental Happiness is not a republic of pleasures with the element of conflict and discord resolved into harmony but is the infinite essence of the self representing its unqualified and undivided reality in its completeness and perfection. Hence the Infinite Satisfaction of Transcendental Bliss is a homogeneous undifferentiated infinite essence and not an organisation of partial pleasures—an infinite essence which is itself only imperfectly and partially manifested in empirical pleasures through the veil of Avidyá or Nescience. It is to be observed that Shankara ascribes the limitation of this transcendental happiness to *Mulá Avidyá*, i.e., an Original Principle of Illusion, a Power of Irrationality which limits the true essence of the Self and thereby causes the appearance of the empirical world of evil and imperfection, while Plato ascribes all limitation to *hylé* or matter which is an inert and inactive principle of division in which the ideas reflect themselves.

The Theory of Measure as the Moral Standard. • •

In the preceding section we have considered the standard as *Aīma-lābha* or Self-Realisation and as *Ātmā-santosh* or Self-satisfaction and we have also considered the refutation of the *Chāryāka* Hedonism from the standpoint of these theories. We have seen that Transcendental Satisfaction as being pure and autonomous is conceived as incapable of being attained by empirical pleasures, and hence the wise man's life is one of rigid self-restraint and freedom from desires. The defect of this view consists in its failure to appreciate the element of truth contained in the hedonistic standpoint. Because undue self-indulgence will entail suffering and misery, therefore all empirical pleasure-seeking is to be condemned. The objection to this ascetic morality is sought to be removed indeed by the offer of a purer non-empirical satisfaction in return, but the fact remains that in this view even innocent pleasures can have no place in the moral life, not to speak of the happiness arising from the higher sentiments and emotions such as patriotism, benevolence, humanism, etc. In the "*Ātmānushāsana*" by Gunabhadra, an attempt is made to remove this defect in the ascetic view without however encouraging indiscriminate, pleasure-seeking as the Hedonists do. Thus it is argued that sin (*pāpa*) does not result from the experience of pleasure itself, but from that particular kind of pleasure which destroys the righteousness of the individual (*dharmaghātaka*). This righteousness is the moral cause or condition of happiness. Hence pleasures that destroy Dharma, which Dharma is the cause of pure Sukha or happiness, are to be condemned as evil; and such pleasures always go beyond measure (*mātrādyatikrama*).

Na sukhānubhavāt pápam, pápam tadhetughátakárambhāt.

Na ajñanam mishtānnāt nanutātmátrádyatikramāt
 ("Átmánushāsana").

Thus indigestion is not caused by the mere eating of sweetmeats, but by their being taken in excessive quantity. Similarly pleasures as such are not evil, but pleasures indulged without moderation such as will upset the equilibrium of the moral life and destroy its true happiness are certainly evil. Hence immoderate pleasures are evil because (1) they destroy the soul's righteousness and (2) by destroying righteousness destroy the soul's true happiness. Hence all pleasures that are inconsistent with the soul's moral equanimity and true happiness are evil, and such pleasures always go beyond measure (*cf.* Aristotle). It follows therefore that neither the natural appetites nor the higher impulses and emotions are to be suppressed, but that they are all to be co-ordinated, systematised and regulated in the perfect moral life.

The Standard as Purity of the Motive (Vishuddhyanga-Abhishandhi) as distinguished from the worth or excellence of the consequence.

This is the theory of morality as enunciated by Samantabhadra in the Jaina-Kárikás and elaborated by Vidyánanda in his commentary thereon called the "Ashtasahasri." It is pointed out that righteousness cannot consist merely in the happiness of others and unhappiness of the self just as unrighteousness cannot consist in the unhappiness of others and happiness of the self.

Thus if righteousness were equivalent to happiness of others and unrighteousness to their unhappiness, then

should we suppose that Achetana, the non-sentient object, and Akasháya, the taintless saint, are also in bondage, i.e., have moral bonds or obligations, as arising from their righteousness and unrighteousness, because in them there is also the Nímitta, cause or ground, of happiness and unhappiness to others.

Again if righteousness consist in self-mortification, and unrighteousness in self-indulgence, then the dispassionate saint (vitarága) as practising self-restraint will have the bond of righteousness (púnyabandha) and the seer or sage (vidván) as enjoying self-contentment (átmasaṁtosh) will have the bond of unrighteousness (pápabandha).

Hence happiness and unhappiness, whether of self or of others, cannot of themselves constitute righteousness and unrighteousness. It is only when such happiness or unhappiness arise from the purity and impurity of the motives prompting the actions which cause them, that there is righteousness or unrighteousness. Otherwise the Árhat or Sage himself would be frustrated of his purpose, i.e., would not be free (mukta) as he would then be involved in the moral order by coming under the law of righteousness and unrighteousness.

The "Ashtasahasri" commenting on the above points out :—

At two ends of the scale of being, there are no merit and demerit, even though there may be benefit or injury to others. Thus some are below merit and demerit, e.g., non-sentient objects (achetanah), and some are above merit and demerit, viz., the dispassionate saints (vitarága). Only sentient beings that are not free from desires are subject, through their activities, to merit and demerit.

It is therefore not the mere fact of causing happiness and unhappiness that constitutes merit and demerit. They must also be intentional in order that there may

be merit or demerit. In the case of the dispassionate saint though there may be causes of happiness or unhappiness, yet the intention to cause them being absent on account of *Tattva-jñāna* or knowledge of reality, there are no merit and demerit.

Abhisandhi, intention, is thus a necessary condition of righteousness and unrighteousness, and not merely the consequences of happiness and unhappiness.

What, then, is the nature of this Abhisandhi, *i.e.*, this intention or subjective attitude, as distinguished from objective consequences of happiness and unhappiness? It is pure (*vishuddhyanga*) in the case of *Punya*, merit or righteousness, and impure (*samkleshānga*) in the case of *Pāpa*, demerit or unrighteousness.

Samklesha, impurity (of the mind) again is either

- (1) *Ārtta*, *i.e.*, of an afflicting, distressing character, or
- (2) *Raudra*, aggressive, violent.

(1) As *Ārtta*, *Samklesha* or subjective impurity manifests itself in

(a) the effort to escape from contact with the unpleasant;

(b) The effort to attain the pleasant (*manojna*) when separated from it;

(c) Absorption in the experience of pain and suffering (*vedana*);

(d) *Nidāna*, the desire for the acquisition of power which is not yet acquired (*aprāptaishvaryyaprāptisamkalpa*);

(2) As *Raudra* or aggressive, *Samklesha* takes the forms of

(a) *Himsā*, cruelty.

(b) *Anṛta*, mendacity.

(c) *Steya*, unlawful appropriation.

(d) *Vishayasamrakshana*, aggressiveness in the maintenance of one's property.

Vishuddhi, purity (of the mind), is also twofold being—

(1) Either of the nature of contemplation based on the consciousness of duty (dharmadhyānasvabhāva).

(2) Or of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of purity or perfection (shukladhyānasvabhāva).

Hence right and wrong are to be determined not by the objective consequences but by the nature of the subjective intention of the agent. This therefore is an attempt to go beyond merely consequential morality to the intuitional principles of right and wrong with a view not merely to their enumeration but also their classification, and the basis of the two-fold classification is not anything external but is a state of internal determination of the self or Ātman or that which the Ātman becomes. The ultimate goal however is the realisation of the true nature of the self (ātmani svarupāvasthānam), a consummation which is to be attained by purification through the successive phases of the contemplation of duty and perfection. Hence this is to be distinguished from the European goal of life which is one of ceaseless movement or progress as distinguished from rest in the self.

IV. THE STANDARD AS MORAL LAW (VIDHI, IMPERATIVE OR COMMAND).

The moral Standard is also conceived by the Hindus as a Law or Command which again is regarded either as a Personal Prescription of a superior to an inferior being (Paurusheya) or again as Impersonal Law (Apaurusheya) without a law-giver.

A.—The Standard as Personal Moral Law,

i.e., as the prescription of a superior to an inferior spirit. This is how the Standard is conceived by the

Chárvákas, the Jainas, the Buddhas, the Rámánujists and the Naiyáyikas. Thus:-

(a) According to the Chárvákas, the standard is the law imposed by the king, who is the highest earthly authority. The king's injunctions constitute duties just as the king's prohibitions constitute the opposite.

Thus according to the Chárvákas the will of the Sovereign determines right and wrong, but this is analysed further into the pleasures and pains of the individual. As pleasure is the only real good and pain is the only real evil, the will of the sovereign is the Moral Law, for the sovereign is the highest earthly authority and the dispenser of all happiness and suffering. (Sukhameva purushártha, dukhameva narakam. Lokasiddha rájá parameshvarah.)

(b) According to the Jainas and Buddhas however, it is not the prescriptions of the king, but the injunctions and prohibitions of Árhatas and Buddhas that constitute right and wrong. The earthly sovereign is an imperfect being like ourselves and his authority is based on brute force. Obedience to such authority is prudential and not moral, being based on the hope of reward and fear of punishment. But the authority of the Moral Law is spiritual and not physical, and can be vested only in the Seer, i.e., the Spiritual Expert that has attained perfection by self-culture. The earthly king is as much subject to the prescriptions of these moral experts, Árhatas or Buddhas as other imperfect beings.

It is to be seen that the appeal here is to the verdict of spiritual experts and not merely to sheer authority. It is thus to be distinguished from the prudential morality of the Chárvákas which is based on the hope of reward and fear of punishment. At the same time no eternally perfect being is recognised as in theism. The authority of the Moral Law arises indeed from the

spiritual perfection of the Árhatas and Buddhas who possess the proper insight into things and thus, are able to prescribe the right modes of conduct, but this spiritual perfection is itself an acquisition in time and not an eternally accomplished fact as theists assume. The objection that on this assumption the Árhatas would be themselves without spiritual preceptors to guide them is met by the conception of a chain of Árhatas and Buddhas which is without beginning in time—a chain in which the preceding Árhatas act as preceptors to their successors.

(c) The Nyáya-Vaisheshikas, the Rámánujists and other theists however contend that the Móral Standard is the law of righteousness as prescribed by God who is the Creator and Móral Governor of the world. Thus in the “Nyáyaparishuddhi” of Venkatesha we have :—

Right and wrong are determined by the injunctions and prohibitions of scripture. Like the commands of the earthly king, these scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are prescribed by God with a view to the governance of sentient beings and represent his beneficent purpose. Hence right and wrong embody the conscious purpose and intelligence of God, *i.e.* they are not arbitrary prescriptions of the Divine Will but represent God's rational purpose and end in this world. Right is that which the Divine Intelligence recognises as good and beneficent and wrong is that which it considers pernicious and evil. (Dharmádharmau vihitanishiddhyakriyásádhayatayá abhimatau ájnavato rájna iva sarva prashásituh ishvarasya anugrahanígrahákhyabuddhivishesharupau.)

Right and wrong are thus Buddhivisheshas, *i.e.*, forms of the divine purpose and not objective categories. Further the divine purpose is not an arbitrary fiat of the divine will, but the revelation of the divine intelligence. Hence Vidhi as the command of God does not constitute

he Moral law but merely reveals it—it is not law-making, but law-declaring.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas however the Divine Command as embodied in scriptural prescriptions is not merely declaratory (jñāpaka) of the moral code but also constitutes it (kāraṇa). The analogy is drawn from positive law which depends on the will of the sovereign. Moral causation is thus conceived after physical causation and the authority of duty is regarded as a form of physical impulsion or force.

Thus far we have considered the following theories of the Moral Standard, regarded as Personal Moral Law, viz.,

(a) Vidhi as the command of the king.

(b) Vidhi as anuśāsana, i.e., as declaratory of the Seer's experiences in the Pāramārthīc plane.

(c) Vidhi as the Command of God conceived, after positive law, as constituting and not merely declaring or revealing what is right or wrong.

(d) Vidhi as God's command regarded as revealing and constituting the Moral Law.

(e) There is yet another conception of Vidhi as the Moral Standard, the view which finds favour with a certain class of Vedāntists. According to these Vidhi is Brahma or the Absolute itself and not the mere prescription of a superior or perfect person. For the essence of the Vidhi lies in its obligatoriness as Moral Law which means that Vidhi has Prāmāṇya, validity or self-evidencing authority as Law which makes it binding on the individual moral agent. But Vidhi could not validate itself without being itself a self-validating experience, for the validity of the valid is only this that it posits itself in consciousness. Vidhi as Pramāṇa is thus Chidāt-maka, i.e., a self-establishing experience whose authority on the moral agent is nothing but its self-accomplished

character reflecting itself in the consciousness of the individual as something to be accomplished. Hence, Vidhi is Brahma itself which is accomplished (Siddha) from eternity. In the consciousness of the individual it appears indeed as Sádhyā, as a thing to be accomplished, but in so far as it validates itself it is essentially Prātibhāṣamātra, mere position in consciousness. As a matter of fact, the essence of Prāmānya, validation, is nothing but this position in consciousness and Param Brahma, the self-positing Absolute Consciousness, is thus the only Pramāna, the various cognitive processes being regarded as Pramāna only by courtesy, their validity being ultimately nothing but this self-evidencing Thought which is the Absolute in the light of which they appear. In so far therefore as Vidhi has Prāmānya, validity or authority, it is nothing but the self-accomplishing Absolute Experience which presents itself as something to be accomplished.

This is a new form of the conception of Vidhi as the Moral Standard which is to be distinguished alike from the conception of it as the prescription of a personal being like God and from that of an Impersonal Law without a lawgiver. It identifies Vidhi with the Absolute which is not a personal being but the self-establishing suprapersonal consciousness that lights up all experience. The authority of the Vidhi is nothing but the self-fulfilled reality of the Absolute Thought presenting itself in empirical consciousness as a thing to be realised in time. The close analogy of this view with Shankara's Transcendentalism is obvious enough. But while Shankara conceives the Transcendental Life as the negation of the empirical, the latter being annulled altogether in the consciousness of Brahma, it is urged here that the validity which attaches to Vidhi in empirical consciousness is nothing but the self-affirmation of the Absolute as self-validating experience.

Hence according to this view the empirical moral life reflects the nature of the Absolute in a way though it does not manifest it in its completeness and purity, while according to Shankara the empirical life is the negation of the transcendental life in Brahma which is to be reached only by total cancellation of the moral life in the state of Karmasanyasa or freedom from the bond of duty. It is remarkable however that in spite of this underestimation of the empirical life, the Shankarites not only recognise the value of morality in empirical life but also offer the original and novel conception of a gradation of moral standards and moral codes in accordance with the ascending stages of the spiritual life of the individual.

(f) Thus according to Shankara, the moral code as constituted by the Vedic prescriptions is impersonal in the sense that the Communicator (Vaktá), of the Vedas only declares the Law and does not create it by his fiat. This Communicator is Ishvara, Brahmá or the Lord and is thus to be distinguished from the Spiritual Expert or Áptapurusha of Jainism and Buddhism. In fact, it is eternally omniscient (nitya-sarvajña) and is also Srishti-Sthiti-Laya-Kartá, the Creator, Maintainer and Destroyer of the world, which theistic characters are lacking in the Áptas and Árhats of Buddhism and Jainism. But the Vaktá, the Communicator, of the Vedas, does not create but merely promulgates the Vedas as they existed in a previous cycle. Some of the Shankarites admit that some of the scriptures have a personal source such as Manu, Mahábhárat, etc., but they are all traced back ultimately to the impersonal (apaurusheya) Vedas. But even the Vedas themselves are empirical, i.e., true in a Vyavahárika or relative sense and untrue in a Páramásthika or absolute sense. They are thus all Mithyá, untrue, and are to be cancelled, but the Vedic Mithyá is to be used in overcoming the grosser or lower untruths,

and the Vedas themselves are to be transcended by *Brahmátmaekatvavijnána*, the realisation of the identity of the Self and Brahma. Now in the course of this process of *Sádhaná* or discipline for liberation the ethical standard may assume a different character according to the particular stage of the *sádhaná* or training of the individual. In the stage of the worship of *Saguna-Brahma* or Qualified Absolute, the standard is *Ishvarájñá*, the Command of the Lord. In the more advanced stage of *Sádhaná-chatushtayá* when external codes and external authority give way to internal sanctions *Átmasantosh* and *Átmalábha* may take the place of *Ishvarájñá*.

Thus according to Shankara even though ethical codes and disciplines are relative and empirical, there is an order obtaining in this sphere of illusion to which the moral agent must conform through a gradation of the moral standards according to the different stages. The ultimate goal indeed is the transcendence of the empirical moral life of the Absolute, but this is to be realised by cancellation of the illusion of the phenomenal life in successive stages in which the lower illusion is to be annulled by the higher and subtler ones and the highest to be cancelled at last by the intuition of the absolute. Thus, it will be seen, implies at once the transcendental unreality of the ethical codes as well as their metaphysical and moral necessity within the sphere of Illusion. It further implies a gradation in the sphere of the illusory empirical life in which specific codes with their specific moral standards have validity according to their proper sphere. It thus differs from the Hegelian conception of a progressive unfolding of the spiritual life in which the higher stage does not simply annul the lower but re-affirms the latter in a new synthesis by absorbing the element of

truth contained in the lower view. It further differs from the Hegelian view in that while recognising a certain order in the empirical life which must be conformed to in subduing it, it makes it the absolute negation of the transcendental which is therefore to be reached not by the transfiguration of the empirical but by its total cancellation in the intuition of Brahman.

. . .
B.—*The Standard as Impersonal Moral Law.*

The moral standard is also conceived as Impersonal Prescription in some systems of Hindu Philosophy. Thus the Purvamīmāṃsakas interpret *Vidhi* as Impersonal Law, which does not derive its authority or force from the will of a Personal Being, but is authoritative in and by itself independently of any personal origin. In fact according to the Mīmāṃsakas the reference to a Personal source is absolutely unnecessary: *Vidhi* need not be presented as the command of God in order to be authoritative and may simply be a verity of the supersensuous order, a law without a law-giver.

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